Thinking Security:

A Reflectivist Approach to Franceâs Security Policy-Making in sub-Saharan Africa by Erforth, Benedikt







A Reflectivist Approach to France’s 







Prof. Vincent Della Sala, University of Trento 
Date of Submission 
9 January 2015 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in International Studies.  
 
    
Abstract 
 
Recent years have witnessed increased French military activism in Africa. Despite efforts to normalise 
its post-colonial relationship and considerable downsizing of its permanent military presence, France 
remains a sought-after actor in solving African security problems. Notwithstanding French decision-
makers’ repeated promises that the gendarme of Africa belongs to the past, French troops have 
participated in nine military operations since the turn of the millennium. Against all expectations, the 
Hollande administration has stood out for being particularly interventionist, concerting a military 
intervention in Mali and deploying a peacekeeping force to the Central African Republic within two 
years of assuming office. The ambiguity between an interventionist policy and a disengaged discourse 
suggests that French military interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa no longer follows the same 
automaticity as in the past. The two interventions in Mali and the CAR testify to the intense ideational 
struggles between different belief systems that had shaped French actors’ minds and thus influenced 
decision-making processes and policy outcomes.     
 Economic interests and neo-colonial continuity have been traditionally identified as the root causes 
of French interventionism in francophone Africa. For the past two decades the literature on French-
African relations has been dominated by the so-called continuity vs. change debate, which scrutinises 
the presence of colonial / neo-colonial practices in the post-1990 French foreign policy. While 
ideational approaches to France’s African policy are not rare, few studies have engaged with the 
decision-making processes that produce French military interventions. Most studies focus on policy 
outcomes, which are rooted in static conceptualisations of ideas that are aggregated at the level of the 
state. Starting from these observations, the present study argues that the mere analysis of policy 
outcomes tells us little about the actual motivations that drive French foreign and security policy in 
Africa.           
 Instead of analysing French interventionism by relying on a predefined set of explanatory variables 
that are juxtaposed with a series of observable outcomes in order to falsify predefined hypotheses, this 
thesis explains French interventionism by drawing on actors’ subjective perceptions and motivations. 
The study uses the actors’ own utterances to explain why French decision-makers are ready to accept 
the considerable risks and costs involved in guaranteeing or re-establishing the security of African 
countries. Adopting an actor-centred constructivist ontology, this study not only identifies ideas as core 
explanatory variables but also traces their emergence and subsequent development throughout decision-
making processes. This approach goes beyond the dichotomous view that reduces French motivations 
to material interests or post-colonial ambitions.        
 Relying on discursive material such as official statements, verbatim reports of press conferences and 
parliamentary hearings, policy reports, and thirty-two high-level interviews with French decision-
makers, the present study narrates military intervention in Mali and the CAR from the perspective of 
French foreign policy elites under the Hollande Presidency. This recent and largely unexplored 
empirical material provides new insights into France’s foreign and defence policy. The study also 
demonstrates why and how the “Africa factor” still matters in France’s foreign policy considerations. 
The importance of Africa in France’s security policy has less to do with neo-colonial ambitions per se, 
than with the understanding French policy-makers have of themselves and their country. More 
generally, the findings show how comprehensive explanations of foreign policy can be produced by 
considering actors’ subjective perceptions. In so doing, the study not only explains France’s current 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa, but also offers insights into foreign policy decision-making processes 
in general, and thereby provides further evidence about how ideational factors influence the making of 
world politics. 
 
Keywords: France, Africa, Mali, CAR, foreign policy analysis, international security, decision-making, 
political psychology, constructivism  
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On the afternoon of 11 January 2013 two Gazelle helicopters with French Special Forces on board, 
which had taken off from an airbase in Burkina Faso, opened fire on a group of militants gathered in 
the Malian steppe. Despite the suddenness of the attack the group was able to respond and engaged the 
Special Forces in a fire fight leaving several militants and one French pilot, Damien Boiteux, dead.1 
Only a few hours later, four Mirage fighter jets of the French Air Force took off from N’Djamena to 
unload their superior fire power on a rebel hideout in Konna. Fifty militants died in the attack. More 
Special Forces were flown into Bamako and an armoured regiment based in Côte d’Ivoire set out for 
Mali. Operation Serval was launched and France was at war. Over the course of the next weeks, the 
number of French troops deployed to Mali increased steadily and exceeded 4,500 by early February 
making Operation Serval the largest French foreign intervention since the Algerian War. This military 
campaign followed President Hollande’s decision to help Mali safeguard its sovereignty by stopping 
the advancing rebel forces and eradicating criminal and terrorist groups, which were gaining ground on 
Malian territory.           
 Twelve months later, French troops received the president’s orders to intervene in another conflict 
on the African continent. This time French military action followed the adoption of UN Resolution 
2127 on 5 December 2013. Prior to that, French troops based at M’Poko airport in Bangui had been 
reinforced during the month of November. Within hours of the presidential order an additional 600 
troops landed in the Central African Republic (CAR) to curb the sectarian violence that was afflicting 
the country. Operation Sangaris was launched. Although less spectacular than the blitz operation in 
Mali, the peacekeeping mission was not less dangerous. Two decades after the Rwandan genocide, 
French troops were once again entrenched in a civil war where frontlines were blurred and it was hard 
to distinguish the perpetrators from the victims.       
                                                     
1  In the months following his death, Damien Boiteux became a martyr of the French intervention. Policy-makers 
evoked his name to refer to the courage of the French Army and the sacrifices France was willing to shoulder. 
New-born babies in Mali and a military camp were named after him.  
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 At first sight, these two tableaus are strong reminders of the early post-colonial era when French 
troops in Africa still numbered 60,000 and France was the uncontested guarantor of stability in its 
former African colonies. At that time, French paratroopers intervened on a regular basis to support or 
topple African governments very much at Paris’s discretion. However, the above descriptions do not 
belong to some distant past but to 2013, a year that marked France’s military reengagement on the 
African continent. The present study ponders France’s new interventionism on the African continent by 
examining the decision-making processes that have led to the two military operations respectively. It 
questions the principal actors’ perceptions and mental maps and thus provides a set of reasons to help 
explain the Hollande administration’s willingness to deploy troops in two conflicts within its former 
colonial sphere.           
 Over the last decade or so, Africa has played a more central role in the global system.2 Increased 
investment opportunities pique the interest of all major world powers and have made the African 
continent a crowded, highly attractive, and heavily wooed fairground for both state and non-state actors 
(Carmody 2011, 1; Severino and Ray 2011). China has been one of the most active players in Africa 
(Alden 2007), but the United States, Russia, Brazil, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also been 
establishing themselves as the preferred partners of several African countries and increasingly compete 
over access to resources and markets. This substantial economic interest in the African continent is 
accompanied by an increased emancipation of African state actors on the international scene and the 
simultaneous marginalisation of traditional foreign actors (read: former European colonial powers). 
Besides the cornucopia of resources and the many still unsaturated markets that stir the blood of 
investors, Africa’s security and the continent’s (in)stability have attracted the attention of all major 
global powers. In contrast to the economic realm, the realm of security remains more resistant to change 
and reproduces old patterns of an established hierarchical order. Traditional foreign actors from the 
                                                     
2  I employ the terms Africa and francophone Africa almost interchangeably throughout this study as a means of 
designating the sub-Saharan African region. There are two reasons for this choice. First, this definition complies 
with the use of the term in the French discourse. The French discourse distinguishes between sub-Saharan 
(l’Afrique) and North Africa (les pays du Maghreb/ de l’Afrique du Nord). Second, whilst most claims indeed 
apply to francophone countries more than to the rest of Africa a clear delimitation is no longer possible nor 
justified. Since the 1990s and the beginning of the normalisation process (see below) French actors have 
advocated a more comprehensive approach to the African continent. Their policies have increasingly addressed 
non-francophone states that were situated outside of France’s traditional pré carré.  
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Global North continue to dominate the discourse and impose many of the security practices in place. 
Despite repeated claims for African ownership in the security sector, Africa remains the region with 
most foreign interventions. Whilst in the past colonial and neo-colonial aspirations as well as Cold War 
strategic and ideological thinking justified foreign intervention on the continent, more recently 
references to global security, the striving for liberal peace as a response to continuous civil wars, 
humanitarianism, bad governance (usually framed in more euphemistic terms as lack of good 
governance), and rising religious fundamentalism often linked to Islamist terrorism are said to have 
made continuous foreign military interventions necessary (Ignatieff 2003; Barnett 2011; Schmidt 2013; 
Reid 2014).           
 Parallel to Africa’s emergence in global markets the past decade witnessed an elevated securitisation 
of the African continent revolving around the concepts of counter-terrorism, state fragility, and 
humanitarianism. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush, who during the 2000 
presidential election campaign had declared that the African continent had no strategic importance to 
the US, made ‘Africa one of his strongest legacies’ (Lyman and Robinette 2009, 2). The Bush 
administration identified an arc of instability as prone to the genesis of anti-Western terror networks 
reaching from Somalia in the East to Mauritania in the West of Africa (Keenan 2009).3 Likewise, the 
succeeding Obama administration demonstrated great interest in African defence and development 
policies to the point where even critics who doubted the existence of a reorientation in the US’s policy 
towards Africa was a paradigmatic shift acknowledged that ‘US policy makers have altered their 
conception of national interests in the region’ (van de Walle 2009, 3). Thanks to the advocacy work of 
US state actors and others, the ‘banana theory’ of terrorism, according to which terrorist groups 
dislodged on a banana shaped route from the Middle East to Africa, quickly began to establish itself as 
a dominant narrative within the Western-led global security discourse and gave rise to security-driven 
bilateral cooperation programmes as well as to the more encompassing Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), the 
Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), or the African Peace Facility (APF) (Keenan 
                                                     
3  Prior to 9/11, the ‘bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by Al Qaeda in August 
1998 had alerted US officials to the militant Islamic presence in East Africa’ (van de Walle 2009, 7). 
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2007; 2009).4 In addition, the US military established an African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007.  
 The belief in the interrelatedness of security and development have reinforced the perceived need 
for a comprehensive strategy towards Africa among the major global powers. In 2011, the European 
Union (EU) mobilised €600 million as part of its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. 
This new security interest in Africa made the international community also look towards those powers 
who had a longstanding experience in military interventionism and showed continuous interest in crisis 
management in the region. France was one of these and it soon became the US’s most important ally in 
its sub-Saharan counter-terrorism strategy and the EU’s “framework nation” on African security (The 
Economist 2014). In addition to the expectations of the international community and France’s allies in 
the West, it is the continuous demand on the part of the African ruling elites that have made France a 
particularly sought-after actor when it comes to Africa’s and notably francophone Africa’s security.5 
Notwithstanding the repeated promises by French decision-makers to reduce their country’s military 
activity in the region, French troops have participated in nine military operations on the African 
continent since the turn of the millennium. Both Africa’s salience on the international security agenda 
and France’s reinvigorated role as the most active foreign security actor in Africa ask for a re-
examination of French security policy towards Africa at the beginning of the 21st century. 
 Against all odds, the Hollande administration has stood out for being particularly interventionist 
since taking office in May 2012. Following the March 2011 Franco-British air-strikes that helped topple 
Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya and France’s alleged involvement in the arrest of former Ivorian 
                                                     
4  ‘Since the creation of the APF in 2004, the EU has committed more than €1.1 billion for Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs), Capacity-building programmes and the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). The three on-
going Peace Support Operations are AMISOM (the AU Mission in Somalia), MICOPAX (the Mission for the 
Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic) and AFISMA (the African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali)’ (European Commission 2013).  
5  The Global North’s inclination to intervene pre-emptively in African crisis situations and to stabilise the 
continent was endorsed by African leaders who benefit from external financial and political support (Schmidt 
2013, 11). A closer examination of this question reveals a less coherent stance on the part of African elites who 
fear subjugation to foreign actors, while at the same time—and this is true for many cases across the continent—
make use of external financial and political assistance to subdue domestic opposition. This creates an operational 
environment that is often difficult to evaluate for outside actors. For instance, the implementation of AFRICOM 
was a diplomatic disaster for the US. African opposition prevented the US from establishing its headquarters on 
the continent and forced the administration to establish AFRICOM’s temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, 
Germany. France’s interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011 were met with as many opponents as 
advocates in Africa. During the crises in Mali and the CAR, on the other hand, France could count on almost 
unanimous African support.     
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President Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, 2013 definitely marked the return of the infamous gendarme 
de l’Afrique. Within less than two years of assuming office, the Hollande administration pushed for 
military intervention in Mali and deployed a peacekeeping force in the CAR. In stark contrast to 
France's persistent vows to disengage, the year saw the country unable to stay away from its traditional 
backyard.            
 This is surprising, to say the least, given the non-interventionist approach to foreign policy initially 
advocated by the Hollande administration. A complete retreat from Afghanistan, further cutbacks to the 
national defence budget, the firm commitment to put an end to the existing defence agreements between 
France and its former African colonies—a process that had already begun under the Sarkozy 
administration—as well as the announcement to reduce France’s permanent military presence in sub-
Saharan Africa to the strict minimum figured prominently on the socialist government’s political agenda 
(Mélonio 2011, 31). Of course, one could dismiss these statements as empty; however, words were 
followed by deeds. French troops returned from Afghanistan and the annual defence budget for the 
period 2014-2019 reduced to 1.5 per cent of France’s GDP (€31,4 billion p.a.) entailing a cut of 34,000 
posts between now and 2020. Furthermore, given the restructuring of the former African cell, as well 
as President Hollande’s apparent indifference to African affairs and the highly praised narrative of 
African solutions to African problems, it seemed that the socialist government indeed reconfigured its 
overall defence policy and was finally putting the long-heralded but never fully realised break with 
France’s traditional approach to the African continent into practice. The signs were set on change and 
all the greater was the surprise when Hollande tipped the carefully constructed narrative of a rupture in 
the making by ordering a large counter-terrorist operation in the Sahel and subsequently committing 
further troops to a peacekeeping operation in Central Africa.     
 French troops had barely set foot on Malian soil when policy-makers in Paris announced the 
ephemeral nature of the mission and started evoking a troop retreat. The French daily newspaper 
Libération (2013) quotes Hollande on 15 January 2013 as saying, ‘France has no vocation to remain in 
Mali’. Two months later the French contingent reached its maximum strength of 6,000 troops. As of 
January 2015, 3,000 French troops remained deployed in the Sahel under the framework of the 
subsequent Operation Barkhane. A similar scenario repeated itself three weeks before Christmas 2013 
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when French troops were called upon to put an end to the sectarian conflict in the CAR. This time the 
retreat of French troops was declared even before the launch of the mission and engraved in the 
operation’s code-name Sangaris, named after an African butterfly known for its light footprint and short 
lifespan. As it turned out, hope and a good portion of optimism dictated the choice of the name rather 
than an exact evaluation of the difficult situation on the ground. The overall question that arises from 
above descriptions is how France’s two latest military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa can be 
understood against the backdrop of a general disengagement discourse.     
 Often France’s military engagement in Africa is explained with reference to the well-established 
narrative of neo-colonial domination. Neo-colonialism as an explanatory variable, however, does not 
offer any insights as to why discourse and practices in the two cases were fraught with ambiguities. An 
alternative approach, which finds much support in the existing literature on French foreign policy 
towards Africa since the 1990s, would explain France’s latest military interventions by placing them on 
a continuity-change continuum. However, such a long-term perspective risks reducing the complexity 
that defined each of the two decisions at the time of their making. Other explanations have interpreted 
the political and ideological seesaw described above in terms of a confused French state that lacks a 
coherent long-term strategy and therefore limits itself to ad hoc reactive policies (Cumming 2013). I 
contend that such explanations account only partially for the reality on the ground.   
 The ambiguity between an interventionist policy and a disengaged discourse suggests that French 
military interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa no longer follows the same automaticity as in the past. 
The two interventions in Mali and the CAR testify to the intense ideational struggles between different 
belief systems that had shaped French actors’ minds and thus influenced decision-making processes 
and policy outcomes. Starting from these observations, the present study argues that the mere analysis 
of policy outcomes tells us little about the actual motivations that drive French foreign and security 
policy in Africa. To overcome the outcome-orientated bias in the literature on French foreign and 
security policy in sub-Saharan Africa, this study delves into the processes of the decision-making 
behind France’s latest military interventions. By giving precedence to processes over outcomes and by 
putting individual actors at the heart of the analysis, the human face of decision-making is 
acknowledged. In other words, this research project engages in the demystification of the French 
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decision-making processes and aims at providing a more comprehensive response as to why 
intervention was decided in the two cases. Methodologically, the present work starts from two 
outcomes, that is, two policy decisions, and asks how these came about by disaggregating the processes 
leading to their emergence. Instead of resorting to predefined concepts in order to explain the two 
decisions, the explanations are inductively extracted from the French discourse. Decision-making 
processes, which often remain overlooked in the field of international relations, are thus the focal point 
of this study. The story told on these pages is a reconstruction of the events in 2013 and 2014, as 
experienced by policy-makers in Paris.        
 France’s two last military interventions in Africa—Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Sangaris 
in the CAR—have been selected as the present study’s principal cases for a variety of reasons. First, 
they reflect a specific category of events that can be labelled as “crisis situations.” During crisis 
situations policy-makers are forced to deviate from the usual path and adapt to new and unknown 
situations as well as to innovate to some extent. Since crisis situations ask decision-makers to leave 
familiar terrain and provide solutions to problems that cannot be solved by simply resorting to standard 
operating procedures, they constitute instances of increased cognitive and meaning-giving activity. In 
other words, crisis situations challenge ordinariness per definition and make room for new ideas and 
new agendas. At the same time, imposing change always remains a difficult undertaking and the 
innovative policy-maker will encounter resistance.6 Consequently, times of crises are times of struggles 
between different competing ideas, concepts, and approaches. Crisis situations provoke explicit and 
audible pronunciations of otherwise silently implied assumptions. Finally, as Widmaier (2007, 785) 
points out, crisis-constructions have their own dynamics that unfold during the process, and which in 
turn may become ‘(re)constitutive of state and societal interests’. For the social scientist interested in 
the explanatory power of ideational variables, they constitute an ideal hunting ground. Second, the two 
cases represent today’s two dominant global securitisation narratives and were categorised according 
to the two major justifications for foreign intervention: global terrorism and humanitarianism. 
                                                     
6  Resistance can also be located within the individual who intends to promote change. Individuals look back to 
familiar conceptualisation of the past and the present when analysing the unknown. Consequently, human-beings 
tend to favour continuity over radical change most of the time.  
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Juxtaposing the two cases allows for an emphasis on the differences and similarities between these two 
concepts and points to the apparent complementarity that decision-makers attribute to them, which in 
turn explains the genesis of similar solutions in fundamentally different situations. Third, the fact that 
the two intervened nations are both situated in France’s former francophone African backyard allow for 
some general conclusions about present-day French security policy in Africa. The two cases unsheathe 
the ideas, conceptions, and attitudes that French policy-makers hold vis-à-vis Africa in general and 
francophone Africa in particular. Fourth, and this is related to France’s role and position in the EU and 
the UN, a better understanding of the motivations for intervention in the French foreign policy apparatus 
also sheds light on common positions taken by the EU or the UN Security Council on defence matters 
in Africa. France’s political weight in those two institutions remains considerable, as one can see from 
the latter’s’ frequent alignment to the French position. In particular in the EU, France remains the 
principal—if not only—agenda setter in matters of African security. Already prior to the French 
engagement in Mali and the CAR, France assumed the role of the lead or framework nation  in each of 
the EU-led missions to Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2003 and 2006, Chad and CAR 
2007-08) (Olsen 2009). Referring to the 2003 EU Operation Artemis under French command in the 
DRC, Utley (2005, 35) wonders whether this was not just another French operation in a multilateral 
guise.             
 The work on this project began in 2011. At that time neither the crisis in Mali nor the one in the 
CAR had erupted. While initial signs of instability were perceived in the case of Mali, the CAR was 
entirely absent from international security agendas. In a certain sense, the final shape of this work owes 
much to the course history has taken over the past three years. As the crises in Mali and the CAR 
evolved, so has this thesis’s structure. In order to examine two such recent events, the analysis needs to 
maintain a certain degree of flexibility and be able to respond to the challenges of a moving empirical 
target. One could oppose this research on the grounds that such an exercise can only be achieved at the 
cost of analytical depth. Critics could further point out that access to sensitive and classified information 
is still restricted. For this and other reasons, data that has been locked behind the iron doors of national 
archives before being released usually enjoys an aura of greater authority over contemporary public 
discourse, which all too often is equated with public fooling. Whilst these are valid concerns—and 
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especially when questions of national security are at stake—they should not be a hindrance to 
conducting timely research.7 I have two responses to this sort of criticism: one stating the obvious and 
the other turning an apparent constraint into a desirable opportunity. To refute the feasibility of 
analysing the military interventions in Mali and the CAR for the seeming lack of reliable data would 
only leave the alternative of capitulating before this challenge. I am happy to accept the risk of erring 
where the data is obfuscated in exchange for the possibility to get parts of the story right.8 More 
importantly, however, the past two years have provided me with the unique opportunity to follow two 
decision-making processes of foreign and security policy-making closely. As the decision-making 
processes and this project concurrently developed, the analysis of the events on the ground can be said 
to have taken place in real-time. This is a veritable advantage, since the purpose of this study is the 
reconstruction of an actor-specific explanation of the decisions to intervene in each of the two cases. I 
have been able to trace the emergence of policy ideas, the struggles between them, the demise of some 
and the victory of others.         
 This thesis is comprised of five chapters, contained in two parts. The first part elaborates the 
conceptual tools used, which are then applied in the second part to analyse the two selected cases of 
French interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa. The theoretical and empirical findings are drawn 
together in the conclusion. Chapter One reviews the existing literature on French security policy 
towards Africa. By examining three strands of literature, the chapter establishes a comprehensive 
summary of French foreign policy in general and French security and defence policy in Africa in 
particular. The chapter covers the period between the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and 
today, but it focuses in particular on the last two decades of French involvement in Africa. Pointing to 
some shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature, such as the overt bias towards the past and the 
conceptual rigidity of many existing approaches, the chapter establishes the rationale for the present 
study by identifying how and why an ideational actor-centric analysis of decision-making processes can 
                                                     
7  A more detailed evaluation of the different data is offered in Chapter Two.   
8  The Cuban Missile Crisis is a telling example of how early political analyses and later historical studies were 
able to complement each other and to provide a comprehensive account of the decision-making processes at work 
during one of the Cold War’s most serious crises (Allison and Zelikow 1999 [1971]; Munton and Welch 2007; 
George 2013). 
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contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of French security policy in Africa at the beginning 
of the 21st century.          
 Drawing on the findings from the review of the literature, Chapter Two establishes the thesis’s 
theoretical framework, which will subsequently be used to examine the two case studies. The 
framework contends that structure and agency are relational to each other. Actors’ belief systems and 
mental maps are the prisms between brute and social facts. They are accessible through an analysis of 
discourse and practices, that is, the observable consequences that ideas produce. In a second section, 
this chapter advances the methodology informing the data collection and the qualitative data analysis. 
Special attention is paid to discourse and content analytical tools and their operationalisation. 
 Chapter Three constitutes the link between the conceptual and the empirical part of this dissertation. 
It develops a definition of agency, which is central to the thesis’s argument. It addresses the question 
of who can be considered an agent of foreign policy-making and provides an answer in the context of 
France. The different decision-units are introduced and their interactions are highlighted. According to 
the respective stage of the decision-making process, different actors come to the forefront. Overall, the 
final decisional power remains concentrated in what I call the decisional-triangle, which comprises the 
president, the foreign minister, and the defence minister, with the president enjoying the largest 
(although not absolute) authority.         
 Chapter Four is the first out of two empirical chapters applying the theoretical framework to French 
interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa. After a short description of the underlying causes and dynamics 
that led to the emergence of the security crisis in Mali with a special focus on the Tuareg question and 
the rise of Islamist terrorism, the chapter dissects the French decision-making process leading up to the 
launch of Operation Serval on 11 January 2013 and France’s vigorous engagement in the Global War 
on Terror (GWoT). This chapter addresses the underlying question of how and why a shift in discourse 
and practice from a no-boots-on-the-ground policy to a quasi-unilateral intervention could occur.9 In 
more general terms, the chapter contributes to a better understanding of how the dominant narrative of 
                                                     
9  With quasi-unilateral intervention I refer to interventions that bear all characteristics of unilateral interventions 
in particular at the operational level but enjoy the political support of a larger alliance. Quasi-unilateral 
interventions are accompanied by an intensive diplomatic activity.  
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global terrorism, together with the sentiment of proximity, became powerful drivers of interventionism. 
The analysis of the decision-making processes in this and the following chapter are divided into three 
stages: the inclusion of the crisis on the French security agenda, its framing and diffusion, and the 
decision itself. This tripartite structure has been chosen to ensure a clear and readable account. In reality, 
the three phases are not strictly separated from each other but overlap.    
 Chapter Five deals with the concept of humanitarian interventionism, the alleged principal 
motivation behind Operation Sangaris in the CAR. Like Chapter Four, the first section provides a 
background note on the political and security situation in the CAR and traces the principal causes of 
inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence that engulfed the CAR. The remainder of this chapter 
discusses the French decision-making process and shows how the eventual solution emerged from 
intensive struggles between different sets of principles. It also suggests that the intervention in the CAR 
was as much a product of the French actors’ self-perception and a response to the actors’ quest for 
honour and standing as it was a product of a needs-based assessment of the situation on the ground.  
 In conclusion, allow me to paraphrase Allison (1999 [1971]) in saying that this study attempts to 
address the entire foreign policy community, which comprises both “artists” and “scientists”. For the 
artist, a detailed analysis of the decision-making procedures that led to the two military operations may 
be particularly palatable. To my knowledge, there exists no detailed examination of decision-making 
processes that explains France’s military interventions in Mali and the CAR. Chapters Four and Five 
remedy this deficit. Each can be read as stand-alone chapter. But it is only in conjunction with each 
other that the comparative dimension of the present study becomes visible. For the scientist, the 
theoretical framework and its application to the rough terrain of empirical reality may bear the greatest 
interest and be considered the actual contribution of this work. A first understanding of the study’s 
theoretical framework and its implications can be gained by looking at Chapter Two as well as the 
conclusion. By applying an ideational framework to two recent instances of decision-making I seek to 
contribute to the debate on ideational foreign policy analysis and, in particular, show that a theoretically 
informed empirical investigation is not only feasible but can provide powerful explanations and yield 
new and interesting results that go beyond the case of French security policy in Africa itself.  
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Chapter One  
French Security Policy in Africa: A Review 
of the Literature 
 
 
France is not really itself unless it has a rank 
—Charles de Gaulle 
 
Dès ma prise de fonction, j'ai dit que plusieurs traits dessinaient, en effet, la position 





France's relations with the African continent have captivated the French and international media and 
fuelled intellectual and political debates for many years. Being at the heart of French foreign policy, 
France’s Africa policy is inextricably intertwined with the country’s national identity. It both determines 
and is determined by French national identity and constitutes an integral component of policy-makers’ 
role conception as representatives of a puissance d’influence (influential power). France’s position in 
Europe and the world is to a large extent shaped by its role in Africa. Although French policy-making 
in Africa ranges from the economic and the political to the cultural realms, the most visible 
manifestation of French activism remains the military domain.     
 Given its salience in both public and academic debates the topic has led to a large number of 
publications over the past four decades. Academic articles are flanked by op-eds and detailed case 
studies written by pundits with specific political agendas in mind. Advocates (L. Dominici and F. 
Dominici 2005) and opponents (Verschave 1998; Verschave 2000; Foutoyet 2009) of the special 
Franco-African relationship vie with each other for the prerogative of interpretation. Journalists, public 
intellectuals, politicians, diplomats, business elites, and human rights activists, all make strong truth 
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claims about what is the Franco-African relationship and what it should be. Truth and myth blend in 
those debates. Although all social phenomena are a combination of fact and fiction (Lebow 2010, 276–
83), the case of the Franco-African relationship and French policy-making in Africa remains 
exceptional by force of the highly politicised and emotional nature of the topic. An exceptionally high 
degree of normativity also shaped the debates about Mali and the CAR.      
 For the time being, most studies dealing with Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Sangaris in 
the CAR are written by either journalists or political commentators who are familiar with the actors and 
practices of French policy-making in Africa and, as many of them proudly underline, are fine 
connoisseurs of the African continent. While enriching the debate with precise recitals of observable 
facts, detailed descriptions of operational plans and military campaigns, and confidential accounts from 
within the decision-making apparatus, the large majority of these contributions ignore the merits of 
theory-driven social enquiry (Lasserre and Oberlé 2013; Flichy 2013; Perret 2014; Flichy, Mézin-
Bourginaud, and Mathias 2014; Notin 2014). Published work by academics on the two military 
operations has hitherto mostly been limited to short briefing notes or op-eds as well as some longer 
studies emanating from the think-tank milieu (Arieff 2013b; Durand 2013; Heisbourg 2013; Koepf 
2013a; Marchal 2013a; Marchal 2013b; Mehler 2013; Wing 2013; IRIN News 2014; Barrios and Koepf 
2014). To my knowledge, no foreign policy analysis has yet examined the decision-making processes 
behind France’s two latest military interventions in detail.10      
 We can begin to place the Malian and Central African cases within the broader debates of France’s 
security policy-making in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, the present chapter reviews three strands of 
literature that account for the major debates and current state of research on French foreign and security 
policy-making in Africa. The first part reviews the general characteristics of French foreign policy. The 
second part introduces the reader to the longstanding relationship between France and parts of the 
                                                     
10  For an exception see Notin (2014) who proposes a process-orientated analysis of Operation Serval. Starting 
from the inclusion of the Malian crisis on the French political agenda, the author provides a detailed account of 
the different stages of the decision-making process. Drawing on a large number of in-depth interviews with French 
decision-makers, Notin is able to reconstruct the decision-making process from the perspective of the actors. 
Several claims I advance in Chapter Five are confirmed by Notin’s study. However, Notin exclusively focusses 
on a reconstruction of the process and is less interested in distinguishing the ideational variables that explain 
France’s activism in more general terms and beyond the immediate threat perception. In addition, his focus lies 
on the operational and not the political level.  
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African continent, while the last part focusses more specifically on France’s defence and security policy 
as well as on French interventionism in Africa. By highlighting the trends and shortcomings in the 
literature, the chapter not only acquaints the reader with the terminologies that shape the debate and 
situates the study in its broader context but also identifies how an ideational actor-centric analysis of 
decision-making processes can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of French security 
policy in Africa.  
 
1.1 French Foreign Policy: Between Grandeur and Decline 
Foreign policy is a constitutive element of France’s national identity (Appleton 2009, 8). Founded in 
the wake of the Algerian War, the birth of the Fifth Republic was directly related to an external event 
(Balme 2009, 138). At that time, de Gaulle ‘was trying to recreate a nation and a state wrecked by 
decadence, defeat, and division’ (Hoffmann 1960, 142). In search of a place and role in the post-WWII 
international system for his country he considered a proactive foreign policy the panacea to re-establish 
France’s international standing and to resolve internal divisions (Cerny 1980, 88). De Gaulle was 
convinced that France still possessed the potential to rank among the world’s great powers, despite the 
undeniable gap in terms of resources and material capacities, which separated France from the US and 
the USSR. He justified this reasoning with reference to France’s history and the symbolic power of a 
proactive foreign policy, which could compensate for deficits in other realms. Foreign policy decision-
making, in other words, was understood as being essential to France’s very survival as a nation: ‘Since 
we are not anymore a Great Power, we need a great policy; if we do not have such a great policy, given 
we are not a Great Power anymore, we won’t be anything’ (quoted in Bozo 2012, 8).11 De Gaulle 
considered the realm of foreign policy as too crucial as to relinquish it to the quarrels of partisan politics 
and declared it a presidential prerogative (domaine réservé). Inherent to the Fifth Republic’s 
institutional DNA was a commitment to making foreign policy central to governing and political 
                                                     
11  ‘C’est parce que nous ne sommes plus une grande puissance qu’il nous faut une grande politique, parce que, 
si nous n’avons pas une grande politique, comme nous ne sommes plus une grande puissance, nous ne serons plus 
rien’.  
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stability. Central to this was a great power policy and the acknowledgment of partisan politics 
weakening France externally and thus also creating political instability domestically. Consequently, the 
longstanding balance between parliamentary dominance and charismatic-authoritarian rule that had 
characterised the French political system shifted in favour of the latter (Bratberg 2005, 28).  
 De Gaulle’s successors, regardless of their political hue, abided to these basic principles (Bayart 
1990, 48). It thus can be argued that these earlier endeavours by the French elite to reconstitute their 
country’s great power status and to regain some of its past glory generated a very specific type of foreign 
policy, which scholars later defined as foreign policy of projection (politique étrangère de projection) 
and which continues to provide a guiding frame for French decision-makers until present. At the heart 
of this policy lies the idea of projecting ‘political, economic, and cultural influence beyond the national 
territory’ (Charillon 2002, 916–17). The belief in the universalism of its values, and by extension its 
foreign policy-making has made France a particularly active actor as well as vigorous democracy and 
human rights promoter on the global stage. According to Charillon (2011, 10–15), foreign policy in the 
Fifth Republic can best be described as a composition of emanation, resistance, and reinvention of 
French power.12 With resistance Charillon refers to France’s constant striving to provide alternative 
interpretations of an international system, which French policy-makers have considered as being overly 
dominated by Anglo-Saxon political and ideological traditions. Balme (2009, 138–39) also proposes a 
tripartite definition of French foreign policy. Like Charillon, he stresses the ‘search for leadership in 
international relations based on a policy of strict independence’. The ‘reinvention of French power’ 
finds its equivalent in Balme’s notion of ‘diplomacy of movement’, which constantly adapts to an 
altering operational environment.         
 De Gaulle’s empty chair policy in Europe, the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military 
command structure in 1966,13 the Hexagone’s special relationship with the developing world and in 
particular its former colonies, the balancing act between the two Cold War blocs, or Chirac’s refusal to 
back the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 are all part of a series of events that have generated the 
                                                     
12  The French word rayonnement (emanation) refers to a country’s capability to exercise influence beyond its 
borders, employing both hard and soft power means. It is in that sense synonymous to projection.   
13  France re-joined NATO in 2009 under the Sarkozy presidency.  
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impression of France being a reluctant ally in the Western liberal-democratic camp. Frachon succinctly 
summarises the Fifth Republic’s infamous reputation among its allies when describing France as ‘the 
exceptionally anti-American member in the Western camp that pretends—notwithstanding its limited 
resources—to have an exceptional global influence’ (Frachon 2002).14 The impression of a ‘certain idea 
of France’ (Cerny 1980, 3; Gordon 1993) and the claim for exceptionalism, propagated by de Gaulle 
and kept alive under the General’s successors, have contributed to the fact that France is often 
considered as the typical outsider, if we are to speak with the vocabulary of comparative politics. This 
role conception has been reinforced by the fact that French decision-makers tend to have ‘a greater 
sense of the past than [decision-makers in many] other states and a self-conscious awareness of being 
different’ (Keiger 2005, 139). From an analytical point of view, this particular role made that the French 
case rarely informed more general models or theories of foreign policy analysis (Appleton 2009, 1–2). 
Vice versa, methods and tools of foreign policy analysis or theories of international relations were 
seldom applied to understand the special relationship between France and Africa, which better 
resembled ‘the world of domestic politics than that of formal inter–state relations’ (Clapham 1996, 89).
 French resistance to Western conformism has been explained with reference to the country’s prestige 
politics, which comes along with the idea of rayonnement (emanation). French actors perceive their 
country first and foremost as a value-promoting entity that has to fulfil a special role and extraordinary 
responsibilities in Europe and in the world. The importance French policy-makers attribute to 
reputational factors such as honour and standing in the international system are incarnated in the notion 
of grandeur. This normative concept was first employed to describe the ‘embodiment of General de 
Gaulle’s hopes and aspirations for his beloved France’ (Cerny 1980, 3). Grandeur also implies a sense 
of prowess that invites the individual to subordinate his/her own actions to higher principles and the 
common good. This subordination to higher principles attributed to the state gave rise to the idea of 
service public and more importantly in the context of the present study explains the merging of 
                                                     
14  ‘Membre exceptionnellement anti-américain du camp occidental, prétendant, en dépit de moyens limités, 
disposer d’une influence exceptionnelle mondiale’. Since France’s rapprochement with the US under Sarkozy this 
claim has lost some of its validity. The Hollande administration maintains close transatlantic relations, notably in 
the realm of security policy in Africa. France and the US collaborate closely in matters of counter-terrorism in the 
Sahel.   
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individual and collective identities.15        
 Although grandeur has been cited as one of the principal driving forces of post-WWII French foreign 
policy-making, as an analytical tool the notion is useful only to some limited extent. Grandeur can have 
multiple meanings and can be interpreted in various ways according to the specific context and the 
actors in place. For de Gaulle, it was more about an attitude than an actual policy (Hoffmann 1960, 
145). Rigidity, as de Gaulle observed, is greatness’s worst enemy (1960, 145). Employing grandeur as 
a stable independent variable distorts the concept’s meaning and does a poor job in explaining actual 
foreign policy-making. As Stanley Hoffman puts it, ‘grandeur is an imperative with a varying content’ 
(Hoffmann 1960, 145). To illustrate this point, a parallel can be drawn between a static version of 
grandeur and the assumption of fixed national identities. Whilst giving the impression of being 
comprehensive explanatory variables they are in fact ‘incapable of explaining why the social actors 
involved act in a certain way’ (Wodak et al. 2009, 11). Such universal and static concepts force meaning 
upon discourses and practices rather than extracting it. A more inductive approach considers discourses 
and practices as constituting elements of social reality. Accordingly, the concepts used to describe a 
given social reality emerge from the discursive production of knowledge and are not defined a priori.16
 Grandeur as a concept can only be saved if it is understood as an amendable and flexible frame that 
gives rise to more concrete and context-specific policy ideas and eventually actions, which both can be 
traced in day-to-day policy-making. To bring these policy ideas to the forefront, the present study 
privileges the notion of puissance d’influence. It incorporates all meanings of the notion of grandeur 
whilst at the same time being more specific and empirically relevant. Most importantly, however, the 
label puissance d’influence is part of today’s parlance of French foreign policy-makers; as opposed to 
the concept of grandeur, which has almost entirely disappeared from the French political discourse, 
being considered a relic from the colonial and neo-colonial past. The notion of puissance d’influence 
comes without preconceived ideas of neo-colonialism and therefore has become a widely used élément 
                                                     
15  The notion of service public exceeds the English equivalent of civil service. A strong devotion to the state and 
the sense of contributing to some greater good are two core characteristics of this concept, http://www.vie-
publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/notion-service-public.html, accessed on 22 
November 2014.  
16  Grandeur initially emerged from the French political discourse. However, it has lost its appeal over time and 
has not been renewed anymore, turning it into a static concept.  
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de langage (element of speech) of the French political discourse. According to Foreign Minister Laurent 
Fabius, there are eight characteristics that make France an influential power in the world (Fabius 2012i):  
1. Its permanent membership in the UN Security Council  
2. Its status as a nuclear power  
3. Its status as the world’s fifth largest economy  
4. 200 million French speakers in the world and an estimated 700 million by 2050 (mainly 
Africans)  
5. Cultural rayonnement  
6. The positive perception of France across the globe 
7. The defence of a certain conception of human rights 
8. The country’s history  
 France’s permanent seat in the Security Council, the importance of Africa as part of France’s 
political, linguistic and cultural sphere of influence, the positive perception of France across the globe, 
the role conception of France as being a human rights promoter, as well as the country’s history in 
Africa influenced the actors’ mental maps particularly during the decision-making processes that led to 
the two military interventions in Mali and the CAR.  
 
1.2 The Development of French Policy-Making in Africa: Continuity 
and Change 
It is widely acknowledged that the de jure independence of France’s colonies in the 1960s did not 
constitute a clear rupture with the colonial past, ‘but rather a restructuring of the imperial relationship’ 
(Chafer 2001, 167; Gregory 2000, 435–36). Following independence, a hierarchical order and the 
subordination of the so-called Third World states remained the determining characteristic of North–
South relations and created ‘a major chasm between their [the former colonies’] formal sovereignty and 
their effective sovereignty’ (Barnett and Sikkink 2008, 66). Relying on highly personalised links 
between French and African political and business elites, bilateral defence agreements containing secret 
clauses for intervention, technical and cultural cooperation, as well as paternalistic discourses that were 
centred around the concept of a shared identity and family metaphors (Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 
2002; Chafer 2001, 177), France continued to exert strong influence on politics in large parts of sub-
Saharan Africa—including former Belgian and Portuguese colonial territories (Gounin 2009, 161)—
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for more than three decades after the African independences had occurred (Chipman 1989; Chafer 2001; 
Gouttebrune 2002). According to Gregory (2000, 435–36), ‘France exercised a “virtual empire” in sub-
Saharan Africa, premised on cultural, economic, linguistic and personal ties forged during the colonial 
period and, somewhat less plausibly, on “geographic proximity”’. This neo-colonial exercise of power 
soon became subject to critical analyses both from academics and advocacy groups (Golan 1981; 
Chipman 1989; Verschave 1998). Adebajo summarises the principal allegations that have been voiced 
against France’s traditional approach towards Africa as follows:  
Turning to France’s role in West Africa, and Africa in general, this role has historically been one 
of neo-colonial domination, with the Gallic nation tying the currencies of its former colonies (the 
CFA franc) to the French franc, exercising political control over local puppets, receiving political 
campaign funds from assorted despots, and establishing permanent military bases in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Senegal from which interventions were launched. Having intervened militarily over thirty times 
and changed countless regimes in Africa during the Cold War, France’s opposition to America’s 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 appears ironic and hypocritical. The idea of France as a defender of the 
sovereign rights of states seems about as plausible as a pyromaniac fireman condemning the acts of 
a deranged arsonist. (Adebajo 2004) 
 While the underlying purpose(s) and motivations of France’s approach towards its former colonies 
are still subject to much debate, there is little doubt that the enterprise of maintaining a zone of special 
influence only became possible because France could rely on African elites who themselves had a 
vehement interest in the relationship and therefore exchanged favours with their counterparts in Paris 
(Bayart 2000; Bayart 2006). The tip of the iceberg consisted of the infamous Françafrique networks, 
which brought together small groups of French and African elites, blurring the distinction between 
private and public interests.17 Paternalistic policies and personalised ties allowed France to exert direct 
influence over a region much larger than the territory confined within its own national borders and to 
elevate its own status to that of an alleged Great Power. Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that 
France’s relations with the African continent for a long time had not been considered as belonging to 
the realm of French foreign policy, but as a distinct policy (Châtaigner 2006). The traditional 
                                                     
17  The notion France-Afrique, which originally was coined by Félix Houphouët-Boigny in order to describe the 
close relationship between France and its colonies, was later given a different meaning by the activist and founding 
member of the French NGO Survie François-Xavier Verschave (1998). Verschave changed the diction of the term 
in Françafrique and used it to denounce the clientelistic dimension of France’s Africa policy and the high degree 
of corruption that accompanied Franco-African relations. Today, both meanings are often used interchangeably, 
in particular by the press, creating much confusion around the concept. In this work, I speak of French African 
relations or Franco-African relations and only use the term Françafrique when referring to the criminal aspects 
of the relationship.       
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differentiation between French foreign policy and French African policy is due to the fact that ‘Africa 
is experienced in French representations as a natural extension [of the métropole] where the 
Francophone world and Francophilia merge’ (Bourmaud 2000), bringing about the notion of ‘the so-
called Franco-African state’ (Dozon 2002). Moreover, France represented the ideal-type of rational 
power-seeking actor and its elites helped to reinforce this image. France’s policy-making in Africa was 
interpreted as a means to strengthen the country’s position relative to other powers in the international 
system. Africa, in other words, became the centrepiece of an international architecture that gave the 
impression of French grandeur (Cerny 1980). Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, for instance, argued, ‘I am 
dealing with African affairs, namely with France’s interests in Africa’ (quoted in Martin 1995, 66), 
which he described as the ultimate objective of any French action in Africa. In light of such discourses 
and the accompanying practices, French policy-making in Africa became an excellent example of an 
interest-driven policy and an easy case for realists (Griffin 2007). Works that according to common 
practice can be summarised under the realist paradigm tend to attribute French activism in the sub-
Saharan African region to France’s geostrategic interests, its ambition for power, and its aspiration to 
maintain a sphere of influence (Bourmaud 1995; Orban 2011).18 Few authors questioned the notion of 
interest at all or provided a definition of what France’s interests could be beyond the materialist/post-
colonial narrative (Olsen 2009).         
 While continuity defined France’s relationship with its former colonies for three decades, the post-
1990s era increasingly put pressure on French policy-makers to normalise this cosy rapport with its 
African sphere of influence (Cumming and Langford 2005, 2). In particular, the triumphing neo-
liberalisation of the international system after the end of the Cold War,19 France’s dubious involvement 
in the Rwandan civil war and ensuing genocide in 1994 (Kroslak 2007; Pascallon 2004, 29), as well as 
                                                     
18  For the sake of convenience, I keep the various “isms” to categorise the different works under review but am 
aware of the limits of such categorisations. See Bourdieu’s (1988, 779) critique of the ill-fated division of 
disciplines into theoretical denominations, in which he states: ‘I am at loss to understand how social scientists can 
indulge in this typically archaic form of classificatory thinking, which has every characteristic of the practical 
logic at work in primitive societies (with the founding fathers acting as mythical ancestors), and is essentially 
oriented toward the accumulation of symbolic capital in the course of struggles to achieve scientific credibility 
and to discredit one’s opponent’ (see also 1987, 47–48). Elsewhere, Bourdieu (1987, 39) maintains that categorical 
academic thought prohibits intellectual invention, impeding the transgression of faux divisions.  
19  The end of the Cold War itself was not the catalyst of reform (d'Albis 1998, 3).  
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the gradual replacement of the old political generation (les Anciens) and the advocacy work by pressure 
groups condemning the Françafrique system (Verschave 1998), are all said to have transformed 
France’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa (Chafer 2002, 347–49; Médard 2005; Bakong 2012). 
Adding to this, in the view of some authors, France’s decision to intensify its commitment to the 
European integration project since the end of the 1980s had been the definitive but often disavowed 
step towards an incremental disengagement from the African continent in favour of closer relations with 
Europe’s industrialised and Asia’s emerging economies (Bayart 1990, 50). 20    
 Though rupture had become the leitmotiv to describe changes in France’s policy towards Africa 
since the early 1990s, it was only in 1997—the beginning of a period of cohabitation in French national 
politics—that true changes in France’s African policy occurred. Step by step, the government under 
Lionel Jospin institutionalised the proclaimed rupture with the past. On the occasion of his first Africa 
tour as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine laid out the basic points of the renewed French 
African policy. Most importantly the Jospin government advocated a more holistic approach, 
considering the entire African continent and not only the francophone pré carré. In addition, the 
government applied itself to divest the old Françafrique networks and to transfer the principal 
responsibility of African affairs to the Quai d’Orsay. In this context, the absorption of the Ministry of 
Cooperation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999—against the vehement protest of most of the 
francophone African heads of states—is particularly noteworthy. The Ministry’s highly symbolic 
character represented the continuity of France’s special relationship with a small number of African 
states and guaranteed the leaders of these states direct access to the French president.21 In addition to 
                                                     
20  In 1983 François Mitterrand decided to keep France in the European monetary system. As shall be seen below, 
equating European integration with French disengagement from Africa represents only half of the truth. France 
has emerged as the principal advocate of the African continent within the European Union, thus allowing for 
African issues to be put on the European agenda. This is particularly true in the realm of security and defence 
policy. As Charbonneau highlights, ‘The French role is absolutely central to an understanding of the EU’s role in 
Africa. Without French political leadership and troop commitments, it seems very likely that these missions 
[Artemis DRC in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2008] would not have taken place’ 
(Charbonneau 2009, 552). 
21  The Ministry of Cooperation was a colonial relic. It had directly emerged from the Ministry of Overseas 
France, formerly known as the Ministry of Colonies, and became soon a ministry exclusively dealing with 
francophone Black Africa (Gouttebrune 2002, 1035). Until today, the debate over the necessity and legitimacy of 
a Ministry of Cooperation continues. In 2013, Senators Jeanny Lorgeoux and Jean-Marie Bockel claim the 
reintroduction of a Ministry of International Cooperation (Ministère de la Cooperation Internationale) that would 
combine the tasks that are presently divided between the Ministry of Economics and Finance and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Sénat 2013, 401–4).  
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these institutional reforms, a more multilateral approach towards Africa developed (Adjovi 2002, 431–
37). The latter involved, in particular, the UN as well as the EU and its member states and transferred 
more responsibility to African countries themselves, via a stronger dialogue with regional organisation, 
namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), as 
well as through the establishment of the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix 
(RECAMP) programme in 1998, an initiative to form and financially support African peacekeeping 
forces (Bagayoko-Penone 2003, 198–99). Multilateralism, as Chasles (2011) argues, ‘offered the 
advantage not only of answering criticisms and questions that had been raised but also presented the 
opportunity to provide a new legitimacy and new methods to French African policy’. Another 
noteworthy episode was Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to abolish the notorious cellule africaine at the 
Élysée. This office, which was famous for its parallel diplomacy, became integrated into the general 
foreign policy framework and was from then on accountable to the president’s diplomatic advisor.22 
 With Africa redefining its position in the international system, French policy-making in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been gradually integrated into the general framework of French foreign policy (Cumming 
1996; Marchal 1998). This partial dissolution of the thus far isolated Franco-African complex has often 
been associated with a move towards pragmatism and multilateralism, and an opening up of the once 
colonial sphere (Barrios 2010). This normalisation process also allowed for the relationship to be 
analysed with the same analytical tools as any other foreign policy (Bourmaud 2011, 42). The majority 
of studies concerned with French foreign policy in general, and French policy-making in Africa in 
particular, scrutinise the degree of continuity or change that defines a given policy and ask whether it 
confirms the infamous ‘French exception’ (Thiam 2008; Cole, Meunier, and Tiberj 2013; Howorth 
2013, 250). Regarding French policy-making in Africa since the 1990s, most experts acknowledge the 
co-existence of both elements of continuity and elements of change (Médard 1982; Martin 1995; 
Huliaras 2002; Kroslak 2004; Le Gouriellec 2011; Cumming 2013; Howorth 2013, 262–64) and 
highlight the ongoing struggles between modernisers and traditionalists (les Anciens et les Modernes) 
                                                     
22  Sarkozy, however, continued to listen to special advisor Robert Bourgi, the metaphorical heir (l’héritier 
spiritual) of Jacques Foccart, who during his lifetime had been the puppeteer of the Françafrique system since de 
Gaulle and the living incarnation of France’s neo-colonial practices in Africa (Foccart and Gaillard 1995; Gregory 
2000, 436–37; Bat 2012). 
  23  
  
within the French state (Bourmaud 1996; Hugon 2005; Gounin 2009).    
 From this common ground, different, subtly nuanced interpretations have emerged, which 
understand France’s altering policy towards Africa respectively as a process of incremental adaptation 
(Chafer 2002), disengagement/normalisation (Glaser and Smith 2005; Médard 2005, 38–39), or as a 
state of confusion (Chafer 2008; Bovcon 2012; 2013; Cumming 2013).23 Apart from some few 
exceptions (Charbonneau 2008a)24 it has become a widely held belief, regardless of the respective 
interpretation that individual works suggest, that the traditional French–African relationship is liable to 
some sort of decline. This decline is noticed both with respect to French interests in Africa (Bourmaud 
2000) and with respect to French capabilities to influence outcomes on the African continent 
(Châtaigner 2006). The increased presence of emerging countries on the African continent has been 
perceived as the principal challenge to the traditional relations that threatens to undermine France’s 
influence in the region.25          
 Two points are worth emphasising here. First, the most common framework of reference against 
which French–African relations are put into perspective continues to be the pre-1990s period. Retaining 
France’s past position in Africa as point of reference allows analysts to trace patterns of continuity and 
change (Martin 1995; Hugon 2010) and to contextualise French African relations over the longue durée. 
It provides the reader with the big picture and a clear storyline but it also biases analyses towards the 
chosen point of reference, which—in this case—is the colonial/post-colonial era. The second point 
relates to the uncritical use of the notion of decline. Most works do not define the notion itself. 
Implicitly, of course, it is understood as the deviation from the status quo of the colonial and post-
colonial past. However, this deviation is mostly measured in material terms at the expense of alternative 
explanations (for instance Schmidt 2013, 165–92). The notion of decline is less suited to explain actual 
                                                     
23  For this tripartite division of the literature see Bovcon (2013, 12).  
24  In his work on French military involvement in Africa, Charbonneau (2006; 2008a; 2008b) insists that the past 
two decades of transformation are rather a sign of restructuration than of decline. Charbonneau (2009, 558) 
considers the Europeanisation of the military domain as a reinforcement of ‘outdated values, practices and 
structures of a particular kind of knowledge, that of French security policy in Africa’.   
25  The 2007-2008 financial crisis, the ensuing sovereign-debt crisis in Europe, France’s slow to negative 
economic growth (stagnation in the second half of 2014), rising unemployment, a largely unsatisfied public, which 
does not hesitate to give their votes to parties situated on the very margins of the political spectrum as a means to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the elites in place, further reinforced the sentiment of decline among French 
decision-makers.  
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foreign policy behaviour. As indicated above, neither colonial grandeur nor its decline understood as 
static explanatory variables can provide compelling explanations as for why the Hollande 
administration decided to intervene first in Mali and then in the CAR. Of course, these concepts played 
into the actors’ larger belief systems most notably insofar as they functioned as antipodes to the present 
behaviour; however only once these belief systems confront new situations that ask for political 
decisions they are translated into concrete policy ideas, the identification of which provide more precise 
insights into the decision-makers’ minds.       
 The normalisation of the Franco-African relationship was accompanied by an increased 
marginalisation of African issues on the French and European political agendas in between the early 
1990s and the mid-2000s (Bayart 2004).26 This political and economic marginalisation of the African 
continent simultaneously provoked a decreasing interest on the part of the scientific community. An 
ever smaller number of researchers attended to the French-African relationship, be it for the lack of 
perceived pertinence, or be it (and this is particularly true for the French academic community) out of 
caution to avoid a topic that continues to be regarded as sensitive.27 Such disinterest did not help to 
overcome another weakness of the literature on France’s policy-making in Africa. As Bourmaud points 
out, ‘analyses of France’s Africa policy very rarely explain their epistemological categories and their 
theoretical bases’ (Bourmaud 2011, 41). Bourmaud is not the only one to contemplate the descriptive 
nature and the lack of theoretical groundwork in studies on French policy in Africa.  
 More recently, this trend of declining interest in Africa has begun to be reversed thanks to Africa’s 
strategic and economic re-emergence on the international scene (Engel and Olsen 2005, 2). Given the 
attention that the African continent has received from other actors in the international system, the idea 
of an African Renaissance28 finds more and more acceptance within the discipline of international 
relations (IR). An increasing number of studies attempt to understand the international competition over 
African resources and markets (Taylor and Williams 2004; Engel and Olsen 2005). Referring to the 
colonial scramble, which hit its peak at the end of the 19th century and the partition of the entire African 
                                                     
26  The gradual economic marginalisation of Africa and in particular of francophone Africa had begun in the 
1970s under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Bach and Smouts 1982, 5–6) 
27  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. 
28  This notion goes back to Vale and Maseko (1998).  
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continent along borders brokered between a handful of European colonial powers, some scholars see a 
‘new scramble for Africa’ emerging (Carmody 2011). However, this ‘new scramble’ differs in at least 
two regards from its colonial predecessor. First, the pool of actors has widened and Europeans are no 
longer the dominant outside actors when it comes to economic relations with the African continent. 
China has emerged as one of the most active players in Africa (Alden 2007; Ampiah and Naidu 2008). 
Second, while Africans had no say in the colonial carving up of their continent one hundred years ago, 
African elites today are key players with considerable bargaining leverage, not least due to the 
increasing competition that has risen over the continent’s raw materials, markets, and lands (Ellis 2012, 
68).            
 In light of this renewed interest in Africa, an increasing number of scholars have returned to the 
dynamics of French policy-making in Africa and by so doing begun to adapt this body of literature to 
the 21st century’s operational environment. Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon (2007) in a special issue of 
Politique Africaine called upon the academic community to revive the debate on France’s relations with 
the African continent. Since then, some serious efforts have been undertaken to structure the rich 
empirical material with the help of social theories (Chafer and Cumming 2011b; Bovcon 2013). Purely 
thick-descriptions of earlier generations of scholars have been replaced by contributions that subject 
empirical data to methodological and theoretical rigorousness. Chafer and Cumming (2011a; 2011b), 
working on Anglo-French bi- and multilateral cooperation in Africa, respectively, resort to neo-classical 
realism to explain policy-makers’ motivations and rationales. Other works address French security and 
development policies from a constructivist perspective and extend the analytical scope by including a 
European dimension (Irondelle 2009; Balleix 2010; Sicurelli 2010). Still others propose institutionalist 
explanations of France’s continuous military engagement in its former pré carré focusing on the 
importance of path-dependency and the longevity of once established regimes (Bovcon 2012; 2013). In 
particular, crises situations and the military dimension of the relationship have gained the attention of a 
younger generation of scholars (Bagayoko-Penone 2003; Gnangueon 2011; Bovcon 2012; Bovcon 
2013; Koepf 2013a; Koepf 2013b).         
 Common to most existing studies is a focus on outcomes rather than on processes only allowing for 
a posteriori interpretations, which risk to either confound results with goals or to ignore the latter at all 
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(Aron 1981, 97–98; Irondelle 2011, 20; for an exception see Koepf 2013b, 29). Bovcon’s work for 
instance, due to the inherent path-dependency in the regime-theoretical/historical-institutionalist 
framework the author applies, cannot fully live up to its aim of providing ‘a dynamic model of the 
interaction between structure and agents’ (Bovcon 2013, 7). More precisely, she underestimates the 
extent to which the behaviour of actors—indeed, the actors themselves—may change over time. The 
underlying motivations that incite state actors to prefer one option over another—which may be 
fundamentally different from the eventual outcome—can only be discerned by engaging with the 
process itself and by producing an analytical framework that replicates the situation of the moment 
when a decision is taken; to the extent to which this is procurable with the limited tools social sciences 
and history offer (Cohen 1986, 9–11; Aron 1981). Only by looking at what actors intend to achieve, 
can underlying interests and preferences be extracted. Once it is known how French actors define their 
roles and their expectations towards sub-Saharan Africa, it becomes possible to create an alternative 
framework of reference against which French policy in Africa can be evaluated. Such a framework 
would depend more on the actual preferences, belief systems, interests, capacities, and the international 
context29 in which a country is situated at the time of a given decision than on a distant point in the 
past.30 It is hence both actor-specific and context-sensitive. Former French Foreign Minister Michel 
Jobert argued in the preface to the French translation of Cerny’s seminal work, The Politics of 
Grandeur, that one thing de Gaulle ‘has taught us, or revealed to us, is that the attitude with which one 
affronts a difficulty has more importance than the result’ (quoted in Cerny 1986, 8). It is this attitude 
and the related motivations, perceptions, and beliefs of French elites that are at the heart of the present 
study.  
                                                     
29  For the importance of the international context, see Chafer (2001, 179). 
30   I am not ignoring the important impact the past has on present decision-making (George and Bennett 2005, 8; 
see also Jervis 1976, Chapter 6). On the contrary, I acknowledge its importance towards the shaping of ideas and 
perceptions. I only claim that it is not the only, and arguably not even the most important starting point from which 
to begin a foreign policy analysis. In this sense, rather than a non-use, a different use of history is advocated.  
  27  
  
1.3 Security for Africa: A Multilateral Affair?    
In no other policy realm has the transition from a traditional to a renewed approach to Africa become 
more evident than in defence and security policy. The period of normalisation has led to a fundamental 
reconfiguration of France’s defence apparatus on the African continent. Next to the reduction of the 
troops permanently stationed in French bases across the continent, France bid farewell to the concept 
of unilateral interventionism in the name of regime stability (Koepf 2013b). Consequently, over the last 
two decades French military operations in sub-Saharan Africa have shifted away from opaque solo-
operations towards a new paradigm, that is, ‘the participation in multinational humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations on behalf of the world community’ (Treacher 2003, 2). France has dedicated 
considerable financial and political means to the establishment of an African stand-by force that would 
be able to be deployed across the entire continent and on short notice (Melly and Darracq 2013, 13). 
African solutions to African security problems is the catch-phrase the Hollande administration employs 
to describe this renewed approach towards Africa in matters of security. However, France’s most recent 
interventions in Mali and the CAR also show that this capacity building process won’t be completed in 
the near future and that the gendarme d’Afrique remains a committed security actor in the region. 
Present French security policy towards Africa oscillates between traditional solutions to crisis 
management and a modernised multilateral approach promoting African ownership.     
 Traditionally, France’s military apparatus used to be high profile and expensive, as were French 
interventions. Despite continuous budget cuts over the past two decades that reduced France’s military 
expenditure to 2.2 per cent of its GDP in 2013 (compared to 3.9 per cent in 1988) (World Bank 2014),31 
the capacity to intervene beyond its territory continues to be considered among the principal tools of 
France’s foreign policy. The importance French policy-makers attribute to their country’s military 
capacities and their interpretation of warfare as an ultimate diplomatic tool reflect a Clausewitzian 
understanding of the military domain. As Maulny (2010, 109) stresses, ‘defence policy, as an instrument 
of diplomacy, gives evidence of the vision we have of the place of our country on the international 
                                                     
31  In 2014, France spent €31.4 billion on defence and allocated €450 million to military interventions. Due to the 
ongoing operations in the Sahara-Sahel and the CAR this latter budget had been surpassed by €605 million (Le 
Drian 2014). 
  28  
  
stage’. Hollande reaffirmed this dominant thought of France’s strategic culture when saying, ‘…there 
is no great nation in this world that is not endowed with a defence apparatus’ (Hollande 2014g).32 Until 
today, French security culture cherishes the ‘sacrosanct principle of autonomous decision-making and 
independent defence capabilities’ (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, 22).     
 Following their nominal independence, almost all former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa 
agreed with France to cooperate in military matters in one way or another. With the exception of Guinea, 
also all former colonies concluded so-called accords de cooperation (military cooperation agreements) 
with France (Luckham 1982, 99; Bakong 2012, 192).33 The essence of these cooperation agreements 
consisted of what was termed “technical assistance” and implied that France would provide the newly 
established African armies with military equipment and assist in the formation of military personnel by 
placing French instructors at their former colonies’ disposal. In exchange for these services, the African 
states asserted that they would continue to resort to French expertise concerning the maintenance and 
the instauration of the material (Bakong 2012, 193). In addition to the accords de cooperation, France 
concluded defence agreements (accords de défense) with eight of its former colonies.34 Defence 
agreements were more extensive than military cooperation agreements ‘effectively transferring 
responsibility for African states’ external (and in most cases internal) security to Paris, and allowing 
France military basing rights’ (Utley 2005, 26). The agreements allowed France to intervene in support 
of those African governments that were well-disposed to the métropole but threatened by internal 
political instability or external threats. Whilst obliging France to guarantee the stability of the 
signatories, the treaties also gave France the necessary discretion and legitimacy to intervene in what 
were now de jure independent and sovereign states and thus contributed to a prolongation of the colonial 
hierarchy of the international system (Gregory 2000, 435). No other former colonial power intervened 
                                                     
32  ‘C'est cette conjugaison d'équipements de qualité, d'hommes et de femmes de haut niveau technique et 
également une stratégie et une doctrine, appuyées par les moyens budgétaires qui sont accordés à la Défense ; 
c'est toute cette conjugaison qui nous permet d'être un grand pays. Il n'y a pas de grand pays au monde qui ne 
soit doté d'un outil de défense.’  
33  CAR (13 August 1960), Gabon (17 August 1960), Congo (1 January 1974), Cameroon (21 February 1974), 
Senegal (29 March 1974), Benin (27 February 1975), Chad (6 March 1976), Togo (23 March 1976), Mauritania 
(2 September 1976), Niger (19 February 1977), Djibouti (27 June 1977), and Mali (14 October 1977). In the mid-
1970s, the three former Belgian colonies Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi also signed military cooperation agreements 
with France.   
34  Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo.  
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more frequently and to the same extent in its former dependencies than France (Schmidt 2013, 176). 
With an average of one military intervention per year until the mid-1990s (Chafer 2005, 10), security 
aspects became so integral that many observers placed them at the core of the French-African 
relationship (Utley 2005; Charbonneau 2008a; Foutoyet 2009, 93).     
 Despite this extraordinary continuity at first sight, France’s defence policy in general and its military 
activity on the African continent in particular have been subjected to fundamental changes since the 
mid-nineties (Gregory 2000). Similar to France’s foreign policy, several factors such as the end of the 
Cold War, the emergence of a new generation of French leaders, a dwindling belief in the cost utility 
benefit of the pré carré, increasing budget constraints emerging from France’s participation in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), France’s contested role in the Rwandan genocide, the 
internationally denounced backing of Zaire’s (DRC) Mobutu, and the disclosure of several other 
scandals related to the Françafrique networks such as the so-called Angolagate (Juilliard 2009) made 
reform necessary (Tull 2005, 2; Utley 2005, 29–30).       
 In an attempt to normalise its post-colonial security architecture, France scaled back its military 
presence in the region, a decision which, however, as French policy-makers continued to emphasise, 
did ‘not signify a disengagement from Africa’ (Berman 2002, 3). Whilst not entirely disengaging from 
the African continent, French governments nevertheless curtailed the most visible elements of their 
country’s presence in the region by reducing the total number of standing forces and avoiding unilateral 
military interventions in African conflicts (Olsen 2009, 250). 35 At the same time, French governments 
became increasingly committed to a more multilateral approach in defence and security matters. Indeed, 
                                                     
35  In the 1960s 58,000 troops were permanently stationed in Africa. As of January 2014, 3,290 so-called forces 
de presence remained on the African continent (2,000 in Djibouti, 940 in Gabon, and 350 in Senegal). In addition 
6,545 soldiers remained deployed in Africa as part of ongoing military operations (out of a total of 8,300 French 
soldiers across the world). 3,085 soldiers were deployed to the Sahel-Sahara, 2,260 to the CAR, 810 to West 
Africa, and 270 in the Indian Ocean (as of 23 October 2014). http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-
prepositionnees, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations, accessed on 23 November 2014. While the reduction of 
troops between the 1960s and the 1980s was considerable (15,000 permanent forces by the late 1980s), France’s 
military presence on the continent remained rather stable during the 1990s, despite proclamations to the contrary. 
In fact, as Charbonneau (2008b, 79) points out, ‘exact numbers of French soldiers in Africa is always difficult to 
determine; the number is usually much higher because of various military operations and exercises that demand 
other forces’. Taken together, the numbers of permanently stationed French forces and those involved in specific 
operations has continuously averaged out at around 10,000 forces. As of 2014, 11,775 troops were operating on 
the African continent (5,050 permanent forces; 6,725 deployed in ongoing operations) (Chapleau 2014b; 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr).    
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Africanisation of regional security and multilateralism had become the new doctrine of French security 
policy (Gregory 2000, 442). The loi de programmation militaire 1997-2002 induced the transfer of 
responsibility to African troops through RECAMP, the creation of military schools, the so-called Écoles 
Nationales à Vocation Régionale (ENVR; National Schools with Regional Vocation) and the quest, 
together with Great Britain in 1998, for a more credible European military capacity (St. Malo 
Declaration), which preceded the more active involvement in missions to Africa under the auspice of 
UN or EU mandates. Some authors argue that France multilateralises its military commitments for the 
purpose of legitimacy as well as to reduce costs and risks (Kroslak 2004, 76; Livre Blanc 2008, 81–
98).36 For Charbonneau (2008a, 293) ‘the gendarme has simply put on a cloak of multilateral [and 
preferably European] humanitarianism’. With regard to the above mentioned troop reduction, this 
argument can be further supported by the fact that the ‘quantitative loss of troops was replaced by a 
qualitative gain in projection forces’ (Charbonneau 2008a, 282), mainly through a process of 
professionalization of the French army.        
 Multilaterlisation in the view of French actors did not imply a loss of sovereignty, autonomy, and 
leadership. The European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad in 2008 was a prime example of an EU operation 
under French leadership. France not only bore a large amount of the costs and provided the majority of 
soldiers and equipment but also was able to frame a policy that developed at the domestic level as an 
expression of a common European consensus (Bono 2011, 39–40). Subsequently, France has become 
the biggest advocate of a common European defence policy, which leads several authors to conclude 
that French defence policy is trapped between two conflicting goals: multilateralism and independence 
(Meunier 2008, 243). The extent to which these two apparently contradictory policy orientations 
influenced the decision-making processes during the crises in the CAR and Mali, will be further 
elaborated in Chapters Four and Five. However, previous interventions and peacekeeping operations in 
Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, in the DRC in 2006, as well as in Chad and the CAR in 2008 suggest that French 
elites still prefer a form of multilateralism that relies on a ‘statutory hierarchy of states’ and that grants 
                                                     
36  Olsen (2009:8) makes this claim with reference to the 2006 EUFOR mission to Congo, which would have 
been unthinkable under a French flag due to France’s involvement in the region in the early 1990s, notably the 
role it played during the genocide in Rwanda.  
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them a non-negligible degree of autonomy and independence in the conduct of a given operation 
(Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, 24–25). Another significant break in France’s traditional security 
policy towards Africa occurred in 2008, when President Sarkozy, against the opposition of most 
francophone African leaders who cherished the merits of these traditional life insurances, initiated a 
general revision of all existing defence treaties. By consequence, neither the intervention in Mali (which 
never signed a defence agreement with France) nor the peacekeeping operation in the CAR were 
justified on the basis of any bi-lateral defence agreement.37     
 The belief that a durable and stable peace in Africa would require African ownership gained 
prominence in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda. One month after the launching of Operation 
Turquoise in June 1994, former French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur urged in front of the 
Senegalese Parliament that one should ‘examine the establishment of an African structure that is able 
to intervene rapidly on the African continent [in the course of] peace keeping operations’ (quoted in 
Bakong 2012, 206). Yet, it needed another crisis in the Great Lake region, before the creation of 
RECAMP was announced by Jacques Chirac at the French-African summit in Louvre in 1998 (Bakong 
2012, 207). Under the Hollande administration, African ownership of the continent’s security became 
the absolute priority both in discourse and practice. In particular, the slogan African solutions to African 
security problems did not only dominate France’s political discourse but gave rise to concrete policy 
measures. 38 The Élysée Summit on Peace and Security in Africa in December 2013 was held under this 
very same motto. Forty African heads of state came together with representatives from the UN and the 
EU to principally discuss the longstanding but still not realised idea of a permanent pan-African rapid 
reaction force that would be able to replace the French forces, which until present remain Africa’s sole 
rapid deployment force.39 From Paris’s point of view, calling upon African leaders to ensure the 
continent’s security was an overdue and financially necessary move. Especially in light of a tightening 
                                                     
37  Mali, which had not concluded a defence agreement at the time of independence, signed a comprehensive 
military cooperation agreement that regulates the presence of French troops on Malian territory in the wake of 
Operation Serval on 16 July 2013 (Diarra 2013).  
38  The roots of the catchphrase African solutions to African problems date back to the 1970s. Giscard d’Estaing 
used the term widely. On the other side of the Atlantic the Carter administration employed the same phrase to 
describe their approach towards Africa (van de Walle 2009, 17).  
39  The African Standby Force was originally supposed to be operational by 2008 but until now exists mainly on 
paper (Weiss and Welz 2014, 900).  
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defence budget, France is no longer able to commit the resources required for maintaining a high-profile 
security presence in Africa. Operation Serval alone cost the French treasury an estimated €650 million 
in 2013. However, most of these political commitments cited above are neither particularly innovative 
nor have they exempted French troops from their traditional role of first interveners in conflicts in 
francophone Africa.40 In crisis situations, ‘Paris is still seen as a key source of diplomatic, military and 
financial pressure on or support for the countries in the region’ (Melly and Darracq 2013, 3). In 
particular, during the crisis in Mali the interim government expressed ‘greater confidence in their former 
colonial master’s capabilities than in those of the AU or ECOWAS’ (Weiss and Welz 2014, 900). 
Likewise, former Central African President François Bozizé appealed first to France shortly before 
being ousted from office by the Seleka rebellion.  
 
1.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a brief discussion of the characteristics of French foreign policy and reviewed 
France’s foreign and security policy-making in Africa since the former colonies’ independence. Whilst 
most authors agree that the relationship gradually shifted from the exceptional to the normal, continuous 
French interventions and the re-emergence of old patterns of behaviour suggest that such a linear 
reading may not be the most suited approach to understand present French foreign and security policy 
towards the African continent. The same can be said about the use of the notion of decline that overly 
biases explanations towards a distant past rather than juxtaposing them to the present operational 
environment. As I have argued above, these concepts, whilst allowing for situating the relationship on 
a timeline and providing an understanding of the historical legacy against the backdrop of which 
decision-making takes place, are less suited to incorporate the motivations that inform specific 
decisions. After three decades of ongoing debate, it is about time to go beyond the continuity-change 
nexus (Bach 1982; Cumming 2013) and to shed light on other facets of French foreign policy in sub-
                                                     
40  For instance, the narrative of the security-development nexus, which dominates the present-day discourse and 
is advertised as a progressive approach to Africa’s security, was already evoked by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 
the 1970s (Dagut 1982, 24). Giscard d’Estaing referred to a nexus of ‘peace, independence, and development, 
which need to be assured by the Africans themselves’ (Dagut 1982, 24). 
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Saharan Africa. The chapter has also elaborated on the notion of grandeur, which until present remains 
the principal ideational variable used to describe French foreign policy in general and explain France’s 
continuous presence on the African continent in particular (Cerny 1980; Vaïsse 1998; Mesfin 2008). I 
have pointed out the limits of this concept—notably its vagueness, static nature, and colonial legacy—
and suggested an inductive approach that distils policy ideas from the actual discourses and practices 
as an alternative method to explain French action in Africa. The last observation this chapter has made 
regards the overly attention scholars have paid to policy outcomes. Few studies have engaged with 
decision-making processes of French interventionism in Africa (Koepf 2013b; Notin 2014) and no study 
has done so using an ideational approach in the context of the two military operations under the 
Hollande administration.41 By engaging with the ideas and belief systems that mattered during the 
decision-making processes of Operations Serval and Sangaris, this work seeks to fill some of the gaps 
in the existing literature and by so doing to contribute to this long-standing and fascinating debate on 








                                                     
41  For a detailed and informative analysis of the decision-making processes (although not of the actors’ 
underlying motivations and preferences) of EUFOR Chad/CAR and the role of France see Dijkstra (2010).  
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Chapter Two 
Agents, Structure, and Ideas: A Conceptual 
Framework for Analysing French Decision-
Making in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Most politicians and journalists are like Monsieur Jourdain; they have half-formed 
and unarticulated theories of how the world works that they use to confront and make 
sense of new situations.  
— Richard Ned Lebow 
 
 
…the essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, 
indeed, to the decider himself....There will always be the dark and tangled stretches 
in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most 
intimately involved… 
— John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
 
 
L’étude de la décision, que ce soit dans le champ de la sociologie des organisations, 
des politiques publiques ou celui de la Foreign Policy Analysis, constitue une 
entreprise de « désenchantement » qui conduit à une forme de dilution de la décision.  
— Bastien Irondelle 
 
 
Attempts to understand and explain processes of decision-making are subject to a series of challenges. 
The present chapter introduces the theoretical and methodological tools that have been used in this study 
to enter the maze of foreign policy decision-making. More precisely, it explains the theoretical 
assumptions that inform this research, with a view to highlighting the benefits of employing an 
ideational framework for the analysis of foreign policy-making in general and decision-making 
processes in particular.           
 As shown in the preceding chapter, France’s relations with the African continent have been 
explained and analysed from a variety of different angles. The different approaches make valuable 
contributions to our understanding of French policy-making in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, since the 
majority of studies concentrate on situating a specific act of French policy-making within a larger 
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temporal frame in order to measure the degree of continuity and change, it is usually a series of 
outcomes—not the procedures themselves—that fall under researchers’ spotlights. The theoretical 
framework proposed here goes beyond this well-established analytical canon and intends to facilitate 
the task of unravelling the complex and oftentimes hidden dynamics of decision-making processes. To 
achieve this objective, a microfoundational reading of events is necessary to ‘probe the “why” questions 
underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action’ (Snyder, Bruck, 
and Sapin 1962, 33). Such a microfoundational and process orientated approach puts actors or agents 
at the heart of the analysis. While embedded in their environment, actors dispose of a non-negligible 
degree of autonomy, which calls for a close analysis of their perceptions, motivations, and behaviour 
(Bourdieu 1985, 727). Actors co-constitute and reshape the system through their subjective 
interpretations of natural and social kinds (Wendt 1999, 68–71), their discourses, and eventually their 
actions (Crozier and Friedberg 1992 [1977], 44, 91; Bratberg 2011, 346). To be clear, the argument 
made here is not about discrediting notions of structure for the benefit of agency. Structural forces—
that is, the operational environment—are constantly influencing the decision-making process, however, 
they only gain meaning in the minds of the actors (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; H. Sprout and M. 
Sprout 1965; Allison 1971). Structure and agency are relational to each other and actors’ perceptions, 
discourses, and practices function as the node between the two dimensions. The purpose of engaging 
with those who make and shape foreign policy is to render the unobservable ontologies of structural 
approaches observable (Doty 1997, 368; 372). Concrete meaning shall be given to the metaphysical 
abstraction of the state, which out of convenience or tradition remains the most common level of 
analysis in the discipline of international relations (Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999).42   
 The theoretical framework proposed here can be described as a context sensitive, ideational foreign 
policy analysis,43 which—in this case—is used to explain France’s security policy in sub-Saharan 
                                                     
42  For a critique of structuralist approaches and an argument in favour of decision-making approaches in 
international relations theory, see Hagan (2001).  
43  FPA, with its ‘focus on the foreign policy process as opposed to foreign policy outcomes’ (Alden and Aran 
2012, 1) can fill the gap in the existing literature on French–African relations. FPA considers decision-making not 
just as a determined factor, but also as a determining factor, of international relations (Smith 1986, 14). The 
approach acknowledges that throughout the policy-making process actors are not only affected by the rules that 
surround them but also make, shape, and interpret these rules. Consequently, FPA treats decision-makers ‘as more 
than passive agent[s] in some preordained spectacle’ (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 113). 
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Africa, but which may be applied to other decision-making processes in world politics. In the course of 
the following discussion it will become evident that some of the current debates on decision-making 
processes raise the same or similar questions as early foreign policy analysts did more than fifty years 
ago (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Hudson 2002, 2–3). Accordingly, present-day political science 
can benefit by returning to seminal writings and anterior debates in the field.     
 The first section of this chapter highlights the interrelatedness of agency and structure. It then 
examines the benefits and challenges that emerge from locating one’s work at the intersection of 
methodological holism and methodological individualism. The second section explores the decision-
making process itself. This section, first, identifies the limits of rational choice accounts of decision-
making. It then introduces the concepts of mental maps and strategic culture in order to propose a 
dialogue between cultural approaches (located at the societal level) and cognitive approaches, which 
focus on individuals. The next section deals with the questions of how threats are constructed and policy 
issues become securitised. It follows a short excursus on the methodology used to analyse the empirical 
data. The chapter concludes by synthesising the core assumptions and establishing a link between the 
theoretical framework and the subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
2.1 The Agency–Structure Debate and This Project 
Since the 1950s, foreign policy analysts have argued that structural forces only bear a meaning in the 
perceptions of actors. In their seminal volume Foreign policy decision-making, Snyder, Bruck, and 
Sapin (1962, 5) contend, ‘it is difficult to see how we can account for specific actions and for 
continuities of policies without trying to discover how their operating environments are perceived by 
those responsible for choices’ (emphasis added). The authors qualify this claim by stating that the 
‘selective discrimination of the setting may effectively limit action. Put simply: What the decision-
makers “see” is what they act upon’ (1962, 102–3). From early on, IR scholars were intrigued by the 
importance of ideational variables and their crucial role for the understanding of politics. However, with 
the publication of Waltz’s powerful critique of reductionist theories—that is, theories that explain 
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‘systems by reducing them to their parts’ (Waltz 1979, 6–7)—and the post-WWII commitment to 
positivism and Humean causation the field of IR experienced a decisive re-orientation away from unit-
level analysis and the examination of foreign policy behaviour to more structural and far-reaching 
explanations. The repercussions of this paradigm shift are still being felt today.44 
 While any description of human affairs necessitates a certain degree of simplification, excessive 
parsimony generates a parallel model-world that differs fundamentally from the one in which we live 
and act. Applicable to only a small number of palpable empirical puzzles, such theorising risks existing 
only for theory’s sake, leading to a production of knowledge that would hardly be valued by others than 
those who generate this knowledge in the first place (Dessler 1989, 443; Flyvbjerg 2006, 223). In his 
ferocious critique of the misguided struggles among social scientists, Bourdieu (1988, 744) condemns 
such ‘”theoretical” theory, a prophetic or programmatic discourse that is its own end, and that stems 
from and lives from the confrontation with other (theoretical) theories’. He continues, ‘…if you will 
allow me to plagiarize Kant’s famous dictum: theory without empirical research is empty, empirical 
research without theory is blind’ (1988, 775). Before Bourdieu, the Florentine thinker, diplomat, 
historian—and as some would argue the ‘first true political scientist’—Niccolò Machiavelli argued that 
‘putting theory to practical use should be the primary goal of political analysis’ (Eriksson 1999, 325–
26).             
 If the purpose of social theory is to understand the social world (Schutz 1967), theoretical 
instruments and explanations should ‘coincide with our empirical reality to the highest possible degree’ 
(Singer 1961, 78; Hermann 1987; Herrmann 1988, 177). This exigency brings structural approaches to 
their limits. While providing comprehensive accounts of the so-called ‘big picture’, structural 
explanations are limited to general and mostly long-term trends, but cannot account for specific 
decisions or a particular foreign policy behaviour (Smith 1986, 177). In other words, structural accounts 
of IR turn a blind eye towards day-to-day policy-making.     
 The cognisance that compelling explanations of foreign policy-making must consider variables that 
are both internal and external to the actors has a long history (Rosenau 1968). Observing the void 
                                                     
44   Indicative of the dominance of structural explanations in IR is the artificial secession of FPA from IR, with 
FPA being considered a sub-discipline of the latter.  
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structural approaches left behind, ‘scholars were drawn to other levels of analysis, to the structure and 
character of states and societies, domestic politics, bureaucracies and the role of leaders’ (Lebow 2008, 
223). Still, the emergence of a more eclectic theoretical approach to the multifaceted empirical world 
has been impeded by the ongoing battles over the correct level of analysis. Accordingly, the greater 
number of existing studies continue to defend one specific level of analysis. For Bourdieu (1988, 780), 
such choices are necessarily the product of religious beliefs, and not scientific alternatives. Attempts to 
explain complex social phenomena, such as the rationale behind France’s military interventions in Mali 
and the CAR by referring to only one level of analysis seem problematic at best.   
 Due to the parallel existence of two truisms that define social life (Giddens 1979), a strictly dualistic 
ontology is improper for conducting empirical investigations. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
‘human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world’; 
on the other, ‘human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the 
possibilities for action and influence its course’ (Dessler 1989, 443; Wendt 1987, 337–38; Carlsnaes 
1992, 260). While the first truism necessitates a prioritisation of actors, the second truism denies that 
agents can ever act independently of the structure that surrounds and constitutes them. The only solution 
to this dilemma is to abandon an overly dualistic vision and to include the different dimensions within 
a single unifying framework.45        
 Precisely because ‘human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense inter-related 
entities’, it is not possible to ‘account fully for the one without invoking the other’ (Carlsnaes 1992, 
254–56). Attempts to understand agents as either completely socially constructed and determined by 
structure or as pre-existing units outside of social construction prevents theorists from seeing the whole 
picture of social action (Wight 1999, 115; 120). Bigo (2011, 236) argues that social scientific analysis, 
thus, should reject ‘the false alternative of structure versus individual’ (Bigo 2011, 236) and account 
for both the power of agents and the importance of structural factors. In line with this argument, Crozier 
and Friedberg (1992 [1977], 44; 91) attribute some constraining functions to the system but, at the same 
time, maintain that the very same actors, who are constrained by systemic boundaries, are also those 
                                                     
45  See also David Lake’s notion of eclectic, mid-level theory: ‘Eclectic, mid-level theory ‘rather than defending 
any single set of assumptions…builds theories to address specific problems of world politics’ (Lake 2013, 573). 
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who ‘influence’ and―in Foucauldian terms―‘corrupt’ and ‘manipulate’ the system. Structure, defined 
as a combination of material conditions and social factors, that is, intersubjectively shared ideas (norms, 
practices, and rules),46 describes the realm of possibility and in turn limits the available options that 
actors consider when making decisions (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1965, 11; Wendt 1999, 139; Bull 
2002). France’s colonial experience and Gaullist foreign policy are examples of such intersubjectively 
shared knowledge structures against the backdrop of which present decision-making takes place. 
(Knowledge) structures, however, are ‘continually constituted and reproduced by members of a 
community and their behaviour’ (Adler 1997, 326–27). They are neither immutable, nor do they 
determine the outcome of a decision. Accordingly, ‘rather than focussing exclusively on how structures 
constitute agents’ identities and interests’ (Adler 1997, 330), one should seek to explain the relational 
between agents and structures.47         
 Clearly, what is needed is ‘a more “sensitive” appreciation of “the operational relation” between 
environmental factors and human behaviour’ (Criekemans 2009, 9). While the environment provides ‘a 
set of opportunities and limitations’, the initiative of action ‘lies with man, not with the milieu 
encompassing him’ (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1965, 83). Actors co-constitute and reshape the system—
and each other—by interpreting observable events, discourses and eventually actions (Crozier and 
Friedberg 1992 [1977], 44; 91).         
 One may argue that combining these demands within one theoretical framework denies the 
explanatory autonomy of either agency or structure, and thus makes it impossible to conduct any serious 
empirical or historical research (Carlsnaes 1992, 259; Doty 1997, 375). However, eclecticism does not 
automatically inhibit empirical investigation. Methodological individualism and methodological 
structuralism can be combined to an operable mid-level theory by using ideas as explanatory variables. 
The mutual interest of psychological and constructivist approaches to international relations in human 
subjectivity and identity provides the necessary element to bridge holism and individualism (Shannon 
                                                     
46  Adler defines the latter as knowledge structures (Adler 1997, 326–27).  
47  Eun (2012, 771-72) illustrates Crozier and Friedberg’s point by using the metaphor of a football game. While 
a football game depends on rules (e.g. the prohibition of fouls), conditions (e.g. the weather), and settings (e.g. a 
pitch with two goals), human agents—and not the structure— are responsible for who wins and who loses the 
game. He concludes that ‘it is essential to consider human decision-makers’ perceptions, beliefs, personal traits, 
and the like in the study of foreign policy and world politics’ (see also Hudson 2005).    
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and Kowert 2012; Cerny 1980, 98).48         
 In abstract terms, “foreign policy interactions” of a given number of actors at t1 (point one in time) 
constitutes the international system at t1 (that is s1). The established structure influences—but does not 
determine—decision-making processes at t2, at which point actors’ interactions continue to shape and 
create an altered international system s2, and so on (see fig. 1; see also Dessler 1989, 453; Carlsnaes 
1992, 260). It is important to note that the actors in this model are constituted through their mutual 
engagement: they are not viewed as pre-existent, fully constituted individuals.49 The struggle for 
meaning and the interaction between the already existing and the new can only be observed during the 
process. Similar to a chemist who wants to understand the causes of chemical reactions between 
different compounds, the social scientist cannot limit her/himself to observing the outcome, that is, the 













Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the mutual constitution of agency and structure in international 
politics  
Source: own elaboration  
                                                     
48  It has to be noted that, while positing that structure and agency are mutually constitutive, many works in the 
constructivist tradition in practice tend to be structuralist (Shannon 2012, 4; Welch Larson 2012, 59–62). Most 
prominently, Alexander Wendt considers unit-level factors an important but separate theoretical problem (Wendt 
1999, 365). 
49  This makes the approach relational and not solely interactionist.  
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 In sum, while actors are at the heart of this approach they cannot be separated from their specific 
environment, but rather need to be observed within their social-milieu or field (champ). Their actions 
only become meaningful within an explicit political, cultural, and historical context, which the analyst 
must take into account (see Chollet and Goldgeier 2002, 175).  
  
2.2 The Decision-Making Process from Perception to Action 
Having situated this work within the field of IR and proposed an agent-centred framework that remains 
sensitive to the operational environment, the remainder of this chapter deals with decision-making 
processes. In particular, it emphasises the role of ideational variables, such as actors’ cognitive maps 
and collective belief systems, by demonstrating how these affect both foreign policy processes and 
outcomes. Starting from a critique of the dominant rational choice approach, this section proposes a 
series of tools to capture the actors’ subjective perceptions and convictions. The argument builds on the 
structurationist approach developed above by combining the individual and the collective dimensions 
of human action.           
 A decision is always a matter of choice, which presupposes a decider (or a group of deciders),50 a 
set of alternatives, and some goals (Allison 1971, 28). Real-world decisions rarely fit into a chess-game 
like action–reaction scheme. Instead, they emerge from a complex and at times ‘mysterious’ process. 
Notwithstanding the idiosyncrasy of each decision, decision-making is not the product of a given 
decider’s unconditional free will but influenced and constrained by a variety of societal factors, the 
availability of information, trade-offs between different actors and alternative options, bureaucratic and 
institutional modes of functioning, the operational environment, and last but not least the personality of 
the actors themselves. Whilst decision-making processes are subject to one or many of these factors at 
any time, no decision is taken that has not traversed the deciders’ ideational prisms. In fact, decision-
                                                     
50  Chapter Three is devoted to a more detailed discussion of the decision-units that make and shape French 
foreign and defence policy. The notion “decision” is not limited to the very moment of choice, but also include 
the pre-decisional and post-decisional phases. If the opposite were the case, the approach proposed here would 
decontextualise the decision from its environment and commit a fallacy similar to the rational actor model.   
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making is a ‘protension, a future-to-be inscribed in the present’ which cannot be separated from the 
position, trajectories, and relations of the different actors and their fields (Bigo 2011, 243). According 
to constructivist epistemology (Piaget 1967) events and objects do not have an intrinsic meaning per se 
but first need to be made meaningful by strategic actors that recognise the role and importance of a 
given event (Barnett 1999, 25). For this reason, explanations of foreign policy need to engage with the 
actors’ subjective understanding of situations.       
     
2.2.1 The Limits of Rational Choice in an Irrational World 
Classical “economic man” and the rational man of modern statistical decision theory and game 
theory make optimal choices in narrowly constrained, neatly defined situations. In these situations 
rationality refers to an essentially Hobbesian notion of consistent, value-maximising reckoning or 
adaptation within specific constraints (Allison 1971, 29).  
 The rational-choice approach to decision-making suffers from two noteworthy flaws, which prevent 
the model from doing justice to the complexity of the social world. First, rational-choice does not deal 
with ideas and perceptions but ‘takes the identity and interest of actors as outside the analysis’ (Snidal 
2002, 75).51 Since motivations are difficult to measure or to quantify, rational choice scholars prefer 
deducing generalised preferences of states from theories (Rathbun 2008, 689). The theory assumes that 
a ‘rational agent is one who comes to a social situation with [already defined] preferences over possible 
social states’ (Shepsle 1995, 280). As Robert Keohane (1984, 75) acknowledges, in order to use 
rational-choice logic ‘one needs to make some assumptions about the values and interests of the actors, 
precisely because the logic alone is empirically empty’. However, by assuming motivations, values, 
and interests, some of the most interesting aspects of the decision-making process are simply black-
boxed and significant questions remain unanswered (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 137). In addition, 
by excluding ‘all mental phenomena from explanations of human behavior’ (Mercer 2005, 78), rational 
choice models reduce human beings to one-dimensional like units (Lebow 2008, 45).   
 Proponents of the rational-choice approach have stressed that the model applies―notwithstanding 
                                                     
51  For an attempt to endogenise interests and changing preferences in rationalist thinking, see Cohen and Axelrod 
(1984).  
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the above criticism―in ‘situations of ultimate danger’, where bureaucratic policies and well established 
governance procedures are only of limited use and the decision comes down to a small circle of 
individual agents acting autonomously in the name of the state (Allison 1971, 8–9).52 The outbreak of 
war, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other crisis situations that ask for quick and non-bureaucratic 
responses by a small group of deciders at first sight seems to be the home turf of the rational-choice 
model.             
 In a sense, French security and defence policy should be an easy case for the rational-choice model. 
The French political system, it may be argued, is construed so that it concentrates power in the hands 
of a single decider—the president—whenever the nation’s security is at stake or the French military is 
to be engaged abroad (Treacher 2003, 20). Having said this, the predisposition of the French political 
system does not dissociate the president from his advisors (and their preparatory work), nor does the 
complexity of the operational environment disappear (Hagan 2001, 10–11). Even during crisis 
situations where decision-making is limited to a small circle of persons and crucial aspects such as state 
survival, sovereignty, or questions on war and peace are at stake, no understanding of a given decision 
can be achieved without an examination of the norms, values, and beliefs that have influenced the actors 
during the decision-making process.         
 To be precise, the criticism of the rational-choice model advanced here does not deny that people 
may strive to make decisions ‘for the purpose of providing themselves the greatest possible benefits’ 
and, in this sense, act rationally (Rosati 2000, 49; McNabb 2010, 23). Even in madness, as chief 
counsellor Polonius in Shakespeare’s Hamlet famously pointed out, there is method (Shakespeare 2012, 
act II, scene 2). Rather than challenging the possibility of rational action, I contend that rationality is 
neither universal nor objectively measurable. This last point relates to a second if not faulty, at least 
                                                     
52  The rational actor approach argues that a close analysis of actors’ ideas, perceptions, beliefs, and idiosyncrasies 
becomes irrelevant during crises. In extreme situations, it is not necessary to engage with personalities of 
individuals, since all actors share the same and easily deductible preferences. Wolfers (1959, 94) illustrates this 
with the metaphor of a burning house, which would drive all inhabitants―with the exception of some irrational 
deviationists―to the nearest exit. The situation is different, if the house, on the other hand, is not on fire but 
overheated. In this case, it is no longer a question of mere survival and decision-makers’ perception and judgment 
of the situation once again become salient. Very few events in world politics classify as “burning house situations”. 
Neither the Malian nor the Central African crises despite France’s cries for urgency, do classify as a “burning 
house” situation (at least not from the perspective of French actors), leaving decision-makers with a wide array of 
options and a non-negligible degree of discretion. 
  44  
  
fragile assumption underpinning the rational-choice model. In order to apply a cost-benefit calculation 
and to choose the most appealing of all options, actors would need to have knowledge of all the possible 
options, including the consequences of each respective solution. The assumption of fully informed 
actors that pursue predetermined interests by resorting to rational calculus has often proven misleading 
when tested against the complexities of social reality. Bourdieu (1988, 783) rightly claims, the 
‘conditions of rational calculation almost never obtain in practice where time is scarce, information 
limited, alternatives ill-defined, and practical matters pressing’. As Kissinger (1966, 505) ascertained 
not without some pathos, ‘Problems are novel; their scale is vast, their nature is often abstract and 
always psychological’. The non-negligible degree of uncertainty that surrounds any decision and that 
confronts agents with ‘situations in which [they] cannot anticipate the outcome of a decision and cannot 
assign probabilities to the outcome’ (Beckert 1996, 804) opens the door widely to subjective 
reasoning.53 Uncertainty prevents decisions and goals from being fully rational (Eun 2012, 768). 
Instead, all decisions (rational or not) are based on incomplete information and are more often than not 
‘ambiguous, tentative, and not fully formed’ (Rosenau 1968, 323).    
 When François Hollande gave the order to intervene militarily in Mali on 11 January 2013, most of 
the advisors in the Ministry of Defence were not particularly optimistic regarding the possible outcomes 
of the mission.54 The existence of this legitimate doubt at the time of the decision illustrates that even 
those who were in possession of the most reliable intelligence on the security situation in Mali were 
still facing the deciders’ worst foe―uncertainty. In light of this challenge, French foreign policy actors 
engaged in processes of strategic construction of the future by delimiting the sense of the 
undeterminable present (Bourdieu 1987, 160). We will encounter this particular way of rationalising 
the present and the future at several instances throughout the following empirical analysis. The most 
                                                     
53  Considerable similarities exist between the definition proposed here and the notion of “bounded rationality”. 
Ideational explanations and bounded rationality are compatible. Simon (1985, 294) argues,‘…if we take into 
account the limitations of knowledge and computing power of the choosing organism, then we may find it 
incapable of making objectively optimal choices. If, however, it uses methods of choice that are as effective as its 
decision-making and problem-solving means permit, we may speak of procedural or bounded rationality, that is, 
behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the 
decision maker….To deduce the procedurally or boundedly rational choice in a situation, we must know the 
choosing organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw 
inferences from the information it possesses. We need know nothing about the objective situation in which the 
organism finds itself, except insofar as that situation influences the subjective representation’.  
54  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 27 January 2014.  
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explicit articulation of this mental shortcut occurred during the decision-making processes that led to 
Operation Sangaris in the CAR during which French decision-makers created the powerful 
counterfactual narrative of a potential genocide that had been prevented from happening.  
 
2.2.2 If not Rational, What Then? 
Social reality is a purposefully constructed edifice that permits human beings to cope with the infinite 
complexity of the world. In contrast to brute facts, which exist independently of the observer, social 
reality is a sociolinguistic construct that is inherently related to the actors’ subjective interpretation 
(Searle 1995, 4; Anscombe 1958). Accordingly, the large majority of interests—in contrast to the 
assumption made by rational-choice models—do not exist outside of specific social identities. Aside 
from some very basic interests, such as the interest in one’s own survival and a ‘minimal physical well-
being’, most interests and preferences are subject to a process of social construction. They are product 
of a constructed ‘self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein 1996, 60). An analysis of foreign policy needs to consider this ideational dimension of 
decisions. In other words, the foreign policy under examination needs to be reconstructed as it appears 
subjectively to the actors themselves (Simon 1985, 298).      
 Faced with a great variety of diverse and oftentimes contradictory information, decision-makers 
select bits of information and disregard others. To compensate for the limited human abilities to achieve 
clear and comprehensive preference orderliness (March 1978, 598), decision-making depends to a high 
degree on the actors’ perceptions and beliefs, which allow them to make sense of a reality they are 
unable to fully comprehend (Blyth 2002, 10). Security interests, like all interests and preferences, are 
not simply given, but emerge from a process of interpretation, during which “natural kinds” traverse 
actors’ ideational prisms to become “social kinds” (Houghton 2007, 27). 55   
 As former State Department planner Louis Halle put it, ‘the foreign policy of a nation addresses 
                                                     
55  For a discussion of the distinction between natural and social kinds see Wendt (1999, 68–71). See also Searle 
(1995) for a distinction between social/institutional and brute facts. 
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itself not to the external world, as is commonly stated, but rather to “the image of the external world” 
that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy’ (quoted in George 1969, 190–91; Wendt 1999, 
249).56 It is important to retain that this argument does not deny the existence of an actor-independent 
natural world, but simply points to the separateness of the natural and the social worlds, with the 
possibility of the two being—to a certain extent—even incongruous (Henrikson 1980, 502; Berman 
1998, 30). The interesting point here is that ideas do not even need to correspond to the real world in 
order to be true or important, as long as they are believed by a large and important enough group of 
actors (Blyth 2002, viii).         
 Based upon their research on cognitive mapping models of decision-making, Shapiro and Bonham 
(1973, 161) claim that decision-makers’ beliefs ‘probably account for more of the variance than any 
other single factor’. In order to select and reject information in a decision-making situation, they argue 
that decision-makers draw on a combined strategy: on the one hand, they are geared to their own 
subjective ‘firm beliefs about aspects of international politics’, while on the other, they scan past events 
to search for analogies that may be applied to understanding present events (Shapiro and Bonham 1973, 
159-160, 162). Most people―consciously or not―accept that they are surrounded by a set of ideas and 
Weltanschauungen that guide them through their daily lives and co-determine their perceptions as well 
as their decisions. Thus, the claim that decision-making cannot be understood independently of the 
actors’ perceptions may ‘seem to be so unexceptional as to verge on the gratuitous’ (Gold 1978, 572). 
However, the historic trajectory of the discipline of IR suggests that more research is needed regarding 
the inclusion of perceptions into the theoretical frameworks of IR and in particular their 
operationalisation.           
 In sum, this project insists that subjective realities, perceptions, and ideas matter. The assumption of 
actors making decisions based on how they perceive the world around them implies that the world a 
social scientist should be concerned with is a world of ideas. To uncover the ideational dynamics that 
drive human action the analyst needs to abandon deductively generated models of rationality and 
embrace social reality inductively by accounting for the actors’ discourses and practices (Bourdieu 
                                                     
56  For an early pronunciation of this argument and an excellent discussion of the role of images in international 
systems, see Boulding (1959).  
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1987, 62). Behind the declaration that ideas matter a more complex question hides: how do ideational 
factors affect decision-making processes? A first step in answering this question consists of defining 
and understanding the mental frames decision-makers use to approach new situations. Ideas can be 
observed and attributed to either individuals or groups. Ideas at the individual level are conceptualised 
here as mental maps, which have become the principal subject of cognitive and psychological 
approaches in IR. Ideas that are situated at the level of collectivities, co-determining the self-
understanding as well as the behaviour of a polity, are subsumed under the term political culture, 
respectively strategic culture in the realm of security policy.     
 The following three sections enlarge upon these two concepts by highlighting both their 
distinctiveness and alikeness. Drawing on the relationship between structure and agency discussed 
above, it is argued that a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts does not reflect the empirical 
reality and hence should be discarded. In line with structurationist theory, a combined approach is 
proposed. 
 
2.2.3 Actors and Mental-Maps 
In order for actors to perceive, interpret, and act towards their environment ‘they apply heuristics that 
facilitate information processing and decision making’ (Weyland 2009, 408). Crisis situations in general 
and military interventions in particular—such as the attack on Mali’s state sovereignty or the civil 
conflict in the CAR, which both provoked a military reaction from France—are catalysts of political 
discourses and constitute ideal laboratories for scrutinising immaterial explanatory variables such as 
ideas, perceptions, and beliefs (Lawson and Tardelli 2013, 1233).57 In moments of high uncertainty 
‘cognitive heuristics hold special sway’ (Weyland 2009, 409; Blyth 2002, 11; Kienzle 2013, 425). When 
confronted with an unexpected and novel situation decision-makers resort to ideational frames and 
                                                     
57  As Crozier and Friedberg (1992 [1977], 111, footnote 38) note, political and organisational crises should be 
considered as privileged moments for analysing organisations. However, one should remain prudent when 
generalising findings generated during moments of crisis. Cognitive frames or decisional procedures other than 
those prevalent during ad hoc decision-making may be more important once the calm and the routine of day-to-
day policy-making return. For the usefulness of crisis situations as a category see also Hermann (1969). 
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incomplete analogies (Hermann 1969, 416), which limit the realm of possibility and structure the 
observed environmental facts according to an orderly system making otherwise unmanageable 
information manageable. In the present study, these simplification- and ordering processes are defined 
as “mental maps”. An understanding of the actors’ mental maps is crucial if one wants to explain foreign 
policy-making. As Johnson (2004, 8) shows, ‘cognitive biases, which result from constraints in the way 
the brain works, allow our decision-making to be skewed by such things as the familiarity of terms and 
concepts, availability of information stored in the brain, and the framing of the decision’. 
 The notion of mental map originates from the works of early gestalt psychologists in the 1930s 
(Henrikson 1980, 497). The pioneering work of Harold and Margaret Sprout—in particular their 
theorisation of the man-milieu relationship—made a more systematic use of the concept in political 
sciences and IR possible (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1965; H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1969; Criekemans 
2009). In contrast to experimental psychology, the object of this study is not the mind as such, but the 
meanings individuals and small groups attribute to observable facts and the expressions they use to 
frame these facts (see Schutz 1967, xx).        
 The definition of mental maps proposed here comes close to what the Sprouts define as ‘cognitive 
behaviourism’, according to which ‘a person reacts to [her] his milieu as [s]he apperceives it—that is, 
as [s]he perceives and interprets it in the light of past experience’ (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1969, 45). 
It is important to retain the distinction that this definition draws between the psychological environment 
and the operational environment (milieu).58 The difference between these two dimensions is 
noteworthy, since the application of a policy solution to the operational environment—that is, the 
confrontation of an idea with external factors—may cause unexpected and unintended outcomes. Ergo, 
discrepancies can emerge between the observable outcomes and the actual decisions, which highlight 
once more that a mere analysis of outcomes is not sufficient to understand a given decision. The 
                                                     
58  ‘The Sprouts (1965, 30) actually distinguish the operational milieu, from the total milieu, as being that subset 
of the total milieu of the decision unit judged relevant or significant for decision-unit performance’ (Gold 1978, 
571 footnote 3). This differentiation reminds of Bourdieu’s treatment of the social champs. For environmental 
factors to influence decision-making processes, individuals need to perceive them and react to them. This is what 
the Sprouts refer to as psychological environment. The operational environment, on the other hand, describes 
external constraints and conditions that will influence the decisional outcome of an individual’s or a group’s 
decision, which are many a time independent of the ‘environed individual’s perception’ (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 
1969, 11). 
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relationship between beliefs, perceptions, and behaviour is not straightforward (Walker 1990, 414), 
which accentuates both the need for process orientated analyses and points to the limits associated with 
an ideational approach to decision-making.59        
 In his study of the geographic mental maps of American foreign policy actors Henrikson (1980, 503) 
observes that mental maps not only are shaped and influenced by processes of institutionalisation, but 
also are a result of ‘education and, more broadly, socialization’. Accordingly, decision-makers’ mental 
maps can only be understood within their historical, political, social, and cultural contexts. Moreover, 
existing mental maps are not simply ad hoc reactions to external observations and stimuli, but have 
developed over a longer period. At any moment, an individual’s mental map is a composite—of past 
experience, present observation, and future expectation. Memory and imagination inform it as well as 
current realities’ (Henrikson 1980, 505).       
 Mental maps are at the same time a tool to validate affirmative political discourses, not only in the 
eyes of the audience but also in the eyes of the narrator. As Dean Acheson put it, ‘the task of those 
seeking policy support “is not that of the writer of a doctoral thesis … qualification must give way to 
simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality, in carrying home a point”’ 
(Acheson 1969, 374-75 quoted in Widmaier 2007, 788; see also Tetlock 2005). Simple storylines and 
abstract schemata that condense reality and depict it in form of a black-and-white lithograph make for 
memorable explanations since they are communicable and easier to understand for others (Lebow 2010, 
279). In their daily work, political elites develop very pronounced mental maps through which they 
perceive the environment around them. For de Gaulle, an effective leader must ‘have a particular way 
of thinking, a thoroughly formed mental set, which is both analytic and synthetic—able to work within 
the limits of time and space’ (Cerny 1980, 69).       
 A first glance at the French intervention in Mali illustrates how mental maps work in practice. 
According to the official discourse, the Malian crisis, without France’s determined intervention, would 
have resulted in the break-up of the Malian state with serious consequences not only for Mali, the Sahel, 
and West Africa, but also for the European continent. A direct link has been drawn between instability 
                                                     
59  See also Janis (1982, 136; 195), who states that ‘a decision does not necessarily have to have a successful 
outcome to be rated as a “good-quality” decision’.  
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in the Sahel region and European security. For instance, Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault asked 
Parliament, if France should have accepted that ‘terrorists threaten the stability of a whole [West 
African] region and the security of France and Europe’ (Assemblée Nationale 2013a, 4475; see also 
Fabius 2013c). Unquestionably, the break-up of the Malian state would have had some impact on the 
West African and Sahel regions and arguably on Europe as well. However, predicting the exact nature 
of these consequences is a difficult, if not impossible task. By portraying a given situation as 
undisputedly true, actors provide the basis for the ensuing problem solution. Mental maps, in other 
words, are narrative heuristics that help both the narrator and the audience to understand and explain 
situations of high uncertainty.60 If we are able to identify the actors’ mental maps, we can say a good 
deal about their motivations and reasoning, allowing for a better and more precise understanding of a 
given decision.            
 This is the central assumption upon which psychological and poliheuristic approaches to foreign 
policy decision-making build (Jervis 1976; Mintz 2003). This type of analysis, however, tends to be 
biased towards individual decision-makers (Walker 1990, 409–10).61 As the above reference to the 
constitutive dimension of culture and references to the institutionalisation of mental maps suggest, 
decision-making is embedded within a specific societal and cultural context. The following section 
explains how societal and cultural variables affect decision-making and why they need to be added to 
the explanatory framework.  
 
2.2.4 Political and Strategic Culture 
By definition and due to their origins in human psychology, cognitive images and mental maps are 
located at the individual level. Psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis assume that speech 
acts and practices firstly provide insights into the mind-set of the individual under examination. This 
                                                     
60  Alexander George (1969, 191, 200) proposes quite a similar definition. Drawing on Nathan Leites’s earlier 
work, he defines ideational prisms that influence the actors’ perceptions as ‘belief systems’.   
61  The same applies to “Operational Code Analysis”, which singles out specific decision-makers to reconstruct 
their personal operational codes in order to explain foreign policy decisions. Poliheuristic theory claims to account 
for various dimensions, in particular the domestic political dimension. However, it considers these factors merely 
as ephemeral input factors and is less interested in the constitutive aspects of culture (DeRouen 2003).   
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study claims that the individual and society are mutually constitutive. As George H. Mead argued, the 
“Self” cannot exist without the “Alter”. Mead emphasises the social nature of the individual when 
writing: ‘The self … is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experience’ (Mead 1962, 
140). Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in their foundational work on foreign policy analysis agree that 
decision-making has as much of an individual dimension to it as it has a societal one. Politics, in other 
words, ‘is not about individual choices made in isolation’ (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 19); it is about 
collective decision-making where individuals confront each other, test their ideas, defend their 
positions, and try to persuade. Discourse itself is an intersubjectively shared experience, which requires 
the theoretical framework to consider the emergence and transformation of ideas at the level of the 
collectivity. Accordingly, analyses of decision-making processes need to ‘account for the impact of 
cultural patterns’ and investigate the possible effects ‘of common value orientations held by most 
members of a whole society’ (1962, 156).        
 As a common mind-set among a group of people, political culture limits the collective attention ‘to 
less than the full range of alternative behaviours, problems, and solutions which are logically possible’ 
(Elkins and Simeon 1979, 128; Johnston 1995, 45). Individual ideas, propositions, and solutions that 
coincide with the prevailing political culture in a given society are more likely to be accepted and hence 
to influence the policy-making process (Ciambra 2013, 25; Risse et al. 1999, 157).   
 Political culture not only operates as a permissive tool but also as a restrictive instrument. According 
to the logic of appropriateness, political culture defines the boundaries between the thinkable and the 
unthinkable (Houghton 2012, 151). In other words, the political contests between actors of a specific 
community engender ‘a collective field of imaginable possibilities’ (Cruz 2000, 277). A comparison of 
German and French strategic cultures illustrates this point nicely. In contrast to German political culture, 
French political culture is much less reticent towards the use of military means, in particular in Africa 
(Malici 2006).           
 In the field of security studies, scholars summarise collectively shared ideas under the term strategic 
culture.62 Like individual maps, strategic culture ‘provides the lens through which national authorities 
                                                     
62  Booth (2005, 25) draws a distinction between political and strategic culture. He argues that strategic culture 
derives from political culture, thus, cannot be used synonymously. See also Kier (1996) and Jepperson, Wendt, 
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refract the structural position of the state in the international system; it explains the subjective 
understanding of objective threats to national security, the instruments relied upon to meet those threats, 
and the preference for unilateral or multilateral action’ (Sperling 2010, 11). The concept of strategic 
culture was first developed by Jack Snyder (1977), who analysed Soviet culture and its impact on 
decision-making processes during the Cold War nuclear rivalry. Snyder defined strategic culture as the 
sum total of ‘ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members 
of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each 
other with regard to nuclear strategy’ (Snyder 1977, 8). Kerry Longhurst, building upon Snyder’s 
definition insists on the gradual evolution and long-term dimensions of the concept. Accordingly, she 
describes strategic culture as a,  
…distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a 
collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic 
culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not 
a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either 
fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences. (Longhurst 2004, 
17) 
 In their recent discussion on European strategic culture, Biava, Drent and Herd (2011, 1228) define 
strategic culture ‘as the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of 
habitual behavior held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the 
best way to achieve it (Klein, 1991; Duffield, 1999)’ (see also Snyder 1977). Induced by the dominant 
worldviews of the political elites of a given state, their national identity as well as their instrumental 
and interaction preferences (Sperling 2010, 11), ‘strategic culture defines a set of patterns of and for 
behaviour on war and peace issues’ (Booth 2005, 25). It is the expression of some general agreement 
among the members of a polity about the means and ends of security policy and the use of military force 
(Baun 2005, 33).  
 Strategic culture is a helpful concept because it captures collectively shared habits, values, and 
beliefs that help to explain how and why certain options have been admitted to the realm of possibility 
and thus entered the political discourse. The concept describes a collective actor’s ideational universe. 
                                                     
and Katzenstein (1996, 57) who argue that ‘the organizational culture of the military…is nested in a broader 
domestic political culture’. At the same time, the two are obviously interlinked.  
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Put differently, strategic culture is the space within which a given community tests ideas, options, and 
solutions to a threat or security problem. The concept also ‘sensitizes us to the importance of history’ 
and allows for insights into the self-image of the actors in question (Booth 2005, 26; Cruz 2000, 276).
 The past functions, as demonstrated by Hibbs’s aspiration model (1982, quoted in Simon 1985, 299), 
as a reference point for future consequences of present decision-making. Beyond that, past discourses 
and behaviour can constrain present action. Previous commitments made by the same person or their 
predecessors limit the respective margin of manoeuvre (Sorensen 2005 [1962], 31).63 It comes as no 
surprise that studies relying on the concept of strategic culture tend to prefer continuity over change 
(Rosa 2014). Path-dependency—an essential explanatory variable for institutionalists (Hall and Taylor 
1996; North 1990; Pierson 1996)—also shows through the French political discourse. When challenged 
on the claim to have developed a “new” approach to African security, several senior civil servants and 
diplomats retorted unanimously, ‘of course, we don’t make a clean sweep…while our approach may be 
different politically, we still keep the instruments that work well’.64 At the same time, as we shall see 
in the subsequent chapters, the patterns of conduct or regularities of behaviour in France’s foreign 
policy-making towards sub-Saharan Africa have gone through a process of transformation and French 
actors had to accommodate new mental frames to the existing ones.  
 Culture is not only constituted with reference to the past but also with reference to the present 
“Other”. Applying Mead’s (1962) interactionist approach to political culture and state identity, it can 
be said that the very existence of a state depends on its interactions with the outside world. Laura Neack 
finds evidence for this argument in her case study on Australia’s role as an Asian Middle Power. She 
concludes that ‘Australia’s idea of itself in the world was absolutely tied to its relationship with other 
states’ (Neack 2002, 176). Analysing the Middle East peace process Barnett (1999, 9) comes to the 
same conclusion, arguing that a common culture emerges from ‘the understanding of oneself in 
relationship to others’. For France, its permanent seat in the UN Security Council, its EU membership, 
                                                     
63  A powerful description of how path-dependency works in practice can be found in Machiavelli: ‘Men almost 
always follow the paths trod by others, and proceed in their affairs by imitation, although they are not fully able 
to stay on the path of others, nor to equal the virtue of those they imitate, a wise man should always enter those 
paths trodden by great men’ (Machiavelli and Bondanella 2005, 20). 
64  Interview with personal advisor to the Foreign Minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Il s’agit d’avoir une approche 
politique qui soit différente mais les instruments qui fonctionnent, on les garde’.  
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and its role as an active player on the African continent constitute the three most important settings 
where the French “Self” interacts with the foreign “Other”. Consequently, French elites pay special 
attention as to how France is perceived by other actors within these three contexts.  
 The academic community continues to debate ‘whether a given strategic culture determines, or 
merely shapes, strategic decision-making’ (Biava, Drent, and Herd 2011, 1228; see also Katzenstein 
1996, 5). The most explicit expression of this disagreement remains the Johnston-Gray debate (Johnston 
1995; Gray 1999). Johnston (1995) holds that cultural, ideational, and normative influences determine 
the behaviour of individual actors (Biava, Drent, and Herd 2011, 1228). In contrast, an opposite 
understanding includes other variables such as material factors, physical geography, and the structure 
of the international system and contents itself by arguing that strategic culture merely shapes decision-
making processes and outcomes (Desch 1998; Gray 1999; Longhurst 2004; Booth 2005; Toje 2005; 
Biava, Drent, and Herd 2011, 1228).65 According to Gray (1999, 50) the difference between the two 
camps comes down to one question. Should strategic culture be thought of as ‘being out there’ causing 
behaviour or alternatively as ‘socially constructed by both people and institutions, which proceed to 
behave to some degree culturally’ (1999, 50)? Toje (2005, 11) claims that ‘strategic culture is the belief 
that factors such as traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and 
historical experience shape strategic behavior and actual policymaking’ (emphasis added). In the words 
of Gray (1981, 22), ‘strategic culture provides the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy 
decision are debated and decided’. Longhurst (2004, 20) adds that policy-actors ‘are neither cultural 
dupes nor prisoners but are fully aware of their cultural context. They cannot bluntly contradict 
foundational elements, but they can try to modify regulatory practices to meet the way in which they 
interpret, or read, the foundational elements in a new context’. Thus, strategic culture can help to 
                                                     
65  According to Glenn (2009), strategic culturalists vary to a considerable degree in terms of their epistemologies. 
He defines four different typologies: Epiphenomenal, conventional constructivist, post-structuralist, and 
interpretivist strategic culture (2009, 530). The former two are devoted to generalisations whereas the latter two 
concentrate on thick description and case-specific details. Works range from structural positivist to interpretive 
post-positivist. The latter portray actors as active framers of reality, who deploy rhetoric and narratives to either 
reconfirm or challenge the boundaries of the acceptable (Weldes 1999, 226 quoted in Glenn 2009, 537). Actors 
are involved in a constant struggle for the dominance of meaning. The emphasis of these studies ‘is not on the 
permanence of strategic culture but rather its contingent use by state elites, interpreting historical events, national 
symbols, key strategists, national myths, etc. for instrumental ends according to the situation they find themselves 
in’ (Glenn 2009, 537). The present study is situated on the conjunction between interpretivist and constructivist 
approaches, with a slight bias towards the former.    
  55  
  
comprehend why decision-makers have taken certain decisions and discarded alternative options (Gray 
1981; Johnston 1995).          
 While accepting the primordial role of ideational factors in the decision-making process, I give 
preference to the term “culture shapes” over the alternative notion “culture causes” behaviour. Thus 
this study considers culture to provide ‘context for events and ideas’ (Edward T. Hall quoted in Gray 
1999, 56). This nuance is not a backdoor to slip material explanations into the theoretical framework 
but a way to avoid an overly static view that undermines the autonomy of agents.66  
 
2.2.5 The Combined Approach 
Most studies in the field of foreign-policy analysis examine either intra-institutional and bureaucratic 
struggles or personal and cognitive traits of specific leaders. Few studies combine both dimensions, that 
is, the societal and the individual.67 Social constructivists argue that culture cannot be reduced to 
individuals but constitutes an inter-subjectively shared property of collectivities or communities 
(Duffield 1999, 769–70; Legro 1996, 122; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 50). In contrast, 
cognitive orientated researchers concentrate on the individual at the expense of structural explanations 
(Houghton 2007, 34; Welch Larson 1994). Each of the two approaches manifests some shortcomings, 
which the respective other model is well equipped to address. Cognitive approaches overestimate the 
power and influence of individual actors. Cultural approaches, on the other hand, often fall prey to the 
structuralist trap. Relying on ‘definitions such as “collectively held ideas, beliefs, and norms”…are so 
broad and imprecise that they have proven difficult to operationalize’ (Pateman quoted in Desch 1998, 
151).            
 In line with the relational approach developed above, I argue that it is necessary to consider the 
                                                     
66   At this point I side with Poore (2003), who defends Gray’s concept of strategic culture as context but 
simultaneously advocates the use of a more consistent constitutive framework. According to Poore, material 
factors have no meaning outside of the cultures that condition them (2003, 283).  
67  For instance, Allison’s seminal work on decision-making processes during the Cuban missile crisis is 
organised along ‘three rough-cut frames of reference’ (1971, v). While separating the different levels of analysis, 
Allison does not deny the existence of additional conceptual lenses nor the possibility of a grand model that 
incorporates the features of all three rough-cut frames of reference (Allison 1971, 255–63). 
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different explanatory dimensions simultaneously for each of the two cases. Psychological analysis 
without an understanding of the institutional and societal background risks ignoring the important 
constraints imposed by the operational environment. Institutional analysis without cognitive 
explanations neglects the human dimension of the policy-making process, which is necessary in order 
to counteract the empirically void anthropomorphisation of the state.     
 As Bevir and Rhodes maintain, ‘[t]he distinction between aggregate and individual is artificial’, and 
whether to focus at a given moment on either of the two depends on the topic to be studied (Bevir et al. 
2004, 131). Levy (2003, 254) adds that psychological variables cannot provide complete explanations 
of foreign policy and, therefore, need to be integrated into ‘a broader theory of foreign policy that 
incorporates state-level causal variables and that explains how the preferences, beliefs, and judgments 
of key individual actors get aggregated into a foreign policy decision for the state’.   
 The move towards a combined approach is based on two simple assumptions. Ideas, beliefs, or 
perceptions are human traits with a non-negligible degree of idiosyncrasy. They would not exist if it 
was not for the individual. Ergo, for ideational approaches the individual is the irreducible unit of 
analysis. As the previous section has shown, ideas at the same time do not emerge in a vacuum, but are 
embedded within a larger social environment. Studies in psychology have demonstrated that self-
descriptions and so called internal stimuli—statements describing internal events—are reactions to 
outside stimuli and socialisation (Bem 1967). These reflections complement the argument developed 
above with respect to the agent-structure debate: ‘Combining microfoundational aspects of individual 
psychology within a larger social, institutional, and political context offers an opportunity to explore 
the reciprocal and mutually determinative relationships between people and their environments’ 
(McDermott and Lopez 2012, 197).         
 In particular, when ideas emerge from a process of public deliberation and are contested at many 
different instances they become inherently social. Put differently, culture and personality interact with 
each other and clear lines of demarcation between the two concepts do not exist (Elkins and Simeon 
1979, 134). The two levels of analysis, the individual and the group, are complementary and inseparable 
(Wodak et al. 2009, 16). Most of the time, it is difficult to attribute a given discourse or practice to 
either personality or societal factors. Usually, ‘personality factors merge with cultural background 
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factors’ allowing for group term explanations (Cerny 1980, 13). Accordingly, the distinction between 
constructivism and psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis becomes superfluous. In 
contrast, the two approaches lend themselves to form an ideational alliance.68   
 Drawing on recent contributions by Houghton (2007), Flanik (2011), and Shannon and Kowert 
(2012) this research joins the dialogue between cognitive foreign policy analysis (political psychology) 
and constructivism. Next to the potential of overcoming the individualism/holism divide, bridging 
constructivism with psychological approaches may also compensate for the former’s difficulty to 
explain change (Welch Larson 2012, 58–59). The study complements the concept of slowly emerging 
belief systems with the more ephemeral and situational notion of mental maps and thus avoids a too 
static vision of policy-making.          
 In his work, Flanik (2011) achieves a dialogue between the two approaches by introducing 
metaphors into the theoretical framework. However, bridge-building must not be limited to the concept 
of metaphors but can be extended to all sorts of utterances and symbols that constitute political 
discourse. Looking at discursive data such as speeches, interview material, briefing notes, or politicians’ 
memoirs and autobiographies means simultaneously examining the cognitive processes of the authors 
as individuals (as long as they can be identified) as well as the cultural and ideational background of 
the group they belong to. Post-structuralist foreign policy analysts advance similar claims when 
examining the discursive construction of the “Self” and the “Other” in foreign policy-making. Roxanne 
Doty (1997, 385) argues that ‘every utterance (practice) is spoken not only by the voice of a concrete 
speaker, but also by the anonymous voices of cultural codes’. Elsewhere, applying the discursive 
practices approach to US’s counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines, she points to the ‘discursive 
space’ within which policy-makers function and which limits their respective perception of reality 
(Doty 1993, 303), while highlighting how agents through their discourses have the potential to create a 
‘particular reality’ (Doty 1993, 308).  
                                                     
68  Both reject narrow rational-choice assumptions as they can be found in neorealism and neoliberalism 
(Houghton 2012, 150). Both approaches also claim that ideas emerge over time and that past experience matters 
in the construction of the present and the understanding of the future. In addition, the two approaches’ shared 
focus on ‘ideational factors and process, the importance of identity, and the importance of understanding how 
agents view the world rather than assuming or imputing the analyst’s view—provide grounds for an ideational 
alliance against prevailing rationalist/materialist approaches’ (Shannon 2012, 7).      
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2.3 Crisis Situations, Threat Perception, and Securitisation 
The two selected cases of French interventionism in Mali and the CAR both were situations in which 
policy-makers had to leave the path of normality and were forced to act under increased pressure, time 
constraints, and against the backdrop of a high level of uncertainty. Above, I pointed to the fact that 
even under such exceptional conditions ideas matter a great deal when it comes to explaining a given 
decision. In the following, I go one step further in arguing that it is in particular during crisis situations 
that the struggle between different ideas and competing mental frames can be observed. Due to the fact 
that ‘agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and impose on others their notion of what a crisis 
actually is before collective action to resolve the uncertainty facing them can take any meaningful 
institutional form’ (Blyth 2002, 9), policy ideas and hidden assumptions come to the forefront of the 
discourse. Whether or not a given situation is defined as a crisis depends much on the successful framing 
of an issue, which in turn depends on the persuasive power of the different competing ideas as well as 
on the actors’ cultural and social capital. Being instances of intensive ideational struggles, crisis 
situations as a specific class of events are particularly well suited for a close analysis of the actors’ 
ideational frames. To remain with the metaphor of the chemist, crisis situations are the test strips used 
to visualise the impact of ideas in foreign policy-making.     
 Threats, danger, and security are not objective conditions or immutable objects that are somewhere 
“out there” awaiting to be analysed, but themselves result from processes of meaning-giving and are 
‘effects of interpretation’ (Campbell 1998, 1–2). As Williams (2003, 513) notes, security should be 
‘treated not as an objective condition but as an outcome of a specific social process: the social 
construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) [should be] analysed by 
examining the “securitizing speech-acts” through which threats become represented and recognized’. 
The concept of securitisation, as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, emphasises 
the ‘inherently political nature of any designation of security issues’ (Waever 1999, 334). Besides all 
the praise it received, the securitisation has induced a wide range of criticism. Some pundits describe 
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the idea as ‘sociologically untenable’ (McSweeney 1996, 89), while others dismiss the approach upfront 
as politically irresponsible (Eriksson 1999; see also Williams 2003, 512). The contentiousness that 
surrounds this concept can be explained by the fact that securitisation confronts analysts, decision-
makers, and political activists with an ethical question ‘why do you call this a security issue?’ (Waever 
1999, 334). During my fieldwork, I experienced strong reactions by decision-makers and policy-
advisors as soon as I explained that this study explores processes of threat construction.  
One can say, it was us, who have constructed the threat. But, no! If you go to Mali you are going to 
see, if the threat has been constructed. I know the country a little bit. I can tell you, if you are a 
woman... in the past, you never had any problems. However, today men refuse to shake hands with 
you. This is a reality. This is not us having decided that there is a terrorist threat.69  
 Security and social constructivism continue to be seen by many as an incomparable pair. All the 
more, it is important to retain the difference between the psychological and the operational environment, 
mentioned above. External language independent facts stipulate the securitisation of an issue (Searle 
1995, 61). However, this does not invalidate the claim that threat perception is a process of discursive 
construction. ‘After all’, as Cruz (2000, 275) points out, ‘we approach reality rhetorically―that is, with 
an intent to convince’. This is what Aristotle meant when arguing that ‘human beings are naturally 
political animals who require and use language to pursue political ends’ (Woods 2006, 51). At the same 
time, rhetoric does more than convincing a given audience; it gives meaning to objects and sense to a 
reality. In the same line, the concept of securitisation does not negate the urgency and the seriousness 
of the two crises in Mali and the CAR nor the committed violence on the ground but holds that only by 
resorting to the discursive construction of a threat it is possible to understand how, why, and when a 
given issue becomes a threat in the eyes of the actors under examination.70 Securitisation, in other 
words, is primarily interested in the processes that contribute to the inclusion, the framing, and the 
solving of a certain issue as a question of security.  
                                                     
69  Interview with a policy officer at the Francophonie Organisation, Paris, 1 October 2013. ‘On peut toujours 
dire, c’est nous qui ont construit la menace, etc… Non ! Allez-y au Mali et vous allez voir si elle est construite la 
menace. Moi, je connais un tout petit peu le pays, et je peux vous dire quand vous êtes une femme et vous arrivez—
jusqu’ici vous n’avez jamais eu un problème—et les hommes commence à vous refuser vous serrer la main. C’est 
une réalité. Ce n’est pas nous qui ont décidé qu’il y a un danger terroriste’.  
70  As I argued above, there are very few objective and universally shared threats in the international system such 
as the approaching end of the world or a fatal attack by extra-terrestrials.  
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2.4 The Empirical Challenge: Some Notes on Method 
Having established the theoretical pillars on which this study rests, the remainder of this chapter 
addresses the challenges related to the operationalisation of this research. In his article on the empirical 
application of cognitive foreign policy analysis , Richard Hermann (1988, 175) asserts that it ‘is much 
easier to argue for the merits of a theoretical frame that includes variables pertaining to decision-
making, than it is to identify how the values of these variables will be inferred’. This statement remains 
pertinent, in particular since no theory or model can discharge the researcher from ‘the need to carry on 
painstaking empirical research’ (Simon 1985, 303). Herrmann (1988) refers to two major challenges in 
particular when dealing with ideational and cognitive variables. First, the conceptual framework must 
be able to match the increased complexity that emerges from treating ‘humans as subjects rather than 
scientific objects’. Second, a sound qualitative methodology that is capable of competing with the 
persuasiveness of positivist explanations needs to be developed (1988, 175).    
 The translation of abstract ‘thought experiments’ (Keohane 1984, 66) into empirical analysis of real 
world problems is a question of method. Methods are not ends in themselves, but always serve a purpose 
(Leander 2008, 12). In other words, neither the underlying research question nor the theoretical 
framework developed here are innocent methodologically speaking. They allow for some 
methodologies and foreclose others. For the purpose of this project, the methodology must support the 
investigation of specific decision-making processes. Moreover, it needs to provide techniques that trace 
both individual and collectively shared ideas. The type of methodology that responds best to these 
requirements is interpretative and mainly qualitative. Qualitative research applies to small-sample 
studies of one or a few cases (McNabb 2010, 24). As Firestone (1993, 22) holds, qualitative 
methodologies are best ‘for understanding the processes that go on in a situation and the beliefs and 
perceptions of those in it’. Qualitative research generates in-depth knowledge of a small number of 
cases and its findings are applicable to real-world policy contexts. On the downside, up-close 
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observations of social phenomena are more difficult to translate into general laws (George and Bennett 
2005, 90; VanderStoep and Johnston 2009, 167).71  
 
2.4.1 Content and Discourse Analysis 
Since there is no direct access to the minds of decision-makers, researchers depend on substitute data 
that allow for making inferences about perceptions and thoughts of individuals and larger groups. This 
substitute data presents itself in form of ‘observable consequences’ (1988, 180)―that is, discourse and 
documentary material, which the researcher examines to make inferences about perceptions, beliefs, 
and cognitions of her/his research subjects (Axelrod 1976c, 7–10). The suggestion of a corollary 
between discursive practices and ideational factors is based on the assumption that all ‘inner life 
achieves an outward expression’ (Schutz 1967, xix). In other words, ‘beliefs become actions through 
the medium of language’ (Kowert 2012, 43).      
 Language takes a prominent role throughout this study. All sources I examined are language-based 
sources, that is, written or oral discourse, public or private conversations between actors and their 
respective audiences. By focussing on speech acts I do not mean to deny that a world independent of 
language exists, but simply contend that ‘we can never know that (beyond the fact of its assertion), 
because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of 
interpretation' (Campbell 1998, 6).         
 For the purpose of analysing the data, content and discourse analysis were used in a complementary 
manner.72 Content analysis focuses on the coding and the analysis of text, whereas discourse analysis 
in the Foucauldian tradition, is more interested in how discourse provokes particular actions and 
considers coding only as a preliminary task (Potter and Wetherell 1994, 49, 52).73 Following the data 
                                                     
71  Structuralists criticise qualitative methodology exactly on these grounds. This criticism needs to be taken 
seriously, in particular with regard to the study’s implications beyond the selected cases. I will come back to this 
point in the conclusion of this work.  
72  Bratberg (2011, 337–38) refers to ideational design to describe the combination of qualitative content analysis 
and discourse analytical methods.   
73  Foucauldian discourse analysis assumes that discourses constitute objects and subjects (Alvesson and 
Karreman 2000).  
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collection,74 I coded all data with the help of the qualitative data analysis software Nvivo®. The coding 
categories emerged inductively from the text and were not defined prior to the analysis. The aim was to 
avoid an excessive pre-structuration of the texts into categories, which arise from the analyst’s own 
subjective mental maps (Tsygankov 2012, 6). The coding concentrated on concepts, phrases, and 
arguments, not on single words. At this preliminary stage I equalled frequency with importance, 
however, probed this assumption during the qualitative interpretation of the data.   
 Content analysis has been criticised for removing the textual fragments under examination from their 
actual context, thus, counting words but being unable to interpret them (Billig quoted in Wilson 1993, 
1).75 Including discourse-analytical tools in the research design helps to overcome this criticism. 
Discourse analysis not only asks what has been said, but also enquires how, to whom, and with which 
purpose something has been said. The added-value of discourse analysis as a method76 can be illustrated 
by the example of public speeches. Public speeches are not only linguistic devices of communication, 
but also means of power. Discourse controls social action through acts of exclusions. It permits some 
ways of thinking and acting while it inhibits others. Discourse drives subjectivity and determines 
meaning (Alvesson and Karreman 2000, 1131). Foucault (1971, 55) defines discourse as a ‘violence 
that we do to things…[and] a practice that we impose on them’. This understanding of discourse is in 
line with the concept of securitisation discussed above. When analysing the data, I always kept an eye 
on the context within which a specific discourse had been pronounced and the audience towards which 
it was directed.            
 One of the principal problems related to an ontology that focuses on human subjects and their 
utterances concerns the reliability of the sources. Holsti refers to a ‘credibility gap’ the researcher needs 
to overcome when working with subjective documentary data (Holsti 1976, 42). Information may be 
distorted or biased. Political leaders, diplomats, and civil servants—for political, diplomatic, or 
professional reasons—may not say what they think and think what they do not say (Levy 2003, 262; 
                                                     
74  A more detailed description of the data collection is provided below under the section “Sources”.  
75  Krippendorff (2004, xxii) argues that this is a popular misconception and coding is only a small part of content 
analysis.  
76  Discourse analysis remains a contested term. Some regard it as a method while others consider it to be a 
discipline (Pierce 2008, 279).  
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Bevir et al. 2004, 138). As Prunier (1995, 280) puts it when analysing France’s reaction to the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, ‘whether the French government really believed its own fabrications, and whether 
its fantasies were convenient decoys or deeply-held beliefs, is hard to say.’ In light of these constraints, 
the distinction between instrumental and representational communication may be difficult at times. Not 
only for the analyst but also for the actors these two dimensions or functions of discourse are 
inextricably intertwined. Wodak et al. (2009, 8) acknowledge that ‘discourse constitutes social practice 
and is at the same time constituted by it’. Each speech act, I argue, is instrumental and constitutive at 
the same time. A purely instrumental use of rhetoric is impossible, since speech acts do not exist outside 
of the realm of social practices that shape and co-determine them. Put differently, even an outright lie 
in the political realm contains elements that tell us something about the social context and the 
motivations that it tries to conceal.77         
 In the following, whenever possible, I point to the instrumental and the foundational dimension of a 
given utterance and draw the distinction between the two. To do so, control strategies need to be 
developed that increase the validity of the claims made in this research project (Duffield 1999, 794; 
Holsti 1976, 44). Although there is no definitive solution to this methodological challenge, the risk of 
getting caught in the trap of deliberatively false rhetoric can be minimised by several tactics. First, using 
a wide range of sources instead of only one kind of data allows for crosschecking. Second, collected 
statements have been checked against secondary literature in order to estimate the reliability of a 
specific source. Third, personal and confidential interviews with political elites have complemented the 
analysis of the official discourse. Fourth, at all times particular attention has been paid to the specific 
social and cultural contexts within which given utterances have been produced (Holsti 1976, 44). 
However, even after employing these strategies, a small margin of error needs to be accounted for. 
While prudence is advisable when dealing with subjective and non-quantifiable data, there is no reason 
                                                     
77  For example, the French official discourse insists on the fact that the intervention in Mali was completely 
unrelated to French uranium mining activities in neighbouring Niger. Several pundits, however, identified 
France’s interest in Niger’s uranium as principal driving force (I will elaborate on this claim in Chapter Four). Let 
us assume for the moment that French policy-makers lied to their audience. This lie would still provide us with 
insights into the collective belief systems that prevail among decision-makers. In this specific case, it would tell 
us that “having mining” interests in Niger does not constitute an acceptable justification of intervention both in 
legal and moral terms.    
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to discard them as unreliable. By far, not all verbal communication between decision-makers and the 
public is necessarily fraudulent. In contrast, it can be assumed that the majority of the verbal data 
actually reflects the central motives of decision-makers (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 148; Siroux 
2011, 36–37). Without any consistency between their assertions and their actions, politicians would 
discredit themselves as untrustworthy and insincere (Axelrod 1976b, 253). 
 
2.4.2 The Case Study Method   
Cases are not a priori delimitated, but the result of deliberate choices made by the researcher (Vennesson 
2008, 227). When selecting the cases, and subsequently, working on them, I found McNabb’s six step-
approach a useful guideline (McNabb 2010, 239–43):  
1. Frame the case 
2. Operationalise key constructs 
3. Define units of analysis 
4. Collect the data 
5. Analyse the data 
6. Present and prepare a report of the findings 
 Framing a case means justifying its selection and explaining the purpose of this choice. The general 
rationale for the case selection presents itself in detail both in the introduction and in Chapter Two. 
There is no need to repeat the arguments at this point. It is sufficient to say that both cases are 
representatives of a family of cases that can help generate a better understanding of decision-making 
processes of current French security policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The key constructs have been 
operationalised in this chapter. The definition of the units of analysis has been evoked in the present 
chapter and will be elaborated in Chapter Three. The translation from theory into empirical 
research―that is, the actual collection and analysis of the data resulted in Chapters Four and Five. To 
reconstruct mental maps and cultural belief systems of French decision-makers and to trace their impact 
on policy outcomes, I have examined two cases of France’s recent security policy towards sub-Saharan 
Africa: the French military intervention in Mali (Operation Serval) and the French peacekeeping 
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operation in the CAR (Operation Sangaris). France’s military intervention in Mali constitutes the 
principal case. Not only did this important mission lead to the generation of a large amount of 
unexploited data, but it also showed a radical deviation from France’s renewed policy paradigm of 
security policy in Africa, which informed the country’s initial position during the Malian crisis. The 
second case builds on the first one and probes the generated findings within a slightly different context. 
The situation on the ground, the declared enemy, and the proposed solution were different. At the same 
time, the French intervention in the CAR gave rise to a whole set of similar motives and justifications. 
Such a replication allows for broader claims about the mental maps and ideas that have influenced the 
Hollande administration in their day-to-day policy-making. This is what George and Bennett refer to 
when evoking a well-structured research design that allows for a comparison between the selected cases 
(George and Bennett 2005). Firestone proposes ‘case-to-case’ transfer―that is, adopting conclusions 
from one case to another one―as a way to widen the findings and to allow for some degree of 
generalisation.           
 Lastly, the case selection was as much guided by analytical criteria as by the developments on the 
ground. This research begun in the second half of 2011. At that time, the situation in Mali albeit instable 
was far from being explosive. Nor was the CAR considered a greater as usual risk to regional or 
international security. While this study started by employing the approach developed here to three 
historical case studies of French interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa, the events in 2012 and 2013 
have generated two more pertinent cases studies for the purpose of the present argument and provided 
the unique opportunity to follow the decision-making processes very closely.   
 
2.4.3 Sources 
Since the central purpose of this project is to reconstruct the decision-making processes that led to 
military interventions in Mali and the CAR, data needed to be compiled that contains information about 
the two cases as well as the mental maps and belief systems behind France’s foreign and security policy, 
its relations with the African continent, and its role in the international system. This data has been 
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collected from official statements made during press conferences or other interview situations. The data 
also include the minutes of weekly hearings of the foreign minister and the defence minister in front of 
parliamentary committees as well as governmental declarations made in either the Senate or the 
National Assembly.78 A total of 659 sources have been coded for the two cases (294 for Mali and 365 
for the CAR, see appendix 1), representing what is often referred to as ‘legitimate’ or ‘official’ data 
(Dunn 2008, 87–8).           
 The official sources have been supplemented by thirty-two semi-structured high-level interviews 
with politicians, diplomats, military personal, journalists, and researchers conducted in Paris between 
May 2013 and December 2014 (see appendix 2; Aberbach and Rockman 2002).79 These interviews 
provide valuable background information regarding the decision-making process, the internal 
organisation and power dynamics of the French state apparatus, as well as (at times critical) annotations 
to the official discourse. Most importantly, they express the subjective understanding of some of the 
core actors and highlight the personal dimension of decision-making processes.80    
 The specific approach to interviewing is determined by the socio-cultural milieu to which the 
respective interviewees belong as well as their national and linguistic identity. I primarily resorted to 
semi-structured, open-ended interviews. This type of interview technique enables the interviewees to 
construct their own arguments, yet, within a framework predefined by the researcher (Cohen 1999, 8). 
                                                     
78  The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosts a comprehensive online database that includes all official French 
foreign policy declarations made since 1990. See: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ‘Basedoc: Déclarations 
officielles et points de presse’, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/, accessed 12 October 2014.  
79  Two interviews were conducted in 2011.  
80  Too often, interviewing is considered as merely a supplementary tool that furnishes research reports with some 
real-life colour. Rationalists as well as behaviouralists discard interviews on the ground of being unreliable or less 
relevant sources of social enquiry. While for behaviouralists interviews are ‘subjective and imprecise and 
therefore subject to multiple interpretations’, for rationalists the agents’ opinion is of little importance since all 
agents ‘respond the same way to the same stimuli’ (Rathbun 2008, 685–86). Moreover, the detailed and relative 
idiosyncratic nature of information retrieved through interviews does not fit well with the general strive for 
parsimony and generalisation in political science. While these arguments should be taken seriously, they should 
not lead us to conclude that interviews are slippery data that are to be used sparingly at most. Undoubtedly, while 
the subjectivity of interview data is one of their major caveats, it is also the true added value and the reason for 
which to conduct interviews in the first place. Data gathered from interviews are not expected to tell an objective 
‘truth’. Interview material reflects the subjective interpretation of selected events by an individual or a group of 
people. In general terms interviews allow ‘to go in-depth as secondary sources, survey, or archives do not allow’ 
(Rathbun 2008, 688). In contrast to other sources, interviews do not serve to discover observable behaviour, but 
help ‘to understand the meaning of that behavior’ (Seidman 2006, 10). For Axelrod (1976a, 363), spontaneously 
spoken words are to be preferred to written words because they ‘may provide a better indication than carefully 
composed words of how the person thinks about an issue on his [her] own’. In fact, ‘interviewing is often the best-
suited method for establishing the importance of agency or ideational factors such as culture, norms, ethics, 
perception, learning, and cognition’ (Rathbun 2008, 690).  
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Maintaining a small degree of predefined structure, semi-structured interviews also lay the ground for 
the so-called horizontal thematic analysis―that is, a comparison of the same or similar themes across 
an entire corpus of interviews (Barbillon and Le Roy 2012, 54). The approach allows for categorising 
and comparing responses thematically.         
 Given this study’s target group—state elites—open-endedness is another crucial criterion. Aberbach 
and Rockman (2002, 674) advise that ‘elites especially—but other highly educated people as well—do 
not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions’. Bourdieu, in the edited volume La 
Misère du Monde (1998 [1993]) affirms that interviewing always involves a degree of “symbolic 
violence”, which is imbalanced in favour of the interviewer, the socially dominant, and against the 
interviewee, the socially dominated. This power relationship is inversed when the subjects are elites 
(Cohen 1999, 5–7, 9). Next to the initial difficulty of gaining access to senior officials who are widely 
sought after, the major challenges lies in gaining the subjects’ confidence, trust, and acceptance. Thus, 
thorough preliminary preparation is essential in order to reduce the distance between the researcher and 
the interviewee. Institutional affiliations with respected research institutes or universities and personal 
recommendations by already established contacts facilitated the process of getting in the door and 
created additional confidence.   
 
2.5 Conclusion and Research Question  
In this chapter I have argued that a comprehensive understanding of decision-making processes requires 
ideational factors to be at the core of the analysis. In an attempt to ‘bring human beings back into the 
IR theoretical enterprise and put them at the intersection of all other forces about which we theorize’ 
(Hudson 2002, 17), I have developed an agent-centred approach that traverses the boundaries between 
individualism and holism. Cognitive maps and intersubjectively shared belief systems have the potential 
to provide central insights into decision-making processes.      
 The theoretical framework serves both to justify and to enable the empirical analysis. Ideational 
factors are identified as essential variables for explaining foreign policy behaviour. While the theoretical 
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framework does not negate the impact of material interests and structural factors, it suggests that 
ideational factors are equally if not more salient than often assumed (Widmaier 2007, 780–81).81 For 
material variables to influence decision-making processes they need to traverse actors’ cognitive 
prisms. While ideas ‘go all the way through social reality’ they do not go all the way down into an a-
material nothingness’ (Blyth 2002, 30). The study’s empirical focus on two crisis situations challenges 
rationalist approaches on their home turf. This study argues that crises cannot be analysed with reference 
to predetermined interests and preferences. Instead, the idiosyncrasy and ad hoc nature of these 
situations leave room for interpretation. It is the observer’s task to uncover why certain interpretations 
are preferred over others.           
 The theoretical framework enables the analysis insofar as it provides the necessary conceptual 
ground for examining both philosophical and instrumental beliefs of French elites (Walker 1990, 405–
6). The examination of mental maps of actors of a given champ produces a comprehensive 
understanding of past decisions and allows for informed guesses regarding the actors’ likely future 
responses in similar settings. When applied to the two case studies of France’s recent military 
interventions in Mali and the CAR, the framework gives rise to following central questions:  
 What were the French actors’ mental maps when deciding on the military interventions in Mali and 
the CAR? 
 How did these maps emerge and where did they come from? 
 What kind of normative justifications were advanced? 
 To what extent were the arguments congruent with France’s strategic culture?  
 What do these cases reveal about France’s self-perception of its role in the world, including its 
relationship with the African continent? 
 For analytical purposes I distinguish between three different ‘moment[s] of the making of action’ 
(Bigo 2011, 237): perception, diffusion and framing, and the decision itself.82 A problem, such as a 
                                                     
81  According to Mark Blyth (2002, 17–18) one of the shortcomings of past ideational explanations was the 
tendency to ‘treat ideas and interests as radically different and unrelated concepts’. I agree with Blyth that this is 
‘logically untenable’ by arguing that ideas and interests are not two different things but two dimensions of the 
same thing.  
82  The clear-cut tripartite division is a deductive move and not an empirical observation. In reality the different 
phases are interwoven. The three stage model draws on Harold Laswell’s policy cycle, which comprises the 
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security threat, emerges from a ‘perceived discrepancy between present conditions and what is desired’ 
(Hermann 2001, 53). Security threats are subjective and depend on the policy-makers’ perceptions. 
Thus, in a first step the appearance of an issue on the security agenda needs to be probed. When and 
how did the Malian and the Central-African crises appear on the French security agenda? What frames 
were used in order to interpret political instability? What alternative frames were discarded? The second 
step in the decision-making process—the diffusion of ideas—involves self-persuasion and persuasion 
of others. The actors’ main task is to raise awareness that a problem exists and something needs to be 
done about it. Since discourse is a constitutive part of actions, events and situations (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987, 21), the process of persuasion and diffusion contributes to the actors’ threat perception 
and influences the framing of issues. Put differently, the cognitive maps, analogies, and metaphors 
decision-makers use in their public discourse both inform policy-makers and help to justify and 
advocate their decisions. Cognitive heuristics are simultaneously diagnostic and instrumental tools 
(Khong 1992, 13–17). Decision-makers gradually adjust their own mode of reasoning to the evolving 
discourse. During this process of securitisation, a political problem becomes a security problem. 
Accordingly, in a second section the study asks what kind of arguments were brought forward to justify 
action and how can the choice of specific arguments be understood. During the third phase, arguments 
that retroactively justify the decision take centre stage. Justifications can be directed towards a domestic 
or an international audience and can advance moral or legal reasons for a given action. In both cases, 
justifications deliver insights into the self-perception of the actors under investigation. Justifications 
speak ‘directly to, and therefore reveals something about, normative context and shared social purpose’ 




                                                     
following five stages: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, evaluation (Savard 
and Banville 2012). 
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Chapter Three 
On Women and Men: Decision-Making in the Realm 
of Foreign and Defence Policy 
  
 
Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of [wo]men … not a machine 
but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory 
of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. 
—Woodrow Wilson 
 
Strategic theory without strategic anthropology consigns the study of a threat and 
use of force to capabilities analysis, the crudities of old-style political realism and 
the flaws of the rational actor approach. 
― Ken Booth 
 
 
After having established the study’s theoretical framework, the principal purpose of this chapter is to 
present the decision-units responsible for securitisation discourses and practices and explain the 
institutional setting that enables their (inter)actions.83 Given this study’s focus on processes, 
perceptions, and ideas, the rhetorical simplification of considering states as ‘centrally coordinated, 
purposive individuals’ (Allison 1971, 3) poses some difficulties (cf. Wendt 1992). Instead of echoing 
the procrustean anthropomorphisation of the state, I propose concentrating on those ‘entities capable of 
experiencing needs, formulating problems, perceiving phenomena by seeing, hearing, and other sensory 
behavior’—in other words, on ‘flesh-and-blood human beings’, their actions and relations (H. Sprout 
and M. Sprout 1965, 207). The notions of agency and actors have already been used extensively, 
however, without having been defined yet. As the link between the preceding theoretical framework 
and the subsequent empirical analysis, the chapter oscillates between theory and practice. In so doing, 
it attempts to render theory meaningful and practice intelligible (Bourdieu 2012, 45–77). It is argued 
                                                     
83  The term decision-unit is borrowed from Hagan (2001); see also Gold (1978, 569) and Hermann (2001). A 
decision-unit is a compound notion that describes both the institutional set-up of specific functions and the 
subjective interpretation by individual agents. This is to differentiate from the term ‘decision-maker’, which 
exclusively refers to human agents.  
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that in order to understand decision-making, both the formal function of public offices and the holders’ 
personal interpretation of their functions need to be examined. Since different leaders respond 
differently to their environment and thus act differently, it is crucial to account for their leadership style 
and personal traits when examining a given decision-making process (Hermann et al. 2001, 95–96). 
 The first section of this chapter provides a definition of agency. The second section identifies the 
central decision-units responsible for the military interventions in Mali and the CAR. This section—
building on the assumption that the offices and personalities of their holders cannot be analytically 
separated—engages first with the formal institutional set-up of the different decision-units and then 
with the decision-makers themselves. The chapter concludes by depicting an interactionist scheme of 
decision-making processes that accounts for both formal and informal structures of government 
(Hermann 2001, 57–58). A look behind the curtain of the policy-making process allows for tracing the 
emergence and the creation of ideas instead of simply assuming their existence.  
  
3.1 A Definition of Agency  
France decided to intervene in Mali! This linguistic shortcut is widely used in the media, as well as in 
political and academic debates. It is not simply some sort of ‘disinterested’ notion, but a meaning-giving 
term with a political agenda (Leander 2011, 306). It ascribes to the state the quality of being an actor of 
its own, capable of perceiving events, having or acquiring preferences, and acting according to specific 
motivations. The use of this shortcut contributes to the illusion of the state being more than a croyance 
collective (collective belief), which is a dangerous fiction that prevents us from actually thinking about 
the state and its actions (Bourdieu 2012, 25).        
 As has been shown in in the previous chapter, the objectification of the state does not allow for in-
depth analyses of the underlying decision-making processes without some further qualification. The 
‘states-as-sole-actors’ approach obscures the constituting force of human agency towards action; it 
disregards processes and consequently remains biased towards outcomes. The theoretical shorthand of 
the state being an actor in international relations can only be justified, ‘if we understand what spelling 
our sentences out in the underlying language would look like and what the meaning of those sentences 
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would be in that fuller language’ (Hudson 2005, 5). The packaging of ‘the activities of various officials 
of a national government as actions chosen by a unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual 
human being’ (Allison 1971, 36), cannot explain the impact of perceptions, cognitive frames, and 
motivations of the different actors within the system (Crozier and Friedberg 1992 [1977], 46). Decision-
making in the realm of public policy is steered by individuals and small groups that engage in the 
discursive construction of reality. A simple scaling up of individual-level identity to collective identity 
ignores the crucial ‘interactive processes’, which are at the heart of all social phenomena (McDermott 
and Lopez 2012, 201).84          
 The ‘states-as-sole-actors’ approach (Wolfers 1959, 83) may grasp traits of national culture and their 
impact on foreign policy outcomes, but does not account for the emergence of ideas and their trajectories 
through the institutional, political, and social space.85 In addition, spirit—the sine qua non for the 
development of ideas and identities—‘is a purely human drive’. Since ‘organizations and states do not 
have psyches’; they ‘cannot be treated as persons’ (Lebow 2008, 62). Consequently, they cannot be 
actors but are simply frameworks that allow for social action. ‘To say that something is in the interest 
of the state is like saying that a good roof is in the interest of the house, when what one really means is 
that a good roof is considered vital by the house’s inhabitants who value the safety, completeness, and 
reputation of their residence’ (Wolfers 1959, 86). Most of these insights are not new. Similar to Wolfers, 
Morgenthau (1948, 73) observed that ‘when we speak of the power or of the foreign policy of a certain 
nation, we can only mean in empirical terms the power or the foreign policy of certain individuals…’. 
Beyond the small world of international relations theory, these findings are often considered common-
sense knowledge. For the majority of civil servants and political leaders, policy-making is not at all 
about rules and structure but firstly about human beings, their ideas and interactions (see Bourdieu 
                                                     
84  This is a fundamental difference between the approach proposed here and mainstream constructivism. For 
instance, in Alexander Wendt’s influential constructivist theory there is no space for politicians, administrators, 
heads of states etc.; in short for human beings (Wight 1999, 127). This shortcoming is common to many 
constructivist approaches, which are ‘famously unclear about who the carriers of this strategic culture are’ 
(Mérand 2008, 23).  
85  Culture examined at the state level leads to ‘ethnocentric, essentializing gross generalizations of large groups 
of people’ at the expense of more fine-tuned analyses of the culture of sub-groups within a given state (Johnston 
1999, 522). 
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1987, 151).86            
 This is not to say that individuals should be decontextualised and analysed outside of the institutional 
setting that defines their roles and establishes the rules of the game. The argument advanced here is no 
negation of the state. Although the state ‘has no physical existence, like a building or a lamp-post...it is 
nevertheless a real entity. It is a real entity because everyone acts as though it was’ (Cox 1992, 133). 
The discourses of individual leaders cannot be understood as happening in a vacuum, but always need 
to be embedded within the larger institutional context. Therefore, a definition of the state is wanted. 
Drawing on Bourdieu, in the present study the state is understood as a field, composed of several sub-
fields within which various actors pursue their own agendas and struggle for symbolic dominance. The 
state figures as an ideational and normative structure (i.e. the field) and constitutes an orthodoxy and 
collective fiction established around a consensus regarding the sense of the world (Bourdieu 2012, 14–
15; 19). The state seen as a field effectively limits but does not annihilate individual action.  
 There is a second point worthy of note. Being a representative of a group involves what 
psychologists define as personality dissociation—the “I” annihilates itself in favour of the group. 
Throughout this process a new identity emerges, the “we”. This comprises both elements of the former 
“I” and elements that are perceived as inherent to the group identity. A good discursive illustration of 
this argument can be found during the 2012 French presidential election campaign. In a televised debate 
between the two presidential candidates, François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy, the former concludes 
his speech by a list of issues he promises to deal with should he be elected president. Each of the points 
on Hollande’s bulleted list is preceded by the clause ‘I, President of the Republic…’.87 This anaphor 
simultaneously refers to the “I” and the office of the president of the Republic. In so doing, Hollande 
distinguishes between himself the individual and himself the potential future president (Hollande 
2012n). In order to understand the practices and properties of the emerging “we”—that is, the “I” as 
individual and the “I” as spokesperson of the group—it requires some knowledge about the apparatus 
and the society that the spokesperson represents (Bourdieu 1987, 193–99). Immediately after his 
election on a state visit to the United States, President François Hollande emphasises his strong 
                                                     
86  General Eric Bonnemaison, director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 27 August 2013. 
87  ‘Moi Président de la République…’. 
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identification with the collective when saying, ‘I represent France, together with the ministers that 
accompany me—we are France—and I have to take on the role my compatriots expect me to take on in 
order to represent them’.88 The statement also illustrates the dominant role of elites in foreign policy-
making, a point to which I will come back below.     
 Given that all social action is rooted in human agency, one wonders why the illusion of the state 
continues to remain the most commonly used aggregate in the discipline of international relations. One 
explanation of this apparent paradox can be found when regarding the human impulse to establish 
groups. Since the dawn of time, individuals confederate and form tribes, communities, societies, and 
states that give rise to collective action. Collective actions by definition are actions that are attributed 
to entire groups or communities. Legitimised to act in the name of the collectivity, the individual makers 
of collective actions tend to escape from the analytical nets of social scientists. Adding to this, in the 
realm of foreign and defence policy, nation-states present their policies mostly as unified positions. In 
contrast to domestic politics in democratic states, where decisions are claimed by the governing 
majority and the opposition assumes the role of the “alter”, foreign policy is directed towards an object 
outside the national boundaries. Put differently, the principal alter in relation to which ego defines its 
identity and produces new ideas is not reflected in the mirror of partisanship but situated outside the 
demos.89 The primary discursive point of reference shifts from the party or coalition to the nation. This 
subtle shift in terminology affects the perception of agency. In addition, convenience and the 
discipline’s established practices and beliefs have surely played their parts in perpetuating the state-
centric view in international relations (Schafer 2003, 173).     
 In the case of France, the powerlessness of Parliament in defence matters seems to make redundant 
the impact of domestic controversies on foreign policy decision-making and creates the impression that 
a ‘state as unitary actor’ approach may be sufficient for understanding foreign policy. Why should we 
bother with domestic contestations of foreign policy, if in the end the executive decides? However, the 
                                                     
88  ‘Je représente la France, avec les ministres qui m’accompagnent – nous sommes, ici, la France – et je dois 
me mettre au rang souhaité par mes compatriotes pour les représenter’ (Hollande 2012h). 
89  This is not to say that no differences in opinion exist within a given society regarding the conduct of the 
nation’s foreign policy.  
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contestation of opinions is not confined to the auras of the Palais Bourbon90 and the Palais 
Luxembourg91. The executive is not immune from cleavages, and diverging opinions persist even among 
like-minded people working towards a common end. As a close observer of French security policy 
notes, ‘There is one official position, but within the French executive there are rather different visions’.92 
This make me agree with Lequesne (forthcoming) who argues that ‘one must not mythologize the 
unitary nature of states in the shaping of foreign policies’. Fragmentation between the different 
decision-units is a regular feature of the foreign policy-making process. The drivers of state action are 
individuals and groups of individuals. Collective action and what is generally known as national interest 
emerge from a process during which competing interpretations, advanced and defended by the various 
actors, struggle for symbolic dominance (Bigo 2011, 248). As a matter of course, it is not feasible to 
account for the behaviour of the total number of individuals that constitute a given state or society. Even 
micro-foundational social research is liable to a considerable degree of reduction. But self-reinforcing 
inequalities, which are part of all social orders (Lebow 2008, 4; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 156), 
make it possible to limit the analytical focus to a smaller number of individuals.   
 The literature on foreign policy analysis and sociological approaches to the state has discussed the 
role of state elites at length. Sasley, who proposes a methodological and epistemological framework 
that allows for the systematic inclusion of emotions into the study of international relations, argues that 
‘policy ideas attributed to a “state” are in fact often symbolized by an individual or a small group of 
individuals who are the “most important representatives of the ideas”’ (Sasley 2011, 467). In their 
seminal work L’acteur et le système, Crozier and Friedberg (1992 [1977], 24) claim that those who ‘by 
virtue of their situation, their resources or their capacities … are able to control [the agenda-setting], 
use their power to impose themselves upon others’. Snyder agrees that ‘state action is the action taken 
by those acting in the name of the state’ (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 65). Since leaders are both 
‘decision-makers and group members’ they can claim to ‘represent and speak for a given identity 
group’. Their importance is enhanced by being ‘cultural bearers’ (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962, 156) 
                                                     
90  The official seat of the National Assembly.   
91  The official seat of the Senate.  
92  Isabelle Lasserre, journalist at Le Monde, interview by author, Paris, 23 August 2013. ‘Il y a une position 
officielle, mais il y a des visions assez différentes au sein de l’exécutif français’.   
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or ‘high identifiers with the group’ (Sasley 2011, 468), or else they would not become leaders in the 
first place. In turn, their representative power allows state elites to discursively construct ‘the principles 
governing our daily lives’ (Woods 2006, 51). In other words, some actors in the system are elevated to 
the ranks of representatives of the larger demos in the name of which they claim to speak and act. To 
explain the paradox of the mandatory dominating the mandator, it has been argued that without the 
representatives and their symbolic actions there was no group; hence, their dominant role in society 
(Bourdieu 1987, 186).93          
 In the realm of security and defence policy, inequalities among subjects are particularly pronounced, 
and only a few can be considered as accepted voices of security (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 31). 
The average citizens know very little about ‘the internal rules of the game’, which bars them from 
participating in most meaning-giving actions (Bigo 2011, 246). Instead, policy-making processes are 
usually handled by a small circle of leaders and specialists who enjoy a high degree of ‘elite autonomy’ 
in their daily work (Cerny 1980, 111). Processes of securitisation are not an open playing field freely 
accessible to everyone, but rather ‘structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially 
effective claims about threats’ (Williams 2003, 514). The exclusive character of foreign and security 
policy makes a strong case for focusing on those elites that dominate the field. A restricted group of 
political, administrative, and military elites has a more immediate bearing on processes and outcomes 
than any other fraction of society. The focus on these foreign policy elites offers several methodological 
                                                     
93  On this point see also the debates in the literature on principal-agent theory (Moe 1984; McCubbins and 
Schwartz Thomas 1984; Pollack 2006). More recently, this elite-centric approach common to the majority of 
studies on role theory and national identities has been criticised. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 6) ask ‘why foreign 
policy elites can stand for the entire country’. I would respond with Bourdieu and argue that state elites create and 
construct the necessary material and symbolic resources that legitimate their position at the apex of the societal 
hierarchy. In contrast to the assumptions made by the democratic theory of the state, elites do not emerge from 
the organisation of civil society who delegates them. Instead, they have constructed the necessary institutional 
resources that legitimate them to speak in the name of the entire society and to decide what is good for everyone. 
As any other group, state elites pursue individual and collective (to their group) interests, which they label as 
societal interests (Bourdieu 2012, 59–61). According to Tilly (1985, 171) states are comparable to racketeers. 
Both create threats in order to ‘charge for [their] reduction’. The underlying critical agenda to which this statement 
alludes is evident. Individuals join a community to escape the Hobbesian anarchy characterised by perpetual 
anarchy, low life expectancy, and eternal threats. In exchange, they accept other threats that are not directed 
towards them as individuals, but rather towards the community of which they are part. However, to conclude from 
this observation that societies are helpless victims controlled by malicious elite groups that create threats at their 
discretion goes too far. Political elites are as much part of society as any other member and, thus, subject to the 
very same societal dynamics and socialisation processes. While the relationship among subjects is neither equal 
nor dominance-free, ‘securitization can never only be imposed’ and it also needs to be accepted by the audience 
(Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 23, 31). The entire process is as much about coercion as it is about consent. 
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and practical advantages (Duffield 1999, 794–95).94 First, foreign policy elites are well-
defined―although particularly difficult to penetrate (Hertz and Imber 1995, viii)―groups whose 
attitudes and beliefs are relatively well known when compared to the broader population. Second, 
‘political leaders and policymakers have often quite sophisticated and complex political belief and value 
systems’ (Duffield 1999, 794–95) that are generally coherent and thus suitable for structured analysis. 
 Elite-centred approaches do not directly account for the role of non-governmental and civil society 
actors. However, given the elitist nature of French foreign policy, this analytical choice should not lead 
to distortions of the overall picture (Parsons 2000; Chafer 2005, 20; Bovcon 2012, 97; Koepf 2013a, 
51, footnote 103). Outside experts rarely have direct access to French state elites, nor are they 
extensively consulted during policy-making processes.95 In the words of Prunier (1995, 285), who 
himself served for a while as an academic expert in the Defence Ministry, ‘being an outside expert 
carries no political weight whatever. Experts are like a bouquet of flowers, pleasant and decorative to 
have around, but definitely not integrated in a politician or civil servant’s view of how to make 
decisions’. Lobbyist groups continue—although less than in the past—to be considered an ill-reputed 
Anglo-Saxon invention. Elected French decision-makers do pay attention to public opinion and the 
domestic political dimension of their foreign policy decisions. However, it seems that beyond the 
barometer of public opinion, the broader population’s influence on France’s security policy is rather 
limited. Adding to this, French policy-making in francophone Africa is not among the major interests 
of the French population either (Bakong 2012, 44).96 Finally, it also depends on the nature and the scope 
of the military mission that defines to what extent decision-makers listen to public-opinion indicators. 
As one civil servant stated when comparing the interventions in Mali and the CAR, ‘In the case of Mali, 
this question [of consulting public opinion] did not emerge, because we had to intervene, but in the case 
                                                     
94  The definition of foreign policy elites (also referred to as elites, or state elites) proposed here includes 
politicians, civil servants, and military personnel with a decisional portfolio (e.g., chiefs of the military staff, 
military advisors to the president or the ministers).  
95  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 27 January 2014.  
96  Pierre Lellouche, MP, interview by author, Paris, 7 February 2014. However, it should be noted that the 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making remains an understudied question in foreign policy 
research. The relationship is complicated and constraints caused by public opinion may be more relevant than 
often assumed (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 11–12). Some scholars have argued that one must distinguish between 
public opinion and perceived public opinion. Elites are said to rely on their perceptions of public opinion shaped 
by pre-existing beliefs and their respective sources of information rather than on public opinion per se (Robinson 
2002, 3). 
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of the CAR the anticipation of public opinion by the policy-makers determines the choices that are 
made’.97  
 
3.2 French Foreign Policy-Makers  
French foreign policy can be defined as an elitist, static, and rather homogenous sub-field of the French 
state. The grands corps de l’État (grand corps of the state) are recruited by means of public concours 
(qualifying examinations). The majority of senior officials attended one of the nation’s Grandes Écoles 
(elite universities), such as the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the Écoles Normales 
Supérieures, the École Polytechnique and/or went to SciencesPo, before entering public service. This 
model of state corporatism promotes the establishment of castes and tends to favour intellectual 
uniformity over diversity.98 It also extends to the political sphere, although there the educational and 
sociological profiles are usually more diversified (Michon and Behr 2013).99 Both President François 
Hollande and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius as ENA graduates typify the traditional career path of 
public servants and politicians in France.        
 To identify the interactions among the members of this small group, the first step consists of 
introducing the core actors responsible for the decisions under examination. Two questions about the 
actors need to be addressed: (1) What types of actors make foreign policy decisions? (2) What is the 
effect of these decision-units on the resulting foreign policy? (Hermann 2001, 47). In the discussion 
that follows, decision-units that are situated at the top of the hierarchy are referred to as individuals and 
                                                     
97  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Dans le cas du Mali il n’y a 
pas eu à se poser beaucoup de question, parce qu’il fallait intervenir, mais dans le cas de la RCA l’anticipation 
par les responsables politique de l’opinion publique est déterminante dans les choix qui sont faits’. 
98  To illustrate this point: Former managing director of the African Department at the Quai d’Orsay and 
renowned expert of the Sahel region, Laurent Bigot, was discharged from his position shortly after the beginning 
of the military intervention in Mali. While the definitive reasons for this move remain unknown, pundits agree 
that his non-compliant way of thinking and non-hierarchical approach to the organisation of his department did 
not fit well with the uniformity and hierarchy that defines the institutional landscape. Others consider his ferocious 
critique of the state of Mali’s democracy and his accusations against the ruling elite in Bamako, which he 
formulated during a conference in June 2012, as an additional reasons for his dismissal (Interview with a 
researcher at the French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 19 December 2013, see also Hugeux (2013)).  
99  The cultural/educational capital symbolised by the grandes écoles is progressively decreasing in the political 
sphere. However, in the Ayrault cabinet still 28 per cent of the cabinet members graduated either from Sciences 
Po or ENA, compared to 41 per cent in the 1986 Chirac cabinet (Michon and Behr 2013, 336–37) 
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by their names and positions. For the president, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of 
defence, that is the decisional triangle (see below), the different subsections introduce first the 
respective offices and then their holders. Ideas that are issued throughout the decision-making process 
can be traced back to these individuals in question.100 For all other decision-units, the aggregate of the 
small group is maintained. Besides the limits imposed by the available data, the distinction between the 
different levels is maintained, because only elected state elites at the top of the hierarchy are accepted 
as the ultimate and legitimate representatives of the state.101 Their persons and their functions conflate. 
Therefore, I consider it indispensable to pay attention to both the role of the office and the personality 
of the office holder. The farther one descends the institutional hierarchy, the less it is possible—or 
necessary—to establish a direct link between individual appreciations and the observable outcome. 
While it is feasible to attribute a specific evaluation of the situation to a president or a minister by 
drawing on the available discursive data, it is more difficult to identify individual policy advisors and 
desk officers with a specific idea. Thus, at the subordinate levels of the institutional apparatus the 
aggregate of the small group is the closest outside observers can get to their subjects.  
 
3.2.1 Le Président de la République 
Two leadership traditions inhere in the Fifth Republic’s political system—personal and parliamentary 
leadership. Together, these legacies of French history have led to the creation of a semi-presidential 
system with a dual executive and shared powers between the president and the prime minister (Elgie 
2005, 70–72).102 Notwithstanding the dualistic character of the Fifth Republic, there exists a de facto 
                                                     
100  Let me strike a note of prudence regarding the attribution of ideas to individual decision-makers. Statements 
by the president or a minister combine as we saw above personal traits and institutional or societal elements. Two 
differentiate between these two dimensions remains a major challenge of foreign policy analysts and a largely 
unresolved puzzle.  
101  One may consider the case of an ambassador whose mandate is the representation of the state, but who cannot 
advance a view in opposition to the elected political leaders and at the same time claim to speak in the name of 
the state. 
102  Prior to the Fifth Republic, France’s monarchs and Napoleon incarnated the personal leadership tradition. 
Parliamentary leadership characterised the Third and Fourth Republics. However, as Hagan (2001, 25) shows, 
French decision-making in light of WWI was the most cohesive of all European powers and President Poincaré 
was able to exercise strong presidential authority. 
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hierarchical order which makes the president ‘the main political actor in the regime’ (Gaffney 2010, 5). 
Presidential authority is particularly prominent in the realms of foreign and defence policy, where 
policies are inextricably linked to the person and personality of the president.103   
 France is unique in Europe with regard to the autonomy the political system grants to the president 
and the velocity of decision-making processes in the realms of foreign and defence policy. The final 
decision on whether or not the French Army will intervene in another country comes always down to 
one person. Given this high degree of presidential autonomy in the realms of foreign and defence policy, 
it is no surprise that existing studies of French-African relations have shown considerable interest in the 
role of the French president. Titles such as La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac (Bourmaud 1996), 
Chirac and la Françafrique (Chafer 2005), Nicolas Sarkozy ou la Françafrique décomplexée (Foutoyet 
2009), or French relations with sub-Saharan Africa under President Sarkozy (Moncrieff 2012) suggest 
the president’s preponderance in African matters, particularly if security and defence issues are at stake. 
Most studies, however, employ the French president as a chronological point of reference and 
concentrate largely on policy outcomes. Rarely do works engage in an actual analysis of the different 
decision-making units and the processes in the course of which identities emerge, preferences are 
shaped and choices made (see Cohen 1986; Gaffney 2010).     
 The presidential dominance in the constitutional design of the Fifth Republic follows from the 
collapse of the Fourth Republic, which was founded on the parliamentary leadership principle. As we 
saw in the first chapter, strong leadership became to be seen as a necessary condition to unite the country 
and reinforce France’s international standing and grandeur (Elgie 2005, 71–72). Charles de Gaulle, who 
took office in the course of the Algerian War to become the Fifth Republic’s first president, personified 
the ideal type of a charismatic and dominant decider. How de Gaulle interpreted and exercised the 
presidential mandate during the early phase of the Fifth Republic crucially shaped the collective 
perception of the role of the president and paved the way for his successors. Consequently, French 
                                                     
103  Interestingly, the concentration of power in the hands of a single person, to the point that some refer to the 
president as the Republic’s Zeus (Cohen 1986, 15–32) does not emerge from the Constitution itself. The 
presidential dominance in defence matters can be explained as a product of de Gaulle’s legacy (Irondelle 2009, 
121) and France’s history since the Second World War, and notably the wars in Indochina and Algeria, in the 
course of which the perception has developed that in times of crises rapid decision-making needs to take 
precedence over democratic deliberation (Cohen 1986, 16).   
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presidents to date have enjoyed a high degree of decisional autonomy in foreign affairs that can only be 
explained with reference to the practices initiated by de Gaulle and pursued by his successors.104
 France’s foreign and defence policies constitute the core of presidential exclusiveness (Chipman 
1989, 117; 155). Although the notion of domaine réservé is mentioned in neither the Constitution nor 
any subsequent organic law, and thus has no legal basis, it has become an essential component of French 
leadership style. The concept of domaine réservé constitutes an interpretation of the presidential powers 
as stipulated in the 1958 Constitution. Established under the charismatic leadership of de Gaulle, the 
principle of presidential exclusiveness continues to regulate ‘the relations within the executive, and 
between the executive and legislative’ in foreign and defence matters (Kessler 1998, 24–25; Irondelle 
2009, 120).            
 The most absolute expression of presidential power concerns the realm of defence policy. Originally 
intended as an effective decisional mechanism in case of a nuclear war, the notion domaine réservé has 
been interpreted as giving the president complete autonomy regarding the conduct of belligerent action. 
The decision to involve France in a military intervention abroad is incumbent on the president alone. 
As commander-in-chief, the president can take such a decision without the authorisation of any other 
constitutional body.105 The autonomy of the French president, his undisputed decision-making 
authority, and his central position at the top of the system removed from party-political quarrels allow 
for decisions to be taken within the shortest possible time (Cohen 1986, 18). From the moment the 
president decides to deploy troops to another country, the first rapid deployment forces can be activated 
within a couple of hours.106 French decision-makers proudly point to this exceptional institutional 
                                                     
104  The 1958 Constitution remains highly ambiguous on the precise competences it attributes to the president in 
the realm of defence policy. While it designates the president as the guarantor of national integrity (Constitution 
de la République française, art. 5), the commander-in-chief, and the only person to command France’s nuclear 
weapons (art. 15), it—at the same time—puts the government in charge of the administration of the armed forces 
and makes the prime minister, not the president, responsible for the national defence (art. 20, 22). The government, 
presided by the prime minister, directs the policy of the nation and to do so has both the administration and the 
armed forces at its disposal (art. 20–21; Elgie 2013, 19–20). In practice, however, the since 1962 directly elected 
and, therefore, highly legitimised president can be considered as the primary initiator of foreign and defence 
policies.  
105  Since the constitutional reform in 2008, the government needs to inform Parliament within three days after 
having decided a military intervention. A debate can take place, but the decision is not due for parliamentary 
approval. Only if the operation exceeds the duration of four months, parliamentary approval is required 
(Constitution de la République française, art. 35). 
106  Interview with a personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014.  
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reactivity, which differentiates their country from all other European member states.   
 The president’s position is further enhanced by the illusion of a national consensus on defence, 
fostered by speech acts and practices of parliamentarians regarding the norms, values, and orientations 
of foreign and defence policy (Irondelle 2009, 118; 130; Bourdieu 2012, 55–56). The following 
statement, which is a short extract from a personal conversation with the conservative Assemblyman 
Pierre Lellouche is representative of the prevailing thought among French elites regarding foreign 
military interventions: ‘Although being in the opposition, we are not here to obstruct the consensus. We 
cannot hope the failure of this mission [Operation Serval]. We are here to assure that the operation is 
conducted in the best possible way, that the French Army possesses the necessary means to conduct 
this mission and that it receives the best possible support from Europe.’107 Constitutionally not enabled 
to participate in the decision-making process on military interventions, Parliament’s role is limited to a 
posteriori approval of a given operation. 108       
 However, the opinions of parliamentarians are considered to represent or to influence public opinion, 
making the executive rather attentive to the reactions of Parliament. Although the ‘war powers’ of the 
French Parliament are generally classified as being ‘very weak’ (Dietrich, Hummel, and Marschall 
2010, 64–66), an assembly of national representatives who are supportive of a military action 
strengthens both the legitimacy and the manoeuvring room of the executive. From the observation of a 
usually rather approving Parliament, the executive deducts that the general political culture across the 
French society approves and demands a country that is active on the international scene and resorts to 
the use of force in order to defend its proper values and ideas.109 This deduction constitutes a clear act 
                                                     
107  Pierre Lellouche, MP, interview by author, Paris, 7 February 2014. ‘Nous-mêmes, même dans l’opposition, on 
n’est pas là pour casser le consensus. On ne peut pas souhaiter l’échec de cette opération. On est là pour s’assurer 
que l’opération est menée le mieux possible, que l’armée française a les moyens de mener cette opération, quel 
reçoit le plus d’accompagnement possible de la part des Européens’.  
108  More precisely, Parliament’s role regarding the conduct of belligerent action is limited to the approval of 
military missions that exceed the duration of four months, the reflection, deliberation, and voting of the general 
organising principles of national defence and France’s strategic orientations, and the annual voting of the defence 
budget. Parliament exercises its control function from the beginning of a military intervention by scrutinising the 
government’s decisions by means of hearings. The regular hearings of the defence and the foreign ministers in 
front of parliamentary committees in addition to the weekly Questions au Gouvernement (questions to the 
government) are both indicators of how much support an ongoing military intervention receives and provide a 
feedback on which the executive can draw when considering future steps. For an introduction to the debate on the 
role of Parliaments in foreign policy decision-making, see Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 13–14). 
109  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. 
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of universalising an elite culture.         
 Presidential power is more constrained during periods of cohabitation, which result from different 
returns in consecutive presidential and parliamentary elections. If the president’s political party or 
coalition fails to secure the majority of seats in Parliament and, thus, remains in the opposition, the 
president still nominates a prime minister from the majority party or coalition.110 In this case, a proactive 
prime minister can effectively downsize the president’s role and powers. The consequence is a foreign 
policy based on the lowest common denominator on which the prime minister and the president can 
agree. Exceptionalism makes room for consensus (Charillon 2002, 925–26). Thus far, however, there 
have only been three periods of cohabitation since the beginning of the Fifth Republic.111 Adding to 
this, cohabitation hardly affects the president’s dominance in the domaines réservés (Irondelle 2009, 
129). François Hollande, although confronted with an extremely low popularity among his constituents, 
did not have to cope with the constraints provoked by political cohabitation when deciding on the 
interventions in Mali and the CAR.112         
 The president’s dominant role in the French political system, however, does not imply that analyses 
should focus exclusively on presidential discourses and practices (Gallagher 2014). Such narrow 
approach would ignore the above-mentioned dependence of the president on subalterns, who use their 
expert knowledge in order to generate decisions favourable to their interests by biasing information that 
they feed into the system (Crozier and Friedberg 1992 [1977], 87–88).113 Even in a semi-presidential 
                                                     
110 The president is free to nominate whoever he judges apt to exercise the office of the prime minister. The 
nominee does not need to be Member of Parliament, as the cases of Georges Pompidou, Raymond Barre, and 
Dominique de Villepin demonstrate. However, since the Assemblée nationale—at the occasion of the keynote 
address of a new government—can issue a censure motion by absolute majority and by doing so dispose the 
government, the prime minister relies on the majority in Parliament (Constitution de la République française, art. 
49–50).  
111  Mitterrand – Chirac 1986-1988; Mitterrand – Balladur 1993-1995; Chirac – Jospin 1997-2002.  
112  The 2000 constitutional reform reduced the presidential term from seven to five years and adjusted the electoral 
calendar so that the presidential and parliamentary elections will succeed each other within a few weeks. 
Consequently, the probability that a president has to nominate a prime minister from the adverse party has become 
even smaller (Elgie 2013, 20–21). Some authors argue that the 2008 constitutional reform, which was intended to 
strengthen the role of the Parliament, above all strengthened the position of the majority, and thus, consolidated 
presidential powers even further (Elgie 2013). Former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine testifies that during 
periods of cohabitation the role and the influence of the foreign minister is strengthened. Together with the 
minister of defence, the foreign minister defines the France’s strategic orientations, and is not reduced to its usual 
role of issuing proposals (Védrine 2002, 868). 
113  The principal-agent literature discusses at length potential conflicts of interest between ‘those who delegate 
authority (principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it’ (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 5).  
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system that is noted for the dominant role that it accords to the president, decision-making can never be 
attributed to only a single actor, but is always the product of the interactions between multiple actors 
(Janis 1982; Irondelle 2011, 21). In other words, presidents do not take decisions in a complete vacuum. 
Socialised within a specific historical and political context, and assisted by their ministers and advisors, 
presidents are not outliers but representatives of society. Often, it is overlooked that a high degree of 
presidential autonomy in defence matters results in a large margin of manoeuvre of the military.114 As 
experts on defence and security questions, the military considerably contributes to the framing of an 
issue. Thus, presidential decision-making is best understood as extensive small-group deliberation 
against the backdrop of a wider institutional, societal, and political context followed by a single person’s 
decision.           
 Repeatedly François Hollande has been portrayed as a president who decides little or not at all—a 
maneuverer who waits for crises to ebb away (Biseau 2013). However, during both the Malian and the 
Central-African crises, Hollande demonstrated strong leadership by taking considerable political risks. 
During both crises, the president presented himself as a determined leader. At the same time, Hollande 
as a ‘contextually responsive (more sensitive) leader[]’ is said to ‘have an increased tolerance for 
sharing of power’ (Hermann et al. 2001, 91). In fact, the president’s political advisors and the concerned 
bureaucracies benefitted from the president’s collegial approach to decision-making. As shall be seen 
below, during both crises Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian enjoyed an exceptional high degree 
of autonomy, which would have been unthinkable for a minister under Hollande’s goal driven 
predecessor Sarkozy.  
 
3.2.2 Presidential Advisors 
In the realm of French security policy towards Africa, there are three different, directly involved 
advisory bodies at the president’s immediate disposal: the diplomatic advisor, the conseiller Afrique 
(advisor on African affairs), and the chef d’état-major particulier du président de la République 
                                                     
114  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author, Paris, 18 February 2014.  
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(CEMP, chief of the military staff of the president). The diplomatic advisor is the president’s first 
facilitator whenever an international crisis arises. If a crisis happens to occur on the African continent, 
the diplomatic advisor is seconded by the conseiller Afrique. 115      
 The special role the African continent continues to play within France’s foreign policy framework 
explains the existence of an advisory body briefing the president on issues exclusively related to the 
African continent. Since May 2012, the African desk, formerly cellule africain and symbol of France’s 
unchallenged neo-colonial influence in the African pré carré, has been managed by Hélène Le Gal, a 
career diplomat who in many respects represents the antithesis of the traditional image of the Monsieur 
Afrique that applied to all her predecessors. She is assisted by Thomas Mélonio, a young economist 
who was in charge of development policies and the African continent during President Hollande’s 
election campaign.116 In addition, for all questions that necessitate a military evaluation the president 
can rely on the CEMP.           
 The diplomatic and the African desks at the Élysée are nodal points that remit information and 
briefing notes between the president and the administration, as well as the president’s counterparts in 
other countries. They also filter and synthesise the information that reaches the president and prepare 
his discourses and state visits (Cohen 1986, 57). Their particular power lies in their proximity to the 
president. In their function as personal advisors, they possess an intimate knowledge of the president’s 
mental maps and they thus know how to frame arguments and present options so that these stand a 
chance to survive the decisional process.117 The special advisor on Africa at the Élysée is considered by 
many to be the most influential advisor in the French institutional system with regard to decision-
making processes that concern the African continent.118 Nonetheless, the African advisor shares her 
                                                     
115  Paul Jean-Ortiz (now defunct diplomatic advisor to Hollande during the crises in Mali and the CAR), a fluent 
Mandarin speaker who spent most of his diplomatic career in East Asia, was not an expert on Africa.    
116  The change in name from cellule africaine to conseiller Afrique is mainly of symbolic nature but comes along 
with a minor institutional change. The African advisor is not anymore directly responsible to the president, but 
the diplomatic advisor. More important in terms of reform, is the choice of Hélène Le Gal, not only the first 
woman to occupy this post but also a diplomat without a particular francophone African profile. Despite these 
changes, the two denominations continue to be used synonymously. What’s more, the continuous existence of an 
advisory desk at the Élysée, dedicated to the African continent, which by the way is the only desk at the Élysée 
with a regional portfolio, is suggestive not only of France’s special interest in that specific region of the world but 
also of a certain degree of continuity despite all rhetoric of rupture and reform (Baïetto 2012).  
117  Interview with a personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014.  
118  Interview with a senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 18 July 2013; Interview with civil servant 
at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 3 February 2014. Other experts of French foreign policy contest this argument 
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powers with the president’s diplomatic advisor and the CEMP.119 The CEMP is the direct link between 
the president, the Ministry of Defence, and the chief of the military staff (chef d’état-major des Armées, 
CEMA). Similar to the diplomatic and African advisors, his function consists of briefing the president 
by synthesising the information that comes directly from the military, the secret services (Direction 
générale de la sécurité extérieure, DGSE), or the Ministry of Defence (Cohen 1986, 76). The CEMP is 
not responsible for the conduct of military operations, a task which falls under the responsibility of the 
CEMA. Like the diplomatic and African advisors, the CEMP is in permanent contact with the president, 
whom he sees on a daily basis. This proximity creates trust between the different persons and makes 
for the opinion of the CEMP carrying weight.120 The CEMP, General of the Army Benoît Puga, is said 
to fully respect the presidential prerogative in military matters, and settles for advising the president 
and mediating between the latter and the military without excessively enforcing his personal opinion.121
 Given the fact that few advisors have to handle a large number of issues, the president and his staff 
rely extensively on the bureaucratic apparatus to provide the necessary background information and 
expert knowledge that makes coherent and effective decisions possible (Balme 2009, 147). The military 
intervention in Mali and the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to the CAR were developed in 
accordance with the CEMA, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the DGSE, the 
concerned embassies, and to lesser extent the Ministry of the Interior and the prime minister.  
 
3.2.3 The Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Always in the shadow of the president, the foreign minister supervises the Quai d’Orsay (French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and France’s diplomatic network. The minister’s most appreciated quality 
                                                     
(Jeanny Lorgeoux, senator, interview by author, Paris, 5 December 2013). In particular, when compared to the 
omnipotent role the cellule africaine had played in the past, especially under Jacques Foccart and later under René 
Journiac, Guy Penne, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, Michel Dupuch or Michel de Bonnecorse, the office’s present 
role may seem that of a mere mediator and contact point for the concerned ministries in France, the different 
African countries, and the French president. For an introduction to the storied person of Jacques Foccart and the 
role of the cellule africaine see (Foccart and Gaillard 1995; Bat 2012).   
119  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
120  Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014. 
121  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
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is their loyalty to the president, to the point that at times one can speak of the foreign minister and the 
veritable foreign minister (i.e. the president) (Cohen 1986, 122). High-ranking public servants are 
traditionally favoured over argumentative parliamentarians for this post.122 Traditionally, the minister’s 
role is that of a loyal agent who devotedly executes the monarch’s will. Whilst they can contribute with 
own ideas to the political debate, they should never publicly oppose the president. The Quai d’Orsay 
cannot impose its own policy. All credit of the minister’s action goes to the president, while ministers 
can safely claim misjudgements for themselves. In sum, their portfolio is not the design of France’s 
foreign policy but its execution. This said, under the Hollande presidency, ‘the Ministry of Foreign and 
European Affairs has recovered a major role in shaping France’s approach to African relationships, 
rather than simply implementing a policy set in the Élysée palace’ (Melly and Darracq 2013, 10). 
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius aptly handled this new margin of manoeuvre and found the right 
balance between inserting new ideas into the decision-making process without imposing himself on the 
president.           
 Another handicap, related to the mandate of the foreign minister is the fact that the office does not 
possess any exclusive realm of competency, besides the management of its proper administration. For 
instance, external economic relations are shared with the prime minister and the minister of finance. 
Security and defence issues are shared with the minister of defence and—in theory—with the prime 
minister (Cohen 1986, 35–38). A case in point constitutes France’s development assistance, which is a 
shared competence between the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
and the Agence Française de Développement (French Agency for Development, AFD) that produces a 
complex, costly, and time-consuming bureaucratic structure, and has led to sporadic calls for the re-
establishment of a Ministry of International Cooperation (Sénat 2013, 442–47; Sénat 2013).123 
Successive foreign ministers have had to deal with the ambivalent role of the office, which places its 
                                                     
122  This statement requires some qualification. The case of Laurent Fabius confronts us with a charismatic and 
highly political figure that does not flinch from pronouncing possible disagreements with the president. Having 
said this, Fabius has been a loyal foreign minister, who—since in office—has not led any open conflicts with the 
president. His seniority and his experience as former prime minister contribute to the image of a wise public 
official who is more interested in fulfilling his mandate than preparing the next coup to boost his political career 
(Semo 2012; Mourgue 2013; Contenay 2014; Cabirol 2014; Fabius 2014e).  
123  Jeanny Lorgeoux, senator, interview by author, Paris, 5 December 2013.  
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holder in the unoccupied space between the president, the prime minister, and other concerned ministers 
(Védrine 2002, 877). Despite or because of these limitations, the minister of foreign affairs remains an 
indispensable element in the foreign policy apparatus. Due to the polyvalent nature of the mandate, the 
foreign minister possesses a global view on most issues, which makes them a crucial source of 
information and provides them with a certain margin of manoeuvre to advance their own proposals 
(Cohen 1986, 46).           
 The Ministry itself is structured hierarchically. Usually, explicit orders are given from the top. The 
information that is produced by the desk officers climbs up the hierarchal ladder and passes through the 
filters of the respective departments and the hands of the minister’s personal staff before it reaches the 
minister. The regional and technical experts at the lower levels of the hierarchy are usually not involved 
in any of the deliberation processes. They provide briefing notes but most of the time do not receive 
any feedback and, consequently, do not know what actually happens to their work before they see the 
final outcome and recognise parts of their own research and advice within a given statement or 
discourse.124           
 However, as Samy Cohen (1986, 176) highlights, the geometry of power within the Quai d’Orsay 
is not fixed but continues to vary according to the respective minister in charge. In the wake of the 
military intervention in Mali, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius demonstrated a stringent and interfering 
internal governance style. A series of senior civil servants and specialists of the region, such as Elisabeth 
Barbier, Laurent Bigot, and Jean Félix-Paganon, were discharged from their posts—some on political 
grounds and others, as Le Figaro and other informed sources suggest, as a riposte to the perceived 
absence of the Quai in the wake of the sudden military intervention in Mali from which the Ministry of 
Defence emerged as the principal player next to the Élysée (Barluet 2013).     
 Like the president, the foreign minister can rely on a small number of personal advisors, which form 
the so-called cabinet ministériel. In the context of the military interventions in Mali and the CAR, the 
director of the cabinet, the vice-director, the policy advisor on political and military affairs, the policy 
advisor on relations with the UN, the intermediary between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
                                                     
124  Interview with senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 18 July 2013.  
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Ministry of Defence, as well as the African advisor, were involved in the preparatory work. In addition, 
the Centre de Crises (emergency operations centre), the Department for Relations with the UN, the 
Centre d’Analyse, de Prévision et de Stratégie (CAPS, policy planning staff), and most notably the 
Direction de l’Afrique et de l’Ocean Indien (African Department), its director, vice-director, and the 
respective regional experts helped to prepare the Ministry’s position. During both crises, the foreign 
minister established special task forces, which were coordinated by the African Department. In doing 
so, Laurent Fabius created the conditions favouring small-group decision-making within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. These ad hoc task forces are composed of a restricted number of individuals and 
each has a very specific goal. Once they obtain their goals, they are dissolved (Hermann 2001, 60–
61).125             
 On the political level, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was assisted by Junior Minister for 
Development (ministre délégué) Pascal Canfin and Junior Minister for French Nationals Abroad and 
Relations with La Francophonie Yamina Benguigui. In particular in the aftermath of the military 
intervention in Mali, Pascal Canfin started to become a more dominant actor. As we shall see below, 
French decision-makers elaborated a three-legged solution to the political crisis in Mali, built on 
security, democracy promotion, and development. Pascal Canfin who directly reported to Laurent 
Fabius was responsible for the third leg and gained notably prominence during the preparation of an 
international donor conference for Mali which took place in May 2013. Since the government reshuffle 
in April 2014 the two junior Ministries have been merged and now belong to the portfolio of Secretary 
of State for Development and La Francophonie Annick Girardin.  
 
3.2.4 The Minister of Defence  
The nodal point between the military and the government is the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, the 
defence minister’s role is to mediate between civilian and military perspectives during all emerging or 
ongoing crises that have a military dimension. The Ministry is composed of both military staff and civil 
                                                     
125  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014.  
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servants. Next to the cabinet ministériel, the minister of defence supervises and is directly assisted by 
the CEMA, the secretary general of the administration, and the commissioner for armament. In times 
of crisis, only the cabinet ministériel and the CEMA, who possesses the necessary technical and 
operational expertise, are in constant interaction with the minister of defence. The remaining 
departments and subordinate institutions exercise auxiliary functions during the decisional and 
operational processes.126           
 French defence ministers as well find themselves in a somewhat unfavourable position, since they 
have no full control of their portfolio. Given that the president is the nation’s commander-in-chief and 
the CEMA has the authority over all operational aspects, each minister needs to define their proper role 
they intend to play in the institutional set-up. Broadly speaking, this role searching is associated with 
three types of ministers.          
 First, there are those ministers for whom the office constitutes a political reward. They tend to be 
more interested in the prestige that comes along with the Ministry than in the Ministry itself. Then there 
are those ministers who have an interest in doing a thorough job but are prevented from playing a chief 
part, because either they lack the technical expertise or they are confronted with a president who prefers 
to have full control of this critical portfolio. In both cases, the minister of defence is usually excluded 
from the most important decisions. Finally, there are those ministers who are eager to exercise their 
function to the fullest and at the same time are endowed with the necessary autonomy by the president. 
This third case reflects the situation at the time of the crises in Mali and the CAR. Usually appearances 
in public are a good indicator for evaluating a minister’s involvement in the decision-making process 
of a given crisis. From the very first day of Operation Serval, Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian 
publicly commented on the conduct of the mission. In contrast, Gérard Longuet, defence minister under 
Nicolas Sarkozy at the time of Operation Harmattan in Libya, had his first appearance in public only 
fifteen days after the mission had started.127        
 Jean-Yves Le Drian is described as being very close to the president. French media repeatedly 
highlighted the three decade-long friendship between the two. In contrast to Foreign Minister Laurent 
                                                     
126  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013.   
127  Colonel Michel Goya, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
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Fabius, who prior to his appointment happened to oppose Hollande on several occasions, at one instance 
calling the latter a fraise des bois (woodland strawberry; meaning something rather insignificant), Jean-
Yves Le Drian has always enjoyed the president’s full confidence.128 During the cabinet reshuffle in 
April 2014, the current occupant of the Hôtel de Brienne129 was proposed for the position of prime 
minister, which he refused (Cabirol 2014). In addition to his loyalty to the president, pundits and 
collaborators stress the minister’s technical expertise.130 In conjunction, these two traits make the 
minister of defence a dominant leader within the Ministry and an influential player in the decision-
making framework. He enjoys a considerable autonomy, which puts him almost on equal parts with the 
President. The minister of defence transforms the guiding principles laid down by the President into 
actual policies.131 The minister’s leading role throughout the decision-making processes and the ensuing 
operations also happened at the cost of the CEMA. For starters, both the minister of defence and the 
CEMA can legitimately claim the role of the principal mediator between the political and the military 
realm. Their interaction determines to what extent the military influences politics respectively vice versa 
how thoroughly the political sphere controls the military. Although operational aspects belong to the 
area of competences of the CEMA, Jean Yves Le Drian expanded his competences and ventured out in 
the world of tactics and operational planning.132 The minister’s attempt to take control over the 
operational aspects of these two decisions augmented the tensions that naturally exist between the 
CEMA and the minister with regard to their respective competences. As a close advisor of the minister 
of defence confirms, ‘the special relation that exist actually between the minister of defence and the 
president … makes for the minister of defence being both the president’s military and defence 
advisor.’133 The CEMA at the time of the two interventions, Admiral Édouard Guillaud, on the other 
hand, was at best consulted and at worst simply ignored (Notin 2014, 145). This struggle for 
                                                     
128  This being said, Fabius became a loyal and widely appreciated foreign minister once he entered the Hollande 
government.  
129  The name of the seat of the Ministry of Defence.  
130  Isabelle Lasserre, journalist at Le Monde, interview by author, Paris, 23 August 2013.   
131  Interview with personal advisor to the Minister of Defence, Paris, 27 January 2014.  
132  Camille Grand, director Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, interview by author, Paris, 23 July 2013; 
Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014.  
133  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘La relation particulière 
qu’il y a actuellement entre le ministre de la défense et le Président de la République fait qu’elle est très forte 
entre eux, et en gros le ministre de la défense est le conseiller militaire et le conseiller de la défense du Président 
de la République’.   
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competences is also reflected in the more general reorganisation of the Ministry in the course of which 
civil servants have increasingly assumed responsibilities traditionally held by the military.134  
 
3.3 Crisis-Management: An Interactionist Scheme of Decision-
Making 
According to political practice, decisions on foreign military interventions are taken in the Conseil 
Restreint de Défense (Restricted Defence Council),135 which the president convokes in order to deal 
with issues that have or are expected to have serious implications for the nation’s security (Code de la 
défense 2009, Art.R. * 1122-3.). These meetings are presided by the president, and usually involve 
those ministers who are present in the ordinary Defence Council, close collaborators of the president, 
and experts on the issue or region under discussion (Code de la défense, Article R*1122-3).136 While 
the Restricted Defence Council has all the characteristics of a small group decisional environment, it is 
not an instance of collective decision-making. The Restricted Defence Council—by some referred to as 
‘the president’s decisional chamber’137—constitutes an advisory board the purpose of which is to 
facilitate presidential decision-making. Both the military intervention in Mali and the decision to deploy 
a French peacekeeping force to the CAR were formally decided in Restricted Defence Council meetings 
on 11 January and 5 December 2013 respectively. However, as a close collaborator of President 
Hollande remarks, by the time of these final pre-decisional meetings ‘the decision has already been 
taken. There is no debate anymore, there may be a discussion, but that’s all’.138    
 The decision itself, that is, the relatively brief ‘moment of the making of action’ (Bigo 2011, 237), 
                                                     
134  Colonel Michel Goya, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
135  Also referred to as Comité de Défense Restreint.  
136  The Restricted Defence Council is regulated by the decree establishing the Conseil de la Défense et de Sécurité 
Nationale (National Defence and Security Council), which defines the nation’s strategic orientations regarding 
the ‘conduct of external operations [and] the planning of responses to major crises’ (Code de la défense 2009, 
Art.R. * 1122-1.). The composition of the Conseil Restreint can vary but usually involves similar to those of the 
Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale the prime minister, the minister of defence, the minister of interior, 
the minister of economy, the minister of foreign affairs, and the minister in charge of the budget. Also present are 
the chiefs of the military staff, concerned diplomatic services, intelligence services, and any other person the 
president judges apt to contribute to the debate.   
137  Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘…la chambre de décision du 
Président’. 
138  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014.  
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is preceded by a longer period of extensive debates, where intra-institutional struggles and interactions 
between the actors come into play. From the perception of an issue as a potential security threat, to the 
framing, and the evaluation of different solutions, and finally the official decision weeks, months, and 
sometimes years elapse. As one colonel in the Ministry of Defence—asked since when the French 
government had been toying with the idea of intervening militarily in Mali—put it, ‘if you look at 
history, you will see that veritable surprises are rare. Situations evolve progressively, and the existing 
plans evolve along with them’.139 For the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius foreign policy 
comprises three principles, anticipation, influence, and coherence. Only anticipation can guarantee 
coherence, which is necessary to exercise influence in the world (Fabius 2012k).  
 The pre-decisional period is the time when subordinate actors exert their greatest influence on the 
decision to-be. In particular, at early stages of the decision-making process decision-makers depend 
heavily on the information gathered by the administrative services and departments. Irondelle (2011, 
35), in his study on the reform of the French military, defined the relation between the president and 
the subordinate administrators as the authority/expertise ratio. Due to the increasing knowledge on a 
specific issue that decision-makers acquire during the process, the ratio between authority and expertise 
decreases. The more experience leaders gain on a specific issue, the less reliant they become on their 
advisors and external cues (Hermann et al. 2001, 100). Consequently, the control over the decision-
making process shifts back to the top of the hierarchy as the decision approaches. The following account 
given by a presidential advisor makes this point clear. 
First, it [my role] lies in informing the president, whom I usually inform by means of policy briefs. 
Today [March 2014], I write much less [policy briefs], because the president knows the situation 
[in Mali] very well; but at the beginning I wrote many. Apart from that, I brief the president on what 
is happening from a political or diplomatic standpoint, or I inform him about the interviews I had 
with persons from these countries. I also compile résumés of the documents prepared by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defence.140  
                                                     
139  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013. ‘Si vous regardez 
l'histoire, les vraies surprises elles sont peu nombreuses. Les situations évoluent progressivement, et à ce moment-
là les plans qui existent évoluent avec elles’. This long-term perspective of strategic thought is institutionalised in 
form of the Centre de Planification et Contrôle des Opérations (Centre for Operational Planning and Control, 
CPCO). The CPCO produces operational plans and options for all kinds of possible scenarios, which serve as 
technical basis for the following political decision. The option to intervene military in Mali and the CAR had been 
played through in detail by the CPCO prior to the presidential decision.  
140  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Déjà c’est l’information du Président 
que j’informe normalement par des notes, que je fais à mon propre initiative. Aujourd’hui je fais beaucoup moins, 
qu’au début, parce qu’aujourd’hui le Président connait bien la situation, mais au début je faisais beaucoup. Si 
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 At each stage of the decision-making process, different actors have more or less influence. These 
actors range from the individual to the group. The decision-units framework identifies three types of 
actors: coalitions of autonomous actors, single groups, and predominant leaders.  
 Coalitions of autonomous actors (or autonomous coalitions) are defined as compounds of individuals 
or groups that shape the decision-making process through their input. Intra- and inter-institutional 
divergences are common and opinions are forged through mutual exchange, conflict, and interactions 
between actors belonging to different units. Agency is not concentrated within one institution or 
individual but shared. During early stages of the decision-making processes when first perceptions and 
opinions are shaped coalitions of autonomous actors dominate the decision-making process. A single 
group is a more restrictive small-group environment, where different individuals deliberate and decide 
over possible solutions.          
 The Conseil Restreint is the typical example of a single group, as defined here. Actors belonging to 
a single-group attach importance to the fact that their actions are perceived as consensual. If differences 
between the members of a single group exist, usually they are not disclosed. This act of de-
particularisation serves the purpose of officialising a specific opinion and thus creating a legitimised 
truism. By staging consensus during the final phase of the decision-making process, the universal 
character of a given decision shall be emphasised (Bourdieu 2012, 53–54). We all agreed; hence, it has 
to be true! Finally, the predominant leader is a ‘single individual who has the ability to stifle all 
opposition and dissent as well as the power to make a decision alone, if necessary’ (Hermann 2001, 56–
57). All French presidents, independent of their personal traits and due to the institutional set-up and 
political practices, become predominant leaders at the moment of the decision. The motto the buck stops 
here—popularised by former US President Harry S. Truman—captures the president’s obligation to 
take on the ultimate responsibility and put an end to the deliberation process. In France, this is the case 
when the president says yes or no to a foreign military intervention.     
 At any given stage of the decision-making process, one or several decision-units get the upper hand. 
                                                     
non je l’informe de ce qui se passe d’un point de vue politique ou diplomatique, ou je lui rends compte des 
entretiens que j’ai eu avec des personnalités des pays. Je vois beaucoup de monde, moi. Ou alors je lui fais une 
synthèse des notes, des documents, qui sont réalisés par le ministère des affaires étrangères ou la défense.’  
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While this process is in constant motion and a regular, clear-cut order does not exist, a general pattern 
can still be identified. A simplified scheme of the decision-making process in military matters in France 
resembles a double-funnel that narrows as the moment of the making of action approaches and widens 
again during the implementation phase (see fig. 2).  
 
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the different stages of the decision-making process and the predominant 
decision-unit at each of these stages 
Source: own elaboration 
 The decision to deploy French troops to a foreign country is taken by an individual, the president, 
after intensive discussion with the defence minister, the foreign minister, and the military and 
diplomatic advisors. This penultimate phase of decision-making, that is the consultations and 
interactions of a single group, is described here as a decisional-triangle (see fig. 3). The president is 
situated at the top of the triangle and the defence and the foreign ministers occupy the two lower edges. 
The two lower edges are not necessarily situated at the same level. Depending on the influence of the 
respective minister and the issue at stake either the minister of foreign affairs or the minister of defence 
are closer to the president. Regarding the military interventions in Mali and the CAR, the increasing 
influence of the Ministry of Defence when compared to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a noteworthy 
although debated point. Some observers assert that the actual decision to intervene in Mali was taken at 
the Ministry of Defence, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was largely excluded from the decision-
making process. Champions of this argument point to the preparatory meetings, which usually took 
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place at the Ministry of Defence and not at the Quai.141 This trend was particularly visible during the 
decision-making phase of Operation Serval. In line with the definition of a single group presented 
above, the official version denies any divergences between the two ministers. Senior officials in both 
ministries, however, when questioned off the record, confirm that—given the friendship that joins 
François Hollande and Jean-Yves Le Drian, as well as the military nature of the two crises—the 
Ministry of Defence was in control during most phases of the problem solution acting as the president’s 
principal military and defence advisory unit.142   
 
Figure 3. Decisional triangle depicting the interactions between the most important decision-makers in 
France in the realm of defence policy 
Source: own elaboration 
 However, the different perceptions of the respective roles of the two ministers cannot only be 
attributed to bargaining games among them. The portfolio of his office put the minister of foreign affairs 
in charge of promoting the French position among France’s international partners. The defence minister, 
on the other hand, is more implicated in the operational dimension of the crisis resolution.143 The nature 
of the tasks of the Ministry of Defence allows for more prominent media appearances than those of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former reports on all military aspects of an ongoing campaign, 
announces casualties, honours soldiers, and presents images of the enemy and the field. The diplomatic 
                                                     
141  Isabelle Lasserre, journalist at Le Monde, interview by author, Paris, 23 August 2013.   
142  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013; Interview with civil 
servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. 
143  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
  97  
  
work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other hand is rather imageless, reinforcing the impression 
of the foreign minister being excluded from the most crucial steps of the decision-making process.144 
 Interestingly, the prime minister, who according to articles 20 and 22 of the French Constitution is 
responsible for the national defence, seems to have played no significant role during the decision-
making process. In contrast to what is suggested in the 2008 White Book on Defence (2008, 253–54) 
his presence at the meetings of the Conseil Restreint was a mere constitutional formality. None of my 
interlocutors mentioned former Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault as an active decision-maker during 
the process. The then Minister of the Interior and current Prime Minister Manuel Valls was evoked at 
several occasions as having participated in all meetings of the Conseil restreint and having shown a 
considerable interest in both missions and their retour en sécurité intérieure (impact on the national 
security).145 However, he only played a little role in the actual making of the decision.146  
 The diagrammed illustrations of the decisional process and the interactions between the three core 
actors in the French political system (fig. 2 and fig. 3) do not depict the auxiliary decision-units, which, 
as we saw above, play a crucial role in particular during the preliminary stages of the decision-making 
process as well as during the implementation phase. To account for the importance of these subordinate 
decision-units, figure 4 disregards the temporal dimension of the process and shows an ichnography of 
the central decision-units and their interactions.  
                                                     
144  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014.  
145  This concept implies that every security policy France implements abroad needs to contribute to the domestic 
security as well. For instance, the concept forces decision-makers to reflect on whether or not a military 
intervention increases the possibility of a terrorist attack on national territory. Vice-versa domestic security is not 
limited to the national territory but involves actions beyond the borders.   
146  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of the interior, Paris, 12 February 2014.  
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Figure 4. Ichnography of the French decision-making process in defence matters 




Based on the actors’ subjective interpretations of their work, this chapter has provided a sociological 
account of the decision-making environment and processes in the realm of defence policy. Starting from 
the formal institutional set-up, the different sections have introduced the central decision-units and 
explained how decision-makers perceive and understand their respective roles within the institutional 
environment. An evolving interactionist scheme has been depicted that attributes different degrees of 
autonomy and influence to either coalitions of autonomous actors, small groups, or individuals 
depending on the specific stage of the process (see fig. 2). Contingent on the respective stage of the 
decision-making process, different decision-units came to the forefront during the decision-making 
processes on Mali and the CAR.         
 While confirming the French president’s exceptional autonomy in the realm of defence policy, the 
chapter has challenged the conventional wisdom according to which presidential decision-making 
happens in a vacuum, making the president the sole actor. Based on the arguments developed above, I 
consider the following definition of presidential power by Allison a suited description of the decisional-
environment in France during the Hollande Presidency. 
In status and formal powers the President is chief. Every other participant’s business somehow 
involves him. But his authority guarantees only an extensive clerkship. If the President is to rule, he 
must squeeze from these formal powers a full array of bargaining advantages. Bolstered by his 
“professional reputation” and “public prestige,” the President can use these advantages to translate 
the needs and fears of other participants into an appreciation that what he wants of them is what they 
should do in their own best interest. (Allison 1971, 148) 
 Thanks to the interactionist model presented here, it will become possible to attribute some of the 
ideas that informed the decision-making process to specific individuals or groups. In so doing, the model 
counteracts the tendency of many constructivist approaches to compile discursive data for a given state 
without further differentiating between the units concerned. The model avoids portraying ideas as a 
common property equally shared by all social strata. Accordingly, the state is not understood as an 
individual homogenous unit, but as a field within which actors shape actions.   
 This is not to deny the existence of some fundamental, intersubjectively shared values and norms, 
which I described in the previous chapter under the notion of political culture. However, the application 
of these guiding principles still lies in the hands of a small group of actors. Actors and ideas are 
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inseparable: to understand the one, one must understand the other.     
 In the following, the theoretical framework laid out in this and the previous chapters will be applied 
to two ‘occasions for decision’ (Hermann et al. 2001). The analysis begins with the Malian crisis and 
the French response to it, before it then examines the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to the 
CAR. Chapters Four and Five trace the processes in both cases and identify the most salient ideational 





Securitising Mali: No Free Ride for 
Terrorists in Francophone Africa 
 
 
Il n'a, à aucun moment, été envisagé l'envoi de troupes françaises au Mali. 
—Christian Rouyer 
Il n'y aura pas d'hommes au sol, pas de troupes françaises engagées…Nous ne 
pouvons pas intervenir à la place des Africains. On peut donner un appui matériel, 
on peut former, mais la France n'interviendra pas.  
— François Hollande 
J'ai, donc, au nom de la France, répondu à la demande d'aide du président du Mali 
appuyée par les pays africains de l'Ouest. En conséquence, les forces armées 
françaises ont apporté cet après-midi leur soutien aux unités maliennes pour lutter 
contre ces éléments terroristes.   
— François Hollande  
 
Figure 5. Mali, borders, rivers, principal cities 






In 2012, the security, political, and humanitarian crises that smouldered in Mali reached new heights. 
The presence of Islamist extremist groups in the arid north of the country transformed a domestic 
political conflict and regional insurgent movement into an issue with global reach. The international 
response to the deteriorating situation in Mali consisted in supporting the interim government in Bamako 
and setting up a multilateral intervention force to restore order in the country (UN Resolutions 2056, 
2071, 2085). The French administration took the lead role in the UN Security Council, becoming the 
strongest proponent of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). All along, 
French foreign policy elites described their country’s role as that of a “facilitator” providing logistical 
and financial assistance as well as diplomatic support. The motto “African solutions to African security 
problems” was the thread that ran through all official declarations (Fabius 2012f; Fabius 2012m). 
Despite the repeated attestations of unconditional solidarity with the interim government in Bamako, 
there was no mention of French soldiers intervening directly in the conflict until events in early January 
2013 provoked a major shift in France’s position. Following the Anṣār ad-Dīn-led offensive towards 
the government-controlled south, Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré issued a written request 
for French military assistance.147 On 11 January 2013, François Hollande announced that, in the name 
of France, he had given the order to launch a counter-offensive against Islamist fighters and criminal 
groups that threatened the existence of the Malian state (Hollande 2013f). By early February 2012, 4,500 
French soldiers were taking part in the military operation code-named Serval.    
 The drastic shift from a no-boots-on-the-ground policy to France’s largest military intervention since 
the Algerian War is puzzling to say the least (Notin 2014, 123–48; Notin and Blanchard 2013). How 
and why did French decision-makers make this shift? Is the French government’s U-turn over the 
conflict an expression of ad hoc policy-making or rather a gradual adjustment to an evolving situation? 
What motivated French decision-makers to intervene in Mali? Examining France’s reaction to the crisis 
in Mali, Melly and Darracq (2013, 6) argue that ‘Hollande rapidly came to view the Mali crisis and the 
wider threat that it posed to West African and international security as his biggest policy challenge 
outside Europe’. They specify that Hollande’s evaluation was that the conflict in Mali affects French 
                                                     
147  There are several unconfirmed speculations around this letter that constituted the principal source of 
legitimisation for the military intervention. Some pundits claim that French officials edited the final version of the 
letter. Others argue that the letter was written in Paris in the first place.  
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national interest, ‘because it might enhance the capacity of Islamist terrorists to stage attacks in France 
and because the disintegration of Mali’s territorial integrity and constitutional government imperilled 
the stability of West Africa’ (Melly and Darracq 2013, 8). In an attempt to demystify the French decision 
to launch Operation Serval, the present chapter engages with the ideas and motivations that emerged 
during the decision-making process. This chapter begins with a background note on the political and 
security situation in Mali on the eve of the French intervention. The remaining sections analyse the 
different stages of the decision-making process: the inclusion of the Malian crisis on the French security 
agenda, the framing and diffusion phase, and the final decision. Together these sections show how and 
why, in the course of the decision-making process, the problem solution shifted from “supporting a 
multilateral peacekeeping force” to a “unilateral intervention in the name of the international 
community”. Each section sheds light on the actors’ mental maps and the ideational variables that 
informed the decision-making process at the respective stages.      
 The empirical findings suggest that French decision-makers are trapped between two contradictory 
principles. On the one hand, France’s reluctance to intervene unilaterally in one of its former colonies 
was rooted in the policy-makers’ determination to put an end to their country’s negative reputation as 
an avaricious neo-colonial power that remains stuck in the clutches of its own history. On the other hand, 
the French political elite was convinced of the necessity of military intervention from early on. If one 
considers decision-making processes as the struggle between principles and concepts, the outcome 
shows that the second principle won out when François Hollande announced the beginning of Operation 
Serval in January 2013. The perceived proximity and responsibility towards France’s former African 
colonies explain the readiness of decision-makers to accept the considerable risk entailed with a foreign 
military intervention. Not only did pro-intervention arguments speak to the core principles and values 
of French policy-makers’ identity and self-understanding; they were also reconcilable with France’s 
commitments to a multilateral security policy and the norm of international humanitarian 
interventionism providing legitimacy and preventing France from being accused of satisfying its neo-




4.1 Mali, Scene of a Long-lasting Crisis   
As sudden as the advances of armed groups in early January 2013 may have seemed, the outbreak of the 
political and security crisis in Mali did not appear out of nowhere. The decision by several armed groups 
to advance towards the south of the country, overrunning Malian Army outposts and prompting the 
French military response, simply constituted a new degree of intensity in a crisis that had haunted the 
region since the mid-2000s. To introduce the case, the following three sub-sections provide an overview 
of the various dynamics that led to the weakening of the Malian state and allowed militant extremists to 
establish themselves in the northern part of the country.   
 
4.1.1 Socio-Economic and Political Factors  
The playing field on which the actors of the Malian crisis confronted each other featured a crumbling 
political system combined with a weak socio-economic environment. Mali is one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Poverty remains a serious issue in rural areas, where the majority of Mali’s 
populace lives (van Vliet 2013, 143). Mali and its neighbouring countries occupy the bottom end of the 
UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) league table, the exception being Algeria (see table 1).148 With 
a population of 14.5 million and a territory of over 1.2 million square kilometres (roughly twice the size 
of France) Mali performs worse than the average of the region in terms of human development (HDI of 
0.344; rank 182/186). The only two neighbouring states that fall behind Mali on the HDI index are 
Burkina Faso (183/186) and Niger (186/186). 
 
 
                                                     
148  The HDI takes into consideration both social and economic development indicators by accounting for life 
expectancy, educational attainment, and income. The aggregate value for “Mali and its neighbouring countries” is 
below the aggregate values for “sub-Sahara Africa” and “least developed countries”, even if Algeria is included 
in the calculation. A look at Mali’s growth rates suggests the existence of a rather stable economy, which grew by 
5 per cent in 2012 (Penney 2013). Despite these positive macro indicators, Mali’s economy remains fragile for the 
reason that it is almost exclusively based on the agricultural (principally cotton) and gold mining sectors and thus 
is highly dependent on price fluctuations on the world market (Kollmer 2013). Growth and poverty reduction are 
also mainly limited to a few urban centres, while rural areas are largely excluded from these positive developments. 
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1 Norway 0.955 81.3 12.6 48688 
2 Australia 0.938 82 12 34340 
3 United States 0.937 78.7 13.3 43480 
4 Netherlands 0.921 80.8 11.6 37282 
5 Germany 0.92 80.6 12.2 35431 
…      
93 Algeria 0.713 73.4 7.6 7418 
…      
54 Senegal 0.47 59.6 4.5 1653 
155 Mauritania 0.467 58.9 3.7 2174 
… 
168 Côte d'Ivoire 0.432 56 4.2 1593 
… 
178 Guinea 0.355 54.5 1.6 941 
… 
182 Mali 0.344 51.9 2 853 
183 Burkina Faso 0.343 55.9 1.3 1202 
… 
186 Niger 0.304 55.1 1.4 701 
na World 0.694 70.1 7.5 10184 
na Sub-Saharan Africa 0.475 54.9 4.7 2010 
na Low human development 0.466 59.1 4.2 1633 
na Least developed countries 0.449 59.5 3.7 1385 
na 
Mali and neighbours 
Algeria included 0.429 58.2 3.3 2066 
na 
Mali and neighbours 
Algeria excluded 0.388 56 2.7 1302 
Source: own elaboration, based on UNDP data, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, accessed on 2 May 2014 
 
 The country's weak socio-economic performance promoted a sentiment of neglect among the 
northerners with regard to the central state. The situation was aggravated in 2010 by a drought that 
ravaged the Saharan region and provoked a major famine causing illness and death and forcing many 
northerners into temporary exile. The absence of the Malian state during this drought not only reinforced 
the prevailing sentiment of neglect but also provoked the more inflammatory interpretation of the 
government’s non-intervention being a planned strike against the minorities in the north. It remains open 
to debate to what extent the absence of the state can be attributed to the inability of the government to 
act or can be interpreted as a concerted act of reprisal against northerners for past rebellions against the 
central government.           
 Given its status as one of the least developed countries in the world, Mali has relied heavily on 
international development aid. Between 1990 and 2012, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
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accounted for an average of nine per cent of the country’s GNI (OECD 2014). In 2011 ODA inflows 
represented 12.6 per cent of Mali’s GNI and almost 50 per cent of its national budget (Heyl and 
Leininger 2013, 73). Notwithstanding the country’s socio-economic difficulties, the international donor 
community considered Mali as one of the most positive examples of the third wave of democratisation, 
facilitating a steady inflow of development aid.149 This glorification by the international community not 
only secured the Malian state considerable amounts of aid money, but also ignored many of the country’s 
effective needs. Out of convenience or ignorance, international donors perpetuated an overly positive 
image of a well-functioning democracy that had, in reality, been ailing for quite some time. Behind the 
veil of democratic institutions and regular elections, there was a more complex situation. As critical 
voices suggest, the alleged “model democracy” had suffered from serious shortcomings for two decades 
(Bigot 2012; Penney 2013). The literacy rate among adults remained low, as did the political 
participation, corruption was high, and the all-inclusive multi-party government under President 
Amadou Toumani Touré reduced the opposition to insignificance.150 Moreover, the government 
deliberately kept the army small to reduce the risk of a military coup, a decision that contributed to the 
almost immediate defeat of the Malian Army by the hands of militants in 2012 and 2013.151 Most 
importantly, the Touré administration did not reconcile the north and the south, but rather aggravated 
the tensions by further marginalising northerners. Instead of engaging in negotiations about a federal 
governance approach, some senior officials and top-ranking officers preferred to cooperate with terrorist 
and criminal organisations in the Saharan desert to undermine insurgent movements in the north. In 
conjunction with repressive policies against the populations of the north, Mali’s poor socio-economic 
performance enhanced a feeling of political isolation, social marginalisation, and economic asphyxiation 
                                                     
149  After a successful coup d’état in 1991, the then General and future President Amadou Toumani Touré (also 
known as ATT) did not cling to his acquired power and allowed for free elections that brought into power Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, who in accordance with the Malian constitution stepped down after the end of his second term in 
2002. At this point, ATT was elected president reinforcing the image of Mali being a stable democracy. He was 
re-elected in 2007, this time pursuing ‘a broad and flexible ruling coalition and a style that he referred to as 
“consensus” politics’ (Arieff 2013b, 6). 
150  Transparency international ranks Mali 127 (out of 177) with an overall score of 28 (out of 100). The measured 
overall degree of corruption in Mali is thus higher than in most of its neighbouring countries, only surpassed by 
Côte d’Ivoire (136) and Guinea (150), source: Transparency international, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#MLI, accessed on 5 May 2014.  The consensus system on which ATT’s 
government was based also prompted corruption, nepotism, and patronage among the ruling elites (Arieff 2013b, 
6).  
151  Interview with policy officer at the DCSD, Paris, 18 February 2014.  
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among the population of the Azawad region (Ag Ahmed 2011). Human rights violations and 
extrajudicial killings committed by the Malian Army inflamed this operational environment where 
misery began to justify violence. 
 
4.1.2 The Tuareg Insurgency and Its Aftermath  
Since 1963, resurging rebel movements across the northern part of the country have kept the Malian 
state in constant alert. These movements have been led by the country’s small Tuareg (Kel Tamasheq)152 
minority and constitute the most visible expression of the deep rifts that divide Mali’s social fabric. 
Marginalised within a state they do not consider their own, the Tuareg have repeatedly claimed more 
autonomy for themselves and denounced the inequalities between the north and south.153 The 2006-2009 
period witnessed continuous violent clashes between government forces and rebels. After mediation 
efforts by Algeria, a fragile peace was established promising ‘greater regional autonomy, the integration 
of Tuareg combatants into the military, and more state aid for the impoverished north’ (Arieff 2013b, 
6). However, like previous economic development programmes for the north, these agreements have 
never been fully implemented (Klute and Lecocq 2013, 127).      
 The land that the Tuareg traditionally considered as their homeland extends over five Saharan 
nations—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger—making their struggle into a regional question 
(Klute and Lecocq 2013, 123). With the fall of Libya’s Colonel Muammar al-Gadhafi in October 2011, 
numerous Tuareg militia who had previously fought on the side of Gadhafi’s regime returned to Mali, 
bringing new momentum to the latest Tuareg rebellion. Composed of Tuareg, Songhaïs, Arab, and Peul 
                                                     
152  This is the name the Tuareg employ and means “Speakers of Tamasheq”. They also refer to themselves as 
Imuhagh, Imazaghan or Imashaghen ("the Free People"), or Kel Tagelmust ("People of the Veil). The origin and 
meaning of the name Tuareg has been long debated and different interpretations continue to exist. According to 
one common but derogatory misinterpretation Tuareg is the Arabic name for “The Abandoned of God”. Despite 
these definitional problems, I stick to the more frequently used notion Tuareg.  
153  Prior to the present struggle, there had been three Tuareg rebellions since Mali’s independence. The first took 
place in the early 1960s. The second occurred at the end of the 1980s and extended to the beginning of the 1990s. 
A third wave of uproar began in 2006 and let to recurring outbreaks of violence between government forces and 
rebel groups. The Tuareg’s fight for an autonomous region, however, is much older. In 1916, they engaged in a 
revolt against the French colonial administration which had refused to grant the Tuareg their own autonomous 
region, the Azawad, as was promised. The French violently suppressed the revolt, confiscated important grazing 
lands and fragmented the Tuareg society by drawing arbitrary boundaries that cut through the Tuareg’s traditional 
homeland (Devon 2013).  
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members, the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) was founded in October of the 
same year (MNLA 2011).154 After five decades of conflict between the northerners and the central 
government in Bamako, during which the representatives of the north repeatedly demanded more 
autonomy and claimed rights of self-governance, the MNLA was the first group to formally strive for 
complete independence from the Malian state (Klute and Lecocq 2013, 123; 132-33).   
 In early 2012, the MNLA took up arms in an attempt to create an independent Azawad state.155 After 
a series of victories that put the MNLA in near full control of the northern part of the country, the 
movement declared the independence of Azawad on 6 April 2012 (MNLA 2012). However, neither the 
Malian government nor any other state acknowledged this claim. The central government in Bamako 
accused the MNLA repeatedly of collaborating with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The 
MNLA rejected these accusations as being unfounded and described them as part of a propaganda 
strategy by the Malian government. MNLA leaders repeatedly referred to the violent clashes between 
their own divisions and several katibas (small battalions) belonging to AQIM, notably during the second 
half of 2012. In their official communications, the MNLA deplored the Tuareg’s dilemma of being 
considered ‘by some [the Malian state authorities, international media] cooperative accomplices of 
Islamists, whilst for AQIM being nothing else than allies of the central government’ (Ag Ahmed 
2010).156 Above all, these reciprocal accusations demonstrate the fragmentation of the Malian society. 
 The MNLA’s offensive in January 2012 inflicted heavy losses on the Malian military and reinforced 
existing resentments among the southerners against Touré’s government. The massacre of 80 soldiers 
in the city of Adjelhoc led to a series of protests across the country and in the capital. Initiated by the 
widows of the soldiers who had lost their lives during the incident the protest were supported by a large 
part of society and continued until March 2012 (Gavelle, Siméant, and Traoré 2013, 26–29). 
Demonstrators denounced the government’s approach against the insurgents and the weak state of the 
                                                     
154  On 16 October 2011, the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) and the Mouvement Touareg du Nord-Mali 
(MTNM) merged to create the MNLA. It is not entirely clear how many members of Gadhafi’s former militia 
integrated into the MNLA. Some are said to have joined government forces, others terrorist organisations, and 
again others the MNLA.     
155  The definition of the Azawad state varies and some consider it to extend beyond the borders of Mali including 
Tuareg land across the entire Sahel-Saharan region (Arieff 2013b, 6). 
156  ‘En effet, pour certains, les Kel Tamasheq (Touareg) ne sont que des complices coopérants avec les islamistes, 
et pour l’AQMI, ils ne sont que des associés du pouvoir central’. 
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Army.157 During these anti-government protests, Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo and a group of junior 
military officers overthrew President Touré in a putsch on 22 March 2012. This putsch was not simply 
the reaction of a small group of soldiers to the ‘appalling conditions in which the soldiers were fighting 
the armed groups in the north’ (Théroux-Bénoni 2013, 1), but rather expressed a more generalised 
popular discontent with the government’s policies. Many hoped that the coup and the ousting of the 
political elite would put an end to the political excesses of the past 20 years and create the conditions 
for the emergence of a new class of politicians. At the time of writing, these expectations have only been 
partially fulfilled.158          
 In the aftermath of the coup, the junta established the Comité National pour le Redressement de la 
Démocratie et la Restauration de l’État (CNRDR), which however failed to gain international 
recognition (UN Resolution 2056). Political pressure from the African Union and ECOWAS, as well as 
continuous conquests and massacres by militants in the north, forced coup-leader Sanogo to consent to 
the creation of an interim government under President Dioncounda Traoré and Prime Minister Modibo 
Diarra. Like its predecessor, the interim government ‘suffered from internal divisions and military 
interference’ in addition to the startling revenue shortages. In the meantime the rebellion in the North 
continued and by then had displaced over 350,000 people, provoking a serious humanitarian crisis 
(Arieff 2013b).159  
 
                                                     
157  In 2012, the Malian military forces counted 7,350 soldiers, 400 of which were enlisted in the Air Force and 40 
in the Navy. Despite significant international military aid, the Malian troops lacked weapons and equipment. Much 
of the military aid had been misappropriated by senior military staff before it could reach the troops (van Vliet 
2013, 147). Consequently, the Malian Army was unable to avert any major attack against the state’s sovereignty.     
158  As of May 2014, the fighting between Tuareg rebels and government forces in the north continued. The former 
have retaken control over the cities of Kidal and Ménaka at a time where the negotiations between the MNLA and 
the central government in Bamako reached a standstill (Libération 2014).  
159  Capitan Sanogo arrested Prime Minister Modibo Diarra in December 2012 and replaced him with Django 
Sissoko. This incident demonstrates the ongoing internal struggles and domestic instability. Capitan Sanogo 
continued to play the role of an influential actor in the background. By opposing the government on the issue of a 
foreign intervention, Sanogo weakened the government’s position in the fight against Islamist militant groups 
(Schreiber 2013, 208). These internal struggles also explain the emergence of President Dioncounda Traoré as the 
French policy-makers’ preferred interlocutor during the crisis.  
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4.1.3 Islamist Extremists and Organised Crime 
So far, the crisis in Mali has been explained with reference to the country’s weak socio-economic 
performance, a fragile and corrupted political system, and the social and economic marginalisation of 
the northerners having led to continuous insurgencies. Most of these characteristics are not unique to 
Mali. Signs of a malfunctioning state can be detected in several francophone African states, for instance 
in Burkina Faso or Benin (Bigot 2012). The same is true for the social divisions between the (semi-) 
nomadic populations of the Sahel-Saharan zones and the sedentary populations of the south, which also 
exist in neighbouring Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, and have led to repeated armed conflicts in each of 
these countries since independence (Heisbourg 2013, 8).160 The factor that transformed this 
national/regional crisis into a question of global interest was the presence and activities of militant 
Islamist groups on Mali’s territory. Yet, these different factors are not unrelated, considering that the 
level of threat is mainly the result of ‘the internal political situation, and its possible targeting by violent 
Islamists, including recruitment for terrorist activity’ (International Crisis Group 2005, 2).  
 Over the past decade, the phenomenon of Islamist extremism has spread across the entire Sahel-
Saharan region.161 The best-known of these extremist groups, AQIM, operates across an area that 
reaches from Sudan in the east to Mauritania in the west. Their activities benefit from and contribute to 
the general instability of the entire region.162 At the crossroads of global trafficking routes, the Sahara 
desert with its porous borders had become a safe haven for all sorts of illegal activities, ranging from 
                                                     
160  Niger, in many regards, is the neighbour that resembles Mali the most. In particular, the relationship between 
the Tuareg and the central governments are almost identical in the two countries (Fleury 2013, 71–81).  
161  It is interesting to note that the French Colonial Ministry at the end of the 19th century expressed fears of a 
“reformist Islam” that could lead to the radicalisation of populations in different colonies (Bonnecase and Brachet 
2013, 10).  
162  AQIM traces its lineages back to the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC),  an offshoot 
of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA), which waged ‘a violent war against 
Algeria’s secular military regime during the 1990s’ (Vriens 2009; see also Kennedy-Boudali 2007). The GIA and 
later GSPC originally concentrated their operations mainly on Algerian territory. However, under the leadership 
of Abdelmalik Drukdal, the GSPC increasingly extended its activities across the border and into the Saharan desert, 
becoming increasingly active on Malian territory. In January 2007, the GSPC changed their name into AQIM, 
suggesting direct links to Al-Qaeda. AQIM reportedly relied on financial support from Al-Qaeda in order to 
strengthen its position in and control over the region. However, the extent of cooperation between AQIM and Al-
Qaeda is not exactly known. Some speak of considerable support through Al-Qaeda, others describe the links as 
‘more nominal than operational’ (International Crisis Group 2005, 20). The change of name came along with a 
change in the organisation’s programme. More than the GSPC, AQIM applies the notion of an international jihad. 




cigarette and licit goods smuggling, to drug and human trafficking, arms trading, and kidnappings.163 
Thanks to the ready availability of arms and money, the group was able to implement itself as a local 
power. For AQIM, which provided the necessary “protection” to traffickers in exchange for a share of 
the profit, smuggling activities had become a stable source of revenue in addition to the even more 
lucrative kidnappings for ransom (Lacher 2012, 8–9).164 In this context, ‘tensions related to the growing 
drug traffic, and the erosion of state institutions through complicity with organized crime’ played a 
detrimental role ‘in the dynamics that led to the outbreak of conflict in northern Mali in January 2012’ 
(Lacher 2012, 9–10). This nexus has promoted the notion of “narco-terrorism” in the French and 
international debates. Acknowledging some degree of relatedness of these two activities it should be 
noted that ‘ambiguity marks the distinction between organized crime and terrorism’ (Asal, Milward, and 
Schoon 2014, 1). As Asal, Milward, and Schoon (2014, 1) argue, ‘this ambiguity is perhaps most evident 
in terrorist organizations’ involvement in the illicit drug economy. While notable cases of ideologically 
driven groups engaged in the drug trade have been widely publicized, terrorist groups rarely participate 
in the illicit drug economy’.165 International security discourses rarely distinguish between these two 
different activities.          
 Europe, America, and some regional powers such as Algeria are not entirely innocent regarding the 
emergence of “terrorism” in the Sahel-Saharan zone. As Keenan forcefully argues, ‘the absurdity of this 
approach [the US’s and Algeria’s counterterrorism strategies], which stems largely from the fact that 
there was no terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel [prior to the mid-2000s], is that an ever-increasing proportion 
of the region’s inhabitants will soon be able to call themselves “terrorists”’ (Keenan 2007, 48). The 
unfolding of events in 2012 and 2013 constitutes a strong factor in support of the argument that the 
                                                     
163  The importance of geography should not be underestimated when considering the causes of the Sahel crisis. 
The territory of the three states of Mauritania, Mali, and Niger alone covers an area that stretches from west to east 
over a distance equal to that between London and the Caspian Sea, and from north to south over a distance equal 
to that between Oslo and Rome. The control of such a vast and sparsely populated area, which additionally is 
characterised by extreme climatic and topographic conditions, would even bring well-equipped and well-
functioning police and Army forces to their limits (Assemblée Nationale 2012b, 86–87).  
164  Between 2008 and 2012, AQIM is said to have totalled between $40 million and $65 million in ransom. Due 
to the lack of official data, an exact estimation is not possible (Lacher 2012, 9).  
165  With respect to the notions of narco-terrorism and the trafficking-terrorist business, Keenan holds that this 
phenomenon has been reinforced by a politically motivated re-definition of existing categories on the part of the 
US. Seemingly overnight, traffickers became terrorists and terrorists engaged in trafficking, this age-old business 
in the region (Keenan 2007, 48). Asal, Milward, and Schoon (2014, 2) further suggest that ‘terrorist involvement 
in the illicit narcotics economy should not be understood as either a logical evolution or an ideological 
contradiction, but rather as part of a tactical toolkit that is contingent on opportunity, access, and need. 
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states in the region had a substantial interest in the Sahara-Sahel becoming a zone of instability in the 
first place. According to Keenan (2013, 29) the ‘GWOT has been used by all regimes in the region to 
repress and silence legitimate political opposition by labelling it or linking it with “terrorism”, “putative 
terrorism” (to use an Americanism) or Islamic extremism (a euphemism for “terrorism”)’. Keen (2000, 
3), discussing the case of Algeria, speaks of a collaboration between government forces and Islamic 
extremists because ‘the “Islamic threat” has tended to legitimize military control and undemocratic 
government’. This view, however, remains contested and further research is needed before drawing 
more definitive conclusions (Notin 2014).       
 Internal divisions make it difficult to determine the ultimate goals of AQIM (Arieff 2013b, 10). 
Several figures, including Mokhtar Belmokhatar and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, claimed the organisation’s 
leadership provoking the creation of new factions.166 One of these splinter groups was the Mouvement 
pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO). Initially a minor group, ‘it grew considerably 
in its first twelve months of operation’ and was included in the UN Al-Qaeda sanction list in December 
2012, being held responsible for several abductions across the region (United Nations 2012). In 
particular, in and around the city of Gao, MUJAO emerged as an inevitable front for smugglers, a 
propagator of the jihadist idea, and occasional benefactor to the impoverished local population (Lacher 
2012, 15).167 Next to MUJAO was the militant group Anṣār ad-Dīn. Under the leadership of Iyad ag 
Ghaly—rebel leader in the 1990s, hostage mediator, and Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia—the group 
initially cooperated with the MNLA in their fight against Malian government forces. In May 2012, after 
having conquered the principal strategic points in the Kidal region, the two groups disunited and began 
fighting each other. By mid-2012, Anṣār ad-Dīn evicted the MNLA from Kidal and Timbuktu (Metcalf 
2012; Schreiber 2013, 208–9).          
 Led by France, the international community started to become alarmed by the developments in Mali 
from the early 2000s onwards, in particular by the kidnappings that affected an ever increasing number 
of Westerners, most notably French citizens. Consequently, the activities of terrorist and criminal groups 
                                                     
166  Abdelhamid Abou Zeid was killed by French and Chadian armed forces in February 2013.  
167  The parallel occurrence of ready money from external sources (ransom, smuggling, support from governments 
and organisations) and the rebels’ food allocations to the local population challenges the causal relationship some 




began to be perceived as a non-contained threat having direct implications beyond the region. After 
asserting that the movement represented a transnational threat, the United States launched the PSI in 
2003, the goal of which was to help create rapid reaction capacities in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and 
Niger. In 2005, the PSI was superseded by the more ambitious TSCTP, which also included Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Senegal (Filiu 2009, 7; Keenan 2013, 14–27). Successive French 
governments became particularly attentive to potential threats from the Sahara. France’s experience with 
Algerian extremist groups in the past (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 79–84; 86-87), the establishment of 
closer links between AQIM and Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2005, and AQIM’s increasing verbal attacks against 
France, the “mother of all evils”, furthered the perception of the existence of a global threat among 
French decision-makers (Filiu 2009).168       
 Despite the fact that both national and international actors acknowledged terrorism as a regional and 
international, but not a national or local problem, Mali soon was identified as the most vulnerable West 
African country. In 2005, the International Crisis Group concluded that ‘Mali, a star pupil of 1990s neo-
liberal democratisation, runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent 
Islamist activity’ (International Crisis Group 2005, i). This report designated Mali as ‘the most clearly 
targeted [of all countries in the region] by external Islamist groups’ (2005, 2). A report by the French 
Parliament drew a similar conclusion in 2012. In their evaluation of the security in the Sahel region, the 
rapporteurs affirmed that Mali traditionally had been considered the weak point in the fight against 
AQIM by all neighbouring countries. Notwithstanding the initially impetuous line of action and a 
successful offensive against the group in 2009, the central government in Bamako did not succeed in 
eradicating AQIM. The failure of the Malian government to completely remove terrorist cells from its 
territory was explained by the government’s deliberative choice to preserve the south of the country at 
the costs of the north, which in any case was considered as being hostile towards the central government 
(Assemblée Nationale 2012b, 65). Some pundits even pointed to a direct state complicity with AQIM 
and other criminal groups (Ag Assarid 2012; Bigot 2012; Lacher 2012, 1; Leboeuf 2014, 46; Notin 
                                                     
168  In 1994, the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA) hijacked an Air France plane from 
Algiers to Marseille. In 1995, the same group committed a series of bomb attacks against the Parisian subway 
system, killing eight and leaving hundreds injured. The attacks engraved themselves deeply into France’s 
collective memory.  
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2014, 57). In the aftermath of the 2012 coup, senior officials were quoted as saying that ‘complicity 
with criminal interests had “entirely taken over government policy in the north” in the final years of 
President Amadou Toumani Touré’s rule’ (Lacher 2012, 14).      
 In sum, the core factors that need to be taken into consideration when analysing the crisis in Mali are 
high levels of corruption, the absence of a strong political leader, the schisms between the south and the 
north, a weak and underequipped Malian Army, and the administration’s alleged complicity with 
criminal groups in the north. All these factors made Mali particularly vulnerable to attacks from terrorists 
and rebels and established the terrain of another French military intervention in Africa (Assemblée 
Nationale 2012b, 66).  
 
4.2 The French Decision-Making Process  
Like the crisis itself, the French decision-making process from the early perception of a threat to the 
final decision in favour of a military intervention evolved gradually. The remainder of this chapter 
explains the French decision by bringing the actors’ subjective reading of reality to the forefront. More 
precisely, the following sections discuss the nascence and subsequent development of specific 
interpretations throughout the securitisation process of the Malian crisis. In the first section, I probe the 
appearance of the crisis in Mali on the French security agenda and explain why French actors have 
considered the Malian crisis as a salient issue for their nation’s security from a very early moment 
onwards. The next section concentrates on the policy framing and diffusion of possible solutions to the 
crisis throughout the second half of 2012. The final section engages with the French decision to intervene 
and proposes an answer to the overall puzzle of why France launched a unilateral strike in January 2013 




4.2.1 Inclusion of the Malian Crisis on the Security Agenda: The Four 
Dimensions of Proximity  
Officials in Paris registered first warnings about a deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region in 
the early 2000s. At first, the insecurity in the Sahel region was largely attributed to the activities of 
armed groups engaged in the prospering drug-traffic business. As mentioned above, a series of 
kidnappings of mainly European citizens in the border zone between Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania 
committed by the GSPC and later AQIM were among the first evident signs that alerted French decision-
makers about the severity of the situation.169 In response to these developments, the French government 
offered the Malian government technical assistance in restoring security in the north. It is at that time 
that the military developed first operational plans for a possible future intervention in Mali. Soon, 
however, French policy-makers realised that a close cooperation at the operational level would not be 
possible.  
With the plan Sahel in 2007, we made the advent of a danger official. We asked Mali to reinforce 
their troop deployments in the north. They, indeed, sent troops to the north, but they remained 
sheltered in the barracks. In real terms, they did not do anything. There was a lack of will to truly 
cooperate. They [the Malian authorities] were happy to receive financial assistance, but did not 
cooperate at the operational level.170    
 As the political and security situation in Mali deteriorated further over the course of the following 
years, foreign policy elites in Paris began to consider the possibility of an escalation of the crisis and the 
erosion of the Malian state. As Vice Chief of Staff Didier Castres attests, beginning in 2010 the CPCO 
elaborated first plans for the liberation of the Adrar des Ifoghas massif, a mountain chain in proximity 
to the Algerian border that served as refuge for Islamist fighters during the French offensive three years 
later.171 In the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began developing briefing notes based on the 
                                                     
169  Interview with policy officer at the Ministry of Defence, Paris, 10 July 2013. By the end of 2012 seven French 
citizens were being held hostage (Koepf 2013a).  
170  Interview with policy officer at the DCSD, Paris, 18 February 2014. ‘Avec le plan Sahel de 2007 on a officialisé 
l’arrivée du danger. On a demandé au Mali de renforcer le déploiement de troupes dans le Nord. Ils ont envoyé 
des troupes dans le Nord mais eux sont restés dans les casernes. Donc effectivement, ils n’ont rien fait. Il y avait 
un manque de volonté de véritable coopération. Ils étaient contents de recevoir le soutien financier mais sur le 
plan opérationnel ils ne coopéraient pas’.  
171  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author, Paris, 18 February 2014. The CPCO is responsible for 
the pre-decisional planning, the operational planning, and the management of operations. The plans mentioned 
above are part of the pre-decisional planning phase during which a situation is evaluated and possible strategic 
options proposed. Reflections at this stage include the goal of the operation, the framework of the operation 
 116 
 
assumption of a collapsed Malian state. As one civil servant states, ‘I arrived at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 2010 and was immediately told that I have to work on the Malian question, since things will 
go awry. At that time we thought that [the situation in Mali] will escalate because of the Tuareg rebellion 
and later because of the consequences of the military operation in Libya’.172    
 However, these events alone do not explain why French decision-makers were particularly sensitive 
to the developments in Mali and finally decided to launch Operation Serval in January 2013; in particular 
since President Hollande and the majority within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were categorically 
opposed to a military intervention in Mali at that stage (Notin 2014, 144). To understand the French 
decision, one needs to engage with the actors’ cognitive reasoning. The 2003 Saharan hostage crisis, 
which marked the beginning of the prospering kidnapping industry in the region, illustrated that 
observable facts can lead to most different interpretations and thus induce a multitude of policy decisions 
(Daniel 2012). In April 2003, a group of European tourists were abducted in the Algerian desert, when 
travelling along a ‘route, dubbed the Piste des Tombeaux (graveyard path), a name which it acquired 
because of the large number of prehistoric tombs in its vicinity’ (Keenan 2007, 32). The majority of the 
thirty-two seized tourists were German citizens; none of them was French. If government action is 
understood as a simple reaction to a well-defined stimulus, in this case the kidnappings of a given state’s 
citizens, one would expect the situation in Mali to enjoy a similar prominence on Germany’s security 
agenda. However, this was not the case. Disparities regarding the perception and recognition of the 
severity of the Malian crisis remained enormous between France and its European partners (see below). 
In the April 2012 issue of Le Monde diplomatique, Philippe Leymarie (2012) explains with much 
precision how the Sahel had turned into a ‘powder keg’ and how this would affect France, given its past 
and future role in the region. Six months later, the Handelsblatt published an article in which the authors 
regret the quasi-total ignorance of the situation among German politicians.  
What do we actually know about the situation in Mali? Many Germans, and many politicians and 
soldiers, don't have the slightest idea. German foreign policy experts haven't even made an issue of 
the fact that something akin to a new 'safe harbor' for al-Qaida and its ilk and a Stone Age Islamist 
                                                     
(unilateral, multilateral), the nature of the operation, the number of troops needed, and a tentative calendar (Teule 
2007, 65–66). 
172  Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘Je suis arrivé au Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères fin 2010 et on m’a tout de suite dit qu’il faut travailler sur le Mali, parce que ça va mal 
tourner. À l’époque on pensait que ça allait mal tourner à cause de la rébellion touareg qui était en formation, et 
puis à cause des conséquences de l’opération au Libye.’  
 117 
 
regime is establishing itself there, right at Europe's backdoor. There has been no parliamentary 
debate and neither the chancellor nor the foreign and defense ministers have done anything to raise 
awareness of the fact that German interests actually are affected by the North African country. 
(quoted in Lindsey 2012) 
 This considerable discrepancy in the perception of the events in the Sahel asks for an explanation. It 
also shows that by merely looking at observable facts, one necessarily misses crucial parts of the story 
(Lake 2013, 579). A positivist reading of reality that concentrates exclusively on observable facts cannot 
grasp the differences in perception and the diverging priority the German and French governments 
attributed to the conflict in Mali in 2012. Nor does it explain why the Hollande administration from July 
2012 onwards emerged as the principal supporter of an African-led peacekeeping mission to Mali. To 
provide answers to these questions, it becomes necessary, as I have argued in detail in Chapter Two, to 
account for ideational and cognitive dimensions of decision-making. To do so, I analyse the appearance 
and inclusion of the Malian crisis on the French security agenda with reference to the notion of 
proximity.            
 In contrast to the “continuity and change” paradigm, which remains a dominant concept in the 
literature on Franco-African relations (see Chapter One; Martin 1995; Huliaras 2002; Cumming 2013), 
the concept of proximity emerges directly from the French political discourse and thus allows for a close 
analysis of the decision-makers’ subjective cognitive maps. By engaging with concepts and 
terminologies that French actors themselves invented, shaped, and developed, I intend to transgress the 
disciplinary boundaries ‘that had been established by prevailing conceptualisations’ (Bleiker and 
Hutchison 2008, 118). Proximity is one of the lenses through which French actors have perceived the 
crisis in Mali and thus can be employed as an analytical concept regardless of one’s disciplinary heritage 
or ontological assumptions. Proximity can—according to the context within which decision-makers 
deploy the term—refer to a temporal, a geographic, cultural or a human/societal dimension. In its 
different forms, the concept facilitated an early appreciation of the Malian conflict among the political 
elite in Paris. In the following, I introduce the different dimensions of the term proximity. It should be 
noted that the notion is not exclusively used in the context of the Malian crisis but defines French elites’ 
perception of the Franco-African relationship in general. The discussion on proximity in the Malian case 
thus ties into the wider debate on the impact of the “African factor” on French decision-making 
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processes. Although introduced here to analyse the threat-perception stage, the concept also influenced 
the subsequent phases of the decision-making process.  
 
Temporal Proximity 
Proximity’s temporal dimension takes the form of a bidirectional projection. Decision-makers, when 
framing present discourses, explicitly or implicitly refer to France’s past and future role in Africa. 
Descriptions of the past emphasised the longstanding special relationship. In contrast, the understanding 
of France’s future role is deliberately free of nostalgia, pragmatic and mainly concentrates on economic 
aspects of the partnership. Together these two elements constitute a knowledge structure that informs 
French decision-makers in their discourses and actions. The longstanding and close relationship between 
France and francophone Africa is interpreted as a permissive and explanatory factor of France’s 
continuous presence and interest in that region of the world.  
Colonisation creates a relationship between the coloniser and the colonised, which lasts even after 
the end of the decolonisation…For 50 years, whether we want to or not, we have gotten involved in 
their [African] politics. Today, this is less often the case. [But] we [still] continue to help 
them.…This is an historical link. When one was the coloniser of another country for more than 150 
years, the ties do not dissolve that quickly.173  
 Through the colonial and later the post-colonial experience ‘a space of common identity that brought 
together Franco-Africans’ was created (Charbonneau 2014, 616). These elements of togetherness remain 
integral to the self-understanding of today’s French political elite and shape decision-makers’ 
understanding of what is just and what is possible. Perceptions of self-interest and responsibility largely 
derive from the historical relationship (Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 2002, 268). Building on ‘the 
remnants of a long history…it is not difficult to justify an intervention in Mali, whereas it is more 
difficult to justify an intervention in a country like Afghanistan or even Syria’.174 The belief in some 
                                                     
173  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of the interior, Paris, 12 February 2014. ‘La colonisation a crée 
un rapport entre le pays colonisateur et le pays colonisé qui dure bien après la fin de la décolonisation….Depuis 
50 ans, si on le veut ou non, on se mêle dans leur politique. Aujourd’hui c’est beaucoup moins fort. On a continué 
à les aider. On fait beaucoup de formation. C’est un lien historique. Quand on était à peu près 150 ans colonisateur 
d’un pays, les liens ne se défont pas aussi vite’. 
174  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘Ce sont les restes d’une 
histoire longue, qui était celle de la colonisation et qui était celle de la décolonisation où les Français vivent 
encore avec le souvenir d’un large empire, où ils croyaient de vendre la civilisation, où il n’y a pas de difficultés 
de justifier une intervention au Mali, alors qu’il est plus difficile de la justifier dans un pays comme l’Afghanistan, 
voire même la Syrie’.  
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kind of natural, long-term rapport that is independent of the ephemeral day-to-day policy-making 
elevates the French-African relationship to something special. French actors describe this gradually 
grown relationship as a particular leverage and the biggest difference between themselves and so-called 
new and emerging actors.175         
 Having said this, the historical legacy of the French-African relationship does not only function as a 
permissive but also as a constraining factor. It limits decision-makers’ discourses and practices.176 
Decision-makers are particularly wary of distinguishing between historical influences and the Franco-
African relationship of yore. As one French senator maintains, today’s relationship between France and 
Africa is ‘no longer a tête-à-tête between France and Africa; it is no longer dad’s or granddad’s 
Françafrique. It is simply a normal relationship between France, which is still a great nation, and the 
Africans, whom we know better than others do’.177 President François Hollande, for his part, 
acknowledges that a sincere engagement with France’s colonial history and a recognition of past 
misdeeds is necessary to build together with France’s former colonies partnerships for the future: ‘[What 
counts is] the truth about the past, truth about colonialism, truth about the [Algerian War (1954-1962)] 
war with all its tragedies, truth about hurt memories. At the same time, however, [we need to avoid] the 
past impeding us from working towards the future. The past—once recognised—must allow us to go 
faster and further in preparing the future’178 (Hollande 2012f).      
 Elsewhere, the President evokes the risk of seeing the past ‘as a form of recrimination’ (Hollande 
2012d), a risk which, if possible, should be avoided. The limits imposed by colonial and neo-colonial 
practices are omnipresent in France’s present relationship with its former colonies. Since these shadows 
from the past cannot be simply removed, they need to be faced and if possible transformed into a more 
opportune operational environment. This transformation of France’s neo-colonial legacy into a post 
                                                     
175  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014.  
176  On the one hand, the colonial experience is cited as an element that explains France’s continuous special 
relationship with the African continent, on the other, French politicians since the mid-1990s have portrayed their 
own actions as the polar opposite of France’s colonial and neo-colonial policies.  
177  Jeanny Lorgeoux, senator, interview by author, Paris, 5 December 2013. ‘Mais ce n’est plus un tête-à-tête entre 
la France et l’Afrique, ce n’est plus la Françafrique de Papa ou de Grand-papa. C’est simplement des relations 
normales entre la France, qui reste quand même une grande nation et les Africains, qu’on connait mieux que les 
autres’.   
178  ‘…vérité sur le passé, vérité sur la colonisation, vérité sur la guerre avec ces drames, avec ces tragédies, vérité 
sur les mémoires blessées. Mais en même temps volonté de faire que le passé ne nous empêche pas de faire le 
travail pour l'avenir. Le passé doit, dès lors qu'il est reconnu, nous permettre d'aller beaucoup plus vite, beaucoup 
plus loin pour préparer l'avenir…’ 
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colonial179 approach has been an ongoing process for more than two decades, and which the literature 
usually labels as period of normalisation (see Chapter One).      
 One way to overcome the constraints created by France’s historical involvement in Africa is to draw 
a clear-cut distinction between past and present practices and to engage in a forward-looking discourse 
of modernisation, which partially legitimatises the formulation of interests. The “rise of Africa” debate 
provides the intellectual context within which such a new definition of France’s relationship with Africa 
takes place (Mahajan 2009; Radelet 2010; Ellis 2012). Referring to Africa’s rapid growth over the past 
decade and its young populations, French elites repeatedly have heralded that ‘the time of Africa has 
come’180 (Benguigui 2012) and have thus embraced what experts usually refer to as an afro-
optimist/positivist attitude (Severino and Ray 2011). Afro-positivism predicts that Africa will follow 
East Asia in its economic if not social development and is likely to become one of the future centres of 
economic and political power. Just as with any prediction, this prediction involves a considerable degree 
of uncertainty and remains a protension of present observations (Bigo 2011, 243). More cautionary 
scholars point to the prevailing poverty, the relative lack of infrastructure, and the weak institutions in 
many African countries. Accordingly, the rise of Africa and its achievement of sustainable prosperity 
constitute only one of several options for the continent’s possible future. However, when reading the 
French discourse on Africa’s future, this option appears to be a truism towards which French actors are 
adapting their current practices. The belief in Africa’s rise in conjunction with the conviction that their 
country’s destiny is inextricably linked to the development of the African continent let the maintenance 
of close ties with Africa appear as crucial for a variety of strategic and economic reasons (Hollande 
2012j). Affirming strategic and economic interests in Africa seems to be an accepted motivation for 
French action as long as these are geared towards the future.  
Beyond the moral values […] we think the [African] continent is on the rise, which for us is an 
opportunity. Africa is the lieu of growth today, just after Asia. […] One of the principal impediments 
of Africa’s emergence is precisely the instability, the wars, and the conflicts. Put bluntly, it is in our 
direct economic interest [to create stability]. This can result in jobs in our country, contracts for our 
                                                     
179  Deliberately written without hyphen to indicate the term’s meaning as a rupture with the negative aspects of 
the past.  
180  ‘Le temps de l'Afrique est arrivé’.  
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companies…we have a stake in contributing to the resolution of some of these conflicts, be it by 
supporting the Africans, be it be doing it on our own.181   
 
The truth is that we do not have any other choice but to take care of Africa. We must do this in the 
most intelligent way possible. I am very optimistic with respect to Africa’s future in the 21st century. 
Africa is a continent with extraordinary resources, many talents, and populations that simply need 
to be educated. It is a problem of education and democratic stabilisation…It is our duty to contribute 
to this stabilisation.182   
French actors across the entire political spectrum are convinced that Africa’s emergence has become 
palpable and that France needs to remain present in the region in order to benefit from Africa’s growth 
in the future. In light of this discourse, one easily overlooks that references to Africa’s growth in the 
French discourse are a social construction par excellence. Pointing to future economic opportunities as 
one of the motivations of French policy-making in Africa is not the same as saying that economic 
interests can explain France’s policy-making in Africa. In their study of special relationships between 
European nations and their ex-colonies Brysk et al. (2002, 268) argue that material incentives only 
impact upon decision-making processes after being ‘perceived through the lenses of specific, post-
imperial ideas and identities’. In other words, interests and ideas become inseparable elements of the 
same analytical frame or as Blyth (2002, 270) puts it, interests are ‘intrinsically bound up with ideas’.183 
This point becomes clear when looking at France’s trade balance with Africa. According to Chipman 
(1989, 186), material considerations had never been the primary driving force behind France’s African 
policies. While this statement can be debated in particular in light of France’s provisioning of strategic 
raw materials (Martin 1985; Kroslak 2008, 64–65), it is likewise a fact that since the 1980s, Africa has 
                                                     
181  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Au-delà des valeurs morales, s’il y a 
un risque de génocide il faut intervenir, au-delà de ça on pense que le continent s’engage dans un développement 
accéléré que c’est pour nous une opportunité. C’est le lieu de la croissance aujourd’hui, c’est le deuxième après 
l’Asie. Et beaucoup de pays ont des taux à deux chiffres déjà depuis dix ans. Donc, un des principaux freins à cette 
émergence de l’Afrique, c’est l’instabilité justement, c’est les guerres et les conflits. C’est dans notre intérêt 
économique tout simplement. Ça peut être des emplois chez nous, des activités pour nos entreprises… on a intérêt 
à contribuer à soit un traitement direct de certains de ces conflits, soit à aider les Africains à le pouvoir faire eux-
mêmes’. 
182  Pierre Lellouche, MP, interview by author, Paris, 7 February 2014. ‘La réalité, c’est que nous n’avons pas le 
choix que de nous occuper de l’Afrique. Il faut le faire le plus intelligemment possible. Je suis un grand optimiste 
sur l’avenir en Afrique en 21e siècle. C’est un pays…un continent qui a énormément de richesses, beaucoup de 
talents, de populations qui ont juste besoin d’être éduqué. C’est un problème d’éducation et de stabilisation 
démocratique. Si les conditions sont réunies, les potentiels sont considérables. On le voit dans certains pays 
comme le Ghana. La croissance du Ghana est à 14 per cent. C’est à nous d’aider à cette stabilisation 
démocratique’.  
183  As Blyth (2002, 270) points out, the move from material reductionism should not imply a parallel move to 
ideational essentialism.  
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carried almost no weight in France’s external trade balance sheets. For the years 2011 to 2013, the entire 
African continent accounted for only 5.3 per cent of France’s imports and 6.5 per cent of its exports in 
goods. During the same period, Mali’s share amounted to 0.002 per cent of France’s imports and 0.071 
per cent of France’s exports.184 Even if one assumes that a collapse of the Malian state would have had 
implications on the entire region, the impact on France’s foreign trade balance would have remained 
marginal. Within the West African region Mali ranks among the economically weaker states. Mali’s 
trade accounts for only one fifth of the trade between France and Côte d’Ivoire (Notin 2014, 20). At the 
same time, France remains Mali’s principal trading partner, as is the case for the majority of francophone 
African states. Mann (2008, 10) understands such economic imbalances as an expression of imperial 
dominance. Indeed, a more differentiated examination of French trade statistics suggests a parallel 
occurrence of macroeconomic losses and possible gains for individual French companies (Adda and 
Smouts 1989, 65–75). Chabal (1991, 293) points out that while the French exchequer does not profit 
much from African trade, French businesses do. The best-known examples of French companies being 
implemented on the African market include the mining company Areva, the telecommunications 
provider Bouygues, and the investment and industrial holding group Bolloré. Even if we concede that 
the French state has certain stakes in the profitability of these companies, the activities of a limited 
number of French multinationals alone cannot explain how Africa’s rise at the macroeconomic level 
became a truism. Adding to this, as ‘internationalization has proceeded over the past 25 years, the 
economic and political importance of businesses with activities in the former colonies has diminished’ 
(Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 2002, 276), not however the belief in prosperous Franco-African 
relations.            
 To draw conclusions about future scenarios by looking at an observable status quo actors rely on 
cognitive shortcuts. History plays a crucial role in the constitution of these cognitive shortcuts. Past 
experience and predictions of the future are inherent in ‘every opinion, in every proposal for action, 
every decision’ (H. Sprout and M. Sprout 1965, 177). Experiences as well as expectations about the 
future are at the heart of decision-makers’ psychological environment and thus influence present 
                                                     
184  Own calculations based on the International Trade Centre database, http://www.trademap.org, accessed on 10 
September 2014. France’s trade surplus resulting from trade in goods with Mali amounted to approximately €398 
million in 2013. The costs of France’s external operations for the same year added up to €1 billion.    
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discourses and practices. In the case of Mali, this means that both France’s historical relationship and 
the general expectations of a prosperous African future influenced the decision-making process by 
creating incentives for French actors to pay increased attention to the developments in the Sahel.  
 
Cultural Proximity 
The belief in “Africa’s rise” explains why the continent continues to enjoy priority on France’s foreign 
policy agenda. Such general appreciation is less useful to explain France’s early perception and 
subsequent involvement in the specific case of the Malian crisis. As we saw above, in terms of economic 
interests, Mali falls behind most other francophone African states. As Marchal (2013a, 498) states, 
‘There are a few thousand French residents in Mali, but most of them are dual nationals and do not have 
the same economic importance as the French community in Côte d’Ivoire or Gabon’. Gold is Mali’s 
principal high-value natural resource. The fact that the world’s third largest gold producer had changed 
its mining code just nine days before the launch of Operation Serval led some critics to interpret the 
French military mission as a way to safeguard these resources. They, however, as Notin (2014, 21) 
points out, tend to forget that Mali’s annual production in gold values but €364 million, which is less 
than half of the costs of Operation Serval in 2013 alone. Others refer to France’s interests in Niger’s 
uranium reserves as the principal motivation of military intervention (Ahluwalia 2013; Koepf 2013a, 6; 
Kimenyi and Routman 2013; Weiss and Welz 2014, 903). However, justifying an ad hoc medium-scale 
military intervention in one country with reference to strategic and economic interests that France may 
have in another country seems only partially convincing at best. France’s mining interests in Niger may 
have affected the decision at the operational level, in particular in terms of possible impacts of the 
military intervention on the mining sites’ security, but they did not constitute the principal motivation 
of Operation Serval.185  
                                                     
185  Frédéric Charillon, director of the IRSEM, interview by author, Paris, 17 January 2014. In fact, Operation 
Serval increased the risk of terrorist attacks on French mining sites in neighbouring countries. Shortly after the 
launching of operation Serval one of Areva’s mining sites in Arlit (Niger) was hit by a terrorist attack that caused 
one death among the Nigerien workers. Additionally, Niamey wants to increase the royalties that Areva has to pay 
to Niger. If the terms of a new mining code passed in 2006 were implemented, Areva would be forced to pay 
between 12 and 15 per cent in royalties. This would constitute an additional burden to the company, which 
currently obtains 20 per cent of its uranium supplies from Niger, but intends to reduce this share to 10 per cent 
over the next years (Hofnung 2013; Hicks 2014; Hofnung 2014).  
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There are economic interests, no doubt. But they are never the triggering factors. We never say: 
Look, we are going to launch an operation in Niger, or in Mali, to protect Areva’s uranium mines in 
Niger.…This has only a marginal impact.…I can guarantee you that the decision to intervene in 
Mali has no link whatsoever—besides, I was very upset when I read this in the German media—
with the control of the uranium in Niger. This question never appeared during the discussions at the 
top of the state.186 
 Most insiders of French politics agree that economic considerations played no or at most a minor 
role during the decision-making process that led to Operation Serval.187 While references to material 
interests were almost completely absent when justifying the French intervention in Mali, there was no 
lack of arguments referring to a shared Franco-African culture. In the eyes of French elites, as well as 
in those of many of their francophone African counterparts, cultural proximity serves both as 
explanation of France’s continuous interest in Africa and as justification of its role as important security 
actor on the African continent. Cultural relations are considered as a field where France can exercise 
considerable influence without being accused of neo-colonial aspirations. France remains a legitimised 
and accepted cultural reference within and beyond the francophone world. Vice-versa for French 
decision-makers, ‘Africa is not a continent like any other. We have a historic relationship that remains 
very strong. When I say ‘historic’ I do not imply that this is a relationship of the past, it is the cultural 
relationship which is very strong. Culture understood as linguistic ties, the number of Africans that live 
in France, who have the double-nationality. France and francophone Africa are coming ever closer’.188
 Shared culture, notably the common language, has created a sentiment of relatedness among French 
policy-makers towards francophone Africa. Thus, the ‘We’ expands beyond the national boundaries and 
comprises other states and societies that share French culture and language. Besides producing the 
sentiment of relatedness as an end in itself, cultural proximity can also be understood in more traditional 
                                                     
186  Camille Grand, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, interview by author, Paris, 23 July 2013. ‘Si vous 
voulez les intérêts économiques, il y en a indiscutablement, mais là aussi ce n’est jamais l’élément déclencheur. 
On ne se dit jamais : Tiens, on va faire une opération au Niger, ou au Mali, pour protéger les mines d’uranium 
d’Areva au Niger….Ça joue un peu à la marge…. je peux vous garantir que la décision d’intervenir au Mali n’a 
aucun lien, et d’ailleurs j’étais très choqué quand je l’ai vu dans la presse allemande, n’a aucun lien avec la 
question du contrôle de l’uranium du Niger. Cette question n’est jamais apparue dans la discussion au sommet de 
l’État’. 
187  Isabelle Lasserre, Journalist at Le Monde, interview by author, Paris, 23 August 2013.   
188  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Pour la France l’Afrique n’est 
pas un continent comme les autres. On a une relation historique qui reste très forte. Quand je dis historique ce 
n’est pas une relation du passé, c’est une relation culturelle qui est très forte. Culture en sens des liens de la 
langue, le nombre des Africains qui vivent en France, qui sont binationaux. La France est l’Afrique francophone 
s’approchent de plus en plus…’.  
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soft–power terms (Nye 1990; Nye 2007). Soft power is about ‘influencing or controlling the meaning 
of normality’ (Berenskoetter 2007, 672) or as the concept’s inventor and most prominent advocate, 
Joseph Nye (2004, 256), puts it, ‘Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments’. In this sense, cultural proximity can be understood as a purposefully 
constructed instrument to justify French interests and to increase France’s power in the region. However, 
cognitive maps such as perceived proximity are never exclusively instrumental. They always fulfil the 
two functions of analysing and justifying (Khong 1992, 16). The term ‘interest’, which in itself is a void 
concept, requires a process of meaning-giving, hence the dual-function of cognitive maps.  
 French elites continue to attach great importance to the role of cultural policies in France’s external 
relations. Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius listed the so-called rayonnement culturel (cultural 
influence/standing) among the eight aspects that define France as a puissance d’influence (Fabius 
2013k). It is thus no surprise that French governments invest considerable material, human, and 
ideational capital in exactly this policy realm. As Ager (2005, 57) summarises succinctly:  
Since decolonisation, France’s cultural policy towards Africa has been an infallible indicator of the 
particularity and complexity of Franco-African relations. Indeed, it is one of the most characteristic 
features of what is often referred to as l’exception française in international relations, for whereas 
other former colonial nations see development assistance as a remit which is limited to socio-
economic concerns over health, education and welfare, France’s aid programme has always 
contained a mainstream of budgets for, among other things, French language teaching, francophone 
cinema and sponsorships to French universities.  
 Most of the time, France’s rayonnement culturel is equated with the promotion and diffusion of the 
French language. For the president ‘language…is a means [for France] to be bigger than it is’ (Hollande 
2012j).189 French politicians are convinced that language serves as an instrument that assures their 
influence abroad, particularly in francophone Africa.  
Imagine you were the minister of hydrocarbons of an African state, and you studied at the Sorbonne, 
you speak perfect French, you have French friends…and when you are minister it is easier for you 
to have a discussion with Paris than with Moscow or Washington. If, on the other hand, you studied 
in Washington, or Yale, or Harvard, or somewhere else, it would be easier for you to be [être] with 
them. The diplomacy of influence begins with the language.190  
                                                     
189  ‘Le combat pour la langue française est une bataille pour la diversité et le pluralisme, une manière pour notre 
pays d'être plus grand que lui-même’. 
190  Jeanny Lorgeoux, senator, interview by author, Paris, 5 December 2013. ‘Imaginez, vous êtes ministre des 
hydrocarbures dans un pays africain, mais vous avez fait vos études à la Sorbonne, vous parlez parfaitement 
français, vous avez des potes français, quand vous êtes ministre vous avez plus de facilité de vous entretenir avec 
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 As core member of La Francophonie—an intergovernmental organisation for the promotion of 
language, cultures, and norms—France can rely on a large network of states within which new ideas 
and positions are tested, coalitions formed, and conflict resolutions proposed, away from the limelight 
that surrounds major international security summits or the work of the UN Security Council. 
 Besides providing a space where coalitions are built, the Francophonie is also a lieu of norm 
diffusion. For Hollande, the Francophonie ‘is not simply any language…but the language of values and 
principles and among these principles there are democracy, good governance, and the fight against 
corruption’ (Hollande 2012o).191 In other words, the Francophonie permits French elites to promote 
(their) values and ideas abroad. This promotion of values is not limited to the discursive realm but can 
be sustained by other means. For instance, in recent years “francophone peacekeeping” has emerged as 
a popular and widely debated concept among both academics and practitioners (see for instance special 
issue of International Peacekeeping (2012:19(3)). In his speeches, the French president makes room for 
this continuum between norm promotion and policy-making. Reminding the diplomatic corps of the role 
the French language plays in foreign policy-making he argued, ‘Finally, when I mention our identity, 
when I speak of our values, of our place in the world, of our attachment to the rule of law, I don’t forget 
the asset that our language and our culture constitute. Language is a way of thinking a way of acting’ 
(Hollande 2012j, emphasis added).192 In the case of the Malian crisis, a parliamentary report from March 
2012 considered it ‘vital to support the Francophonie, be it in the realm of education or by supporting 
francophone media’ (Assemblée Nationale 2012b, 97–98) in order to prevent AQIM from diffusing their 
ideology in northern Mali.         
 Cultural proximity influenced the perception and the subsequent decision-making process during the 
crisis in Mali in two ways. First, it allowed for the creation of a sentiment of belonging or relatedness. 
This relatedness in turn precipitated a sense of responsibility among French elites and thus facilitated 
                                                     
Paris qu’avec Moscou ou Washington. Si à l’inverse vous faites vos études à Washington ou à Yale ou à Harvard 
ou ailleurs, pareil vous avez plus de facilité d’être avec eux. La diplomatie d’influence commence avec la langue’.  
191  En leur disant que la Francophonie, ce n'est pas simplement une langue. C'est d'ailleurs une langue qui n'est 
pas celle de la France, qui est aussi celle de l'Afrique. Dans quelques années, c'est en Afrique que l'on parlera le 
plus le français. Et je vais m'adresser à eux pour leur dire que cette langue leur appartient mais qu'elle suppose 
aussi d'être une langue qui soit celle de valeurs, de principes. Et parmi ces valeurs et ces principes, il y a la 
démocratie, il y a bonne gouvernance, il y a la lutte contre toutes les corruptions’. 
192  ‘Enfin, lorsque j'évoque notre identité, lorsque je parle de nos valeurs, de notre place dans le monde, de notre 
attachement au droit, je n'oublie pas aussi l'atout de notre langue et de notre culture. La langue, c'est une manière 
de penser et aussi d'agir’.  
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the making of action.193 Second, cultural proximity and most notably the promotion of the French 
language were employed as soft-power tools by French foreign policy-makers. These tools were 
particularly effective within the francophone geo-linguistic space.  
 
Geographic and Human Proximity  
Closely related to the idea of a common geo-linguistic space is the assumption that the geographic 
vicinity between France/Europe and the African continent requires France/Europe to pay particular 
attention to its African neighbour. Geographic or geopolitical images constitute an essential component 
of the set of cognitive images that actors hold. In particular foreign policy-makers rely heavily on 
‘geographical ideas, images, and associated reasoning processes’ (Henrikson 2002, 440).  
France in its approach towards Africa—whatever else one may say—is influenced more by 
geography than by history. Africa is our neighbour, more than other continents that are farther away. 
It is a neighbour with many problems and which is experiencing a rapid demographic and luckily 
economic growth. But it is difficult to make accurate longer-term forecasts about Africa. If things 
get on the wrong course, this will have an impact on us.194      
 In a sense, the appearance of the crisis in Mali on France’s security agenda as well as the subsequent 
decision to intervene militarily were based on a ‘distance thinking’ (Henrikson 2002, 440) that 
approximated the Sahel and Europe. During the reasoning processes that precede any decision, 
geographical distances transform into subjective distances. These subjective or ‘attributional’ distances 
are dependent on a whole set of cultural, political, and historical ties between the entities in question 
(Henrikson 2002, 457–60). In several conversations I had with French decision-makers and civil 
servants, a terrorist threat stemming from the Sahel was ranked higher than equal threats stemming from 
Afghanistan or Syria. When I asked why, the answers nearly always involved a reference to the smaller 
distance between France (Europe) and Mali (Africa). These actors did not refer to objective distances 
(e.g. the distance by land between Paris and Bamako is 6137 km while the distance between Paris and 
                                                     
193  The concept of responsibility will be discussed in detail below.  
194  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘L’approche de la France vis-
à-vis de l’Afrique quoi qu’on dise on est très vite rattrapé par la géographie plus que par l’histoire. L’Afrique est 
notre voisin, plus que des continents plus éloignés. C’est un voisin qui a beaucoup de problèmes qui est en pleine 
croissance démographique, économique aussi, heureusement, mais on voit bien qu’il est difficile de faire des 




Damascus is only 4378km) but to an image that merges objective distances with perceived distances 
(Henrikson 2002, 443).195 Specific figures of speech in the French discourse emphasised the proximity 
of the two regions by discursively reducing the distance between them. Phrases like ‘…the constitution 
of a terrorist base…heavily armed on Europe’s doorsteps…’196 (Assemblée Nationale 2013a, 4781 
emphasis added) drew the Sahel region and the European continent closer together. The spatial distance 
was annihilated and the crisis not primarily portrayed as happening in the Sahel, but within the European 
neighbourhood. 
And we [Europeans] do not realise that today we live in a completely globalised system, where drug 
traffickers, the people of Al Qaeda, local claims…all this blends and can have repercussions on 
European territory, be it through immigration, or terrorist attacks. Africa is 14 kilometres from us. 
If you are in Spain, you are 14 kilometres away from all this. If you are in the north of Finland, of 
course this is another planet.197  
 Attributional distances are malleable and dependent on a series of cultural, historic, and societal 
factors. The shared Franco-African history and the cultural links discussed above are two factors that 
reduce the attributional distance between France and Africa, making actors neglect ‘the intervening 
obstacles of a sea, mountains, and the world’s largest [hot] desert’ (Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 2002, 
280). Migration plays a crucial role in shaping the perception of decision-makers regarding the 
attributional distances between states. The visibility of a given migrant community reduces the 
perception of distances among not only the migrants themselves but also among the actors of the host 
state. It contributes to the creation of a sentiment of familiarity with the situation on the ground. 
According to one advisor to the French president, Mali constituted ‘…a theatre of operations that the 
French know, because it is enough to go to the next café where they can talk to a Malian, who will tell 
                                                     
195  Decision-makers provided rather vague understandings of the actual distance using terms such as “a few miles” 
or “a couple of hundreds of kilometres”. Others, referring to the strait of Gibraltar, described a threat developing 
14 km from Europe’s borders. Eugene Staley (1941) found similar distortions in the perceptions of American 
policy-makers when comparing their understanding of distances between places located on the American continent 
and overseas locations.  
196  ‘En outre, ce qui se produisait au Nord-Mali depuis une bonne décennie et que nos forces ont découvert n’était 
rien d’autre que la constitution d’une base terroriste, d’un foyer terroriste puissamment armé aux portes de 
l’Europe, qui menaçait directement l’ensemble de la région sahélienne, mais, à terme, également le continent 
européen’. 
197  Pierre Lellouche, MP, interview by author, Paris, 7 February 2014. ‘Et on ne réalise pas qu’aujourd’hui on est 
dans un système complétement mondialisé, et où les trafiquants de drogues, les gens d’AQIM, les revendications 
locales, tout ça se mélange et peut avoir des prolongements sur le sol européen, par l’immigration, par les 
attentats. L’Afrique est à quatorze kilomètres de nous. Quand on est en Espagne on est quatorze kilomètres de tout 
ça. Quand on est au Nord de la Finlande évidemment c’est une autre planète’. 
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them “yes, we need to do it”. The Malian diaspora in France supported the intervention. The consensus 
in favour of this operation was very strong’.198 It can be argued that both the presence and the active role 
of the Malian community in France reinforced the visibility of the crisis. Estimations for the number of 
Malians living in France range from 80,000 to 120,000 persons, most of whom are installed in and 
around Paris, notably in the city of Montreuil (Seine Saint-Denis), a Parisian suburb also known as la 
deuxième ville malienne (Mali’s second largest city) (Gonin and Kotlok 2012; Vincent 2013). Related 
to this presence was the conviction that France needed to assume some sort of responsibility towards 
the Malian state. The presence of a Malian community on French territory partially blurred the lines 
between what is a foreign and what is a domestic issue, annihilated the distance between the two 
countries, and furthered the perceived necessity for action. As one interlocutor explained, ‘it is not only 
the geography but also the mixture of populations. If you do not deal with the terrorism in Mali one day 
[unfinished sentence]…we were absolutely convinced that it is easier for a French jihadist to go to Mali 
than to Syria’.199 The continuous although declining presence of French expatriates in Africa has a 
similar effect on the perception of distances. Taken together, the presence of Malian citizens in France 
and French citizens in Mali led to the cognisance that a radicalisation of the Malian state could not 
remain without consequences for France.200 This conviction reflects the increasing impact of the concept 
of retour en sécurité intérieure (impact on domestic security). This doctrine postulates that any action 
abroad needs to strengthen the nation’s domestic security (Livre Blanc 2008, 57). Vice versa, the concept 
also implies that the maintenance of France’s domestic security may require military actions abroad.
 Temporal, cultural, human, and geographic proximity are mutually reinforcing and contributed to an 
early recognition of the Malian crisis. They determine French perceptions of Africa in general and help 
                                                     
198  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Troisièmement, un théâtre d’opération 
que les Français connaissent, parce qu’il suffit qu’ils aillent au café et il y a un Malien avec qui ils peuvent en 
parler, et le Malien va leur dire « oui, il faut le faire ». La diaspora malienne ici était pour cette opération. Il y a 
avait un très fort consensus pour cette opération’.  
199  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Ce n’est pas seulement la géographie, 
c’est aussi le mélange des populations. Si on ne traite pas le terrorisme au Mali un jour…[phrase non complétée]. 
Nous étions absolument convaincus que c’est plus facile pour un djihadiste français d’aller au Mali, qu’en Syrie’. 
Malians constitute the largest group of sub-Saharan African immigrants in France. For 2010, the INED calculated 
that 99,011 immigrants of Malian origin live legally in France (Institut national d'études démographiques 2010). 
Compared to migrants originating from Algeria (1.1 million), Morocco (1 million), Portugal (890,000), Italy 
(452,000), Tunisia (384,000), Turkey (377,000), or Spain (357,000), the number of Malian migrants is rather small. 
However, Malians form a very active community within French society. 
200  Camille Grand, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, interview by author, Paris, 23 July 2013.   
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us understand decision-makers’ subjective reading of the situation in Mali. As illustrated in the Venn 
diagram below (fig. 6), the different dimensions of proximity constitute the grille d’analyse (analytical 
lens) through which French decision-makers perceived the African continent. To summarise the 
argument in the words of a policy advisor to the president, ‘It is our geography that comes through, and 
the proximity we share with the people of these [francophone African] countries, because of the 
diasporas, [and] due to our history and our presence we have quite a good knowledge of these 
countries’.201  
 
   
Figure 6. The four dimensions of Franco-African proximity 
Source: own elaboration  
 
The Military Experience and Expertise   
In addition to the different dimensions of proximity, France’s longstanding military experience and its 
continuous military presence in Africa explain why France was at the forefront of the crisis management 
from the very beginning. To date the French military remains the most deeply implemented external 
actor in Africa disposing of an unchallenged combat experience and sophisticated intelligence.202  
                                                     
201  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘C’est un peu notre géographie qui 
parle et notre proximité avec les gens de ces pays, du fait des diasporas, du fait de l’histoire et notre présence qui 
fait qu’on a une connaissance assez fine de ces pays’. 
202  As Fleury points out, the French Air Force had made its first experience in fighting mobile pick-up columns in 
the desert during operation Lamantin against Polisario rebels in Mauritania in 1977 (Fleury 2013, 15–20). Koepf 
(2013b, 287–89), drawing on Kisangani and Pickering’s (2009) international military intervention dataset, lists a 











In my opinion, there are two particularities regarding the Ministry of Defence. Its historical ties 
explain France’s military presence in Africa today. France maintains military bases and an important 
military presence in a certain number of places in Africa. Second, France has still a very fine-grained 
intelligence network in Africa. France can gather more intelligence in Africa than in Central Asia. 
And France has more information about francophone Africa than about Anglophone Africa. The 
knowledge networks (réseaux des connaissances) [and] our diplomatic presence account for the fact 
that we possess a lot of information. The weight of history, or what history gives us, is exactly that.203    
The so-called ‘Franco-African militarism’ that originated during colonial times remains an influential 
notion both among the French military and many of their francophone African counterparts 
(Charbonneau 2014, 616). It defines the self-understanding of most French officers and reinforces the 
conviction of the French Army possessing an unrivalled expertise in conflict resolutions on the African 
continent. This sentiment of expertise is not limited to the military alone, but politicians and diplomats 
share the understanding that their foreign policy apparatus in general and their Army in particular benefit 
from the greatest expertise on the region: ‘Why do the other Europeans not intervene? Because 
undoubtedly they do not have the same level of information. They do not have the capacity to intervene. 
They do not think they have a particular responsibility to intervene, like we do, because we are 
permanent member of the UN Security Council’.204       
 French officers continue to stress the common experiences with their African colleagues, which have 
created empathy and perpetuated the idea of a shared destiny that comes along with a sizeable degree of 
responsibility (Fleury 2013, 16). As Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Didier Castres puts it, ‘the majority 
of French military operations took place in Africa. We, the military, we all went to Africa when we were 
young. There is a sort of blending. We went to the same schools with the Africans. Many [African] 
officers visited schools in France. We have no problem understanding each other. We speak the same 
                                                     
including the interventions in Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Libya (2011), Mali (2013), and the CAR (2013), France has 
intervened in total 39 times since 1960.     
203  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘La particularité ici, 
s’agissant du ministère de la Défense, c’est à mon avis deux choses. Ses liens historiques font que la France est 
militairement présente en Afrique aujourd’hui. Elle a des bases en Afrique, elle a une présence militaire 
importante en Afrique dans un certain nombre d’endroits. Deuxièmement, elle a encore un réseau de 
renseignement très dense en Afrique. La France a plus de renseignement en Afrique qu’en Asie centrale. Et elle a 
plus de renseignement en Afrique francophone, qu’en Afrique anglophone. Les réseaux des connaissances, les 
présences diplomatiques font qu’on a beaucoup d’informations. Donc, le poids de l’histoire ou ce que l’histoire 
nous donne c’est ça’.  
204  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
‘Pourquoi les autres Européens n’interviennent pas? Parce qu’ils n’ont sans doute pas le même degré 
d’information, ils n’ont pas la même capacité d’intervenir. Ils ne se sentent pas avoir une responsabilité 
particulière d’intervenir, comme nous le pouvons avoir, parce qu’on est membre permanent au Conseil de Sécurité 
des Nations Unies’.  
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language. We feel connected’.205 This statement also shows how the different dimensions of proximity 
play into the military’s self-understanding and their conception of France’s role in Africa. In particular, 
the temporal proximity of a historically grown relationship, the human proximity in form of shared 
experiences, and the cultural proximity with a special reference to the shared language find entrance in 
the military’s mind-set.          
 Speaking of military expertise, one cannot ignore France’s permanent military presence in Africa 
(les forces prépositionées). The controversial issue of whether or not France should maintain a military 
presence in Africa in the 21st century has been subject to severe criticism and led to disagreements 
between politicians, civil servants, and the military. Information gathered during personal conversations 
with both civilians and the military confirm that the political and military mind-sets have not always 
been in accordance with each other on this point. ‘Following Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar and the 2008 
White Book on Defence, Sarkozy wanted us to abandon almost all bases in Africa. We did not follow 
this through. We understood that this was a mistake’.206 The military oppose the closure of French bases 
on the African continent for both pragmatic and identity reasons. As a policy advisor in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs emphasises, the total closure of all military bases in Africa would have produced an 
identity crisis among the military: ‘In some regards the military are turned towards the past. The day 
there are no longer any forces in Chad will be viewed negatively. The officers who have to implement 
this decision will themselves have spent some time in their early years in Chad and treasured very good 
memories’.207            
 The military – civilian divide is not the only schism that characterises this debate. Elected political 
representatives are very much of two minds on the question of France’s military presence in Africa. 
Proponents consider ‘the [presence of] French forces on African soil—in the long run—an undeniable 
                                                     
205  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author, Paris, 18 February 2014. ‘L’essentiel des opérations 
militaires de la France ont eu lieu en Afrique. Nous, les militaires, on est tous passé par l’Afrique quand on était 
jeune. Il y a une espèce de brassage. On était dans les mêmes écoles avec les Africains. Beaucoup d’officiers ont 
visité les écoles en France. On n’a aucune difficulté à se comprendre. On parle la même langue. On se sent lié’.  
206  Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014.  
‘Après le discours de Sarkozy à Dakar et dans le livre blanc 2008, Sarkozy a voulu qu’on quitte quasiment toutes 
les bases en Afrique. On n’est pas allé jusqu’au bout. On a compris que c’était une erreur’.  
207  Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘De la part des militaires il y a ce 
côté assez tourné vers le passé. Le jour où il y aura plus de militaire au Tchad ça sera ressenti négativement. Les 
officiers qui devront prendre la décision ou la mettre en œuvre, eux-mêmes auront passé du temps dans leurs 
jeunes années au Tchad et ont gardé des très bons souvenirs’. Chad has been chosen as an example of long-
standing Franco-African military relations. Since 1986, the French operation Epervier has been ongoing in Chad.  
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[strategic] leverage for [their] country’208 (Assemblée Nationale 2012b) while sceptics suggest to reduce 
France’s military presence in Africa to the minimum and to Europeanise the tasks that the forces 
prépositionnées currently fulfil (Mélonio 2011, 28–33). In particular, the president’s diplomatic advisors 
and several dominant players in the Quai d’Orsay have continuously advocated the withdrawal of 
French forces from Africa. To some extent even society at large is divided on the issue of France’s 
military presence in Africa. As one diplomat summarised bluntly, ‘if we were to close the military bases, 
fifty per cent of the French would say this is a stupidity and the other fifty per cent would say “well-
done”’.209            
 As we saw in Chapter One, the division of French society on the question of its military presence in 
Africa resulted in a policy that proclaimed the reduction of permanently stationed forces but at the same 
time continued to send troops to the continent as part of punctual French military interventions. The 
Hollande administration for its part proposed to further reduce the total number of troops stationed 
permanently in Africa but likewise considered it necessary to remain present on the continent for the 
time being. As an advisor to the president states, ‘the president’s idea is, instead of having a few big 
bases with 2,000 troops (hommes) each, to maintain a smaller presence with a few hundred troops 
(hommes) but in more countries. Of course, if the [respective] governments agree.’210 Adding to this, if 
one adds those forces that have been part of French interventions the total number of French soldiers in 
Africa has been kept stable over the past two decades.       
 With Djibouti, Dakar, Libreville, but also Abidjan, N’Djamena, Niamey, and Gao (as of 2013) the 
French military maintains several strategic entry points that allow French soldiers to be deployed to the 
majority of African states within hours. This solution seems to be generally accepted even among the 
sceptics of the idea of a French permanent presence in Africa, many of whom concede that 
‘fundamentally, it makes sense to have troops that remain operational in Africa. In fact, being 
operational in Africa means being operational everywhere. Before leaving for Afghanistan the fighter 
                                                     
208  ‘À cet égard, les forces françaises présentes, à long terme, sur le sol africain sont un indéniable atout pour 
notre pays’. 
209  Cyrille Le Déaut, policy advisor at the French embassy, interview by author, Paris, 30 August 2013. ‘En gros 
si on fermait ça, la moitié des Français dirait que c’est une connerie, l’autre moitié dirait bravo’. 
210  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘L’idée du Président c’est d’avoir 
moins de forces concentrées dans des grosses bases à 2000 hommes, mais d’avoir une présence plus petite avec 
quelques centaines d’hommes mais dans plus de pays. Évidemment si les gouvernements sont d’accords’.  
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planes trained in Chadian skies.’211 The Malian crisis was a successful test case for proponents of a 
continuous French military presence in Africa. Thanks to the forces prépositionées the French military 
was able to intervene within a few hours following the presidential decision. The military success of the 
operation in turn confirmed the advocates of a French military implementation in Africa. Future strategic 
planning will continue to count on the forces prépositionées. Although no troops were stationed in Mali 
itself before the launching of the Operation Serval, it was the Special Forces present in the neighbouring 
countries including Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire that were the first to intervene and 
to stop the advancing rebel fighters. Being present in the region also means being present in Mali, despite 
the lack of any defence agreement between the two countries.212    
 Though the French military is in favour of a strong and permanent military presence in Africa, they 
are no reckless warmongers. On the contrary, and in line with previous research, military staff, while 
more likely to perceive potential threats, ‘are risk averse in the actual use of force’. As Horowitz and 
Stam (2014, 532–33) put it, ‘military experience leads to a desire for greater armaments and 
preparedness, not a greater desire to use force’. Horowitz and Stam come to a different conclusion when 
analysing the military experience of political leaders and how it affects their likelihood to initiate war. 
They statistically demonstrate that leaders ‘with prior military experience but no combat experience are 
not just more likely to initiate low-level disputes, but wars’ (2014, 544). The three principal actors 
constituting the decisional triangle under the Hollande administration, Laurent Fabius, Jean-Yves Le 
Drian, and François Hollande himself all fulfil this criterion. They all have served in the armed forces, 
however without ever having had any combat experience. Foreign Minister Fabius was with the Navy 
in Toulon, Defence Minister Le Drian served in the 512th train regiment, and President Hollande in the 
71st engineer regiment. Statements in which François Hollande describes his military service as his 
                                                     
211 Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘Fondamentalement ça a du sens 
d’avoir des troupes qui reste opérationnel en Afrique. En réalité, être opérationnel en Afrique c’est être 
opérationnel un peu partout. Les avions de chasse qui s’entrainent au-dessus du Tchad, ils le faisaient avant 
d’aller en Afghanistan’. 
212  In 1985, a technical cooperation agreement was signed between Paris and Bamako that provided for the free 
delivery of a certain amount of French military equipment to Mali, the integration of French officers into the 
Malian Army, and the possibility for Malian soldiers to conduct internships in France. Articles 2a. 8a, and 11 of  
the Accord de coopération militaire technique entre le gouvernement de la République française et le 
gouvernement de la république du Mali, accord n°19850175 http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-
php/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___traites/home.html&VUE=m
ae_internet___traites&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN=1, accessed on 3 June 2014. 
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school of life to which he referred to repeatedly in his speeches leading up to Operation Serval (Courage 
2013), suggest that this experience shaped the president’s mind and to some extent favoured the decision 
of intervention.           
 Taken together, the different dimensions of proximity and the longstanding military experience in 
the sub-Saharan African region help explain why France was at the forefront of the problem solution of 
the Malian crisis from the start. It is against this backdrop that the increased awareness of French policy-
makers, France’s calls for a multilateral military intervention, and the drafting of operational plans for 
an intervention in Mali need to be understood. Having explained the emerging threat perception with 
reference to the knowledge structures that prevailed among French decision-makers, this chapter will 
now move on to look into the policy framing and diffusion. Although alert signs had been perceived for 
quite some time, the veritable cognitive shift away from the alert phase to the action stage occurred only 
in 2012.   
 
4.2.2 Framing and Diffusion  
By the time the Hollande administration assumed office in May 2012, few in the French political 
establishment would have denied the potential threat the Malian crisis represented. A report published 
by the French Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2012 concluded that the ‘factors of 
instability that are presently coming together in the Sahel are of such exceptional severity that they 
justify this region of the African continent being one of our highest priorities’ (Assemblée Nationale 
2012b, 97).213 Having reached the point where the French political elites’ intersubjectively shared 
psychological environment became increasingly permissive to an interpretation of the Malian crisis in 
terms of a high-level risk not only for the region, but also for France and Europe, the decision-making 
process entered its next stage: the policy-framing phase.      
 This stage of the decision-making process is characterised by increased discursive activity. From 
May to December 2012, the Hollande administration produced an average of forty official foreign policy 
                                                     
213  ‘Les facteurs d’instabilité qui se conjuguent aujourd’hui au Sahel sont d’une gravité exceptionnelle qui justifie 
que cette région du continent africain soit l’une de nos toutes premières priorités’.  
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declarations on the crisis in Mali per month. This represents a one hundred per cent increase compared 
to the period from January to May 2012. As shown in figure 7, a first peak in the production of official 
statements was reached in July 2012, and—after a sharp decline in August—followed by a steady 
increase over the following months.214 Put differently, the issue emerged as the top priority on France’s 
foreign policy agenda.  
 
 
Figure 7. Official foreign policy statements by members of the French government on the situation in Mali 
Source: own elaboration, based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs basedoc database 
 
This quantitative increase was accompanied by a qualitative shift. France’s official position moved away 
from the observation phase to a definition of the security problem followed by calls for its resolution. In 
order to understand how French decision-makers managed the leap from the definition of the problem 
to potential solutions, one needs to engage with those elements in the French discourse that are necessary 
for the framing and the diffusion of the policy issue.       
 The way problems are framed in the policy-making process is ‘crucial, especially at the agenda-
setting stage, since [their] definition and the identification of possible implications at that stage may 
affect the selection of solutions in the decision-making stage’ (Sicurelli 2008, 219). As mentioned in 
Chapter One, in situations of high complexity actors ‘apply heuristics that facilitate information 
processing and decision making’ (Weyland 2009, 408). Time pressure and limited human perception 
                                                     
214  The small number of official statements in August 2012 is due to the reduced activity of the French state during 
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and reaction capabilities with regards to complex situations require decision-makers to produce a 
simplified model of the situations they face. These models minimise doubts and provide the decision-
maker and the audience with a manageable list of options. Simplified models of reality are expressed in 
form of narratives that characterise the political discourse and become part of the decision-makers’ 
mental maps.           
 As stated above, the Malian crisis was given top priority by the Hollande administration from early 
on. Almost all questions related to the security situation in Mali were immediately handled at the peak 
of the decisional hierarchy where much of the framing occurred.215 Drawing on the information by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the military and the DGSE, the president’s advisors 
produced an evaluation of the situation, which prompted François Hollande to announce two weeks after 
his election that a military intervention would be necessary to solve the Malian crisis (Hollande 2012c). 
Such an intervention, however, was not to be led by France but should take the form of a pan-African 
peacekeeping force (AFISMA) under the direction of ECOWAS. Hollande was explicit about the fact 
that he did not intend to send French combat troops and firmly retained this position until December 
2012 (Notin 2014, 123). The European Union for its part should put in place a training mission to form 
a new generation of Malian soldiers (EUTM). AFISMA and EUTM were understood to be 
complimentary and together should constitute the riposte of an international community united in the 
fight against terrorism. France’s role was to support the deployment of the AFISMA and to act as the 
overall coordinator/facilitator (facilitateur) between the different national and international actors. This 
role was compatible with the non-interventionist stance the Hollande administration had chosen as 
trademark of its foreign policy. Both the determination to break with France’s past military activity on 
the African continent and the desire to produce a foreign policy that would be in coherence with the 
complete withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan forbade any references to a unilateral French 
intervention. To make intervention possible, the conflict in Mali was framed as a direct threat to the 
international security and in particular to the security of Europe.   
 
                                                     
215  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014.  
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The Definition of the Enemy  
While the Tuareg rebellion and the military putsch received considerable attention during the first half 
of 2012, these elements were increasingly disregarded in light of the rising prominence of the activities 
of AQIM, MUJAO, and Anṣār ad-Dīn. During a state visit of Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou 
in Paris, President Hollande indicated that the veritable threat of the crisis lies in ‘the implementation of 
terrorist groups in the north of Mali’. The unspoken understanding was that Islamist terrorism had to be 
overcome before any political solution could be envisaged. This is in contrast to the earlier official 
discourse, which put the political situation in the south at the core of the problem resolution (Ministère 
des Affaires Étrangères 2012b).216 While French decision-makers regarded the Malian crisis from a 
security, developmental, and political point of view, the three factors did not receive the same degrees 
of attention.            
 On several occasions the French government emphasised its strict non-negotiations policy with 
terrorist groups (Hollande 2012g), meaning that putting an end to the activities of AQIM, MUJAO, and 
Anṣār ad-Dīn would require some military action. In other words, decision-makers as of May 2012 and 
more particularly since October 2012 had started to securitise the Malian crisis by giving priority to a 
potential terrorist threat. On 4 October 2012, Gérard Araud argued, ‘we agree that we need a political 
solution, but we also need a military solution’ (Araud 2012c).217 This statement by the French 
representative at the UN depicts the moment when the French position shifted away from a political 
solution to a securitisation of the crisis.  
                                                     
216  Until July 2012, terrorism, rather than being considered the major problem, was framed as deriving from the 
general instability that prevailed in the country and across the region (Araud 2012b).  




Figure 8. The three components of the conflict resolution and their hierarchical order over time218  
Source: own elaboration 
 By looking at the importance each of the three components received within the discourse at any given 
stage of the decision-making process, one can trace a gradual development away from the political to a 
military solution during the second half of 2012. The developmental side of the conflict resolution came 
only to the fore in the aftermath of the intervention (fig. 8).    
 Giving preference to the security dimension seems to be at least partially in conflict with the more 
comprehensive approach the French administration was advocating publicly. As expressed in a great 
number of official statements and stipulated in UN resolution 2071 the political, 
developmental/humanitarian, and security dimensions of the crisis should be treated simultaneously and 
with equal importance (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2012c). This triangular approach builds on 
widely shared understanding according to which development and security are inextricably interlinked 
(Stern and Öjendal 2010). This view is neither new nor particular to the French government. In fact, the 
European Union’s policy agenda since the early 2000s has been informed by this ‘understanding of the 
links between development, good governance and security’ (Bagayoko-Penone and Gibert 2009, 790).
 Following 9/11, the debate on the GWoT advanced the view that ‘failed states [left unaddressed] are 
a potential safe haven for terrorists’ (Menkhaus 2004, 152). The development-security nexus implies 
that ‘policies towards security may become one part of development policy because in so far as they 
enhance security, they will contribute to development; and policies towards development may become 
                                                     
218  The triangular illustration draws on a metaphor introduced by Laurent Fabius (2012e).  
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part of security policies because enhanced development increases security’ (Stewart 2004, 2).219 If one 
adds to this picture the belief in good governance and the rule of law, one arrives at the interpretation 
advanced above according to which any strategy to resolve the Malian crisis must take into account the 
political, developmental, and security dimensions. The French vice-representative to the UN confirms 
the French elites’ belief in this three-dimensional approach when saying, ‘the elimination of conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism, requires the implementation not only of security policies but also 
of development and good-governance programmes. This can be done by, for example, putting in place 
regional strategies. This is the approach taken by the European Union, whose Sahel strategy has both a 
security track and a development track’ (Briens 2012).220 Although they may read like excerpts from a 
political science textbook, such statements are more than simply rhetorical devices to please the 
international community. During interviews in Paris, the great majority of interlocutors affirmed their 
firm belief in the security-development nexus, which guided their analytical lenses and thus their 
propositions towards the resolution of the crisis221 As one policy advisor stated, ‘I do not know how you 
analyse all this, but one thing that is certain is that there is no “either security or development”. These 
two are interrelated, and they need to advance together. To separate the two for the benefit of the one or 
the other is absurd. This doesn’t make any sense. This would create a succession of failures. The two 
must be linked…’.222         
 Indeed, the different elements were treated as being linked, but not necessarily considered as being 
of equal importance. After the security component had moved to the top of the discursive triangle the 
                                                     
219  It is worthy to note that the assumption that development must become part of security policies only truly 
applied after the French intervention, that is, during the post-conflict phase. Prior to that, the discourse indeed 
stressed the importance of development on security, but was contradicted by the applied practices. The suspension 
of development aid to Mali after the military coup in March 2012 suggests a discrepancy between discourse and 
practices.  
220  ‘…l’élimination des conditions propices à la propagation du terrorisme doit passer non seulement par la mise 
en place de politiques de sécurité mais également par la conduite de programmes en faveur du développement et 
de la bonne gouvernance’.   
221  It should be noted that this is not a specificity of France. Since the late 1990s the ‘EU’s increased attention to 
security issues has spilled over onto its development agenda’ (Broberg 2013, 680–81). One may even speak if not 
of a global so at least of a Western consensus regarding the idea of an existing nexus between development and 
security. 
222  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013. ‘Je ne sais pas comment 
vous analysez tout ça, mais il y a une chose qui est certaine, c'est qu'il n y a pas soit la sécurité, soit le 
développement. Il y a une vraie intégration des deux, et chacun doit avancer… ensemble. Dissocier les deux au 




identification and labelling of the threat begun. The identification of terrorism in the Sahel region as 
both the underlying cause of the Malian crisis and its most serious consequence enhanced the need for 
a military solution even further. The definition of terrorist groups, as advanced by the Hollande 
administration, encompassed insurgents, criminals, and any other fighting forces who did not dissociate 
themselves explicitly from an extremist Islamist ideology. Such a comprehensive definition of terrorism 
allowed the French government to paint a simple and straightforward picture of a ruthless enemy, as the 
following statement by Foreign Minister Fabius illustrates. While this definition did not necessarily 
account for the various fractions between the different insurgent movements, it allowed for the 
establishment of a narrative that would later justify the French intervention. 
Sometimes we call them kidnappers, which seems a neutral term. These are terrorists, people who 
do not hesitate to kill, who live off plunder and crime, who rape, who act outside all rules of 
humanity. This is what we are talking about. Thus, it is evident that when confronted with people of 
this kind, not only France but also the international community cannot accept their doings (Fabius 
2012j).223 
 Hollande when discussing the security situation in northern Mali argued that ‘this is no liberation 
movement, this is an external intervention that destabilises a country, Mali, and that brings forward 
groups whose vocation is an intervention that exceeds the Malian territory, and concerns Africa and may 
even affect other regions. This threat, it exists.’ (Hollande 2012b).224 Two points are worth noting. First, 
Hollande emphasised that the Malian conflict had to be understood in terms of a hostile, foreign 
intervention and not a domestic conflict. This is insofar important as the option of the Malian crisis 
being a domestic conflict or civil war would have foreclosed any French involvement at an early stage.
 As has been shown in Chapter One, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and against the 
backdrop of the severe criticism against France’s interventionism in Africa, French policy-makers 
adopted what they called a new approach to Africa’s security. Under the label ni ingérence ni 
indifference (neither inference, nor indifference) diplomats and the military ‘reviewed their strategy 
                                                     
223  ‘On dit parfois ravisseurs - c'est un mot qui apparaît neutre comme ça - il s'agit de terroristes, de gens qui 
n'hésitent pas à tuer, qui vivent de la rapine, du crime, qui violent, qui sont en dehors des règles de l'humanité. 
C'est de cela dont on parle. Il est donc évident que lorsqu'on a, en face de soi, des personnes de cet acabit, non 
pas seulement la France mais la communauté internationale ne peut pas admettre la poursuite de ces agissements’. 
224  ‘Il y a une menace d'installation de groupes terroristes au Nord Mali. Il ne s'agit pas d'un mouvement de 
libération, il y a une intervention extérieure qui déstabilise un pays, le Mali, et qui installe des groupes dont la 




towards the [African] continent’ (Merchet 1998). In line with the ongoing normalisation process that 
was intended to put an end to the old habits of the gendarme d’Afrique, Paris announced that the times 
when the French military were the first in line were over. In their discourses, French decision-makers 
defended the argument that Africa’s security had to be established by African countries themselves or 
under an international mandate. Most importantly, France was determined and in some cases legally 
bound to not get involved in conflicts over domestic political contestations of power. Thus, 
distinguishing between ‘terrorist groups’ and the MNLA was a way for the president to affirm coherence 
with previous policies and to emphasise that France was not taking part in a domestic conflict to stabilise 
the incumbent regime. Second, by evoking the possible implications on other regions, the president 
referred to the contagious effect the crisis could have on the entire West-African region and eventually 
even Europe (see below).          
 With the shift towards a more security orientated approach to the crisis-solution in Mali, comparisons 
with Afghanistan mushroomed in the official discourse. The neologism Sahelistan (Laurent 2013), used 
to describe a region of instability, vulnerable to drug trafficking and religious fanaticism, found entrance 
into the public discourse where it subsequently gained increasing popularity. The most ardent advocate 
and user of this term was Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (2012h): ‘What is about to develop in the 
north of Mali represents a risk for everyone. I am frequently referring to Sahelistan, that is, the 
equivalent of Afghanistan in the Sahel. Indeed, you are confronted with a good number of people who 
are terrorists, who have many weapons, lots of money, and who kidnap people. All this adds to the drug 
trafficking’ (Fabius 2012l). 225         
 The parallels that were drawn between Afghanistan and the situation in Mali served two specific 
purposes.226 First, the use of this analogy was motivated by the necessity to produce a simplified 
narrative of the situation and to create the impression of facing a familiar situation. Referring to 
Afghanistan rendered a complex situation more comprehensible to the French actors themselves as well 
as to the recipients of the official discourse, that is, domestic and international audiences. Decision-
                                                     
225  ‘Ce qui est en train de se développer au nord-Mali représente un risque pour tout le monde. Moi je parle 
souvent de «Sahelistan» c'est-à-dire l'équivalent de l'Afghanistan au Sahel. En effet, vous avez là des personnes 
assez nombreuses qui sont des terroristes qui ont beaucoup d'armes, beaucoup d'argent et qui font des prises 
d'otages. Tout cela se mêle aux trafics de drogue’. 
226  Others described Mali as another Somalia. 
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makers confronted with new situations whose outcomes are yet unknown rely on comparisons with what 
they perceive to be similar cases from the past to make sense of current challenges and overcome 
uncertainty. In his seminal work Analogies at War, Khong (1992, 252–53) shows that analogies 
‘perform diagnostic or inferential tasks’ and affect decision outcomes by making ‘certain options more 
attractive and others less so’. François Hollande’s (2013p) statement that ‘history…teaches us always 
what we have to do tomorrow’ is suggestive of the important role historical analogies play during the 
decision-making process.227 According to Khong (1992, 253), analogies ‘matter most during the 
selection and rejection of policy options, and they exert their impact by influencing the assessments and 
evaluations that policy-makers must make in order to choose between alternative options’. Moreover, 
analogies are also used to justify and advocate the chosen policy options (1992, 252). In the extract cited 
above, Fabius (2012h) proposes an easily understandable narrative that is free of doubts and that 
identifies a very specific threat: terrorism. Moving the observed facts into the realm of the familiar is a 
means to exude confidence among the audience. By using historical analogies, decision-makers 
implicitly transmit the message of “we recognise the danger; we know how to deal with it”.  
 Second, the Afghanistan analogy portrayed a “high-risk” environment and hinted to the implications 
the implementation of terrorist elements in the Sahel may have for the entire international community 
and in particular for Europe. As one observer of French politics noted, ‘The two most serious [foreign 
policy] crises for us are Syria and Mali [but] Mali is top of the list. In Mali we have an Afghanistan, a 
Somalia being created in the North. And the target is not the US: it is France’ (quoted in Usher 2012). 
Hence, the Afghanistan analogy allowed not only for drawing parallels between different situations in 
order to allow for their comprehension but also helped to predict possible negative consequences of a 
non-intervention. The view prevailed among the president’s advisors that Mali, should it fall into the 
hands of extremists, would become a rear base for terrorists to prepare attacks on Europe. As one advisor 
put it, ‘We saw how the 11 September attacks had been organised from Afghanistan’.228 In October, 
Jean-Yves Le Drian used the same analogy to argue for a timely intervention: ‘When we intervened in 
Afghanistan in 2001, it was in the aftermath of the 09/11 attacks. Let us not wait that such a tragedy 
                                                     
227  ‘…l'histoire qui nous renseigne toujours sur ce que nous avons à faire pour demain’. 
228  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. ‘On a 
bien vu comment depuis l’Afghanistan ont été organisés les attentats du 11 septembre’.  
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repeats itself’ (Le Drian 2012c).229       
 During autumn 2012, references to a terrorist threat and its implications on France’s national security 
became increasingly explicit. President Hollande, speaking in front of the Senegalese National 
Assembly, defined the crisis in Mali as a direct attack on France.  
But are we here to analyse, to try to understand, or to take our responsibilities? The ongoing horrors 
cannot continue. How can we accept all these profaned mausoleums, these chopped off hands, these 
raped women? How can we tolerate that children are enrolled by the militia, that terrorists come to 
this region to then spread their terror elsewhere? France, I am saying it clearly, via its expatriates in 
this region, was directly attacked.230 (Hollande 2012k) 
 References to the atrocities committed by those groups labelled as terrorists included rape, 
decapitation, religious fundamentalism, the recruiting of child soldiers, and the destruction of cultural 
sites, in particular the mausoleums in Timbuktu (Fabius 2012a). Beyond the mere reporting of 
observable facts, which may be excerpt from a somewhat more complex situation, these eerie 
descriptions of the atrocities committed in northern Mali together with the repeated references to 
Afghanistan emphasised the need for immediate action.231 The use of the Sahelistan, or as some dub it, 
Afrighanistan narrative bears a considerable risk insofar as it amplifies a threat by contributing to its 
construction (Keenan 2013). Rekawek (2014, 19) brings it to the point when arguing that the Western 
narrative of,  
Afghani-style terrorist statelets proliferating in Africa and threatening not only their 
immediate neighbours but also the West….fails to account for the far less straightforward 
reality on the ground…. [and] risks giving the Sahel terrorist too much publicity – and by 
extension credibility – and creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of the impending triumph of 
global jihadism in the southern neighbourhood of the European Union.  
                                                     
229  ‘Quand nous sommes intervenus en Afghanistan en 2001, c'était au lendemain des attaques du 11 Septembre. 
N'attendons pas qu'un tel drame se reproduise pour agir’.  
230  ‘Mais sommes-nous là pour faire des analyses, pour essayer de comprendre, ou pour prendre nos 
responsabilités ? Les horreurs actuelles ne peuvent plus se poursuivre. Comment accepter ces mausolées profanés, 
ces mains coupées, ces femmes violées ? Comment tolérer que des enfants puissent être enrôlés de force par des 
milices, que des terroristes viennent dans cette région pour ensuite semer la terreur ailleurs ? La France, je l'ai 
dit aussi, à travers ses ressortissants dans cette région, a été attaquée et agressée’. 
231  The Afghanistan analogy also affected the conduct of the military operations. As Colonel Michel Goya points 
out, the military intervention was guided by the principle of avoiding the mistakes committed during the campaign 
in Afghanistan. Consequently, all operational planning concentrated on a short military intervention. Any sort of 
stalemate that would keep the French Army for a long time in a state of guerrilla warfare had to be avoided. Michel 
Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
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 In the same speech, President Hollande outlined his understanding of the scope of the conflict and 
explained in front of a principally West African audience why not only France but the entire European 
Union should be concerned with the developments in the Sahara. The president affirmed, ‘it is not only 
your security threatened [by the Malian crisis], but also ours, the security of Europe, a Europe which 
knows the invaluable importance of peace…this Europe that made and still makes peace (fait la paix), 
this Europe also needs to make and to want peace in Africa every time there is a conflict or terrorism’ 
(Hollande 2012k).232 By framing Mali’s security as a prolongation of Europe’s security, the president 
subscribed to the idea of Europe and Africa being two interrelated entities.  
 
A Threat to Europe?  
References to Europe’s security were not simply neutral observations, but served a specific purpose. By 
framing the Malian crisis as a ‘danger not only to Mali, but to the whole of Africa and Europe’ (Fabius 
2012o), France’s European partners were alerted to the severity of the situation and encouraged to 
participate in the conflict resolution. In June 2012, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius affirmed his 
commitment to ‘…make [his] colleagues sensitive to this conflict of which one speaks less than of other 
conflicts, but which has the potential to severely degenerate, and this only a few hundreds of kilometres 
from us’ (Fabius 2012b).233 Over the course of the second half of 2012, these statements multiplied and 
became increasingly affirmative. In fact, the framing of the Malian conflict in terms of a potential threat 
to Europe is the second most frequently cited concept that emerged from the qualitative analysis 
conducted for this study. At the European Council on September 26-27 2012, Defence Minister Jean-
Yves Le Drian urged his colleagues to ‘…concretise a European mission to support ECOWAS and the 
central government in Bamako in stabilising Mali to avoid the creation of a sanctuary for terrorists’ 
                                                     
232  ‘C'est votre sécurité qui est en jeu, c'est aussi la nôtre, celle de l'Europe qui connait la valeur inestimable de 
la paix pour laquelle elle a obtenu aujourd'hui même le Prix Nobel. Cette Europe qui a fait la paix, qui fait la 
paix, cette Europe, elle doit aussi faire la paix et vouloir la paix en Afrique chaque fois qu'il y a un conflit et du 
terrorisme’.  
233  ‘Mais je veux - je vais le faire dans un instant - sensibiliser mes collègues parce que c'est un conflit dont on 
parle moins que d'autres conflits mais qui peut dégénérer de façon grave et même très grave, et ceci à quelques 
centaines de kilomètres de chez nous’. 
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(Ambassade de France à Nicosie 2012).234 In October, Le Drian became more explicit about the target 
and the consequences of the terrorist threat by saying ‘their aim is to take action beyond the borders of 
the Malian state to hit Europe. If we do not act, we will be the victims. Protecting Mali’s sovereignty 
will guarantee Europe’s security’ (Le Drian 2012b).235 Once again, a still unknown outcome was 
presented as an easily comprehendible truism.       
 Although the statements above constituted a means of attracting Europe’s interest for the situation in 
Mali,236 they were more than simply ‘a convenient narrative which benefits both the propaganda 
machine of Islamists and the calls of those in the West who support military action’, as some pundits 
seem to suggest (Hellmich 2013). Instead, they were inspired by a real fear that ‘a state the size of Mali 
that falls for terrorism is a state that then will prepare attacks thousands of kilometres beyond its 
borders’.237 As one presidential advisor pointed out, ‘what is happening in the Sahel region—
geographically speaking—is not very far from us. This is our neighbourhood. If the problems are not 
dealt with on site, in a couple of years they will be here with us [in Europe]’.238 Adding to this, a genuine 
conviction existed ‘among French political elites that their vision of Europe [’s involvement in Africa] 
was what was best for their partners’ (Treacher 2003, 53). This conviction continues to influence 
France’s understanding of a Common Security and Defence Policy and results in the French government 
remaining the strongest supporter of a proactive European Defence policy.   
 The decision-makers I interviewed confirmed unanimously that ahead of the French military 
intervention they had been seriously worried about an escalation of the Malian crisis because of the 
potential implications such an outcome could have had on the security of France and Europe. A report 
published by the French Senate corroborates these findings when arguing, ‘Africa is too close, both in 
                                                     
234  ‘À cette occasion, Jean-Yves Le Drian a défendu la concrétisation d’un format européen de soutien à la 
CEDEAO et au gouvernement de Bamako pour stabiliser le Mali et éviter la formation d’un nouveau sanctuaire 
terroriste’. 
235  ‘Leur objectif consiste à agir au-delà des frontières du Mali pour frapper l’Europe. Si nous ne prenons pas de 
mesure, nous en serons victimes. Préserver l’intégrité du Mali c’est garantir la sécurité de l’Europe’. 
236  General Eric Bonnemaison, director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 27 August 2013.  
237  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
‘C’est une menace régionale avec un risque pour la sécurité de l’Europe, parce qu’un État qui basculerait dans 
le terrorisme à l’échelle du Mali, c’est un état qui pourrait ensuite préparer des attentats à des milliers de 
kilomètres de là’.  
238  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘…ce qui se passe dans la région du 
Sahel n’est pas très éloigné géographiquement de nous. C’est vraiment notre voisinage. Si les problèmes ne sont 
pas traités sur place dans quelques années ils seront chez nous’. 
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terms of geography as well as population (en termes de population), for Europe not to be concerned 
when observing the multiplication of “fragile states” in that region’ (Sénat 2013, 475).239 The view that 
a state collapse in Mali inevitably will lead to terrorist attacks on European soil can be explained by 
looking at France’s painful experience with terrorism during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and the 
notion of geographical proximity. Both make French decision-makers’ feel particularly vulnerable.240 It 
is noteworthy that this view is not limited to the political field but shared across the French society. A 
good number of voices from academia and the media confirmed the potential threat Mali constituted for 
the entire European continent (Laïdi 2013; Lasserre and Oberlé 2013, 48; 220-221; Laurent 2013, 319).
 Similar to the domino theory during the Cold War, French actors referred to a proliferation of the 
terrorist threat across the West-African region, which by then had become an inevitable truism: 
‘Between a proven risk and a hypothetical risk, one needs first resolve the proven risk. And today this 
risk is the presence of AQIM in northern Mali. To do nothing means taking the risk that AQIM will 
contaminate—via a spill over—other countries in that region and even more than today become a threat 
to France, its expatriates, and interests’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2012e).241 Fabius repeatedly 
emphasised that ‘terrorism is not something that stops at any given border. Mali is divided in two, and 
this can affect the neighbouring countries, that is, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Senegal, and Côte 
d’Ivoire; and even the entire African continent’ (Fabius 2012n).242 Interviews at the Ministry of Defence 
and the Élysée confirmed that this domino theory of terrorism was also shared by these two decision-
units.243 When the French president later had to weigh the costs and benefits of a unilateral strike a few 
months later, the idea of a likely proliferation of the terrorist threat was on the side of the latter. A 
personal advisor of Foreign Minister Le Drian describes France’s interest for the region as follows: 
It [France] has always been interested [in the region], however for different reasons, sometimes to 
interfere in the political process, sometimes to not interfere anymore, and sometimes―and this is 
                                                     
239  ‘L’Afrique est trop proche, tant au sens géographique qu’en termes de population, de l’Europe pour que l’on 
puisse y voir se multiplier des « États fragiles » sans que l’Europe ne soit directement concernée’. 
240  Adding to this, AQIM had declared France its archenemy, reinforcing concerns in Paris. 
241  ‘Entre un risque avéré et un risque hypothétique, il faut déjà régler le risque avéré. Et le risque avéré 
aujourd'hui c'est la présence d'AQMI au Nord Mali. Ne rien faire, c'est prendre le risque de voir AQMI, par un 
effet de contagion, contaminer d'autres pays de cette région et menacer plus encore qu'elles ne le font déjà 
aujourd'hui la France, ses ressortissants et ses intérêts’. 
242  ‘…le terrorisme ce n'est pas quelque chose qui s'arrête à telle ou telle frontière. Le Mali est coupé en deux et 
cela peut toucher les pays voisins, c'est-à-dire le Niger, le Burkina Faso, la Mauritanie, le Sénégal et la Côte 
d'Ivoire ; et puis l'ensemble des pays d'Afrique’. 
243  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
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the case of François Hollande―to help those states to build their own security system on solid 
pillars, because if one fragile state in the heart of Africa [referring to West Africa] falls, it is the 
entire Sahel region that falls.244   
 The most explicit expression of a sentiment of interrelatedness between Africa and Europe in the 
French political discourse can be found in the concept of Eurafrique. Eurafrique ‘is a body of thought, 
originating in the colonial period, according to which the fate of Europe and Africa is seen as being 
naturally and inextricably linked at the political, economic, social, and cultural levels’ (Martin 1982, 
222). This geopolitical vision is biased towards francophone Africa and views France as the 
relationship’s pièce maîtresse (centrepiece) (Liniger-Goumaz 1972, 39). In his critique of Western 
colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa, Guy Martin (1982, 226) dates the emergence of the term 
Eurafrique back to the beginning of the 20th century and attributes its initial diffusion to journalists, 
writers, businessmen, and politicians close to the colonial lobby, including the French Prime Minister 
Joseph Caillaux and the political scientist Eugène Guernier.245 In a series of papers published in the 
1930s, Eugène Guernier (1933) elaborated on the geographical complementarity of the African and 
European continents (Dramé and Saul 2004, 97), which he and other early Eurafricanists understood as 
natural and indispensable, and therefore desirable (Liniger-Goumaz 1972, 26). Throughout the Third 
Republic, Africa was perceived as a natural extension of Europe, and together the two continents would 
create a ‘viable autonomous entity’ (Liniger-Goumaz 1972, 278). Former Prime Minister Joseph 
Caillaux was convinced that ‘Europe…can’t save itself and its civilisation…if it doesn’t unite 
itself…with the vast dark continent, which nature has placed under its [Europe’s] dominance’ (quoted 
in Guernier 1933, 91). After the Second World War Eurafrique became a means that allowed political 
elites to preserve France’s Great Power status without having to formally hold on to the old Empire, 
which by then had already entered the process of decolonisation (Dramé and Saul 2004, 96–97; Treacher 
                                                     
244  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘Elle s’y était tout le 
temps intéressée, mais pour des raisons différentes, parfois pour s’ingérer dans le processus politique, parfois 
pour ne plus du tout s’y ingérer, et puis parfois pour aider ces états là―c’est le cas de François Hollande―à 
bâtir leurs systèmes de sécurité sur des piliers solides, parce qu’un état faible au cœur de l’Afrique (l’Afrique du 
nord, le Sahel) c’est tout le Sahel qui tombe’.  
245  Dramé and Saul (2004, 96–97) locate the emergence of the concept at a slightly earlier point in time: Journalists 
and geographers are said to have already employed the term during the second half of the 19th century. The authors 
agree, however, that the first systematic formulation of the concept occurred during the 1930s, most notably 
through the writings of Henry de Jouvenel and Eugène Guernier. 
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2003, 122). During the first phase of the Cold War and conditioned by the technological advancements 
in modern weaponry—notably by the emergence of long-distance missiles—Africa gained strategic 
importance. Providing an area of retreat and a position from where a counter-charge could be launched, 
the African continent was considered to strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities. Similar to the Monroe 
Doctrine, the Eurafrican space should demarcate a European zone of influence.    
 After having fallen into oblivion for almost three decades, the term reached new prominence by the 
mid-1990s. In light of the criticism that emerged against the Françafrique system, Europe ‘offered both 
material and moral resources’ (Charbonneau 2014, 620) to renew the French–African relationship. 
Building on the perceived interrelatedness between the two continents, Europe soon became the 
preferred multilateral framework of reference for French activism in its former colonies. As 
Charbonneau (2008a, 279) points out, ‘the EU has usually represented the hope of a new type of 
interventionism, one that is multilateral and multinational and thus, by definition, one that is more 
legitimate and less susceptible of accusations of neo-colonialism’.246 In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
the view prevailed that Europe could increase France’s power in the world.247 For Yates (2012, 332) 
‘Europe permits France to exercise an influence corresponding fairly well to its geostrategic ambitions. 
As a small world power but a large European power, France can hope to find in the EU a relay, a way 
of accessing an international role that it refuses to renounce’. Succeeding French governments have 
reached out for Europe to amplify France’s impact in Africa. Following the initial euphoria in the early 
2000s, French officials became more sceptical when realising that the operationalisation of EUFOR 
Chad and European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger did not reflect the approach 
France intended to advance. Additionally, Europe, whilst acquiring increasing competences on the 
African continent, did not help to increase France’s own influence in the world.248 Consequently, the 
idea of legitimisation replaced the amplification of power as the principal motivation of France’s strive 
                                                     
246  Charbonneau (2008a) argues that references to Europe do not make France’s defence policy in Africa any more 
legitimate. For Charbonneau the French rhetoric may have changed since Maastricht, however the practices on the 
ground have not. For Charbonneau French (neo-)colonial tradition and EU multilateralism are not incompatible. 
Elsewhere, Charbonneau criticises European peacekeeping operations in Africa for being an expression of a 
Europeanised French hegemony (Charbonneau 2008b, 119; Charbonneau 2008a) and states ‘the gendarme has 
simply put on a cloak of multilateral humanitarianism’ (2008a, 293).  
247  Interview with senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 18 July 2013. 
248  Interview with senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 18 July 2013. 
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for a common European approach (Charbonneau 2008a).249     
 The end of the Cold War had made Europe become increasingly active in its Eastern neighbourhood 
and aroused the fear among French politicians and diplomats that this strategic reorientation would make 
Africa sink into oblivion. No one expressed this fear more eloquently than former Minister of 
Cooperation Jacques Pelletier when saying, ‘The wind from the east shook the coconut palms.’250 This 
suspicion was not aided by the fact that the EU—with exception of the Balkan region, the participation 
in the Afghanistan war, and small-scale peacekeeping operations—has been largely absent from 
international security matters (Larsen 2002, 294–95). French policy-makers have considered it their 
mission to convince their European partners of the strategic importance of the African continent. To 
pitch the idea of a common defence and security strategy in Africa to other European states, French 
decision-makers have relied on a double-edged discourse that emphasises simultaneously the risks and 
benefits Europe has to expect from the region (Livre Blanc 2013, 56). Policy-makers referred to Africa’s 
future economic potential and the elevated terrorist threat almost in the same breath.  
However, these interdependencies do not only concern the risks and threats, but in themselves 
constitute opportunities. The demographic explosion and Africa’s economic take-off are good news 
for Europe as well as for the emerging countries that invest in Africa massively. In a world where 
the centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia, can Europe and France find the driving force of their 
future growth in Africa?  (Sénat 2013, 25)251 
 Some authors interpreted this double-sided discourse of risks and opportunities as an expression of 
France’s Africa policy being in a ‘state of confusion’ (Bovcon 2013). In contrast I would argue that this 
make-or-break attitude is in fact a well-elaborated strategy that is intended to convince even the most 
reluctant European partner of the advantages of a European approach to the continent. Former President 
Sarkozy’s claim to renew the French-African relationship by breaking from the past did not stop the 
former president from advocating a Eurafrican alliance. On the contrary, in his much criticised speech 
                                                     
249  The pro-European attitude in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs decreased to some extent and made 
room for scepticism, in particular regarding the operational level, following the EUFOR Chad/CAR and EUCAP 
Niger missions in 2008, which were considered as partial failures; Interview with senior civil servant at the Foreign 
Ministry, Paris, 18 July 2013. 
250  ‘Le vent de l’Est secoue les cocotiers’ (Kroslak 2004, 67).      
251  ‘Mais ces interdépendances ne concernent pas seulement les risques et les menaces, elles portent en elles des 
opportunités. L’explosion démographique et le décollage économique de l’Afrique sont une bonne nouvelle pour 
l’Europe comme pour les pays émergents qui y investissent massivement. Dans un monde dont le centre de gravité 
est en train de se déplacer vers l’Asie, l’Europe et la France peuvent‐elles éventuellement trouver dans l’Afrique 
un moteur de leur croissance future ?’ 
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at the University of Dakar in July 2007,252 Sarkozy made a case for a Eurafrican Union: ‘Together with 
Africa, France wants to herald the arrival of Eurafrique, this grand common destiny that awaits both 
Europe and Africa’ (Sarkozy 2007). Similar to early Eurafricanists in the 1930s, the former president 
linked Europe’s economic and political future to the emergence of the African continent. Comparable 
ideas can be found across the entire political spectrum. In her 2011 book Pour une Europe juste, 
Élisabeth Guigou, socialist MP and chairwoman of the Commission of Foreign Affairs in the French 
National Assembly, writes that Europe—in light of the recent financial crisis—needs to unite itself with 
the Mediterranean and the sub-Saharan African regions in order to maintain prosperity and wealth. 
Guigou (2011, 168) fears Europe is falling prey to power struggles between the United States and 
China.253 The only way for Europe to avoid such a fate lies in its capability of building a Euro-
Mediterranean and, in the long term, a Euro-African union (62, 168; see also Livre Blanc 2013, 40). If 
her thesis bears resemblance to the traditional concept of Eurafrique, so too does her reasoning. Guigou 
evokes the double-proximity—geographical and human (170)—that obliges the two regions to reinforce 
their mutual ties. Africa and Europe are said to complement each other in the realms of agriculture (62), 
economy (62-4), and—last but not least—demography (68; see also Aubry 2011).   
 François Hollande, like his predecessor, having promised a rupture with the colonial past, remains 
committed to the Eurafrican idea. For the president, the Mediterranean Sea is not a dividing but a 
unifying factor that imposes common and shared responsibilities on Europe and its southern neighbours 
(Hollande 2012a). On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the African Union in May 2013, Hollande 
proclaimed that he had come to Addis Abeba to speak of ‘Africa’s future, the future of the relation 
between France, Europe and Africa, that is, the future of the world’ (Hollande 2013i).254 By equating 
the future of the French–African relationship with the future of the Euro-African relationship and by 
extension the future of the world, Hollande inferred from the close and ‘intimate’ relationship that 
                                                     
252  This speech, which was intended to advocate a new approach to the French-African relationship, ended up 
being an example of extremely bad communication. In front of a Senegalese audience, the President not only 
absolved colonialism of most of its sins, but also proclaimed that the ‘African Man’ has not engaged with his own 
history and continues to live according to the seasons of the year, which forecloses any possibility of progress 
(Sarkozy 2007).   
253  Similarities exist with an argument made earlier by Pierre Nord. Nord, author of L'Eurafrique notre dernière 
chance (1955), saw Europe as being caught between the US and the USSR.  
254 ‘Mais aujourd'hui ma présence ici est pour évoquer l'avenir, l'avenir de l'Afrique, l'avenir de la relation 
entre la France, l'Europe et l'Afrique, et donc l'avenir du monde‘. 
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France had maintained with many African countries (Hollande 2013i) that also Europe is closely linked 
to Africa. This sort of extrapolation constituted a mental shortcut of the French foreign policy elite that 
influenced their threat perceptions and policy choices throughout the decision-making process.  
 At the European Council on 13-14 December 2012 Fabius and Le Drian urged their colleagues to 
take the Malian threat seriously and portrayed it as a critical juncture towards the establishment of a 
Europe de la Défense. They concluded their speeches by affirming that ‘in a strategic context that is 
characterised by the emergence of new threats, France is convinced that the European Union has to 
reinforce its contributions to international security in its neighbourhood and beyond. This conviction 
contributes to France’s European ambition’ (Le Drian and Fabius 2012a).255 During all phases of the 
Malian crisis and the subsequent intervention, French politicians called upon Europe to take a more 
active position allowing for a quicker resolution of the conflict. French elites were convinced that their 
European partners needed to be mobilised, to provide military, humanitarian, and development 
assistance (Fabius 2013d, 4).         
 Given the great expectations on the part of French diplomats and the Élysée concerning a European 
approach to the crisis resolution, it is no surprise that French decision-makers became increasingly 
frustrated with Europe once they realised that they could not convince other member states of the 
seriousness of the situation in Mali (Marchal 2013a, 488). Notwithstanding the implementation of the 
2007 EU Sahel Strategy, which French security experts considered the result of their successful 
lobbying,256 the general impression that prevailed in Paris was that of a disinterested and largely absent 
Europe. Defence Minister Le Drian stated in front of Parliament, ‘We stand in front of the necessity of 
reviving l’Europe de la Défense, which today is at a standstill. Despite the diminution of America’s 
engagement in Europe, the risks—be it old risks or new risks—remain very high, in particular those 
coming from the Sahel. Unfortunately not all our partners share this point of view’ (Assemblée Nationale 
2012a, 7).           
 While some authors explain Europe’s reluctance by blaming French elites’ arrogance and their failure 
                                                     
255  ‘Dans un contexte stratégique caractérisé par l'émergence de nouvelles menaces, la France est convaincue 
que l'Union européenne doit apporter une contribution renforcée à la sécurité internationale, dans son voisinage 
et au-delà. Cette conviction participe de l'ambition européenne de la France’.  
256  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013.  
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‘to produce evidence they claimed to have about the threat Mali represented’ (Marchal 2013a, 491), 
French decision-makers hold the lack of a common European vision responsible for Europe’s disinterest. 
In particular, among the military the lack of a common strategic culture is understood as the principal 
factor preventing successful European military interventions.257 Against this backdrop, French decision-
makers soon arrived at the conclusion that the instability in Mali remains a French issue. As one of Le 
Drian’s policy advisors put it bluntly, ‘this is first of all a French issue. With the exception of Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and Belgium, go and try to get the rest of Europe interested in Africa, well good luck. The 
Poles do not give a toss; neither do the Scandinavians or the rest of Eastern Europe. They do not have 
the means or the desire’.258 French actors were convinced that their European partners ignored the 
existing threat. ‘This zone is little-known by other Europeans. I was flabbergasted [when I assisted at a 
European Council meeting on terrorism two years ago]. We worked on the terrorist risk in Europe, but 
there was nothing about terrorism in the Sahel…They did not even realise what was happening in the 
Sahel, nor did they realise the objective threat that existed in this region’.259 These complaints are 
directed against both European member states and the EU as a supranational institution. The 
parliamentary report on the security situation in the Sahel cited above affirms that it ‘is undeniable that 
the European Union, in contrast to some of its members like France, was slow to take concrete measures 
to fight against AQIM and to work on the recovery of the security in the Sahel’ (Assemblée Nationale 
2012b, 75).260           
 In summary, French elites continued to stress the necessity of a common European approach to 
Africa’s security, but at the same time they were aware of its limits and remained sceptical with regard 
to the feasibility of a European solution in the near future. This scepticism played an important role 
during the decisional phase in early January, as shall be seen below. At the same time, the Hollande 
administration understood it as its task to keep France’s European partners interested in the Sahel region 
                                                     
257  Michel Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
258  Interview with a personal advisor to the Minister of Defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘…c’est d’abord une 
question française. Allez intéresser le reste de l’Europe à l’exception de l’Allemagne, de l’Italie, de l’Espagne, de 
la Belgique en Afrique bon courage. Les Polonais s’en foutent, les Scandinaves s’en foutent, l’Europe de l’Est 
s’en fout et les autres n’ont pas les moyens ni l’envie’. 
259  Interview with a project officer at Francophonie organisation, Paris, 01 October 2013.  
260  ‘…il est indéniable que l’Union européenne, contrairement à quelques-uns de ses membres, comme la France, 




and to help to advance the idea of l’Europe de la Défense. As Le Drian argued in summer 2012, ‘First, 
we need to recreate the spirit. It does not exist anymore. Then, we need to think about the concrete 
implementation of a couple of specific points....We do not want some kind of abandonment. If we do 
not take the initiative, who else will?’261 (Le Drian 2012a). However, Europe was not the only playing 
field where French decision-makers tried to promote a multilateral solution to the Malian crisis. From 
May to December 2012, the Hollande administration collaborated with Mali’s neighbours, the African 
Union, ECOWAS, and France’s traditional partners in the region to find an African solution to the crisis 
in Mali.  
 
Africanisation of Africa’s Security 
From the beginning of its mandate, the Hollande administration campaigned for the deployment of an 
African peacekeeping operation to Mali. Drafted on France’s initiative, UN resolutions 2056, 2071, and 
2085 provided the legal framework for the deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping force coordinated 
by ECOWAS.262 With the adoption of UN resolution 2085 the way for the African-led International 
Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) seemed to be paved. The resolutions illustrate France’s 
commitment to the doctrine of “African solutions to African security problems”. Going beyond 
Western-led peacekeeping operations and strengthening regional defence capacities across Africa was 
one of the most prominent elements in the socialist government’s foreign policy discourse.  
 The idea of establishing a regional intervention force was not new but dates back to the mid-1990s 
and the establishment of the RECAMP programme in 1997. As described in Chapter One, a gradual 
break with the colonial and post-colonial past happened during the 1990s. Arguably, France’s 
involvement in the Rwandan genocide constituted the ultimate trigger that generated the conviction 
among French decision-makers that France should refrain from unilateral involvement in the region. It 
became imperative for the French political elite to avoid any sort of accusations that portray their country 
as a neo-colonial power. Thus, for both financial and legitimacy reasons, it had become inconceivable 
                                                     
261  ‘Il faut d’abord recréer l’esprit, il n’existe plus. Puis établir les points concrets de mise en œuvre....Nous ne 
voulons pas d’une forme d’abandon. Si nous ne prenons pas les initiatives, qui le fera ?’  
262  The three resolutions were sanctioned by the UN Security Council on 5 July (2056), 12 October (2071), and 
20 December 2012 (2085) respectively. 
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that France would continue its unilateral interventions of the past to protect friendly regimes or to 
overthrow dictators that had fallen from favour with the French president. Under the label of 
Architecture de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique (APSA, African Peace and Security Architecture), 
successive French governments promoted an African appropriation of the continent’s security.263  
 Present French security policy towards Africa rests on the three pillars of multilateralism, 
regionalism, and African ownership (Charbonneau 2008a, 283), all three of which shaped the discourse 
on the crisis in Mali. In principle, all French military interventions abroad are embedded in the Western 
liberal tradition of interventionism and are usually conducted as multilateral operations. The 2008 White 
Book on Defence describes the institutionalisation of this multilateral approach acknowledging that 
‘with some exceptions, all our military operations are conducted within a multinational framework. This 
framework can take the form of an already existing coalition, as in the case of NATO and the European 
Union, or be ad hoc circumstantial coalition’ (Livre Blanc 2008, 201).264 According to the White Book, 
unilateral interventions are only considered as a possible option under three specific circumstances: 
when they serve the purpose of protecting French expatriates, when a binding bilateral defence 
agreement makes them necessary, or when they are launched in response to targeted actions against 
selected French interests (Livre Blanc 2008, 71–72).       
 Although the idea of African security ownership can be traced back to the mid-1990s, it fell on 
particularly fertile ground when it coincided with the socialist government’s foreign policy discourse. 
During the electoral campaign, the Socialist Party embraced a human-rights oriented discourse vis-à-vis 
the African continent. Notably, Thomas Mélonio, the number two of the African desk at the Élysée, can 
be identified as being at the origin of this new discourse on Africa. In a pamphlet published by the Jean 
Jaurès Foundation, Mélonio (2011, 12) developed a ‘leftist vision on Africa’.265 He criticised France’s 
past military interventionism in francophone African countries in the name of regime stability, called 
for the definitive annulment of all existing defence treaties with African countries, and advocated a 
reduction of France’s military presence on the African continent, a transfer of responsibilities to the 
                                                     
263  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013.  
264  ‘Sauf exception, toutes nos opérations militaires se dérouleront dans un cadre multinational. Celui-ci peut être 
préétabli, dans le cas de l’Alliance Atlantique et de l’Union européenne, ou ad hoc, dans le cas de coalitions de 
circonstance’. 
265  ‘…une vision «de gauche» de l’Afrique’.  
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European level, and a more committed support to the creation of African defence capabilities (2011, 
28–33). These guiding principles dominated the Hollande administration’s initial policy towards crisis 
management on the African continent. The idea was to carry the rupture with the colonial past beyond 
the spheres of political discourse and symbolic acts, and apply it to the day-to-day policy-making 
processes. On several occasions, the president affirmed France’s commitment to the military capacity 
building in Africa. In the traditional presidential keynote speech on Africa, François Hollande explained 
in front of the Senegalese National Assembly that the ‘future of Africa will rest on Africans’ increased 
capacity to handle the crises that the continent is going through by themselves’ (Hollande 2012i).266 The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which as an institution is said to be less attached to the African continent 
than for instance the Ministry of Defence, soon became the principal mouthpiece and promoter of a 
regional intervention force. Between June and December 2012, Laurent Fabius repeatedly emphasised 
the necessity that France and the international community should support the capacity-building of 
African armies. The foreign minister stressed that the security crisis in Mali ‘is an African problem, and 
there the solution needs to be first and foremost African’ (Valero 2012). In September 2012, the 
minister’s spokesperson declared that ‘this is an African operation, which other states, such as France, 
are ready to support. But the minister made it clear that there won’t be any French forces on the ground’ 
(Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2012d).267 On 5 December 2012, Hollande confirmed this view again 
when commenting on the future military operation in Mali, which will ‘not only be decided but also 
executed by them [the Africans]’ (Hollande 2012e).268        
 The primary intention behind this allegedly new approach to African security, which should be 
showcased during the crisis resolution in Mali, was to avoid accusations of neo-colonial interference in 
African matters. As Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius underlined when questioned on France’s 
contribution toward the international intervention force, ‘France is not going to substitute the Africans 
since this idea of the French intervening against the Malians would be perceived as extremely hard 
                                                     
266  ‘Le futur de l'Afrique se bâtira par le renforcement de la capacité des Africains à gérer eux-mêmes les crises 
que le continent traverse’. 
267  ‘C'est une opération africaine que d'autres États, dont la France, sont prêts à soutenir. Mais le ministre a dit 
clairement qu'il n'y aurait pas de forces françaises sur le terrain’. 
268  ‘Elle sera non seulement décidée par eux mais exécutée par eux’. 
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(dure)—that would make no sense at all’ (Fabius 2012e).269 Elsewhere, President Hollande made it clear 
that France’s non-interventionist stance in the Malian case was not an expression of disinterest or 
indifference but the attempt to break with the inglorious unilateral interventionism of the past.  
France is directly concerned [by the Malian crisis], but not in the ways known from the past…in any 
case, we have to act, not by responding with yesterday’s interventions—these times are over—our 
role consists of supporting the Africans. It is them who need to take the initiative, the decision, the 
responsibility…Our mission when the time comes will be to support their action within the United 
Nations and the Security Council (Hollande 2012j).270    
 The Africanisation discourse excluded the possibility of direct French involvement.271 Instead, 
France could take on the role of a facilitateur (facilitator) who shepherds the problem’s solution from 
the distance (Fabius 2012g). The Hollande administration insisted on that point.272 All official statements 
until early January 2013 confirmed that the deployment of French troops was out of the question. Even 
on 10 January, one day before the presidential decision to launch Operation Serval, the foreign minister’s 
spokesperson declared that ‘the recent developments underline once more the necessity to quickly 
proceed with the deployment of an African intervention force in Mali and a European training and 
advisory mission’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2013c).273 However, one has to remain somewhat 
critical concerning these affirmations. While many actors in the French state apparatus notably in the 
Élysée and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to exclude France’s military participation, the 
possibility of an air support mission was envisaged among the viable options from October 2012 
onwards, without, however, ever having been announced publicly.274    
 The quest for legitimacy and the conviction that an autonomous African peacekeeping facility would 
                                                     
269  ‘Mais la France ne va pas se substituer aux Africains parce que ce serait une idée qui serait reçue de manière 
extrêmement dure si des Français intervenaient contre des Maliens - cela n'aurait aucun sens’.  
270  ‘La France est directement concernée, non pas dans les formes que nous avons pu connaître, mais en tout cas, 
nous aurons à agir, non pas par les interventions d'hier - ce temps-là est révolu - notre rôle consiste à appuyer 
nos partenaires africains ; ce sont eux qui doivent prendre l'initiative, la décision, la responsabilité, et les 
organisations régionales, dans les actions qu'ils souhaitent mener. Mais notre mission sera à ce moment-là 
d'appuyer leur action dans le cadre des Nations unies et de ce que décidera le Conseil de sécurité’. 
271  The phrase “France is not going to intervene unilaterally” is the most frequently coded node that emerged from 
the qualitative analysis of the data.  
272  References to France as a facilitator are among the ten most frequently coded concepts that emerged from the 
qualitative analysis of the discursive material.  
273  ‘Ces derniers événements soulignent une nouvelle fois la nécessité de procéder au déploiement rapide d'une 
force africaine au Mali ainsi que de la mission européenne de formation et de conseil’. 
274  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Mais très tôt – je dirais en octobre – 
on avait sur la table l’option, que quand l’opération africaine sera prête, on offrirait nous une contribution sous 
la forme d’un soutien aérien. Donc on est déjà dans une intervention française, même si ce n’est pas une 
intervention au sol’.  
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benefit both Africa and France explains the French commitment to an African solution. In practice, 
however, few actors in Paris believed in a speedy realisation of autonomous African peacekeeping 
capacities (Notin 2014, 76). In particular, the French military remained doubtful with respect to the 
feasibility and effectiveness of a completely autonomous African security architecture. As Jean Fleury, 
former chief of staff of the Air Force, put it: ‘It [France] wishes to entrust the Africans with the problem 
solution. However, it cannot but know that most of the propositions it advances are completely 
unrealistic’ (Fleury 2013, 11).275  
 
4.2.3 The Decision to Intervene 
In the evening of 11 January 2013, François Hollande met the press and announced that the French 
Army had launched a military operation to fight together with Malian forces against those terrorist 
groups that threatened the existence of the Malian state, the security of its population, and the lives of 
6,000 French expatriates (Hollande 2013f). This was the beginning of Operation Serval, which at its 
height engaged around 6,000 French soldiers, making it the largest French military intervention since 
the Algerian War in 1954–1962.276         
 The decision came as a reaction to an earlier offensive by rebel forces. In an attempt to extend their 
traditional stronghold that until then was limited to the northern regions of the country, AQIM, MUJAO, 
and Anṣār ad-Dīn fighters were directing themselves towards the south.277 By 10 January, they had 
captured the town of Konna (600km northeast of Bamako), ‘the last buffer between the rebels and Mopti 
…, which is the main town in the region and is seen as the gateway to the country's north’ (Diallo 2013). 
                                                     
275  ‘Elle souhaite confier la solution du problème aux pays africains. Elle ne peut cependant que savoir que la 
plupart des propositions qu’elle avance sont totalement irréalistes’. Several interviewees confirmed this point, 
arguing that everyone is aware of the limits that surround the idea of African peacekeeping capabilities. Interview 
with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014.  
276 The number comprises both the ground soldiers and those participating from France. Five thousand soldiers 
were deployed in Mali. As Colonel Gèze, commander of the 21st Infantry Marine Platoon explains, ‘Within one 
month the equivalent number of troops and equipment of the ten-year presence in Afghanistan had been shipped 
to Bamako’ (quoted in Notin 2014, 221).    
277  The exact reasons for this offensive remain unclear. Some argue that it was a preventive measure in light of 
the upcoming deployment of a UN backed African-led peacekeeping force others contend that the rebels simply 
underestimated France’s determination to intervene.  
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In reaction to these developments, France’s permanent representative at the UN requested a closed-door 
meeting of the Security Council on 10 January. On 11 January, François Hollande reunited the restricted 
Defence Council at the end of which he decided to respond to the request issued by Mali’s interim 
president and to deploy French troops in a veritable counter-offensive that aimed at eradicating as many 
terrorist fighters as possible.278          
 After a first phase that lasted until the end of January and during which the French Army stopped the 
rebel columns and recaptured Timbuktu, Gao, and Konna, the French president paid his first state visit 
to Mali. On 2 February, Hollande, surrounded by crowds of rejoicing Malians, announced that ‘terrorism 
has been repelled, hunted, but not yet been defeated’ (Hollande 2013g).279 At that time, the military 
operation entered its second phase, which aimed at maintaining the pressure against the remaining 
insurgent fighters, stabilising the northern part, in particular the Kidal region, creating the conditions for 
democratic elections in July 2013, and preparing the terrain for the African-led international 
peacekeeping operation. At the time of writing, the ongoing operation had claimed the lives of several 
hundreds of insurgent fighters and nine French soldiers. It saved the Malian state from collapse and 
allowed presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in July 2013. It is also said to have positively 
contributed to regional stability and is considered an asset in the global war on terror. Operation Serval 
prepared the terrain for the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali  (MINUSMA) 
contingent, which replaced the AFISMA in July 2013 and until July 2014 had led to the deployment of 
8,000 UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the Malian Army, with the assistance of the EUTM, was able 
to train and deploy 7,000 soldiers (Ministère de la Défense et des Anciens Combattants 2014). In July 
2014, Operation Serval still comprised 1,600 French soldiers who were engaged in regular 
counterinsurgency missions.          
 Most of these elements point to a rather successful military operation, which a posteriori gives reason 
to Hollande’s decision. However, during the very moment of taking action, nothing was less certain than 
the outcome of Operation Serval. As Notin points out, ‘at the moment when they had to make a decision, 
the French authorities had no tangible element at their disposal except for some distraught reports by 
                                                     
278  Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014.  
279  ‘…le terrorisme a été repoussé, il a été chassé mais il n'a pas encore été vaincu‘.  
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the Malian Army’ (Notin 2014, 152–53). For this close observer of French foreign interventions, ‘Serval 
was exceptional in many regards, and its launch was particularly remarkable. France was about to launch 
its most significant military operation since the Algerian War based not on evidence but an array of 
presumptions’ (2014, 153). Afghanistan analogies were, as we saw above, continually present during 
the policy framing process. Thus, French decision-makers knew of the risks involved when engaging in 
warfare with transnational non-state actors. Therefore it is no surprise that most of the civil and military 
advisors in the Ministry of Defence were not particularly optimistic regarding a quick end to the 
mission.280 Notwithstanding the considerable degree of uncertainty, the high risk of military action, and 
a discourse that hitherto excluded any French troop involvement, François Hollande ordered the 
intervention. Against this backdrop, the last section of this chapter concentrates on the moment of the 
taking of action, that is, the French decision to resolve the crisis in Mali with military means. Given the 
fact that until early January the Hollande administration had consistently denied the possibility of a 
unilateral French strike, the subsequent intervention thus seriously challenges ideational arguments and 
discursive approaches. In particular, the analysis of public discourse could be discarded as a wild-goose 
chase. To maintain the ideationist approach advanced here, one needs to question if―in light of this 
fundamental change―cognitive maps can still be said to have had an impact on the decision to intervene.  
 
Elements of Justification   
After having announced his decision on 11 January 2013, François Hollande commissioned Foreign 
Minister Fabius to expose the motivations behind the French intervention. Fabius initiated his statement 
by revoking the potential threat to Europe, designating the enemy as ‘groups of terrorists and criminals’, 
and referring to UN Resolution 2085 on the deployment of an international peacekeeping force.281 He 
thus put the justification for intervention in line with those elements that had dominated the official 
                                                     
280  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 27 January 2014.  
281  It is worthy to note that in contrast to UN Resolution 2085, which authorises the deployment of an AFISMA 
or Mission Internationale de Soutien au Mali sous conduite africaine (MISMA) in French, Fabius refers to an 
International Support Mission to Mali (mission internationale de soutien au Mali), dropping the crucial qualifier 
‘African-led’. In the remainder of the declaration, Fabius refers to UN Resolutions 2056, 2071, and 2085 as 
providing—in conjunction with article 51 of the UN Charter and the request by the Malian authorities—the legal 




discourse until 10 January 2013. After this introduction, an explanation of why the president took the 
risk of a unilateral intervention followed.  
However, for the last couple of days the situation has severely deteriorated, and the terrorist groups 
of the north—taking advantage of the delay between the moment of making international decisions 
and their application—have decided to go down to the south. All evidence suggests that their aim is 
to control the whole of Mali in order to put a terrorist state in place. Therefore, the Malian authorities 
addressed both the UN Security Council and France to ask for urgent intervention. The Security 
Council met yesterday and estimated in a declaration, which was passed by unanimity, that the threat 
is extremely serious and that action is needed. The Security Council was seized by the Malian 
authorities. France also received a request for air and ground support. In light of this emergency 
situation and in accordance with international law, the president of the republic, head of state, chief 
of the armies, took the decision to positively respond to the request by the Malian state and the 
international community.282 (Fabius 2013i) 
 The foreign minister stressed the fact that the president’s decision was a mere reaction to a changing 
situation on the ground, not a shift in France’s underlying policy. Indeed, the goals advocated in the 
official discourse remained largely the same before and after 11 January 2013. However, the means to 
achieve the desired goals had been altered. In early October 2012, the French representative at the UN 
argued, ‘we see a sanctuary for terrorist groups emerging in Mali, which subsequently can destabilise 
the whole of Africa. Thus, we need to act. We cannot wait any longer. But of course, it is up to the 
Malians to act, it is up to the Africans to act, and the Security Council must support them’ (Araud 
2012c).283 French policy-makers already at this earlier point in time vociferously advocated the need of 
a military strike. Simultaneously, the president affirmed his determination to fight terrorism in the Sahel. 
In an interview with France 24 he explained that, ‘by leaving AQIM, that is Al Qaeda, to prosper in the 
Sahel, I put my country in jeopardy because terrorism [le terrorisme] can come from there…I can’t 
accept this. We need to cut off the terrorists’ route. Therefore, an international policy is needed. This is 
                                                     
282  ‘Mais depuis quelques jours, la situation s’est malheureusement détériorée très gravement et profitant du délai 
entre les décisions internationales prises et le moment de leur application, les groupes terroristes et criminels du 
nord Mali ont décidé de descendre vers le sud. Leur objectif est selon toute évidence, de contrôler la totalité du 
Mali pour y installer un État terroriste. C’est la raison pour laquelle les autorités maliennes ont saisi à la fois le 
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et la France pour leur demander d’intervenir en urgence. Le Conseil de 
sécurité s’est réuni hier et dans une déclaration qu’il a adoptée à l’unanimité, a estimé que la menace était 
extrêmement grave et qu’il fallait réagir. Il a été saisi par les autorités maliennes. La France a été saisie également 
d’une demande d’appui aérien et d’appui militaire. Compte tenu de cette situation d’urgence et en s’appuyant sur 
la légalité internationale, le Président de la République, chef de l’État, chef des armées, a pris la décision de 
répondre positivement à la demande du Mali et à la demande de la communauté internationale’. 
283 ‘Nous voyons apparaitre au Mali un refuge pour les groupes terroristes qui peuvent ensuite menacer de 
déstabiliser l'ensemble de l'Afrique. Donc nous devons agir, nous ne pouvons plus attendre. Mais naturellement 
c'est aux Maliens d'agir, c'est aux Africains d'agir et le Conseil de sécurité doit les soutenir’. 
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what I want to do in Mali’ (Hollande 2012m).284 As demonstrated above, the securitisation of the Malian 
crisis and the emphasis put on a military solution dates back to the second half of 2012. The difference 
between the preceding statements and Hollande’s decision to intervene lies in the policy-makers’ 
willingness to contribute to this mission in a way that exceeded all prior commitments.  
 In contrast to the previously employed notions of ‘presence and activities of terrorists’, Fabius framed 
the threat in terms of the creation of a ‘terrorist state’. The use of the term ‘terrorist state’ suggests that 
the crisis reached a new level of intensity, calling for immediate action. By consequence, the decision 
was presented less as a choice than as a necessity. Acknowledging the serious character of Hollande’s 
decision, Fabius argued that ‘the changing situation made this [intervention] necessary: we need to stop 
the breakthrough of the terrorists, or else Mali will fall in their hands, constituting a threat for the whole 
of Africa and Europe’ (Fabius 2013i).285 Once again, the necessity of intervention was linked to the 
expected consequences a collapse of the Malian state would have on Europe. In addition, French 
decision-makers also highlighted the suddenness of the rebels’ offensive. 
Suddenly, the terrorist armed groups launched an offensive. They have taken the city of Konna. At 
this moment, our assessment was that they were totally able to take Bamako. So we decided that the 
existence of the state of Mali and, beyond Mali, the stability of all West Africa were at stake. With 
determination but also with reluctance we decided that we had no other choice but to launch this 
military intervention. We will conduct it as long as it will be necessary. (Araud 2013b)  
 The changes in the operational environment together with the decision-makers’ perception of a 
serious and immanent threat created the conviction of a necessary and unavoidable intervention. The 
official discourse emphasised the fact that the president was constrained to make a decision within a few 
hours (Fabius 2013k). This argument should be taken with a grain of salt. A military operation of the 
scale of Serval requires intensive preparation. Operational plans dated back months if not years and 
phone conversations between Dioncounda Traoré and François Hollande evoking a unilateral strike by 
                                                     
284  ‘C'est en laissant AQMI, c'est-à-dire Al Qaïda, prospérer dans le Sahel, que je ferai courir un risque à mon 
pays parce que le terrorisme peut venir de là. Nous avons même appris qu'il y avait eu des ressortissants français 
au Mali, comme il y en a en Somalie, comme nous pouvons en trouver en Syrie, et qui ensuite peuvent revenir dans 
leur pays avec des visées terroristes. Je ne peux pas l'accepter. Il faut donc couper la route des terroristes. Il faut 
donc avoir une politique internationale. C'est ce que je veux faire au Mali’. 
285  ‘C’est une décision grave mais qui est absolument nécessitée par la situation : il faut stopper la percée des 
terroristes, sinon c’est le Mali tout entier qui tombe dans leurs mains avec une menace pour toute l’Afrique et 
pour l’Europe elle- même’. 
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the French Army took place from 7 January onwards.286 However, reducing the moment of the “making 
of action” to such a short period of time helped create the impression that a unilateral operation had not 
been a viable option until the very day on which it was decided.287 This is important in order not to 
discredit the preceding discourse. By stressing the ad hoc nature of the decision, the military intervention 
could be framed not as a rupture, but as a continuation of the previous discourses and practices. The 
message was conveyed that if it were not for the rebels’ changing tactics France would not have 
intervened. Notin (2014, 177) in his analysis of the military aspects of Operation Serval finds further 
proof at the operational level for the urgency having been rather political than military.   
 At the same time, French decision-makers invested considerable effort and time in presenting the 
mission as an international intervention that enjoyed a three-fold legitimacy.  
I would like to underline that this intervention conforms to the strict framework set up by 
international law. The intervention is a reaction to a formal request by the Malian president. It is 
conducted in compliance with the UN Charter, and is consistent with UN resolutions 2056, 2071, 
and 2085. The United Nations provide the framework, Mali requested the mission, the Africans and 
the International Community are our partners. Of course, we do not have any desire of acting alone. 
The international political support—I insist on that point—is almost unanimous. Our actions were 
transparent and we informed all our partners. Yesterday, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called 
me on the phone to confirm—and I quote—that we have the United Nations’ full support.288 (Fabius 
2013j, emphasis added) 
 To make the intervention compatible with international law, the French discourse referred to the 
formal request by the Malian interim president, the UN Charter and the support of the international 
                                                     
286  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. Others 
argue that the decision had already been taken 10 days before its announcement; Cyrille Le Déaut, policy advisor 
at the French embassy, interview by author, Paris, 30 August 2013. According to Keenan (2013, 274–75) French 
and US forces were preparing the ground for a possible intervention since June 2012. He explicitly refers to French 
and Us forces being deployed to Niger ‘to help with intelligence and logistical support in the event of a military 
intervention into Mali’ (Keenan 2013, 275).  
287  The official version reads that Hollande took the decision to intervene on 11 January 2013. A couple of hours 
later, the first soldiers engaged in combats with Islamist fighters. Inevitably, the military had prepared this strike 
in advance or else they wouldn’t have been able to react in such a short time frame (Lasserre and Oberlé 2013). 
Interestingly, François Hollande stated during his state visit to Mali in February that he had taken the decision 
already on 10 January (Hollande 2013g).  
288  ‘Cette intervention, je veux le souligner, s'inscrit dans le cadre strict de la légalité internationale. Elle répond 
à une demande formelle du président malien et elle est conduite en conformité avec la charte des Nations unies, 
en cohérence avec les résolutions des Nations unies 2056, 2071 et 2085. Le cadre, c'est donc l'organisation des 
Nations unies ; le demandeur, c'est le Mali ; nos partenaires, ce sont les Africains et la Communauté 
internationale. Nous n'avons évidemment pas vocation à agir seuls. Le soutien politique international dont nous 
disposons – je voudrais insister là-dessus - est quasi-unanime. Nous avons agi en toute transparence, nous avons 
informé l'ensemble de nos partenaires. Hier, le Secrétaire général des Nations unies, M. Ban Ki-Moon, a tenu à 
m'appeler au téléphone longuement pour me confirmer – je le cite - que nous avions le plein soutien de 
l'organisation des Nations unies’. 
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community, and the three resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council on the situation in Mali 
throughout the second half of 2012. At the outset of the intervention, references to resolutions 2056, 
2071, 2085 and their unanimous approval dominated the French explanations. More than providing a 
legal base in a strict sense, they served to assure the necessary political support. Although Operation 
Serval resembled more France’s past military interventions in support of friendly regimes than a 
multilateral peacekeeping operation, actors framed it as an intervention that France conducted in the 
name of the international community and Europe for the sake of Mali and the West African region.289   
I think everyone was happy that France intervened. The United States were unable to intervene. Of 
course, they have considerable means at their disposition, but they would have had to deploy a good 
number of resources to intervene in Mali. The fact that France did the job almost alone―well…apart 
from the little help it received from the United States and the United Kingdom, which provided some 
tanker aircraft―suited the United States. The fact that France did the work almost alone suited 
everyone. I think this suited indeed everyone, and as a result it provided us with huge political 
support. …the world understood why France intervened. We did not intervene for ourselves, we did 
not intervene to defend any French interests. We actually intervened to save a country from 
collapse.290  
 Next to the legitimacy this argument seeks to create, it also reflects the way French actors perceive 
their role in the international system. As representatives of an influential middle power, French actors 
are convinced that their actions must be greater than the mere maximisation of interests. France’s actions 
beyond its borders must aim at uniting French interests with a larger common good, be it of the 
international community, Europe, or Africa.       
 By the end of January 2013, references to UN resolution 2085 disappeared almost completely from 
the French discourse. This discursive shift can be explained by the discrepancies between the wording 
of UN resolution 2085 and France’s subsequent action. Actually, the resolution did not foresee the 
deployment of French troops but only evoked the establishment of the AFISMA. Instead of further 
                                                     
289  Isabelle Lasserre, journalist at Le Monde, interview by author, Paris, 23 August 2013.   
290  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. ‘Je 
pense que tout le monde était content que la France intervienne. Les Etats-Unis n’étaient pas en mesure 
d’intervenir. Ils ont bien sûr des moyens considérables, mais il aurait fallu qu’ils déploient un nombre de moyens 
pour intervenir au Mali. Le fait que la France fasse le job quasiment seule, enfin elle a eu un peu d’aide, elle au 
eu l’aide des Etats-Unis, le Royaume Uni a apporté des avions ravitailleurs, mais le fait que la France a fait très 
largement le travail seule, ça arrange les Etats-Unis. Ca arrangeait tout le monde. Je pense que ça arrangeait 
tout le monde, et du coup ça nous apportait un soutien politique très large. Je n’ai pas vu beaucoup de déclarations 
hostiles à l’intervention au Mali. Il y en a eu quelques-unes, y compris en France du parti de Front National, etc., 
mais globalement tout le monde a compris pourquoi on est intervenu. On n’est pas intervenu pour nous, on n’est 
pas intervenu pour défendre des intérêts français. On est vraiment intervenu pour sauver un pays du K.O’.  
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insisting on the text of UN resolution 2085, justifications accentuated the request for assistance issued 
by Dioncounda Traoré.291 Although these were the most frequently advanced explanations of the French 
decision, in particular throughout the month of January 2013, they only touch the surface of the complex 
web of motivations that provoked the decision to intervene. In other words, they lay out the conditions 
that allowed France to intervene in this specific situation. They do not explain why the French president, 
together with his ministers and advisors, seized the opportunity and took a considerable moral and 
political risk when approving the military operation. To understand the French decision, one also needs 
to examine why alternatives were discarded and what elements pushed French actors towards 
intervention.  
 
The Reluctance of Europe and Africa  
Over and again, and in particular during the early phase of the intervention, French policy-makers 
referred to Operation Serval as a decision that was taken with great reluctance and only out of absolute 
necessity. More than being a mere justification, this reluctance to intervene was the expression of a 
veritable conviction. The claim that France is not going to intervene unilaterally had been repeated on 
so many occasions that the arguments’ advocates treated it as a truism: France did not want to intervene 
in Mali; it had to! As shown above, in particular the president’s advisors at the Élysée and Laurent 
Fabius and his staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had internalised the doctrine of a non-intervention 
to an extent that made it difficult to abandon this idea. Thus, in order to change France’s position, it 
necessitated a counter-narrative that was strong enough to overcome the persistent reluctance. This 
counter-narrative emerged first in the form of the realisation that all multilateral efforts failed to address 
the problem.            
 As shown above, from September to December 2012 the French government advocated a European 
and African problem solution to the crisis in Mali. L’Europe de la Défense is understood as a collective 
                                                     
291  Dioncounda Traoré first contacted the president on 7 January. Over the course of the coming days, the two 
presidents were in permanent contact to exchange on the developments on the ground. This limits the very 
“moment of the making of action” to three days (Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, 
interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013). 
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defence community that assures both Europe’s internal security and is able to intervene abroad. In 
particular in light of the emergence of new threats French actors were convinced, as Le Drian and Fabius 
pointed out, ‘that the European Union needs to reinforce its contribution to international security, both 
in its neighbourhood and beyond’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2012a).292 In line with this 
conviction, the president, the foreign minister, and the defence minister first campaigned for a European 
intervention force and then for a European training mission in Mali. However, the reluctance of most 
Europeans to answer France’s calls reinforced the sentiment that over the short- and medium-term a 
coherent, comprehensive, and efficient European approach to Africa’s security would not be feasible. 
The more the crisis in Mali intensified without provoking a visible reaction on the part of other EU 
member states, the more French decision-makers fell back to the conviction that ‘Europe at the military 
level is inexistent’. While genuinely willing to share the responsibility of solving the Malian crisis with 
their European partners, French actors regretted the lack of responsiveness from the rest of Europe. As 
one policy advisor put it, ‘Europe is a reluctant empire. It is not an empire that aspires to expand. It does 
not want to intervene. France would prefer the hat be European rather than French’.293 Adding to this, 
French elites consider the rest of Europe to be rather inward looking, a characteristic that prevents 
Europe from establishing veritable military capacities comparable to those French actors find at their 
own national level.294           
 Over the course of the second half of 2012, French politicians became increasingly critical vis-à-vis 
Europe.295 For instance, conservative MP Pierre Lellouche described Europe’s involvement in Mali and 
the CAR as ridiculous: ‘One needs to recall that, in theory, Europe counts 1.5 million soldiers in arms. 
If you send 200 instructors to Mali, and 500 soldiers, who are not going to wage war, to Central Africa, 
this is ridiculous. This is as if one would assume that the problem concerns only France and not the 
                                                     
292  ‘Dans un contexte stratégique caractérisé par l'émergence de nouvelles menaces, la France est convaincue 
que l'Union européenne doit apporter une contribution renforcée à la sécurité internationale, dans son voisinage 
et au-delà’.  
293  Cyrille Le Déaut, policy advisor at the French embassy, interview by author, Paris, 30 August 2013. ‘L’Europe 
sur le plan militaire elles inexistante. La France, comme d’ailleurs l’Angleterre, aimerait que l’Europe intervienne 
militairement. Le problème est surtout le blocage allemand. On n’arrive pas à créer l’Europe de la défense. 
L’Europe c’est un Empire réticent. Ce n’est pas un Empire qui se veut étendre. Il ne veut pas intervenir. La France 
préférait que la casquette serait européenne, plutôt que française’. 
294  Project officer Francophonie Organisation, interview by author, Paris, 01 October 2013.  
295  Criticism against other European states was mostly limited to domestic political debates in Parliament. The 
minutes of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the National Assembly are an insightful starting point 
for tracing this critical debate.  
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whole of Europe’.296 While not all actors were equally harsh towards Europe, most shared the conviction 
that for the rest of Europe, the crisis in Mali was a French affair.297 Vice-versa, Europe’s reluctance 
reinforced the traditional sentiment among French elites that ‘Africa is not a European issue, [but] first 
and foremost a French issue’.298         
 The biggest obstacle between the status quo and the envisaged Europe de la Défense—according to 
officials in Paris—is the lack of a common strategic culture and common vision of Europe’s security. 
Due to their respective histories, the different European member states have developed diverging 
security orientations and strategic interests, which are difficult to combine and are at times entirely 
incompatible.299 
I am extremely sceptical. The problem is that we have visions and strategic cultures that are too 
different to come to an agreement on a common policy. What we see emerge are regional blocs, 
which are essentially economic. We can see a merger between the Dutch, the Belgian, the Central 
European, and German armies. To some extent, we [the French] share a common vision with the 
British. Consequently, we try to come closer to them, which is still a bit complicated. We are far 
away from a common defence [Europe de la Défense]. We had 44,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and 
we were incapable of sharing a common vision. The same is true for Libya. The EU was nowhere. 
We are far away from a European cohesion. We need a strategic vision that is more or less identical. 
And then, we also need the same vision with regard to the use of force. I am very sceptical of the 
idea of a European coherence.300  
Acknowledging the lack of a shared European strategic culture, Jean-Yves Le Drian in his efforts to 
advance the European defence project gave priority to the creation of a ‘common European spirit’. Only 
after having created a common strategic culture, according to the minister, one can think of 
                                                     
296  Pierre Lellouche, MP, interview by author, Paris, 7 February 2014. ‘Il faut rappeler que l’Union Européenne 
c’est 1,5 million de soldats théoriquement sous les armes. Quand vous avez 200 instructeurs au Mali, et 500 soldats 
qui ne vont pas faire la guerre d’ailleurs en Centre-Afrique, c’est ridicule. C’est comme si on considère que ce 
problème concerne la France et non pas toute l’Europe’. 
297  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013.  
298 Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘Pour les élites française 
aujourd’hui l’Afrique ce n’est pas une question européenne. C’est d’abord une question française. Ça ne se 
partage pas ce genre de chose’. 
299  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013.  
300  Michel Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014. ‘Je suis extrêmement sceptique. Le 
problème c’est qu’on a des visions, des cultures stratégiques tellement différentes, qu’on ne se peut pas mettre 
d’accord sur une politique. Ce qu’on voit apparaître ce sont des blocs régionaux essentiellement économiques. 
On voit une fusion entre l’armée des Pays-Bas et l’armée allemande, belges, néerlandais, allemands, en Europe 
Centrale aussi. Nous, on a un peu la même vision que les Britanniques, donc on essaie de se rapprocher un peu 
des Britanniques, même si c’est toujours un peu compliqué. On est très loin de l’Europe de la Défense. On a eu 
44.000 soldats en Afghanistan, on était incapable d’avoir une vision commune. Pareil en Libye, l’UE n’était nulle 
part. On est très loin d’avoir une cohésion européenne. Il faut avoir une vision stratégique à peu près identique, 




Europeanising specific tasks and pooling the different national military capacities (Le Drian 2012a). 
However, this process necessitated time (Le Drian and Fabius 2012b) and the reluctance of other 
member states to get involved in the crisis resolution confirmed French actors in their conviction that 
‘Europe is not an instrument that allows for rapid interventions or for interventions in highly deteriorated 
situations necessitating high-risk military operations’. While unsuited for rapid and high-risk operations, 
officials still considered Europe a useful asset when it came to softer operations such as training and 
peacekeeping or policing missions.301 Accordingly, the defence minister has from September 2012 
onwards pushed its European partners to advance the creation of the EUTM, a training mission that does 
not involve any combat operations. Although the minister held onto the idea that ‘the crisis in the Sahara 
[would be] a good opportunity for a European intervention, both military and civilian, in order to assist 
in consolidating the rule of law and to restore a functioning judiciary while, at the same time, assuring 
military support’ (Assemblée Nationale 2012a),302 he became increasingly aware of the fruitlessness of 
his attempts to convince his European counterparts. The military reinforced this perception by pointing 
towards the operational limits of a potential European intervention force. Given their expertise in the 
region, the Army remains an actor politicians listen to.       
 French actors came to a similarly sober conclusion regarding the African peacekeeping force that 
after procedural delays and political disagreements among the ECOWAS members was not expected to 
become operational before September 2013. Some authors cite ECOWAS’s and AU’s lack of political 
will and financial resources among the principal motives for French intervention (Marchal 2013a, 488; 
Weiss and Welz 2014, 897). In light of these delays and the limited offensive capacities of the AFISMA, 
French actors’, led once again by the military, became increasingly convinced that the African forces 
did not have the military clout to conduct an intervention alone. The military were the first to observe 
the infeasibility of an African-led counterstrike in case of a larger offensive by the rebels. Vice Chief of 
Staff Didier Castres explains that the members of the restricted Defence Council evaluated the capacity 
                                                     
301  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Ça dépend. Je crois que cette opération 
de formation de l’armée malienne, elle marche très bien…la leçon que j’en tire c’est que la défense européen n’est 
pas un outil qui permet d’intervenir rapidement, et ce n’est pas un outil qui permet d’intervenir dans des situations 
très dégradées, dans le spectre élevé de l’opération militaire’.  
302  ‘La crise au Sahel serait une bonne opportunité pour une intervention européenne, à la fois militaire et civile, 




of an African force to stop the offensive during their first meetings. They concluded that these forces 
simply were not ready. In contrast, the French Army had developed detailed plans for a possible 
intervention since 2009. By January 2013, the military possessed a precise understanding of the force 
that was needed to counter the rebels’ offensive. With regard to the operational level, the intervention 
was thus not perceived as a drastic change of the underlying policy, but simply as a reshuffle of the order 
in which things were going to happen.303 One pundit defined Serval as ‘the acknowledgement that we 
[the French] cannot outsource―I dare to say―Africa’s security entirely to the United Nations, the 
African organisations, and the regional organisations’. According to the same analyst, ‘these three actors 
very often demand the presence of a modern and efficient third-party Army, which happens to be the 
French Army’.304          
 Operation Serval was never considered as being contradictory to the Africanisation discourse, but 
rather as complimentary to it. From the outset any kind of military operation, be it multilateral or 
unilateral, was portrayed not ‘as a [foreign] military intervention, but as the return of the Malian Army’ 
(Araud 2012a).305 On day two of the French military campaign, the president specified the intentions 
behind the operation as follows, ‘Let me remind you that France does not pursue any specific interest 
other than saving a friendly country [pays ami] and fighting against terrorism. This is why its action is 
supported by the entire international community and greeted by all African countries’ (Hollande 
2013e).306 French decision-makers considered the support by the international community and Africa as 
sufficient criteria to distinguish Operation Serval from past interventions. As of 17 January, the first 
African troops arrived in Mali, reinforcing the view that French troops were acting only in support of 
the African peacekeeping force.         
 In order to bring their actions in line with the Europeanisation and Africanisation discourses, it was 
crucial for French actors to win the support of the Security Council and even more the approval of the 
                                                     
303  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author, Paris, 18 February 2014.  
304  Camille Grand, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, interview by author, Paris, 23 July 2013.  
‘… il y a la reconnaissance, qu’on ne peut pas entièrement sous-traiter, si j’ose dire, la sécurité africaine aux 
Nations Unies, aux organisations africaines, aux organisations régionales. Que ces trois acteurs sont très souvent 
demandeur d’une présence tiers d’une armée moderne, efficace etc. qui se trouve être l’armée française’.  
305  ‘Ce n'est pas une intervention militaire, c'est le retour de l'armée malienne’. 
306  ‘Je rappelle que la France dans cette opération ne poursuit aucun intérêt particulier autre que la sauvegarde 
d'un pays ami et n'a pas d'autre but que la lutte contre le terrorisme. C'est pourquoi son action est soutenue par 
l'ensemble de la Communauté internationale et saluée par tous les pays africains’. 
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African Union, the concerned regional organisations, and national governments. Asked about the 
difference between the operations in Mali and Central Africa and those in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, a 
presidential advisor replied:  
These interventions are of a very different nature. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, half of Africa was 
against the operation. South Africa was against the operation. The African Union was divided. In 
the case of Libya, the African Union was against the operation. This is where the difference lies. 
The two operations in Mali and CAR would not have been realised if Africa had been against us. In 
both cases (Mali and CAR) Africa was for us and with us.307  
 As this statement shows, decision-makers’ understanding of France’s new security approach in 
Africa eventually did not exclude military interventionism per se, but only avoided any sort of 
involvement that would have created the impression that France was acting against African interests. 
Once having secured the support of the African Union and ECOWAS, a unilateral intervention, in 
preparation of a longer-term African troop deployment, became a possible solution to the crisis.  
There is the principle [no French intervention], but then there is the practice. In practice the African 
standby force did not exist. The only forces that were implemented were ad hoc forces. These forces 
do not have sufficient operational power to counter an offensive such as the one in Konna. This [the 
French decision] is insofar not contradictory since the Africans are there, they play an important 
role, but they do not meet the criteria to act as the first force to enter [la force de première entrée].308  
 The African desk at the Élysée and the decision-units dealing with the crisis in Mali at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs raised concerns over the political implications of such an intervention and the impact 
it would have on France’s image in the world. Consequently, for a long time they opposed this option. 
Only when the strict non-interventionist discourse became incompatible with other elements that defined 
decision-makers’ self-understanding did the opposition wane and the entire political elite could be united 
behind the idea of a French intervention. The conflict between the principle of non-intervention, on the 
                                                     
307  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘C’est des interventions de nature très 
différente. La Côte d’Ivoire, la moitié de l’Afrique était contre cette opération. L’Afrique du Sud était contre cette 
opération. L’Union Africaine était divisée. La Libye, l’Union Africaine était contre cette opération. La différence 
c’est ça. Les deux opérations au Mali et en RCA n’auraient pas été réalisées si l’Afrique était contre. Hors, dans 
un cas comme dans l’autre l’Afrique était pour et l’Afrique était avec nous’.  
308 Interview with civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘Ça c’est le principe, mais après 
il y a la pratique. Et la pratique c’est que la force africaine en attente n’existait pas. C’étaient toujours des forces 
ad hoc qui se sont mis en œuvre. Ce ne sont pas des forces qui ont la puissance opérationnelle suffisante pour 
repousser une offensive telle que de Konna. Ça n’est pas contradictoire dans la mesure que les Africains sont là, 




one hand, and the perceived necessity to act on the other explains why France did not intervene earlier, 
although it was well aware of both the urgency of the situation and the absence of an alternative to a 
unilateral intervention.309 The interviews conducted for this study in the aftermath of the military 
intervention confirm that the proclaimed rupture between the socialist government’s approach and those 
of its predecessors was framed in terms of African participation and support. Rather than saying, “no 
intervention in Africa”, French decision-makers argued that for the time being there will be no military 
interventions without full African support.310 This allowed the actors to accommodate their previous 
opposition to a military operation with the subsequent presidential decision.    
 In summary, French decision-makers convinced themselves of the necessity of Operation Serval after 
both the European and the African-led operations did not develop in the way intended by French foreign 
policy-makers. Seen from Paris, everything possible had been done to share the responsibility of the 
crisis solution. However, no other country seemed sufficiently concerned, willing, or capable of 
resolving the crisis. This in turn obliged France to act as the initiator of the problem’s solution. When 
promoting the then upcoming Élysée summit on African peace and security, the French president made 
it clear in front of a group of French expatriates in South Africa that the intervention in Mali was 
exceptional for France’s new security approach to Africa. Resorting to a counterfactual argument, 
Hollande defended the apparent ambiguity in France’s actions saying that ‘we did it, because there were 
no other options. If France [had not intervened], no one would have done it. If no one had done it, the 
terrorists would have carried the day’ (Hollande 2013o).311          
 A certain resignation vis-à-vis European and African solutions reigned over the ranks of French elites 
in January 2013. One of Fabius’s advisors captures this sentiment when stating, ‘France would be 
pleased if it could share these things. However, in reality, although we may not be the only ones, we are 
still the first ones. We do it and we will continue doing it’.312 Others are more explicit and describe 
                                                     
309  Interview with policy officer at the DCSD, Paris, 18 February 2014.  
310  Cyrille Le Déaut, policy advisor at the French embassy, interview by author, Paris, 30 August 2013.  
311  ‘Nous l'avons fait au Mali, dans des conditions exceptionnelles…. Nous l'avons fait parce qu'il n'y avait pas 
d'autres possibilités. Si ce n'était pas la France, ce n'était personne. Si ce n'était personne, c'étaient les terroristes 
qui l'emportaient’. 
312  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Si d’autres pays que la France 
voudrait le faire on serait ravi pour partager les choses. Mais la réalité c’est qu’on n’est pas les seuls mais on est 
les premiers. On le fait et on continuera à le faire’.  
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Operation Serval as the consequence of an outright failure of the proposed multilateral approaches to 
the crisis solution.313 When the events unfolded in January 2013 and required a quick decision, all actors 
agreed that Europe would be unable to react within the limited time frame the rebels’ recent move had 
imposed on the problem solution. 
  
The Conceptual Maps behind the Decision 
While the absence of an effective multilateral solution gradually convinced French decision-makers to 
take a more active role in the conflict resolution, the actors’ emotional bounds with West Africa as well 
as the policy-makers’ understanding of France’s role in the world cannot be left disregarded when 
explaining the decision to intervene. By looking at the conceptual maps with which French elites 
constructed the security narrative one can identify a high degree of proximity. From proximity derive 
notions of responsibility, friendship, which in turn influence the role perceptions of French elites. 
President Hollande himself expressed these sentiments most clearly when saying, ‘I am responsible, 
because I am at the head of a country that has a link with Africa, because we [are] connected with this 
continent, because there are populations that blended by being mobile, by moving, I have a particular 
responsibility, thus, I am keen that France takes the initiative’ (Hollande 2013b).314 Speaking in New 
York on 26 September 2012, Hollande proclaimed ‘France, I would like to remind you, and I confirm, 
will assume all its responsibilities while leaving the Africans the capacity and the legitimacy to 
undertake this intervention’ (Hollande 2012g, emphasis added).315 The notion of responsibility was one 
                                                     
313  Michel Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
314  ‘Mais j'ai la responsabilité, parce que je suis à la tête d'un pays qui a un lien avec l'Afrique, parce que nous 
solidaires de ce continent, parce qu'il y a des populations qui se sont mélangées par la mobilité, par les 
déplacements, j'ai une responsabilité particulière et donc je tiens à ce que la France soit à l'initiative’. Similar 
utterances can be observed at various instances in the French security discourse. For instance, on the occasion of 
the Élysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa on 5 December 2013, that is one day after the launching of 
Operation Sangaris in the CAR, Hollande emphasised how the perceived proximity with the African continent 
creates emotional bounds and a pronounced sense of responsibility for the francophone African region, which are 
part of the French elites’ role perception: ‘France is aware of what is expected of her. It deducts from this at the 
same time geographic, sentimental, cultural, linguistic, [and] economic proximity [with Africa] a particular 
responsibility’ (Hollande 2013m) (‘La France est consciente de ce qui est attendu d'elle. Elle déduit de cette 
proximité - à la fois géographique, sentimentale, culturelle, linguistique, économique -, elle déduit de cette 
proximité une responsabilité particulière’.) 
315  ‘La France, je le rappelle ici, je le confirme, prendra toutes ses responsabilités tout en laissant aux Africains 
la capacité, la légitimité de mener cette intervention’. 
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of the core elements during both the pre- and post-intervention discourse. Actors referred to the term as 
an element of motivation, explanation, and justification, often without any further specification of its 
meaning.316 Hollande, on the day of Operation Serval’s launch defended his decision in front of the 
diplomatic corps by saying that preventing the terrorists’ offensive is a ‘question of solidarity and 
responsibility’ (Hollande 2013q).317       
 Responsibility has a multitude of different meanings, which taken together constitute a core 
explanatory factor of the French decision. The term is used to describe France’s historical responsibility 
towards Africa. The colonial experience and its heritage made French elites feel more concerned with 
the Sahel and West Africa than decision-makers in any other country. Notwithstanding the fact that 
more than half a century had passed since France’s former colonies gained independence, French 
decision-makers acknowledged the impact of their predecessors’ practices on the contemporary security 
state of francophone Africa: ‘We also have some responsibilities. The African states are as they are 
because we created these states. We drew these stupid borders during the time of colonisation. We 
divided them into those ethnic groups. We linked the Tuareg and the Malians. One could argue that we 
did this 50 years ago…still...France is a little bit responsible for all this’.318 In the words of a ministerial 
advisor, ‘colonialism created a relationship between the colonising and the colonised countries that 
continues to last well after the end of the decolonisation’.319 These and other statements are in line with 
the findings of Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz (2002, 268), who―in their discussion on postcolonial 
relationships―argue that ‘historically conditioned notions of collective, familial relations motivate the 
European powers to maintain distinctive types of relations with their former colonies’. This claim can 
be specified further by arguing that the colonial past as an antipode to present action constrained policy-
makers in their choice and thus narrowed the list of available options. Although several elements in the 
French discourse point towards the colonial dimension of responsibility, this view remains contested 
                                                     
316  For a general discussion of the emerging international norm of R2P see (Bellamy and Williams 2011). 
317  ‘Elle le fera strictement dans le cadre des résolutions du conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies et elle sera 
prête à arrêter l'offensive des terroristes si elle devait se poursuivre, car c'est une exigence de solidarité et de 
responsabilité’. 
318  Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014. ‘On a aussi des 
responsabilités. Les états africains sont comme ils sont, parce que c’est nous qui les avons fait ces états. C’est 
nous qui avons dressé ces frontières stupides pendant la colonisation. C’est nous qui les avons coupés en ethnies, 
qui ont rattaché les Touaregs aux Maliens etc. On peut dire, on a fait ça, il y a 50 ans, mais néanmoins. La France 
est un peu responsable de ça’.  
319  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of the interior, Paris, 12 February 2014.  
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among French elites. Other interviewees excluded colonial responsibility or some sort of late penitence 
for France’s colonial past as a motivation or justification of the French decision from the outset.320
 Actors were more likely to agree when the term was employed with reference to the First and the 
Second World Wars. Repeatedly, French decision-makers pointed to their country’s debt vis-à-vis the 
African continent. Responsibility became synonymous for ‘the awareness of historical and emotional 
links’. According to one policy advisor, ‘all these populations gave a lot for France. This is the idea of 
responsibility. We have a common history and today we cannot say, “These are your problems and we 
let you down”’.321 Acknowledging the importance of Africa’s contributions to France’s war efforts, it is 
still surprising that Hollande publicly emphasised the historical dimension of responsibility seventy 
years after the end of the Second World War; in particular given the president’s determination of wanting 
to break with the past. On the occasion of his first state visit to Mali, Hollande affirmed in Bamako, ‘We 
fight in fraternity, Malians, French, Africans, because I do not forget that when France was attacked, 
when it was looking for help, for allies, when its territorial unity was threatened, who came to help? It 
was Africa, it was Mali. Thanks, thanks to Mali. Today, were are repaying our debt’ (Hollande 2013g).322 
Statements like this support the view that the concept of historical responsibility remained an important 
element in the mental maps which French actors used in order to approach the crisis in Mali. Despite 
affirmations to the contrary, the idea of a historically grown responsibility directly influenced the 
decision-making process and reinforced the conviction that a military operation was necessary. The 
outcome itself, that is, a quasi-unilateral intervention, is partly based on the actors’ ‘subjective reading 
of history’ (Welch 2005, 11). In reacting to the rebels’ offensive with a counter-offensive French 
decision-makers fell back into old patterns of behaviour. Over the past fifty years, the French Army had 
successfully intervened many times in what seemed similar situations. Against that backdrop, French 
                                                     
320  Interview with policy officer at the DCSD, Paris, 18 February 2014.  
321  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of the interior, Paris, 12 February 2014. ‘C’est la conscience 
qu’on a un lien historique, émotionnelle. Pour un Français, les Sénégalais c’étaient aussi nos soldats. Toutes ces 
populations ont beaucoup donné pour la France. C’est ça l’idée de la responsabilité. On a une histoire commune 
et on ne peut pas dire aujourd’hui vous êtes dans les problèmes et on vous laisse tomber’.  
322  ‘Nous nous battons en fraternité, Maliens, Français, Africains parce que moi je n'oublie pas que lorsque la 
France a été elle-même attaquée, lorsqu'elle cherchait des soutiens, des alliés, lorsqu'elle était menacée pour son 
unité territoriale, qui est venu alors ? C'est l'Afrique, c'est le Mali. Merci, merci au Mali. Nous payons aujourd'hui 
notre dette à votre égard’. Several policy-makers within the French state apparatus were sincerely surprised and 




actors convinced themselves that a successful outcome of the operation was indeed possible, 
notwithstanding all uncertainties and idiosyncrasies that accompanied the crisis in Mali.    
 When evoking the notion of responsibility, actors referred to France’s role in the UN Security 
Council even more than to the historical dimension. Being one of the five permanent members of this 
international institution that describes itself as bearing ‘the primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security’ (United Nations 2014) creates certain expectations among French 
actors and their foreign counterparts. In addition to France’s overall commitment to the global security 
architecture, France for long has advocated the adoption of an African seat in the Security Council. As 
long as Africa is not represented in the Security Council, France will remain the self-declared defender 
of African interests in this institution.323 In conjunction, these two aspects make for a strong explanatory 
factor for the president’s decision to respond to the Malian government’s quests for assistance. As 
Hollande’s former spokesperson Romain Nadal underlined, ‘We are a permanent member of the 
Security Council, we have a particular role to play in Africa, because we have strong ties to this 
continent. We have very, very strong ties. Therefore, the president considers that we must intervene 
when called upon by the Africans. This was the case in Mali’.324 The perceived responsibility by agents 
working in the name of a puissance d’influence can be considered as one of the principal motivations 
that led to Operation Serval. The relationship between responsibility and action, that is, discourse and 
practices, is likewise an issue of credibility. As one French colonel put it, ‘from the moment you are 
responsible, you take risks. If not, you must not be responsible’.325     
 The same applies to France’s military capacities. An effective military apparatus, it might be argued, 
can only be considered such when it can be used to defend the causes for which the nation aspires to 
stand. The idea that its military capacity obliges France to act remained one of the central themes of the 
official discourse. During the interviews I conducted for this study, I repeatedly encountered the 
following argument: ‘We have a responsibility, because we have a certain expertise in Africa. The fact 
                                                     
323  Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013.  
324  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson of François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. 
‘On est membre permanent du Conseil de Sécurité, on a un rôle particulier à jouer en Afrique, parce qu’on a des 
liens forts avec ce continent. On a des liens très, très forts. Donc le Président considère qu’à ce titre là on doit 
intervenir si on est sollicité par les Africains. Ce qui était le cas pour le Mali’. 
325 Xavier Collignon, vice-director of the DAS, interview by author, Paris, 6 August 2013. ‘À partir du moment où 
vous êtes responsable, vous prenez des risques. Sinon, on ne doit pas être responsable’.  
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that we have got the capacities also means that we must use them’.326 Not only does France still have 
the expertise and military capacities needed to conduct successful operations on the African continent, 
it is also the only actor that unites in itself the institutional design and political will necessary for the 
conduct of rapid interventions.327 This capacity not only obliged France to take action, it also served as 
a justification once the decision was taken. Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, 
argued with regard to the request for assistance issued by Mali’s interim president, ‘if they turn to us, 
they judge us capable of creating their security’.328      
 Be it in Europe, at the UN, or in Africa, foreign policy-makers expected France to be the first country 
to take a stance regarding the crisis in Mali. Put differently, France’s role enactment as a puissance 
d’influence with a special interest in Africa created so-called role expectations. Role expectations are 
interbehavioural and as such ‘concern the performance of any individual in a social position relative to 
individuals occupying other positions’ (Thies 2009, 9). They bridge between the individual, or a group 
of individuals, and the social structure. These expectations confirmed the role conceptions (expectations 
held by the role occupant) of French elites with regard to Africa’s security and further reinforced the 
feeling of responsibility they had developed towards the Malian state (2009, 9). According to Sarbin 
and Allen (1968, 510–14) role demands constrain leaders in particular situations by calling ‘for a specific 
role enactment’ (Thies 2009, 10). Former Minister for Development Pascal Canfin put it as follows, 
‘France is about to define a security and humanitarian response to the present crisis. There are great 
expectations among our European partners as well as among out partners in the Sahel vis-à-vis France. 
With respect to this zone, we have a responsibility that we need to take on’ (Canfin 2012a).329  
 In a sense, France seems to disprove Chandler’s (2007, 372) point on the ‘growing disjunction 
between UN Security Council resolutions and its practices’, just like the claim that ‘political elites are 
keen to express the rhetoric of high moral responsibility in the international sphere but are reluctant to 
                                                     
326  Interview with policy officer at the DCSD, Paris, 18 February 2014. ‘On a une responsabilité parce qu’on a 
une expertise en Afrique, le fait qu’on a les capacités veut aussi dire qu’il faut les utiliser’. 
327  Michel Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014.  
328  Romain Nadal, former spokesperson for François Hollande, interview by author, Paris, 7 October 2013. ‘Et si 
eux se tourne vers nous, ils jugent que nous sommes capables, aptes à faire cette sécurité’.  
329  ‘La France travaille à définir une réponse sécuritaire et humanitaire à la crise actuelle. Il y a chez nos 
partenaires européens comme au Sahel une forte attente vis-à-vis de la France. Nous avons à l'égard de cette zone 
une responsabilité qu'il nous faut assumer’.  
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take responsibility for either policy-making or policy outcomes’ (Chandler 2007, 381). Put differently, 
the criticism of a growing misfit between rhetoric and practices does not fit with France’s position in 
the UN Security Council. In particular, when it comes to security in francophone Africa, one can argue 
with confidence that French governments not only talk the talk but also walk the walk. References to 
the notion of responsibility are not only an integral part of the official discourse but also determine 
France’s political and strategic culture.         
 The sentiment of responsibility was further enhanced by the notion of friendship that French and 
Malian actors employed to describe their relationship. By framing their decision as that of an actor 
assisting a friend in need, French policy-makers anthropomorphised both the bilateral relationship as 
such and the decision they had produced in the name of France. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, rather 
than the state being another state’s friend, it is the foreign policy elites who consider themselves more 
or less related to their counterparts in another state. Friendship in this regard shapes the relationship 
between states and influences decision-making processes by pushing for action. Berenskoetter (2007, 
670) defines friendship in international relations as a ‘process of building a “common world” to which 
states become emotionally attached’. Repeatedly, French decision-makers emphasised that France was 
a friend of Africa and a friend of Mali. Friendship, Hollande stated, ‘creates obligations’ (Hollande 
2012i). Thus by declaring themselves a friend of Mali and the region, French actors became directly 
concerned and felt obliged to assist in the problem solution (Fabius 2012c). In other words, the perceived 
friendship facilitated the French intervention insofar as it made action morally indispensable.330 As 
Hollande put it, ‘For us, it is not about conquering a territory, increasing our influence, or seeking 
whatever commercial or economic interest. These times are over. In contrast, our country—because it 
is France—must help a friend’ (Hollande 2013h, emphasis added).331 The two elements that come to the 
forefront in this statement relate to the self-understanding of French decision-makers as well as to the 
emotional dimension of decision-making processes.       
                                                     
330 Although Aristotle emphasised the selflessness of true friendship, friendship, it can be argued will always be 
based on some sort of reciprocity. That is to say, France, in exchange for its good deed can expect some political 
favour and if it is only the prolongation of the Franco-African common world.  
331  ‘Je sais bien qu'ici comme ailleurs, vous comprenez l'enjeu. Il n'est pas pour nous que conquérir un territoire, 
de vouloir accroitre notre influence ou de chercher je ne sais quel intérêt commercial ou économique. Ce temps-
là est fini. En revanche, notre pays parce que c'est la France doit venir en aide à un pays ami’.  
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 Emotions played an important role in the French discourse on Africa and francophone Africa in 
particular. References to emotional bounds that ran through the French discourse directly affected the 
decision to intervene. A president who declared himself as being ‘very much attached’ to Africa 
(Hollande 2012h) was joined by a minister for development who followed the crisis in Mali ‘with much 
attention and much emotion’ (Canfin 2012b), and a foreign minister who, when seeking allies across 
West Africa, declared himself to ‘love Senegal’ (Fabius 2012d), to affirm collectively their ‘sadness’ 
about the collapse of the Malian state.332 Bleiker and Hutchison (2008, 116), in their study on emotions 
in world politics, find empathy and compassion to be central explanatory variables of the making of 
world politics. Elsewhere in the same text they state, drawing on Mercer (1995), that ‘questions of affect 
play a crucial role in determining how individual and collective identities are constituted, thus also 
shaping perceptions of the international system and the threats it may pose to states’ (Bleiker and 
Hutchison 2008, 122). According to Marcus, emotions in politics have been used ‘to explain why people 
deviate from their characteristic disposition’ (Marcus 2003, 222). Drawing on these findings, I would 
suggest that the decision for intervention, to some extent, can be explained with reference to the 
emotional attachment French actors feel when Africa’s security is concerned. As a close advisor to 
Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian stated, ‘Mali … is part of us, or at least of our history….The 
extremely close ties that persist between Africa and France make us consider ourselves more legitimate 
than others [to act]. The path we have to cross mentally to imagine rescuing Mali is rather short.’333 In 
addition, emotional bounds give decision-makers the necessary domestic support to conduct military 
operations in Africa. As one pundit observed, ‘François Hollande can say, “I commit myself militarily 
in Africa, I will have to deplore some casualties, but I do it” because the French will always feel 
something with regard to Africa’.334        
                                                     
332  Interestingly, these sentiments seem to be shared by their African counterparts who continue to speak of a 
‘question of love’ (Boni, Yayi 2012) in order to describe their close relationship.   
333  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. ‘Le Mali dans l’esprit 
général français, c’est une partie de nous-mêmes, en tout cas c’est une partie de notre histoire…. Donc, le lien 
extrêmement étroit entretenu entre cet Afrique là et la France, fait que non pas nous nous sentons plus légitime 
que d’autres, mais le chemin qu’on doit parcourir mentalement pour imaginer de venir en secours du Mali est 
assez simple’.  
334 Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014. ‘François 
Hollande peut dire je m’engage militairement en Afrique, je vais avoir des morts, mais je le fais, parce que les 
Français vont toujours sentir quelque chose par rapport à l’Afrique’. While this statement illustrates once more 
consensus of the elite with regard to military interventions in Africa, it is questionable whether this attitude can 
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 Arguably, the biggest amplifier of the perceived emotional bounds between French and African elites 
is the common language. France’s commitment to the Francophonie organisation remains considerable 
and references to a common language and culture were abundant in the discourse on the crisis solution 
in Mali. When asked how to explain the notion of proximity, almost all my interlocutors responded by 
saying, ‘first we are united by the language we share’.335 As shown above, French actors consider their 
language to be more than a means of communication, but also a vehicle of norms and values, and as one 
of several foreign policy instruments that allow them to exercise political influence on the African 
continent.336 
…speaking the French language, which is an African language here, also means passing on values, 
carrying a message, inspiring peoples; speaking French means speaking the language of freedom, 
means speaking the language of dignity, means speaking the language of cultural diversity. This is 
your language this is our language, we share this language. Let us circulate it, let us carry it, let us 
do everything that those who speak this language will have an advantage compared to those who do 
not.337 (Hollande 2013g) 
By reinforcing the sentiments of proximity, responsibility, and togetherness among French and African 
elites, the common language influenced the decision-making processes and facilitated the military 
intervention in several ways. First, by simplifying the communication between Malian and French elites, 
the common language promoted an early perception and understanding of what was happening on the 
ground. Second, French language promotion and cultural policies were employed as a preventive means 
of counteracting the increasing influence of AQIM in the region. Finally, the French language is 
interlinked with the perception French elites have of their own country and its role in the international 
system.            
 Much has been written about French grandeur and how it influences the country’s foreign policy-
                                                     
actually be generalised to the whole of French society. By attributing their own cognitive schemata to the entire 
French society, foreign policy-makers universalise an elite culture and by so doing auto-legitimate their actions.  
335  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of the interior, Paris, 12 February 2014. ‘Ce qui m’a frappé 
toutes les fois quand on a rencontré les Africains, d’abord on est uni on partage la même langue. Ce n’est pas 
rien. Tous les élites africaines aiment la France, aiment de venir, trouvent que c’est vraiment un pays frère’. 
336  Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone, policy advisor at the Francophonie organisation, interview by author, Paris, 20 
September 2013.  
337  ‘Parce que parler une langue, parler la langue française, qui est ici une langue africaine, c'est aussi 
transmettre des valeurs, porter des messages, inspirer des peuples ; parler la langue française, c'est parler la 
langue de la liberté, c'est parler la langue de la dignité, c'est parler la langue de la diversité culturelle. C'est votre 
langue, c'est notre langue, nous l'avons en commun. Diffusons-la, portons-la et faisons en sorte que ceux qui la 
parlent aient une chance de plus que les autres’. 
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making (Cerny 1980; Gordon 1993). As argued above, the problem with this concept, which was 
developed to describe France’s foreign policy behaviour under Charles de Gaulle, is that it is somewhat 
dated and no longer fits with contemporary foreign policy discourses and practices. I, therefore, rely on 
the notion of puissance d’influence to examine the self-understanding of French elites and its impact on 
decision-making processes. The notion of puissance d’influence (influential power) is in many regards 
similar to the concept of grandeur, but has been adapted to the characteristics of international relations 
in the early 21st century. For Yves Gounin the concept of puissance d’influence and the discourses and 
practices that derive from it are an expression of ‘schizophrenia’. On the one hand, French leaders 
continue to emphasise France’s grandeur, its position in the international system, its dominant role in 
Africa, and its place in history, on the other they are well aware of the limits of this narrative given the 
size of France and both its financial and political constraints.338 This co-occurrence of a proactive foreign 
policy and a certain number of constraints resulted in a policy that supported a multilateral problem 
solution. In the end however, the Hollande administration did not stop short from unilateral action. While 
the goal of Operation Serval was to save Mali’s sovereignty, it just as much served to safeguard France’s 
own identity. As the president proclaimed on the evening of his decision, 
France is an active and engaged power, which has this ambition of being useful in the world that 
surrounds it. This ambition is not new, but derives from our history, which makes us hold a series 
of principles and values, which we have not invented exclusively for ourselves, but which we share 
with the entire world: democracy, human rights, a balance of power (une conception équilibrée), the 
will to avoid any hegemony or power, and the intention to always resort to international 
organisations to allow for peace and security.339 (Hollande 2013q)  
 The idea of France being a puissance d’influence can only be maintained if French actors make 
national and international audiences believe that France is actually assuming this self-imposed role. 
Africa remains the first region where France can give proof of its political and military capacities. 
Accordingly, in January 2013 after all multilateral efforts had failed to materialise and the sovereignty 
of a state within France’s special zone of influence was threatened, a French president, who holds that 
                                                     
338  Yves Gounin, privy counsellor, interview by author, Paris, 26 June 2013.  
339  ‘La France est une puissance active, engagée, qui a cette ambition d'être utile au monde qui l'entoure. C'est 
une ambition qui n'est pas nouvelle, qui vient de notre histoire, qui fait que nous portons des valeurs, des principes 
qui ne sont pas ceux que nous avons inventé pour nous-mêmes mais ceux que nous donnons en partage à l'ensemble 
du monde ; la démocratie, les droits de l'Homme, une conception équilibrée, la volonté d'éviter toute hégémonie 
ou toute puissance et le souci qu'il y ait à chaque fois le recours aux organisations internationales pour permettre 
la paix et la sécurité’. 
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‘France is not just any country in Europe and its president not just any head of state in the world [and 
who] … intends to emphasise France’s international ambition’340 (Hollande 2012l) could not afford to 
stand and watch but had to act. In this regard, it is particularly interesting to note that the crisis was 
primarily not about Mali, but about the entire West African region, if not the continent as a whole. In 
November 2012 Fabius said he ‘felt a [general] realisation that this was not only about Mali―although 
at the heart of the problem―but, I almost dare to say, about the future of the whole of Africa’ (Fabius 
2012i).341 Put differently, the crisis could have happened in any of France’s former African colonies and 
would have provoked the same or a similar reaction on the part of France’s foreign policy elite.  
 The claim that this decision was as much about France’s own identity as about solving the security 
crisis in the Sahel can be confirmed when looking at the reactions to operation Serval of both African 
and French actors. Four weeks into the intervention, Hollande travelled to Mali to announce the first 
military successes and to symbolically introduce the second phase of the military operation that 
consisted of stabilising the country, enabling the holding of elections, and conducting counterinsurgency 
missions. On this and subsequent occasions the Malian elite cheered the values and principles of the 
Fifth Republic and praised the French state for its rapid and determined reaction. Statements such the 
following by Mali’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré provided the necessary acceptance and 
confirmation of the role France intended to play in Mali and in Africa when saying, ‘Representatives of 
Timbuktu tell François Hollande, president of France, the France of the 1789 revolution, the president 
of a France that cherishes liberty, equality, and fraternity, that he is the brother of all Malians, the brother 
of all inhabitants of the Sahel, and true friend all Africa (Traoré 2013).342 Against the backdrop of these 
eulogies, François Hollande elevated his decision to launch Operation Serval as the most important of 
all events in his entire political life: ‘I want to say that today I have experienced the most important day 
of my political life. At one point, a decision had to be taken committing the lives of men and women. I 
                                                     
340  ‘La France n’est pas n’importe quel pays d’Europe et son président n’est pas n’importe quel chef d’État du 
monde…j’entends donner à la France toute sa place dans l’affirmation d’une ambition internationale’. 
341  ‘Toute une série de personnalités y sont intervenues, notamment le président français. J'ai senti physiquement 
une prise de conscience que ce n'était pas simplement la question du Mali - au demeurant très importante - qui 
était posée, mais j'allais dire presque le devenir de l'ensemble de l'Afrique’. 
342  ‘Représentants de Tombouctou, dites à François Hollande, le Président de la France, la France de la 
Révolution de 1789, la Président de la France de la Liberté, de l'Égalité et de la Fraternité, qu'il est le frère de 
toutes les Maliennes, de tous les Maliens, le frère de toutes les Sahéliennes, de tous les Sahéliens, l'ami sincère de 
l'Afrique toute entière’. 
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took this decision in the name of France. This decision honours France. Through the clamours, fervours, 
and the support you show me, you are showing the highest respect to the whole of France (Hollande 
2013g).343            
 In France, foreign policy-making takes up a core place in the decision-makers’ role conception. 
While this statement applies to foreign policy-making in general, France’s policy towards Africa has the 
most distinctive influence on French actors’ national role conception. This is also due to the fact that 
French actors find an audience in their former special zone of influence that is willing to accept their 
self-imposed role conception. As Brummer and Thies argue (2014, 4) ‘the role location process for a 
state involves the acknowledgment and acceptance of NRCs [national role conceptions] by other states’ 
to complete this social act of role creation. France’s former colonies exercise this mirror function par 
excellence. In the case of the Malian crisis they not only provided the locus of French action but also 
acted as an affirmative audience. Audiences, in general, fulfill several functions. They guide the foreign 
policy performer, they either negatively or positively sanction actions, they contribute to the 
maintenance of an actor’s specific behavior over time, and most importantly they serve as confirmation 
of an actor’s subjective reality (Thies 2009, 11). François Hollande’s subsequent invitation as the only 
non-African head of state to the 50 year anniversary of the AU and the positive reception by African 
heads of state of the Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, which took place in Paris in December 
2013, confirmed the French president’s decision and allocated France the role it intended to play in the 
international system.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: The Fight among Principles 
In this chapter, I demonstrated how the French decision to intervene in Mali developed gradually. A 
decade had passed from the early perception of the emergence of a threat in the Sahel to the actual 
decision to deploy ground troops. The Hollande administration brought the decision-making process 
                                                     
343  ‘Et moi, je veux ici vous dire que je viens de vivre la journée la plus importante de ma vie politique. Parce que, 
à un moment, une décision doit être prise, elle engage la vie d'hommes et de femmes. Cette décision, je l'ai prise 
au nom de la France. Cette décision, elle honore la France et à travers les clameurs, la ferveur, le soutien que 
vous m'apportez, c'est à toute la France que vous donnez votre plus grand hommage’. 
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from the perception stage to the policy framing and finally action phases. In other words, the Hollande 
administration ‘securitised’ (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998) the situation in Mali in order to solve it. 
To address the initial question of how and why the shift from a no-boots-on-the-ground policy to a quasi-
unilateral French intervention occurred, I engaged with the French discourse and isolated the various 
cognitive maps and rhetoric devices that were employed by French foreign policy elites throughout the 
decision-making process. At the time actors possessed clear mental maps when engaging in 
securitisation discourses on the African continent. This is not anymore the case, struggles between 
different paradigms explain the changing course of French foreign policy.   
 Whilst being subject to changes and struggles, the debate on France’s military intervention in Mali 
does not support the thesis of French policy-making being in a state of confusion (Bovcon 2012; 
Cumming 2013). By looking at the process, the idea that the president’s decision was the expression of 
ad hoc policy-making could be discarded very quickly. Instead of being simply the reaction to a quickly 
changing situation on the ground, French decision-makers had familiarised themselves gradually with 
the crisis in Mali and little by little made room for a unilateral military solution. The examination of the 
different dimensions of proximity showed how French actors incorporated the Malian crisis on their 
political agenda before elevating it to their absolute priority. These findings are in line with arguments 
about preference formation and preference change advanced by cognitive science. For long, cognitive 
scientist have argued that new or changing ‘preferences are not created out of thin air; they evolve from 
refinements of existing preferences’ (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 7).     
 Critics of discursive approaches consider the shift in the French position a case to disprove the 
relevance of political rhetoric and discursive material. To counter this criticism I had to demonstrate 
that, notwithstanding the fundamental shift in the French position, the cognitive maps approach 
maintained its explanatory power. Rather than discarding the impact of mental maps outright, I showed 
that the precise moment of the decision, just as the decision itself, resulted from the co-occurrence of 
contradictory principles. In fact, France’s foreign policy elites were torn between their commitment to 
a multilateral, European, and African solution, and the perceived idea that it was France’s responsibility 
to solve the crisis in Mali. These two convictions provoked conflicts not only within the French state 
apparatus, but also within individual decision-makers. Most of the actors who were more inclined 
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towards unilateral intervention, were initially situated in the Ministry of Defence and among the military. 
In both institutions, actors soon were convinced that the degradation of the situation in Mali could only 
be brought to a halt with the help of French troops (Notin 2014, 122). During a state visit in Chad in 
July 2014 Hollande implied that the driving forces of Operation Serval had been located in the Ministry 
of Defence and among the Joint Chiefs of Military Staff. The president, emphasising Chad’s important 
support during the operation, stated ‘when on proposal of the minister of defence and the chief of staff, 
I had to decide a troop deployment to fight against terrorists, it was you, it was here, from Ndjamena, 
that the first planes departed’ (Hollande 2014e, emphasis added).344 Notin (2014, 128) describes the 
almost comic situation by the end of 2012 in which ‘the military prepared themselves for a war that the 
diplomats tried to avoid’. The closer January 2013 came, the broader the support for a military 
intervention became. In the end, the president’s decision could be presented as a consensus between 
Hollande, his advisors, and the different ministries, which benefitted from broad cross-party support. 
The intervention did not eradicate the multilateral rhetoric from the French discourse. In contrast, 
Operation Serval was framed as an intervention that France conducted in the name of the international 
community and for the sake of Mali. Four months after the beginning of the military campaign, Hollande 
continued to argue ‘that it is the Africans who need to assure their own defence, also with regard to 
terrorism. But for all that France is not going to withdraw…we need to support Africa’s security’ 
(Hollande 2013j).345 Finally, the perceived responsibility won over the constraints and limits imposed 
by the operational environment and previous discourses. Proximity, responsibility, and friendship were 
among the principal heuristics that explain why the French president, in agreement with his 
administration, was able to take on the risk and send French troops to the Sahel.  
 
                                                     
344  ‘Lorsqu'il s'est agi de déclencher l'intervention au Mali, au début de l'année 2013, lorsque sur la proposition 
du ministre de la Défense, du Chef d'Etat-Major, il fallut que je décide de l'engagement des forces, pour arrêter 
des terroristes, c'est vous, c'est d'ici, de Ndjamena que sont partis les avions qui ont permis d'obtenir les premiers 
résultats. Je sais donc ce que la France vous doit et le Mali plus encore’. 
345  Ce sont les Africains qui doivent assurer leur propre défense, y compris par rapport au terrorisme. Mais pour 
autant, la France ne va pas se désengager. Ce que nous pouvons apporter au-delà de ce que nous faisons déjà 
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…men gladly change their ruler, thinking to better themselves. This belief causes them 
to take up arms against their ruler, but they fool themselves in this, since they then 
see through experience that matters have become worse. This stems from another 
natural and ordinary necessity, which is that a new prince must always harm his 
subjects, both with his soldiers as well as with his countless other injuries involved in 
his new conquest. 
―Niccolò Machiavelli 
 
L’inaction n’était pas une option. 
―Jean-Marc Ayrault  
 
En République centrafricaine, notre objectif a été d'éviter ce qu'on a appelé, peut-être 
trop rapidement, un génocide. Je rappelle que la veille du jour où nous sommes 
intervenus, 1.000 personnes ont été tuées dans le pays. Cette intervention a eu lieu à 
la demande des Nations unies, de l'Union africaine et de la République centrafricaine. 
―Laurent Fabius 
 
Figure 9. Central African Republic, borders, rivers, principal cities 




While the world watched French armed forces fighting against terrorist and criminal groups in the Sahel, 
another state in France’s special zone of influence plunged into chaos: the Central African Republic 
(CAR). In the second half of 2012 the rebel alliance Seleka346 (alliance in Sango) started a rebellion 
against the government in place. By January 2013, the Seleka had taken over large parts of the country 
and subsequently―after a failed peace agreement―ousted the then President François Bozizé in a 
military coup on 24 March 2013 to replace him by one of their own leaders, Michel Djotodia. Djotodia 
pledged to install a transitional government that would allow for the return of stability and permit 
democratic elections. However, over the course of the following months Djotodia and his administration 
increasingly lost control over their followers. Notwithstanding desperate calls for restraint by Djotodia 
and his acolytes leading to the eventual dissolution of the alliance, uncontrolled Seleka combatants took 
advantage of their dominant position and began looting Bangui’s Christian neighbourhoods and 
government strongholds as well as uncounted villages on their way to the capital. Some of these fighters 
considered their actions as revenge for years of neglect on the part of the government, others were simply 
driven by grief and the lucrative profits they saw in the business of banditry, and again others explained 
their motivation to loot as a combination of the two factors.     
 Despite the official dissolution of the Seleka in September 2013, the interethnic clashes in the CAR 
did not stop. In opposition to the excesses of these ex-rebels, self-defence militias―the so-called anti-
balaka―were formed and were soon afterwards joined by members of the former Army, the forces 
armées centrafricaines (FACA).347 They, too, did not limit their actions to defensive measures but 
committed atrocities mainly against the country’s Muslim minority, and thus gave further momentum 
to a seemingly endless spiral of reciprocal violence. As in many other civil conflicts the ‘protectors 
                                                     
346  The Seleka, created in late 2012 and dissolved in September 2013, was an alliance between different rebel 
groups. The three main factions were the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Patriotic 
Convention for the Salvation of Kodro (Sango for country) (CPSK), and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity 
(UFDR).  
347  Different explanations exist regarding the origins of the anti-balaka militias and the meaning of their name. 
While some pundits argue the anti-balaka militias have emerged in reaction to the atrocities committed by ex-
Seleka combatants, others hold that they already existed as local militias before the formation of the Seleka. With 
the Seleka looting across the country, these former self-defence militias then turned into the primary opponent of 
ex-Seleka fighters and are at the origin of organised violence, lootings, and acts of lynching of mainly Muslim 
civilians. As for the name, some authors translate anti-balaka as anti-machete, while others advance the translation 
of anti-balles-AK (anti AK-47 bullets) (IRIN News 2014).      
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bec[a]me violators, and their appearance cause[d] fear, not security (Mehler 2012, 49). After a new wave 
of violence, the UN Security Council―headed by France―passed Resolution 2127 on 5 December 
2013 and by so doing accorded the French government the sought-after legitimacy to launch Operation 
Sangaris in support of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic 
(MISCA). Within a few hours after the vote of the UN Resolution, François Hollande announced the 
deployment of a French peacekeeping operation.      
 The present chapter explores the justifications, motivations, and belief systems that prompted the 
Hollande administration to intervene in yet another conflict in Africa less than twelve months after the 
beginning of Operation Serval. As the preceding chapter, this chapter scrutinises the actors’ motivations 
by engaging with the different stages of the decision-making process. More precisely, the chapter 
explores the role of mental maps during the decision-making process and analyses the constraints and 
opportunities these provided for decision-makers. Notwithstanding the non-negligible differences 
between the two cases, one cannot understand the French operation in the CAR without taking into 
account France’s action in Mali. While it is true that the nature, legitimacy, and purpose of the two 
military operations differed greatly, both situations on the ground and the French responses also showed 
certain similarities. Tardy, for instance, detects important parallels with regard to both the operational 
environment and the decision-making processes during the two crises. 
First of all, if the two situations differ in terms of the specific risks they cover―risk of terrorism in 
Mali versus risk of mass crimes in the CAR―the two countries are similar in terms of their 
respective state fragility and extreme weakness of their governance structures. This similarity is 
important insofar as it affects the policies of crisis management to be put in place….348 (Tardy 2013, 
2–3)  
 Furthermore, similar conceptual maps and motivations came to the forefront in both cases. Decision-
making processes in the context of the CAR were necessarily influenced by the experiences and strategic 
limitations imposed by the on-going war in Mali. By looking at two instances of securitisation of French 
foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa, the scope of the present research can be widened. Moreover, the 
                                                     
348  ‘Tout d’abord, si les deux situations se distinguent par la spécificité des risques qu’elles recouvrent – risque 
terroriste au Mali versus risque de crimes de masse en RCA – les deux pays se rejoignent par leur état de fragilité 
et d’extrême faiblesse de leurs structures de gouvernance. Cette similitude est importante en ce qu’elle informe la 
nature des politiques de gestion de crise à mettre en place, dans les deux cas de long terme et allant au-delà des 
seuls aspects sécuritaires pour inclure l’assistance dans le domaine des élections, de la bonne gouvernance, de la 
réforme des secteurs judiciaire et de sécurité ou du développement’. 
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case of the CAR suits itself to verify prior findings within a different context and thus allows for more 
general claims regarding French decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa under the Hollande 
administration.349 In sum, considering both cases allows for a better understanding of France’s 
relationship with the African continent at the beginning of the 21st century, its security policy in that 
region of the world, and its identity as defender of the present international order.   
 This chapter begins with a brief description of the 2012-2013 crisis in the CAR. This first section 
focuses on the origins and dynamics of the crisis. Special attention is paid to the role of religion among 
the various causes of the conflict as well as France’s longstanding military presence in that country. 
Whereas the French Army disengaged from Mali at the time of independence, it has never truly left the 
CAR. This continuous French military presence had a direct impact on the decision-making process that 
precipitated France’s latest military operation in Africa. The chapter’s second part surveys the decision-
making process more closely. It will be shown how and why the French discourse shifted from an initial 
reluctance to intervene towards an intervention in the name of humanity. The impact of the Rwandan 
genocide on the decision-making process in the CAR will be illustrated, the assumed relationship 
between instability and the global war on terrorism highlighted, and the role of empathy as part of the 
actors self-identity as representatives of an influential power analysed.   
 
5.1 The Central African Republic: A Crisis-Ridden Phantom State  
The CAR has been considered a failed or phantom state for most of its post-independence existence 
(International Crisis Group 2007, i). As a colony nicknamed the ‘Cinderella of the French Empire’ 
(2007, 3; Brustier 1962), this land-locked country at the heart of the African continent, covering an area 
that is slightly larger than France and the Benelux states taken together, but only inhabited by an 
                                                     
349  I am at unease with the notion of ‘structured, focussed comparison’; since it suggests that all variables with 
exception of the independent variables under examination could be kept constant across the different case studies. 
Nevertheless, by widening the scope some general claims about French security policy in sub-Saharan Africa 
become possible. In the end, both case studies serve the purpose of explaining one common phenomenon: French 
military interventionism in francophone Africa (George and Bennett 2005, 67–70). For a more detailed discussion 
of this point see the introduction and conclusion to this study.    
 189 
 
estimated 4.5 million people, has suffered from continuous political instability and has never escaped 
the endless spiral of violence and atrocities successive governments and different warring groups 
inflicted upon each other and the rest of the population. Some pundits define the history of the post-
independence CAR as ‘one of the most tragic of the African continent’ (Niewiadowski 2014, 1). The 
notorious excesses of self-proclaimed Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966-1979) exposed only the peak 
of an iceberg of failed governance and unsuccessful leadership. Given this permanent state of fragility, 
which induced a semblance of normality, the situation in the CAR has largely failed to attract the 
deserved attention of the international community (Ngoupandé 2003, 23–24).    
 Despite ‘the fairly successful democratic transition in the early 1990s’ (Mehler 2011, 118), the 
country once more fell victim to mismanagement and became the scene of violent conflict shortly 
afterwards. According to Mehler (2011, 122), the ‘CAR is an example of a transition that was perverted 
by the undemocratic behavior of democratically elected rulers’. Recent human development indicators 
show quite plainly the consequences for the population of this ‘perverted transition’. In 2013, the CAR 
ranked 185/187 on the HDI league table. The life expectancy at birth was with 50.2 years the second 
lowest in the world. A gross national income per capita of $588 and 3.5 years of schooling on average 
reflected the arduousness of daily-life in the CAR.350 Extreme poverty, a lack of infrastructure, the 
absence of a functioning state, and an insufficient educational system constituted the breeding ground 
of recurring mutinies, coups, and rebellions. Finally, a plethora of natural resources (diamonds, gold, 
game animals, and crude oil in the north) gave rise to disputes over strategic resources thus fuelling the 
continuous conflicts even further. Due to the country’s constant political instability, the CAR did not 
benefit from the same generous allocations from the international donor community as Mali. Lastly, the 
country’s geographic location and its borders with Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan, placed the CAR at 
the heart of the Darfur crisis, the secession of South Sudan, and the 2006-2008 rebellion in eastern Chad, 
not to mention the activities of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) that spilled over to the south east of 
the country (Berg 2009).351    
                                                     
350  UNDP data, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, accessed on 28 July 2014. 
351  The CAR borders with Chad in the north, Sudan in the northeast, South Sudan in the east, the DRC and Congo 
Brazzaville in the south, and Cameroon in the west. The borders in the north are anything else but stable and 




5.1.1 Towards the Abyss  
With the exception of André-Dieudonné Kolingba, who lost the 1993 democratic elections to Ange-
Félix Patassé, all of the country’s successive presidents were ousted from office by their political 
opponents in one way or another.352 Skirmishes and struggles for leadership defined the last two decades 
and the presidencies of Félix-Ange Patassé and his successor François Bozizé. Between 1997 and 2008, 
four peace agreements were signed between the different opposing groups.353 However, none of these 
agreements produced a sustainable peace or the long-wanted stability in the CAR. For Mehler (2014), 
the conflict in the CAR is as much about the mutual distrust among elites created by years of intrigues, 
mutinies, and politically motivated killings as it is about societal grievances. Adding to this, personal 
interests usually prevailed over national welfare. As the International Crisis group puts it, all ‘armed 
opposition in the CAR has been driven by [the rebels’] desire to acquire control of the state to advance 
[their] own personal interest rather than any specific political agenda’ (International Crisis Group 2007, 
22). Regardless of which movement prevailed at any given moment, without an inclusive national 
political agenda, the remaining groups were soon antagonised and it thus was only a question of time 
before the next outburst of violence occurred.         
 Throughout his term, François Bozizé had failed to address the country’s most urgent needs. Besides 
the government’s inability to contribute to economic and social development, Bozizé’s biggest mistake 
was his failure to address the prevailing insecurity and to contain the armed groups that were present in 
the CAR’s territory, in particular in the northeast. Similar to Mali’s Amadou Toumani Touré, Bozizé 
feared that a strong Army could turn against him and thus kept the FACA underequipped and badly 
                                                     
in Darfur and South Sudan, rebels and refugees crossed the border and carried the conflict into the CAR. The same 
is true for rebels from Chad, who later constituted a good part of the Seleka movement. In the southeast the Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) infiltrated the CAR when retreating from the Ugandan and US military.  
352  David Dacko (1960-1965) overthrown by Jean-Bédel Bokassa; Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966-1979) overthrown 
by the French government (Operation Barracuda) and replaced by David Dacko; David Dacko (1979-1981) 
overthrown by André Kolingba; André Kolingba (1981-1993) electoral defeat in the 1993 elections; Ange-Félix 
Patassé (1993-2003) deposed by François Bozizé; François Bozizé (2003-2013) ousted by Seleka rebels; Michel 
Djotodia (2013) after continuous violence forced to resign by regional leaders and the international community; 
interim President Catherine Samba Panza (2013 - ).  
353  The major peace agreements were signed in Bangui 25 January 1997, Sirte (Libya) 2 February 2007, Birao 13 
April 2007, and Libreville (Gabon) 21 June 2008. 
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trained.354 His ethno-familial nepotistic governance aggravated the general discontent even further 
(International Crisis Group 2013, 1–5). Since the end of 2012, the newly created Seleka movement 
engaged in combats with the FACA and international peacekeepers deployed by the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS). In January 2013, Bozizé―aware of the FACA’s 
inability to resist any major rebellion―and after having solicited France for military support, without 
effect (Libération 2012; Reuters 2012), agreed to the Libreville II negotiations.355 The resulting 
Libreville II agreement, in other words, was the president’s last chance to remain in power after having 
been abandoned by his two major foreign allies―Chad and France―who had supported him during and 
after his takeover.356          
 The peace treaty ‘aimed to provide a road map for a political transition and ceasefire’ (Mudge and 
Le Pennec 2013, 29). A government of national unity was to be created under human rights advocate 
and long-term opposition leader Nicolas Tiangaye. The Seleka was represented by UFDR leader Michel 
Djotodia as vice prime minister and defence minister (Mehler 2013, 2). The three-year transitional 
period that was stipulated by the agreement never materialised ‘due to Bozizé’s refusal to engage in a 
concerted and peaceful transition; failure by ECCAS to monitor the agreement; and Seleka’s tactical 
advantages on the ground’ (International Crisis Group 2013, i). None of the parties were ready for 
compromise or interested in a solution that could have saved the country from the exodus. Bozizé was 
                                                     
354  Other authors put it more carefully when emphasising the ‘low capacity, the existence of parallel structures in 
state security services, and the heteroclite composition of the armed forces’. They interpret Bozizé’s failure to 
address these shortcomings as a probable lack of political will (Mehler 2012, 57–58). 
355  After the rebels had taken over several major cities in the northeast and the centre of the country, FACA troops 
together with ECCAS peacekeepers could stop the rebels from entering Bangui and thus created a standstill that 
allowed for negotiations. Libreville II is not the official name of the concluded peace treaty, but is used in the 
present study to distinguish this latest peace agreement from the earlier agreement concluded in Libreville in 2008.   
356  In 2011 the Sarkozy administration had revoked the existing bi-lateral defence agreement. The renewal of the 
existing defence agreement between France and the CAR was part of an overall review of all remaining defence 
agreements between France and its former colonies. The amended treaty did not contain an assistance clause. In 
case of an internal or external aggression, France was not anymore obliged to assist the Central African government 
militarily (République française 2011). Consequently, and in contrast to previous instances such as the 
interventions of the French Air Force and Foreign Legion against the UFDR in late 2006 and early 2007 provoking 
negotiations that resulted in the Birao peace agreement in April 2007 (Makong 2013), the Hollande administration 
was free to refuse Bozizé’s request and to abstain from an intervention in the name of regime stability. With Idriss 
Déby, Bozizé lost his principal and final regional ally, who not only supported him during the military coup against 
Félix-Ange Patassé in 2003 but subsequently also secured the former’s stay in power (Debos 2008, 227). 
Previously, Chadian soldiers formed a major part of Bozizé’s presidential guard (Debos 2008, 228). Chad’s 
involvement in the CAR, however, runs deeper and is more ambiguous. As of December 2012, signs became 
visible that Déby had decided to abandon Bozizé. In March 2013, the Chadian administration is believed to directly 
have supported the military coup. The Déby government is also ‘believed to have been a sponsor and perpetrator 
of human rights abuses against civilians in CAR’s north’ (Mudge and Le Pennec 2013, 32).  
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assured by the support South Africa had granted to his government whilst the Seleka did not ignore their 
own successes during the latest combats. In February 2013, new clashes were witnessed undoing all 
hopes for a lasting peace. On 24 March the Seleka advanced towards the capital and ousted Bozizé who 
fled to Cameroon. This move put an end to François Bozizé’s decade-old presidential rule, which in its 
final moments was marked by a ‘solitary and paranoid exercise of power’ (International Crisis Group 
2013, 2).357 Bozizé’s departure, however, was not enough to end the violence.    
 The CAR was soon engulfed in an even more dangerous crisis. After the departure of Bozizé, Seleka 
leader Michel Djotodia became president and head of a transitional government. In an attempt to poor 
oil on troubled water and to reverse the AU’s decision to temporarily suspend the CAR, Djotodia 
pledged to observe the Libreville II accord and to implement the agreed transition (International Crisis 
Group 2013, 13). Implementing this promise, however, was no mean feat. Soon after his assumption of 
office, the heterogeneity of the movement came to the forefront. Between March and September 2013, 
Michel Djotodia increasingly lost control over this ‘heterogeneous coalition of Central African and 
foreign combatants’ who, as many observers claimed, had ‘nothing in common except being Muslims’ 
(International Crisis Group 2013, 8). By the time Djotodia announced the dissolution of the Seleka, it 
was already too late for this decision to end the aggravating violence committed by both ex-Seleka 
fighters and anti-balaka militia.358 The CAR was in shambles and even the slightest reference to 
statehood would have euphemised the reality on the ground. A state of anarchy had engulfed the entire 
country, undoing the little that was left of the weak institutional setting. 
 
                                                     
357  François Bozizé’s had seized power in 2003 after ousting Ange-Félix Patassé from office. After an initial 
period of reconciliation, Bozizé soon found himself in the midst of the so-called Bush War (2004-2007), which 
opposed government forces and various rebel groups (notably Michel Djotodia’s UFDR). Despite the signing of 
the Sirte peace agreement on 2 February 2007 between the government and the FDPC and the Birao peace 
agreement on 13 April 2007 between the government and the UFDR, which officially put an end to the conflict, 
the hostilities continued giving rise to the more inclusive Libreville peace agreement 2008. However, occasional 
outbreaks of violence and disputes over the control of diamond fields in the north continued well into 2011. The 
2012 Seleka rebellion constituted a restart of the same conflict.  
358  The violence committed by anti-balaka elements reached its heights at the beginning of 2014 after the 




5.1.2 The Role of Religion: Fact or Fiction?  
What had begun as a conflict between rebels of mainly northern origin and government forces loyal to 
then President François Bozizé quickly turned into a full-blown civil war that gained an increasingly 
sectarian dimension. Even for a country accustomed to political crises, authoritarianism, and mutinies, 
this was something new. Whilst not being a religious movement per se, the Seleka used references to 
their Muslim identity as the common denominator to unite the different factions and groups comprising 
the movement (Flichy, Mézin-Bourginaud, and Mathias 2014, 50). Islam soon became the principal 
identity-forging element of this rebel alliance. Religion was likewise a means of emphasising the 
marginalisation, underrepresentation, and neglect of the northerners, especially those living in the 
remote Vakaga province, who constituted the majority of the Seleka’s recruits.359 Based on these 
observations and the fact that Michel Djotodia was the country’s first Muslim president,360 the news of 
the civil war in the CAR being a religiously motivated conflict between Muslims and Christians spread 
like wildfire (Bensimon and Guibert 2013).       
 However, religious identity only added to the divisions already existing between populations, which 
were rooted in geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and social cleavages (Mayneri 2014, 189; Burchard 2014). 
In other words, the sectarian divide between Seleka (mainly Muslims) and anti-balaka (mainly 
Christians) militias, with reference to which many pundits analysed the conflict, layered upon a much 
older ethno-regional cleavage between the north and the south (Mehler 2011, 119). In the discourses of 
leading rebel figures, social grievances became intertwined with religious claims. For instance Abakar 
Sabone co-founder of the UFDR, the strongest of all factions comprising Seleka, claimed a more 
equitable representation of the nation’s different ethnic groups, denounced well-known grievances such 
as ‘the impassibility of the roads in the [Vakaga (northern CAR)] region…, the lack of health care, the 
                                                     
359  The Vakaga province, bordering on Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan and thus being particularly exposed to the 
conflicts that have afflicted the region, had been completely abandoned by the central government. Most people 
living in this region feel closer to N’Djamena and Khartoum than to Bangui. Many speak Arabic instead of Sango 
or French. The populace of the Vakaga region also accounts for the largest number of the CAR’s Muslim minority. 
Other recruits reportedly originated from southern Chad and Sudan reinforcing the perception among southerners 
that the Seleka is a foreign movement that invaded their country.   
360  This definition does not consider Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s politically motivated conversion to Islam. In 
order to please Libya’s Gaddafi he and his Prime Minister Patassé converted to the Muslim faith for two months 
(Flichy, Mézin-Bourginaud, and Mathias 2014, 44).  
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lack of education, and insufficient access to potable water’, and at the same time criticised Bozizé’s 
‘broken promise to appoint a Muslim prime minister’ (Mehler 2011, 131–32). Religion, in other words, 
was exploited in order to find support for a cause that would be better explained in terms of geopolitical 
motivations and societal grievances. Oftentimes, the actors on the ground identified religion with 
indigenousness. Put differently, religion was also used to define the “Self” of the respective groups and 
to distinguish it from the “Other”, the foreign. For many anti-balaka members, Seleka fighters were 
foreigners that had invaded their country (Mayneri 2014, 191).      
 Finally, explanations of the conflict as a religious war between Christians and Muslims become 
untenable when one looks closer at the many different shapes of the various religious identities (Mayneri 
2014, 191). As former Central African Prime Minister Jean-Paul Ngoupandé notes on the specifics of 
Islam in sub-Saharan Africa,  
‘[Over] a period of one thousand years, Islam became integrated in everyday life, adjusted to the 
African traditions, which it digested and incorporated. It took on a specific African shape, having 
succeeded in creating a synthesis between itself and many pre-Islamic religions. This is the key to 
understanding the tolerant, noble, and even friendly character of the negro-African Islam. Only its 
[African version of] monotheism gets along well with animism.361 (Ngoupandé 2003, 81)    
 Neither the Seleka nor the anti-balaka nor the CAR’s populace in general practice Christianity or 
Islam in a traditional sense. Most people mix animist practices with one of the above-mentioned 
monotheistic beliefs. The anti-balaka movement, for instance, often described as Christian militia, is 
composed of members of Christian, Muslim, and Fulani (Peuls) communities. Beyond their nominal 
belonging to one of these communities most of them are animist, a trait that can be easily grasped by 
noting their wearing of so-called gris-gris—charms that are supposed to protect the bearer against enemy 
fire when going into battle (Chapleau 2014a; Assemblée Nationale 2014c). Notwithstanding this 
cautious qualification of the crisis’s religious dimension, the conflict has forged cleavages within the 
country that can easily be summarised along religious lines of demarcation. A report by the International 
Crisis Group from June 2013, describes the new political situation in the CAR as follows,  
The political, geo-ethnic and religious balance within the country’s leadership has been shaken up, 
provoking fears and confusion in CAR and in neighbouring countries. The military aircraft 
transporting the Seleka’s wounded flew to Khartoum and Rabat, the visit made by Central African 
                                                     
361  The attention here lies on the blending of monotheism and animism not on the normative evaluation of a certain 
form of religious practices, which is open to debate.  
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leaders to Qatar and the concerns expressed by neighbours (South Sudan, Uganda, Congo-
Brazzaville) about the rise of religious fundamentalism have created a climate of suspicion and 
dangerous religious tensions within the country and region. (International Crisis Group 2013, 18) 
 These tensions expressed themselves in form of lootings, atrocities, and what some characterised as 
pre-genocidal362 clashes. In the end, the violent confrontation between uncontrolled ex-Seleka units and 
the anti-balaka militias were driven more by hate vis-à-vis those who caused them hardship and by the 
sentiment of revenge than by any religious ideology. In this regard, the situation in the CAR is 
incomparable with the ideology advanced by fundamentalist fighters in Mali. References to radical 
Islam thus need to be considered as political arguments that were first used by the Bozizé administration 
to stigmatise the rebels and to win the international community’s support for its fight against rebel 
forces. Later this argument was willingly picked up by international actors to bring the conflict in line 
with the 21st century’s most popular security narrative, global Islamist terrorism.  
 
5.1.3 The French Army in the CAR  
The French state and its Army look back on a long history of deep involvement in the CAR’s domestic 
politics. As Faes and Smith (2000) show, the CAR before and after its independence ‘was the “hub” of 
the French pre-positioned forces on the continent’ (Faes and Smith 2000).363 Every time French interests 
                                                     
362 The notion of genocide has been subject to much debate. In particular, the question of at what stage one may 
start speaking of genocide remains unclear. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia advanced the 
following definition of genocide: ‘Genocide is characterised by two legal ingredients according to the terms of 
Article 4 of the Statute: [1] the material element of the offence, constituted by one or several acts enumerated in 
paragraph 2 of Article 4; [2] the mens rea of the offence, consisting of the special intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.’ However, this does not solve the question of threshold. 
‘In part’ as some authors have recognised could refer to ‘the murder of a single person’ (McGill Faculty of Law 
2007). The broader consensus, however, is that genocide refers to ‘the promotion and execution of policies by a 
state or its agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group ... [and when] the victimized groups 
are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., ethnicity, religion or nationality’ (Harff and 
Gurr 1988, 360). This definition, however, does not overcome the problem that in the case of the CAR one can 
hardly speak of the state as the perpetrator of the systematic killings. French actors referred repeatedly to the notion 
of genocide or genocide in the making. But as much as they used the notion they put its meaning and applicability 
into question both with regards to the extent of the killings and its perpetrator creating much confusion around the 
notion.  
363  This section focuses primarily on the French Army’s involvement in the CAR’s domestic politics. Another role 
the CAR played for the French military in Africa should however not be forgotten. Since independence French 
troops have used Bangui as a rear base for more than thirty operations on the African continent. Broader strategic 
considerations are thus likely to have influenced the decision-making process as well (see paragraph on geographic 
proximity, Ngoupandé 1997, 256). 
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were concerned, Paris, according to the same authors, ‘amputated’ the country’s sovereignty. This, 
however, would not have been possible without the consent of the CAR’s ruling elites, who willingly 
entrusted their own security to the French Army.          
 The CAR’s first president, David Dacko, who came to power thanks to his family ties with the 
defunct spiritual leader of the CAR’s decolonisation process and subsequently installed an autocratic 
and kleptocratic regime received the former coloniser’s full support (Bigo 1988, 42-48). His successor, 
Jean-Bédel Bokassa, had to work harder to win the sympathy of his French counterparts Charles de 
Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, but could count on Monsieur Afrique Jacques Foccart and President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, aficionado of big game hunting. As in most parts of francophone Africa, 
regime-stability was the ultimate ambition of France’s policy towards the CAR until the turn of the 
millennium (Koepf 2013b). However, France did not only support dubious regimes, but in several 
instances provoked regime changes by deploying troops to the CAR (see appendix 2). Thus, the defence 
agreement concluded in the 1960s (loi n°6-1225; décret n°60-1230), was not an automatic life insurance 
for the Central African elites in power (Mehler 2014). Once the self-proclaimed Emperor Bokassa had 
become too compromising, Giscard d’Estaing ordered Operation Barracuda to overthrow Bokassa on 
20 September 1979 and to put David Dacko back in power. Dacko’s regime, however, was too weak to 
survive without France’s financial and military support. France increased its development assistance to 
the CAR, installed French political advisors in all strategic positions of the Central African state, and 
reoccupied the former French military base at Bouar (International Crisis Group 2007, 6–7). This policy 
soon came to be known as the “Barracuda syndrome” (Ngoupandé 1997), which signifies ‘the 
infantilisation of a people that were so dispossessed of their own history that they were not even 
responsible for deposing their own tyrant’ (International Crisis Group 2007, 6). Exemplary of this 
tutelage was the role of Jean-Claude Mantion, lieutenant colonel in the French Secret Services. Mantion 
first acted as the protector of David Dacko and later of his successor André Kolingba and soon became 
one of the most powerful persons in the country, acting as a veritable proconsul to the CAR (Malagardis 
2013). In no other African country French actors were as deeply involved in the domestic political life 
as in the allegedly sovereign CAR (Faes and Smith 2000). After an attempted coup by future Presidents 
Ange-Félix Patassé and François Bozizé, France’s paternalist way of dealing with this crisis negated the 
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last bit of sovereignty this young state had once enjoyed. When dealing with the unsuccessful coup-
leader Patassé, it was the French ambassador and Jean-Claude Mantion representing the Kolingba 
government who decided on Patassé’s fate. As the International Crisis Group put it ironically, ‘France 
reached an agreement with itself to provide safe conduct to Patassé’ (International Crisis Group 2007, 
8).             
 After the election of Ange-Félix Patassé a series of mutinies characterised the country’s political 
landscape throughout the 1990s. In reaction to these recurrent outbreaks of violence the French Army 
‘patrolled Bangui to protect foreign nationals’ (International Crisis Group 2007, 10). Subsequently, 
French troops were repeatedly involved in ‘short, intense, and unpredictable operations’ (Saint Victor 
2013, 6). Operations Almandin I, II, and III were France’s response to the three succeeding mutinies 
that distressed the CAR between 1996 and 1997. The new degree of violence implicated the French 
government deeply in the CAR’s domestic politics. After the death of two French soldiers in January 
1997 and the retaliation by French forces that caused several civilian casualties, Lionel Jospin, one of 
the core players of the normalisation process of France’s Africa policy from 1997 to 2002, publicly 
criticised the French military operation and demanded to put an end to the opaque decision-making that 
had governed France’s relations with the African continent up to this date (Jospin 1997). This and 
subsequent statements of the same kind while breaking with traditional ‘consensus observed by French 
politicians with regard to military operations in Africa’ (International Crisis Group 2007, 10) did not 
stop France’s military interventionism.364 However, they revealed a shift in the ideational framework 
that had defined French decision-making. Up until the beginning of the normalisation process in 1994, 
French actors considered it normal that the French state bore a helping hand in one of its former colonies. 
In light of the advancing European integration following the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, structural 
changes in the post-Cold War international system, the genocide in Rwanda and the actors’ efforts to 
                                                     
364  Operation Cigogne, which started in 1997 and oversaw a coordinated troop reduction, was the most visible 
expression of the French foreign policy elite’s intention to end the more than a century long French military 
presence in the CAR (International Crisis Group 2007, 12). In 1998 this objective seemed to have been achieved 
with all but 200 French troops, which had been integrated into the MISAB, returning to France. When François 
Bozizé launched his successful coup against the Patassé regime in March 2003, France did not intervene on the 
side of the Patassé government and thus indirectly supported Bozizé together with Chad, which provided soldiers, 
weapons, and other logistics, the rebel movement around Bozizé. Once the new regime took office in Bangui, Paris 
sent 300 soldiers in support of the FOMUC/MICOPAX and to protect French expatriates as well as other foreign 




redress and adapt their policies to these changes, this ideational framework gradually crumbled away.365 
New influences and orientations began to shape the decision-makers’ mental maps while the remnants 
of the past were still present. These reconsiderations led to the professionalization of the French Army 
and a reduction of the total number of troops.        
  Explaining France’s reaction to the 1996-1997 mutinies, Faes and Smith (2000) compare the 
situation the Chirac government faced at the time to a Cornelian dilemma. A non-intervention would 
have helped undemocratic rebels take over with the prospect of long-term instability, while an 
intervention perpetuated the image of imperial interference, which was in stark contrast to the process 
of normalisation. This is also what happened a decade later when French paratroopers in 2007, in a 
mission that reminded the famous battle of Kolwezi in 1978, secured the city of Birao. This last minute 
military operation undermined the UFDR’s attack and led to the signing of a peace agreement between 
the rebels and the Bozizé administration. But it also provoked heavy criticism against France’s supposed 
neo-colonial approach towards the region. Since then the French Army has remained on alert in the 
CAR. Interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group in the aftermath of the redeployment of 
French troops in 2007 clearly demonstrate that the government already expected to have to intervene 
again in the near future. ‘Return tickets’, according to one diplomat, ‘would prove infinitely more 
expensive than remaining to prevent the total collapse of the state’ (2007, 21). 
  
5.2 The French Decision-Making Process 
The context described above reflected the operational environment Hollande and his administration 
were facing when they came to power and took the decision to launch Operation Sangaris on 5 December 
2013, one and a half years later. Once more a French government had to choose between either sitting 
on the fence and observing what some top representatives labelled a genocide in the making (Araud 
2013c; Fabius 2013r) or taking action that involved considerable costs and could only happen at the risk 
of France being criticised for its neo-colonial approach and interference in a sovereign state’s domestic 
                                                     
365  For a more detailed discussion on the normalisation process, see Chapter 2. See also (Chafer 2002; Banégas 
and Marchal 2013) 
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affairs. As Wheeler argues, this is the core dilemma actors face when intervening or claiming to 
intervene in the name of humanitarian principles, since ‘“doing something” to rescue non-citizens facing 
the extreme is likely to provoke the charge of interference in the internal affairs of another state, while 
“doing nothing” can lead to accusations of moral indifference’ (Wheeler 2002, 1). By looking closely 
at the decision-making process that led to Operation Sangaris, the remainder of the chapter probes 
concepts, motives, and justifications that help to understand how French policy-makers solved this 
dilemma. More precisely, I ask why French actors were willing to digress for a second time within one 
year from their repeated manifest to put an end to France’s role as Africa’s gendarme.   
 As in the previous chapter, I first probe the emergence of the Central African crisis on the French 
security agenda and explain why the intervention had not occurred earlier, despite the deteriorating 
situation in December 2012 and the subsequent putsch in March 2013. The explanatory factors that are 
advanced relate to the parallel occurrence of the military operation in Mali and different degrees of 
perceived proximity. The next section engages with the policy framing phase and explains how French 
decision-makers became increasingly convinced that intervention was needed. It also shows how actors 
were torn between the idea of framing the intervention in humanitarian terms and the attempt to portray 
it as yet another instance in the GWoT. The final section concentrates on the decision and the 
justifications and motivations that surrounded it. This section first shows how and why French actors 
played down the importance of this operation. By concentrating on the notions of empathy and 
responsibility it also explores two motivations that are part of French actors’ self-identity and which 
eventually were decisive for the launch of Operation Sangaris.  
 
5.2.1 In the Shadows of Serval: The Inclusion of the Central African Crisis on 
France’s Security Agenda  
For the past ten years, French officials had described and interpreted the situation in the CAR mostly as 
part of a larger regional mosaic. Instability, political volatility, and conflicts were attributed to Central 
Africa rather than to the Central African Republic. Several factors reinforced the French actors’ 
understanding of the situation in the CAR as a regional dysfunction. The rebellion in eastern Chad, the 
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presence of a European peacekeeping force (EUFOR Chad/CAR) both in Chad and the north-eastern 
CAR, the conflicts in South Sudan and Darfur, and the porous borders that allowed refugees and rebels 
from neighbouring countries to enter and exit the territory of the CAR mostly uncontrolled were all part 
of the same regional operational environment (Lacroix 2009; Bertoux 2012). By the mid-2000s the LRA 
shifted its base of operations to eastern DRC and from there ‘launched attacks and raids into the Central 
African Republic’ and thus further reinforced the perceived need for a regional approach (Enough 
Project n.d.; Gettleman 2012). Only in 2012 did French actors begin to consider the instability in the 
CAR as a discrete issue on their security agenda. The increasing number of reported clashes between 
government forces and Seleka rebels, the attacks on government buildings and the French embassy in 
December 2012, and the putsch against Bozizé in March 2013 caused growing concern among the 
Hollande administration. At the same time none of these events was considered as sufficiently serious 
to put the Central African crisis at the top of France’s national security agenda. The concurrence of the 
two crises had as an effect that French foreign policy-makers never attached the same importance to the 
situation in the CAR as to the one in Mali. A comparison of the French government’s respective 
discursive output during the crises in Mali and the CAR shows that the former took priority over the 
latter on France’s national security agenda. Between January 2012 and December 2014, the Sarkozy366 
and Hollande administrations produced and registered a total of 1,409 official foreign policy statements 
that contained the word Mali, but only 601 statements that mentioned the word Centrafrique or one of 
its derivatives.367 Except for the period between December 2013 and April 2014, that is, at the height of 
Operation Sangaris, the number of statements issued monthly dealing with Mali always exceeded those 
issued on the CAR (see fig. 10).  
                                                     
366  January – May 2012.  
367  This finding is based on a word count analysis of the Basedoc database maintained by the French Foreign 
Ministry. The search was conducted for the three French denominations of the term Central African Republic: 
Centrafrique, République Centrafricaine, and RCA, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-php/cadcgp.php, 




Figure 10. Timeline of official French foreign policy statements 
Source: own elaboration, based on data extracted from http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-php/cadcgp.php, 
accessed on 2 September 2014 
In retrospect, one could argue that it is not surprising that Operation Serval stirred a more intensive 
discursive activity than Operation Sangaris, given its relatively larger size. However, the total number 
of troops deployed during the two operations is a consequence of the respective decision-making 
processes and not their cause. Instead, the crucial variable remains the cognitive processing of the 
perceived information. Thus, an explanation as to why the two operations enjoyed such different degrees 
of priority on the French security agenda needs to consider factors other than merely the total number 
of troops deployed.         
 Differences in the perceptions of the respective operational environments in Mali and the CAR are 
advanced as the primary explanantia of the two policy outcomes. Although the crisis in the CAR was 
framed under the broader category of “crisis situation in francophone Africa”, which facilitated the 
emergence of the conflict as a priority on France’s security agenda in the first place, it was understood 
primarily as an indirect threat to France’s national security. This difference in perception is closely 
related to the fact that Operation Serval directly responded to the narrative of the GWoT, whilst 
Operation Sangaris—despite the actors’ attempts to bring the crisis in the CAR in line with the GWoT 
narrative—was mainly justified and justifiable on humanitarian grounds. In general, the GWoT narrative 





























































































































makers to resort to military force.368 However, the principal difference between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Sangaris was not perceived as an intervention stricto sensu, but primarily as a reinforcement of 
those French forces that were already deployed to the country (forces prépositionées).369 By the time the 
Seleka ousted President Bozizé in March 2013 the French forces already exceeded 500 troops. 
Consequently, when Hollande gave the order to launch Operation Sangaris in December 2013 this 
decision was at least at a discursive level in perfect continuity with the earlier troop reinforcement and 
could be framed as a response to the changing situation on the ground.370 The president, when 
announcing his decision, emphasised this continuity by saying, ‘there are already 600 French troops on 
site. This number will be doubled within the coming days if not within the next hours’ (Hollande 
2013k).371 Troop reinforcement, being a more technocratic and organisational question and less 
politicised than a full-fledged intervention, quite naturally led to a less important discursive output. 
Moreover, the fact that French troops had already been present in the country before the CAR became 
a priority on the French security agenda ensured that the intervention itself never reached the same 
exceptional character as Operation Serval. While French decision-makers remained vague about what 
their country’s exact role in the conflict resolution might be, they did not categorically reject the 
possibility of active French military involvement.  
 Adding to this, in the case of Mali, France’s intervention, as we saw in the preceding chapter, was 
not governed by any UN resolution but was the Hollande administration’s reaction to Dioncounda 
                                                     
368  Humanitarian crises are primarily linked to misery and backwardness in faraway places and only indirectly 
affect the intervening state’s national security. For a more detailed discussion on the power and limits of the 
securitisation of the GWoT narrative since 9/11 see Buzan (2006).    
369  The Hollande administration, in the wake of the December 2012 uprisings and again after the putsch in March 
2013, decided to reinforce the French military presence in Bangui. After the UN Security Council had voted 
Resolution 2127 on 5 December, France deployed a 1,600-strong peacekeeping force (subsequently reinforced to 
reach a strength of 2,000 troops)Operation Sangarisin support of the ECCAS-led MICOPAX. Previously, 
France had maintained a contingent of approximately 300 troops under the framework of Operation Boali. 
Operation Boali was originally established to support the two African-led peacekeeping missions FOMUC (Force 
Multinationale en Centrafrique) and MICOPAX. From 2008 to 2013 MICOPAX had been mandated to protect 
civilians, secure the territory, and facilitate the political dialogue. Having succeeded the Force Multinationale en 
Centrafrique (FOMUC) established on 25 October 2002 by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC), on 19 December 2013 the ECCAS-led MICOPAX had transformed into the African-led 
MISCA. Both missions received considerable logistical, technical, and financial support by France (and the EU 
with regards to financial support) (Meyer 2011, 20–24). 
370  The mandate of Operation Sangaris was different from the mandate of Operation Boali. In particular, French 
troops were granted greater liberties in the use of force.  
371  ‘Déjà 600 militaires français sont sur place. Cet effectif sera doublé d’ici quelques jours, pour ne pas dire 
quelques heures’.  
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Traoré’s request for military assistance. In contrast, Operation Sangaris was voted on by the UN Security 
Council. UN Resolution 2127 explicitly ‘authorizes the French forces in the CAR, within the limits of 
their capacities and areas of deployment, and for a temporary period, to take all necessary measures to 
support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate’ (UN Security Council 2013, §50).  
 Taken together, these factors made that the crisis in the CAR was perceived and framed as a minor 
risk to France’s national security. Most importantly, and in contrast to what the official discourse after 
the launch of the operation suggested, intervention was by far not the only viable option during the 
decision-making process. Notwithstanding the teleological interpretations of the gradual reinforcement 
of French troops in the CAR during the year 2013, the decision-making process that eventually led to 
the launch of Operation Sangaris was not linear and military intervention was not a foregone conclusion; 
at least not until September 2013. Moreover, the perceived proximity, which was one of the main driving 
forces behind the launch of Operation Serval, was less pronounced in the case of the CAR making it 
more difficult for French actors to overcome prevailing doubts and uncertainty during the decision-
making process. Instead, reluctance dominated the French actors’ cognitive maps up until the point at 
which concerns about the humanitarian situation and the risk of genocide appealed to the actors’ self-
understanding as representatives of an influential power that had to honour its obligations and thus were 
able to dispel prevailing doubts. 
 
The Hollande Administration’s Reluctance to Intervene  
In June 2012 the Hollande administration began to consider the situation in the CAR to be an 
idiosyncratic crisis deserving France’s full attention (Conway-Mouret 2012). The recognition and 
labelling of the developments in the CAR as symptoms of a crisis, however, did not immediately lead 
French actors to conclude that military intervention was necessary; this was quite novel given the 
frequency of French military interventions in this country (see appendix 3). France’s reluctance to 
intervene in the Central African crisis, provoked civil commotion in the capital, notably after a new 
offensive by Seleka forces in early December 2012 that brought them in control of large parts of the 
country. Protesters in the capital vigorously denounced France’s passivity. After having gathered in 
front of the US embassy, the protest march directed itself towards the French embassy and several 
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hundred protesters fired life ammunition against the embassy’s facilities on 26 December 2012.  
 These outbreaks of violence are epiphenomenal of the extremely ambiguous relationship between 
the two countries, as the justifications advanced by the protesters clearly show: ‘We are here at the 
French embassy, because France colonised us. But France also tends to abandon us. We don’t need 
France anymore, France should take its embassy and leave’ (Huffington Post 2012).372 Former Prime 
Minister Jean-Paul Ngoupandé in his critique of the self-victimisation of the Central African population 
explained the difficulty successive French governments were facing as follows:  
Thirty-seven years after independence, it the CAR does not cease infantilising itself, that is, 
regressing in the psychoanalytical sense of the term. No other former French colony in sub-Saharan 
Africa maintains as unhealthy and irrational relations with the ex-coloniser as the CAR. Everything 
operates on the level of “I love you, neither do I”373…. The CAR is also the country of the worst 
anti-French verbal excesses when one party or group of parties feels abandoned’ (Ngoupandé 1997, 
39). 
 As the protests in Bangui from December 2012 show, two decades later Ngoupandé’s analysis of the 
Central Africans attitude vis-à-vis the former coloniser remained valid. In a highly sensitive context 
where almost any action could provoke uncontrollable and unwanted reactions, French actors had to 
demonstrate a particular tactfulness in producing a narrative that would be interpreted in the way its 
authors intended and lead to policies that would not repeat the case of Côte d’Ivoire, where French 
troops found themselves between the opposing camps and were accused by both sides of supporting the 
respective other (McGovern 2011).         
 For the time being, the French government declared that it was ‘preoccupied’ by the recent outbreaks 
of violence and condemned the rebels and their attack on Mali’s internal sovereignty. The Hollande 
administration’s priority at that point became the security of its diplomatic staff as well as the safety of 
the around 1,200 French expatriates and Central Africans of double nationality living and working in 
the CAR, mainly in Bangui (Élysée 2012a; Élysée 2012b). In response to the attack, President Hollande 
ordered the defence minister to increase France’s military presence (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
2012f). Yet, following François Bozizé’s appeal to France for military assistance in the fight against the 
                                                     
372  ‘Nous sommes ici à l'ambassade de France, parce que c'est la France qui nous a colonisés. Mais la France a 
tendance à nous lâcher. On n'a plus besoin de la France, la France n'a qu'à prendre son ambassade et partir’. 
373  In French, « Je t’aime, moi non plus » refers to the infamous love song written by Serge Gainsbourg and 
performed by himself together first with Brigitte Bardot and later Jane Birkin. Ngoupandé uses this reference to 
emphasise the notoriously ambiguous relationship Central Africans maintain with their former coloniser.  
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rebel movement, Hollande responded that France would not protect any regime against an advancing 
rebellion but simply protect French interests and citizens (Francetvinfo 2012).    
 By the time the Seleka ousted François Bozizé from office in March 2013 and replaced him with the 
self-appointed leader Michel Djotodia, 560 French troops were present in the country to assure the safety 
of ‘French expatriates or expatriates from other nations that enjoy [France’s] protection’ (Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères 2013d). Despite this non-negligible military presence, and irrespective of Bozizé’s 
formal request for military assistance prior to the putsch, French troops did not directly interfere in order 
to stop the dissolution of the Central African state. Referring to the reform of the existing defence 
agreement in 2010, which obliges France to intervene only in the case of an external aggression, the 
French government did not feel obliged to act. It thus refrained from providing definitive military 
support to the Central African government that could have saved the regime from collapsing and re-
established much needed stability. The concept of regime stability that could have been brought forward 
during those early stages of the crisis had become obsolete and thus did not emerge as a motivation in 
the French political discourse (Koepf 2013b).        
 In addition to the waning of the concept of regime stability as a motivation and legitimate justification 
of French interventionism, there are other case-specific reasons that explain the decision to stall an 
intervention in favour of the Bozizé regime in January 2013. First, backing François Bozizé would have 
implied that the French government was ready to rescue an undemocratic and increasingly unpopular 
leader. This practice, while accepted in the past, stood in contrast to France’s commitments to a renewed 
security policy towards the African continent. Since the beginning of its term, the Hollande 
administration showed itself committed to putting an end to France’s neo-colonial approach and 
traditional military interventionism (Mélonio 2011). Representatives of the Hollande government 
produced a new discourse on Africa that should be ‘realistic, normalised, and encompassing the entire 
continent’ (Le Gal 2014). The CAR, as the site where France had interfered more often and directly than 
in any other of its former colonies, was a symbol that could either strengthen the established discourse 
or destroy it. Supporting the incumbent regime in its struggle for survival not only would have been in 
contradiction with the reformed defence agreement but also would have been a strong reminder of 
France’s past involvement in Africa and would have put the three pillars of the renewed discourse into 
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question. The debate that preoccupied French decision-makers at that time centred on the questions of 
credibility and coherence. Both were at risk to be undermined should the president decide to help his 
Central African counterpart. In January 2013, the Hollande administration decided to remain in line with 
its earlier political commitments.374 An intervention was judged to be too risky by Hollande and his 
cabinet, who had not forgotten that France’s involvement in the CAR’s domestic politics already had 
cost one former French president the re-election and provoked a severe debate on France’s role and 
legitimacy in Africa throughout the 1990s, which damaged France’s reputation considerably 
(Ngoupandé 1997, 6). As Notin (2014, 42) remarks with regard to France increasing absenteeism, ‘with 
the omnipresence of the media policy-makers are no longer inclined to take additional risks abroad when 
they have to confront so many at home’. This decision, however, was more than merely a strategic move 
on the part of the Hollande administration. The colonial and neo-colonial past was understood as the 
antipode of present-day French security policy in Africa. Having been central to the Socialist discourse 
already prior to Hollande’s election as president, it had obtained the status of an identity forging element. 
French actors had begun to see themselves as advocates of this renewed discourse. Accordingly, the past 
became the “Other” in comparison and opposition to which the present “Self” defined itself. Hence, 
undermining the discourse of normalisation would also have challenged the actors’ self-perception.  
 Consequently, the French government initially refused to commit to more than a reinforcement of 
the French troops on site whose mandate primarily consisted of protecting foreign nationals in and 
around Bangui. However, for those pundits who interpreted the French troop reinforcement as indirect 
support for the Bozizé regime the government’s reluctant stance remained a sign of neo-colonial 
continuity. The Hollande administration, despite its reservation to intervene, had to defend itself against 
accusations portraying France as the protector of the Bozizé regime. On the question as to whether or 
not additional troops would be brought in to save a defeated president and his regime, Fabius retorted, 
‘No, not at all. François Hollande said it clearly; we do not have to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
the CAR. However, we need to protect our citizens. This is what we are doing’ (Fabius 2013e).375 
Despite these affirmations, doubts persisted among different recipients of the French discourse, in 
                                                     
374  Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014.  
375  ‘Non, pas du tout. François Hollande l’a dit fort bien, nous n’avons pas à nous mêler aux affaires intérieures 
de la Centrafrique. En revanche, nous devons protéger nos ressortissants. C’est ce que nous faisons’. 
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particular among parts of the domestic audience. These doubts pushed members of the Hollande 
administration to become even fiercer advocates of the still fragile narrative of normalisation. The 
doctrine of non-interference into a state’s domestic affairs prevailed over all other arguments until the 
second half of 2013. The question remained topical even months after Bozizé had been ousted and 
Operation Sangaris launched. Quizzed by the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs in December 
2013, Fabius had to repeat the government’s reasoning: ‘M. Candelier French MP for the Communist 
party, nonetheless, is right to highlight the necessity of putting an end to these interferences. Several 
speakers were surprised that France did not support Mr Bozizé. In this respect, I would like to reaffirm 
our principled stand: France does not, or not anymore, give support to this or that government; it 
supports the Africans’ (Assemblée Nationale 2013e, emphasis added).376 The fact that the French 
government was criticised for supporting Bozizé even without having committed any significant 
numbers of troops to the country showed French actors quite plainly the difficulties they would have to 
expect should they decide to take a more pronounced stance in the Central African crisis. The following 
exchange between former Delegate Minister in charge of French citizens living abroad Hélène Conway-
Mouret (2013) and a French journalist demonstrates the dilemma situation in which the Socialist 
government had found itself, after having been criticised for both supporting Bozizé and abandoning 
him at the same time: 
Q: …At the moment we are witnessing a crisis in the Central African Republic, with rebels at the 
gates of Bangui, the country’s capital. There is no question of intervening, said François Hollande. 
Can we interpret this as a desertion of François Bozizé?  
A: No, not at all. Simply that France cannot intervene in an independent country.  
Q: It already did so in the past! 
A: All this is part of the past. 
Q: These times have passed?  
A: Absolutely. Of course, we have interests that we protect, we have French expatriates for whom 
we are responsible and should the security situation be changing, we will certainly be present to 
evacuate our expatriates, but today this is not an issue. 377 
                                                     
376  ‘M. Candelier a cependant raison de souligner la nécessité de mettre un terme aux ingérences. Plusieurs 
orateurs se sont étonnés que la France n’ait pas soutenu M. Bozizé. Je veux à cet égard réaffirmer une position 
de principe : la France ne soutient pas, ou plus, tel ou tel gouvernement ; elle soutient les Africains’. 
377  ‘Q - Passons au chapitre international. En ce moment, il y a une crise en République centrafricaine avec cette 
offensive des rebelles qui sont aux portes de Bangui, la capitale centrafricaine. Il n'est pas question d'intervenir, 
a dit François Hollande. Peut-on interpréter cette position comme un lâchage de François Bozizé ?  
R - Mais pas du tout. Simplement, la France n'a pas à intervenir dans un pays indépendant.  
Q - Elle l'a déjà fait !  
R - Tout cela fait partie du passé.  
Q - Ce temps est donc révolu ?  
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 This episode from early 2013 constitutes an important element for the understanding of French 
actors’ altered approach to Africa. The fact that the official discourse of rupture was actually 
accompanied by deeds is suggestive at least of the co-existence of several competing mental frames that 
French actors would rely on when facing a new crisis situation that in the past would automatically have 
provoked a military response; if not of the end of the traditional policy towards Africa. The decision to 
abandon Bozizé was far from being self-evident, particularly given the criticism it then provoked from 
those parts of society who expected French intervention in the name of stability.  
 Second, the first call for assistance reached Paris at the very moment Hollande had given a green 
light to Operation Serval and the deployment of 5,000 troops. A positive response to Bozizé’s request 
for military assistance at that time would have brought the French Army to its operational and logistical 
limits. This concern was shared with the Defence Ministry and the military that, for strategic reasons, 
were usually more inclined towards an early intervention than the rest of the Hollande administration 
(Assemblée Nationale 2014d). The French military, without overstretching its own capacities, can 
deploy around 6,000 to 7,000 combat troops anywhere around the world on a permanent basis and renew 
these forces periodically at any one time. With 5,000 troops already deployed in Mali, and without the 
least certainty regarding the outcome and the duration of this operation, a second operation in the CAR 
would have constituted an elevated risk for French forces.378 In February 2013, that is only one month 
into the operation in Mali, policy-makers began to call for the reduction of the troops deployed.379 This 
strategy of reducing the number of troops as quickly as possible aimed not only at avoiding the 
impression of France re-occupying one of its former colonies, but also sought to liberate troops who 
could later be deployed to the CAR. With the intervention in Mali at its heights, it was both strategically 
unthinkable and politically impossible to launch a second operation at the time of Djotodia’s putsch.380 
Operation Serval first needed to show some success before the government could engage French troops 
                                                     
R - Absolument. Nous avons bien sûr des intérêts que nous protégeons, nous avons des ressortissants français dont 
nous sommes responsables et s'il devait y avoir une situation sécuritaire qui devait changer, nous serons bien sûr 
présents pour évacuer nos ressortissants mais aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas d'actualité’.  
378  As Vincent Desportes highlights during an interview, France can deploy a total of 70,000 combat troops; 
however, only once. On a permanent basis the White Book on Defence recommends a deployment of not more 
than 6,000 to 7,000 periodically renewable troops.  
379  This opinion was not shared by the military who considered such announcements as counter-productive to their 
mission. In the end, the promised retreat took longer than initially announced. 
380  Vincent Desportes, general in the French Army, interview by author, Paris, 12 January 2014.  
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in a second mission on the African continent. Eventually, a significant reduction of the operational forces 
was not achieved before the end of 2013. The French military were reticent to intervene in the CAR for 
yet another reason. The nature of the conflict in the CAR demanded a policing operation and made the 
clear identification of an enemy impossible. Military forces tend to dislike such policing missions 
because they cannot be ended through victory. In addition, these missions require the intervening forces 
to operate among civilians thus increasing the risk of collateral damage and exposing the soldiers to 
attacks by a non-identifiable enemy.            
 Adding to this, the regional context played decisively into the French decision to stall the idea of an 
intervention. Any involvement in the CAR―in order to be considered legitimate and stand a chance of 
success―needed to gain the approval by the Chadian government, France’s principal ally in the fight 
against terrorist and criminal groups in Mali.381 As one colonel of the French Army pointed out, ‘Chad 
was an ally of the Seleka, but also our ally, and at the same time they were on our side in Mali. To 
intervene [at that time] would have been delicate. It is always delicate. We did not want to take sides 
because we did not want to turn Chad against us’.382 When analysing the situation on the eve of the 
Seleka’s coup, the DGSE warned the French government of a possible offensive of the Seleka. However 
the French Secret Services were contradicted by the Military and the embassy in Bangui. As one pundit 
points out, the question is where the military and the embassy did get their information from. The most 
likely candidate to have assured the French that an offensive of the Seleka would not take place is Idriss 
Déby who at that point wanted to see Bozizé ousted.383       
 In addition, the security narrative constructed around the crisis in Mali dwarfed the situation in the 
CAR. Given that policy-makers have limited resources and cognitive capacities that influence the way 
                                                     
381  It is worth noting that France has remained deeply involved in Chad’s security policy. Operation Épervier 
began in 1986 and on 1 August 2014 became part of Operation Barkhane (restructuration of French troops in the 
Sahel in order to ensure durable stability and security across the region and to continue the fight against terrorist 
and criminal groups. To this end France cooperates with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad). In this 
context French troops continue to ensure the country’s stability as well as to protect French expatriates and 
economic interests. The base at N’Djamena also serves as a rear base (point d’entrée) for French troops deployed 
in the region. In addition to this, France supports the Chadian Army with logistics (means of transport and fuel) 
and provides twelve military advisors who are fully integrated in the Chadian forces (Assemblée Nationale 2014a). 
At the same time, Chad has emerged as an indispensable partner for France in its crisis management both in Mali 
and the CAR (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2013b; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2013a).    
382  Michel Goya, colonel, interview by author, Paris, 10 January 2014. ‘Tchad était l’allié de la Séléka, mais aussi 
notre allié à nous, et au même moment ils étaient à notre côté au Mali. C’était délicat d’intervenir à ce moment-
là. C’est toujours délicat. On n’a pas voulu prendre parti pour ne pas se mettre en dos le Tchad’.  
383  Interview with a researcher and specialist on the CAR, 19 December 2014.  
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they perceive, store, and treat incoming information, they have to order their preferences before 
translating them into policy outcomes. When simultaneously facing two crisis situations in francophone 
Africa, French policy-makers felt that they had to list priorities as resources for intervention were scarce 
(March 1978, 598; Johnson 2004, 8; Assemblée Nationale 2013c). President Hollande explained 
France’s initial reluctance in retrospect by referring to both the concept of ‘preference orderliness’ 
(March 1978, 598) and the self-imposed limitations that emerged from an incongruousness of the 
renewed discourse and France’s historical presence in that country:  
…the Central African crisis began at the time we decided to support the Malian state. This was 
concomitant. In that respect this crisis fell in the background. This is understandable, given the 
urgency in the Sahel. For the past ten months, chaos has prevailed in Central Africa. As the president 
of Chad explained it very well, this is not new. One could argue that the crisis dates back to 1994, 
but those who have an understanding of history could go back in time even further, when France 
was very present in Central Africa, too present. This is why, today, we are reluctant (Hollande 
2013d).384  
 Resulting from the ideational struggle between the need for stability and the avoidance of neo-
colonial references, the constraints imposed by the securitisation strategy and limited resources, as well 
as the need to establish preferences by discarding alternatives, the French government concluded that it 
was better to abandon Bozizé during the early months of 2013, at a time at which the incumbent regime 
could still have been saved. In so doing, the Hollande administration gave additional weight to their 
previous commitment of a clear break from the past and the desire to establish a renewed relationship 
with the African continent. On the question why France had not officially condemned the putsch by the 
Seleka, Fabius commented, ‘the former President Bozizé failed: he made commitments that he did not 
keep, notably his promise of a unifying government. In light of this situation we are acting together 
with our friends and colleagues of the African Union and the ECCAS (Fabius 2013h).385 This episode 
confirms that the concept of regime stability had indeed been replaced by alternative solutions that imply 
                                                     
384 ‘…la crise centrafricaine a commencé au moment où nous avons décidé d'apporter notre soutien au Mali. 
C'était concomitant. Si bien que cette crise est passée au second plan. Et on peut comprendre, tant l'urgence était 
au Sahel. Depuis dix mois, c'est le chaos en Centrafrique. Comme l'a très bien dit le président du Tchad, ce n'est 
pas nouveau. On pourrait dire depuis 1994 mais ceux qui ont le sens de l'histoire pourraient remonter même avant 
et avec une France qui a été très présente en Centrafrique, trop présente. Ce qui fait que, aujourd'hui, nous sommes 
sur la réserve’.  
385  ‘L’ancien président a échoué : il a pris des engagements qu’il n’a pas tenus, notamment en ce qui concerne le 
gouvernement de large union. Face à cette situation, nous agissons avec nos amis et collègues de l’Union africaine 
et de la CEDEAC (sic) en faveur de la paix, sans pour autant nous substituer aux autorités en place’.   
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neutrality and promote a policy of non-interference. French interventionism is beyond the point of 
automaticity. As shall be seen in the following, this non-interference policy, however, waned once 
frames other than regime-stability gained prominence and were advanced to justify military action. 
 
The Four Dimensions of Proximity Revisited  
In Chapter Two, I established the link between the individual and the operational environment. The 
quintessence of this reflection posits that ‘individuals act in this world as much as they are acted upon 
by it’ (Siroux 2011, 22).386 This ontology implies that not only external or environmental constraints but 
also internal motivations need to be considered. Although examining the operational environment can 
do a good deal in explaining the deferral of the French intervention, it is not the only and by far not the 
most important explanation for France’s delayed response and the relatively lower priority the Central 
African crisis enjoyed in Paris when compared with Mali. The previous chapter explained the particular 
attention the French state paid to the developments in Mali by turning to four different dimensions of 
proximity: temporal, cultural, geographic, and human/societal. These different dimensions of proximity 
deserve a re-examination in the case of the CAR. Like Mali, references to the different dimensions of 
proximity contributed to the issue first being placed and then being promoted on France’s security 
agenda. As Hollande put it a day after he ordered the launch of Operation Sangaris: ‘France is aware of 
what is expected of it. It deduces from this proximity, which at once is geographic, sentimental, cultural, 
linguistic, [and] economic, a particular responsibility’ (Hollande 2013m).387 A closer examination, 
however, reveals that the notion of proximity did not have the same importance and was understood and 
framed in different terms, just as had been the case in Mali. This is surprising, given the longstanding 
and close relationship between former métropole and former colony as well as the continuous presence 
of French forces in the CAR. At the same time, this difference can be advanced as an explanation as to 
why the inclusion of the Central African crisis on France’s security agenda took longer and never 
became as forthright as the French actors’ desires to save the Malian state from the clutches of terrorism. 
                                                     
386  ‘Les individus agissent dans le monde autant qu’ils sont agis par lui’.  
387  ‘La France est consciente de ce qui est attendu d’elle. Elle déduit de cette proximité – à la fois géographique, 
sentimentale, culturelle, linguistique, économique – elle déduit de cette proximité une responsabilité particulière’.  
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 The most visible difference between the two cases in terms of proximity regards the concept’s 
geographical dimension. The aforementioned ‘distance thinking’ (Henrikson 2002, 440) was reversed. 
Whereas French actors cited Mali as an example of the vicinity between Africa and Europe, this very 
same Eurafrican vicinity was now being emphasised to justify the need for action in the CAR. Hollande 
resorted to this mental shortcut when saying, ‘this situation concerns first of all your continent, Africa, 
but it also concerns our continent, Europe. Because our two continents form a common entity that is 
exposed to the same threats and confronted with the same dangers. Our two continents, which want to 
get even closer, thus need to be together to ward off these risks and prevail over these threats’.388 French 
actors defined the possible implications a regional zone of insecurity in Central Africa may have had for 
France’s national security. In several instances, they implied the possible appearance of a terrorist threat 
that would become a direct concern of France. For instance, one advisor to the foreign minister 
confirmed that the ‘CAR [did] not represent an immediate terrorist threat, but everyone agree[d] that if 
we allowed for a crisis zone at the heart of Africa to develop this would create regional instability, which 
may not directly affect France, but which would contribute to the propagation of insecurity’.389 Fabius 
underlined the link between potential threats affecting France’s security and the notion of geographic 
proximity when explaining the need for close cooperation between Africa and Europe: ‘In the West we 
have the American continent, in the East we have the Asian continent, and then there is another 
continent; in fact an entity, which is the Eurafrican entity’.390     
 Located at the heart of the African continent, French actors attributed to the CAR the role of the 
centrepiece. This metaphor favoured the development of the idea of a possible spill over effect. French 
actors seemed convinced that if the centrepiece breaks, the entire construct would collapse back on itself. 
Thus to avoid this risk and to preserve Africa’s stability, which was thought to be both in France’s and 
Europe’s interest, not the least because of the closeness between these two continents, order needed to 
                                                     
388  ‘Cette situation concerne d'abord votre continent, l'Afrique, mais également le nôtre, l'Europe. Parce que nos 
deux continents forment un ensemble commun soumis aux mêmes menaces, confronté aux mêmes dangers. Nos 
deux continents, qui veulent encore se rapprocher, doivent donc être ensemble pour conjurer ces risques et 
dominer ces menaces’.  
389  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘La RCA il n’y a peut-être pas 
la menace immédiate de nature terroriste, mais chacun s’accorde à reconnaitre si on laissait se développer une 
zone de crise au cœur de l’Afrique ça aurait eu des conséquences en termes de déstabilisation régionale, qui ne 
touche pas directement la France, mais qui a des conséquences en termes de propagation d’insécurité’. 
390  ‘Il y a à l’Ouest tout le continent américain, il y a à l’Est le continent asiatique, et puis il y a un continent, un 
ensemble qui est l’ensemble euro-africain’.  
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be re-established in the CAR. The perceived necessity of stabilising the CAR emanated from the belief 
that ‘no country is completely sheltered from these problems [drug traffic, terrorism, civil war], because 
in this globalised Africa, in this globalised world, what affects one country affects another’ (Fabius 
2014f).391 The security of the CAR, in other words, was considered not only a necessary precondition 
for the stability of the African continent, but was framed as an exigency that concerned the entire 
international community. Due to the subjective perception of distance French actors defined Africa as 
‘[France’s] neighbour, more than other continents that are further away’.392 All references evoking the 
notion of geographic proximity referred to the African continent as a whole. As Laurent Fabius clarified 
in front of the Senate, ‘it is a question of common sense: one cannot pretend to be interested in Africa, 
the continent of the future, if one does not show any interest in its centre. This is exactly where the 
Central African Republic is located’ (Fabius 2013s).393 While the Eurafrican idea promoted the Central 
African crisis on France’s foreign policy agenda, it also prevented the crisis from sticking out as an 
idiosyncratic issue that deserved France’s special attention.    
 Looking at the concept’s temporal dimension, the CAR offers a case where present French policy-
making remains influenced more by experiences from a not always glorious past than by expectations 
of a prospective (and prosperous?) future. Given France’s role as a former kingmaker of Central African 
leaders and despots, the constraints imposed by the past outweighed the possibilities the common history 
could offer. Just as in Mali, the Hollande administration was careful to avoid any references to past 
interventions in Africa. Once again, this avoidance can be explained by the fact that French actors 
identified themselves as representatives of a French state that maintains a renewed relationship with the 
African continent. Given France’s traditionally deep involvement in the country’s domestic politics, 
communicating this message convincingly was no mean feat in the case of the CAR.   
 To avoid the impression of yet another French military intervention in the CAR, the first official 
                                                     
391  ‘…aucun pays en fait n’est totalement à l’abri de ces problèmes parce que dans cette Afrique globalisée, dans 
ce monde globalisé, ce qui touche un pays en touche un autre. Je crois donc qu’il faut que nous ayons à l’esprit 
que cette question de la sécurité, qui n’existait pas de la même façon il y a quelques décennies, est pour nous tous 
une exigence’.  
392 Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘L’Afrique est notre voisin, plus 
que des continents plus éloignés’. 
393  ‘Une réflexion de bon sens est nécessaire : on ne peut pas prétendre porter attention à l'Afrique, continent 




statements calling for military action were preceded by formula of repentance. As we saw above, 
Hollande distinguished the French government’s present practices from those that belong to a distant 
past when explaining France’s initial reluctance to intervene: ‘…when France was very present in 
Central Africa, too present. This is why, today, we are reluctant’ (Hollande 2013d).394 Both discourse 
and practice by French elites were geared to emphasise that it was not the Barracudas395 intervening in 
the CAR, but a nation that acts in support of the African forces, with the blessing of the UN and for the 
sole purpose of defending human rights and saving innocent lives. However, this is not to say that history 
has not produced an elevated degree of responsibility, which made French actors feel more concerned 
with the fate of the Central African population. This connectedness through history remains one of the 
distinctive features of France’s policy towards Africa. Notwithstanding, the French actors’ honest 
commitment to break with France’s neo-colonial past, they could not dissociate themselves from the 
bounds that history had created. When Fabius outlined France’s interest to intervene in the CAR, he first 
referred to the fact that ‘there are people that are in the act of killing each other in a country, which is 
close to ours due to its history’ (Fabius 2013p).396      
 As was the case in Mali, the rupture should be illustrated by evoking a modernised, pragmatic 
discourse acknowledging the African continent as an equal economic partner and maintaining a 
relationship that was inspired by potential gains rather than historic legacies. The realisation of this 
narrative, however, was further complicated by the Central African economy’s actual state. With a per 
capita GDP of below $500 ($282, September 2014), the CAR has of course much margin for growth 
left. However, the CAR’s economy did not show any visible signs that would hint towards this 
emergence over the past decade.397 Although the country’s annual GDP growth rates reached up to 4.8 
                                                     
394  ‘On pourrait dire depuis 1994 mais ceux qui ont le sens de l'histoire pourraient remonter même avant et avec 
une France qui a été très présente en Centrafrique, trop présente. Ce qui fait que, aujourd'hui, nous sommes sur 
la réserve’.  
395  Nickname attributed to the French soldiers stationed in the CAR. The name Barracuda refers to the military 
operation that deposed Emperor Bokassa in 1979. Since then it is also used to describe the infantilisation of the 
CAR by the former colonial power. Against this backdrop Fabius’s remark needs to be understood that ‘it is not a 
question of sending paratroopers, but as a first step we are going to increase our strength’ (Fabius 2013f). 
Paratroopers were involved in Operation Barracuda as well as in many other punctual French missions that helped 
to support or overthrow various francophone African governments.  (‘Il ne s’agit pas d’envoyer des parachutistes, 
mais nous allons augmenter un peu les effectifs, dans un premier temps, avant de les stabiliser à nouveau…’.)  
396  ‘Quels intérêts défendons-nous concrètement ? Premièrement, je souhaite à nouveau rappeler qu’il y a des 
gens qui sont en train de se faire assassiner dans un pays proche du notre du fait de son histoire’.  
397  Data retrieved from trading economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-per-capita, 
accessed on 19 September 2014.  
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per cent, growth remained extremely fragile. The recent security crisis, for instance, made the annual 
growth rate plummet to -9.2 per cent in 2013, a record low since independence. What’s more, the CAR 
plays an even less important role than Mali in France’s external trade balance sheets.398 The effective 
gains for the French economy stand in no relation to the costs of France’s military intervention in the 
country. The total trade in commodities between France and the CAR has been declining over the past 
four years and never exceeded €50 million in exports and €10 million in imports (annual values) (see 
table 2, Flichy, Mézin-Bourginaud, and Mathias 2014, 69). At the same time, Defence Minister Le Drian 
cautiously estimated that Operation Sangaris would cost an extra €100 million on top of the defence 
budget foreseen for 2014 (Assemblée Nationale 2014b, 10); a sum that largely exceeds the potential 
gains from trade. 
 
Table 2. Trade balance in commodities between France (reporter) and the CAR (partner) 2011-2013 




Source: own elaboration, based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, 
http://comtrade.un.org/data/, accessed on 9 January 2015 
Whilst these figures make it difficult to apply the “continent of the future” narrative to the context of 
the CAR, they also show that the widely shared view of France using military force in Africa to 
safeguard economic benefits does not hold (Le Drian 2013b; Welz 2014, 609).399 The activities of some 
major French multinational companies such as Bolloré, Castel, or Total still make France the CAR’s 
most important investor and create the impression of economic interest being one of the major driving 
forces behind France’s intervention. In macroeconomic terms, however, the CAR’s significance for the 
French economy remains marginal. Notwithstanding these indicators, which should incite a prosaic 
                                                     
398  For the period from 2011 to 2013 the CAR accounted on average for 0.0012% of France’s imports and 0.0084% 
of its exports, compared to Mali with 0.0017% of France’s imports and 0.0711% of its exports. Own calculations 
based on the International Trade Centre database, http://www.trademap.org, accessed on 10 September 2014. 
399  Mali and the CAR are not the only two cases of French interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa where economic 
interests fall short of explaining French decision-making. Patrick Berg (2009, 61), for instance, cites the French 
interventions in Chad in 2006 and 2008 as further examples of French cost-intensive French military operations 
despite negligible economic interests.  
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evaluation regarding the CAR’s future, the Hollande administration continued to evoke Africa’s future 
potential when searching for reasons why the violent conflict in the CAR deserved the international 
community’s attention. As in the discussion on geographic proximity, French actors described stability 
in Central Africa as a precondition for the more general emergence of the African continent. The same 
frames that were applied to France’s relationship with the entire African continent were now being used 
to make the case for France and Europe’s interest in the crisis resolution in the CAR. Convinced that 
Africa’s emergence was imminent and committed to remain one of the continent’s preferred partners, 
French actors identified insecurity as one of the principle spoilers of this future vision.   
…we think that it is in our interest and in the interest of Europe. Beyond moral values[of course] 
if there is the risk of genocide we have to intervenebut beyond this, we think that the African 
continent enters a phase of accelerated [economic] development, which we consider as an 
opportunity. [Africa] is the place of growth today; it is the second […] after Asia. Many countries 
have had two-digit growth rates for the past ten years. One of the principal spoilers of Africa’s 
emergence is wars and conflicts. This [securing Africa] is quite simply in our economic interest. 
This can lead to more jobs at home, business for our companies…we are well advised to contribute 
to either a direct treatment of certain conflicts or by supporting the Africans to do it by themselves.400     
 In order to achieve the set objective of doubling France’s trade with Africa over the next five years, 
the Hollande administration considered security to be the realm where they could contribute the most 
(Assemblée Nationale 2013d). Despite the CAR’s present irrelevance in France’s external trade balance 
sheets, interest-driven explanations were not entirely excluded from the debate. At least at the beginning 
of the policy framing process, the French discourse oscillated between value-driven and interest-driven 
motives. In the aftermath of the intervention any references to economic interests disappeared from the 
discourse. As we shall see below, from the moment of the decision, French actors rejected the idea that 
economic interests could have influenced the decision-making process. This change in the discourse can 
only be explained as the adaptation to an altered situation. At the beginning of the framing process, 
France’s objective was to raise its European and international partners’ awareness of the Central African 
                                                     
400  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Là aussi on pense que c’est notre 
intérêt et l’intérêt de l’Europe. Au-delà des valeurs morales, s’il y a un risque de génocide il faut intervenir, au-
delà de ça on pense que le continent s’engage dans un développement accéléré que c’est pour nous une 
opportunité. C’est le lieu de la croissance aujourd’hui, c’est le deuxième après l’Asie. Et beaucoup de pays ont 
des taux à deux chiffres déjà depuis dix ans. Donc, un des principaux freins à cette émergence de l’Afrique, c’est 
l’instabilité justement, c’est les guerres et les conflits. C’est dans notre intérêt économique tout simplement. Ça 
peut être des emplois chez nous, des activités pour nos entreprises… on a intérêt à contribuer à soit un traitement 
direct de certains de ces conflits, soit à aider les Africains à le pouvoir faire eux-mêmes’.  
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crisis. Referring to Africa’s emergence was considered an effective means of interesting other actors in 
the issue. Once the intervention took place, the discourse needed to comply with the humanitarian 
narrative that had been chosen to justify the decision.      
 It is worthy to note that the interest-driven argument of French interventionism did not emerge from 
the business sector. On the contrary, French companies have become increasingly averse to invest in 
Africa while political elites consider it their task to incite new French investments on the African 
continent (Le Gal 2014).401 By doing so the French discourse became accomplice of the idea that 
economic interests played a dominant role during the decision-making process. However, rather than 
reflecting measurable economic incentives, this discourse emerged from the belief in a prosperous future 
of the African continent. The idea of ‘Africa’s rise’ had become an incontestable truth among French 
policy-makers. In addition, references to economic growth and potential gains, many French actors 
thought, were the price to be paid for the efforts to interest the international community in this forgotten 
country at the heart of the African continent.        
 As for the human and societal dimension, given the longstanding French military presence in the 
CAR a strong blending had occurred between French soldiers and their Central African counterparts. 
The CAR has been one of the principal bases of the forces prépositionées on the African continent since 
independence. The continuous presence of the French Army created close ties between members of the 
two armed forces. Hence, what Charbonneau (2014, 616) defines as ‘Franco-African militarism’ and 
French military staff refer to as blending and shared experience fully applies to the case of the CAR. 402 
This proximity, however, does not extend to the realm of civil society. First, the Central African 
community in France is much smaller than their Malian counterpart. The Institut National d'Études 
Démographiques (INED), for instance, does not list migrants from the CAR as a separate category, but 
groups them under the label “other African countries” (Institut national d'études démographiques 2010). 
Adding to this, compared to Malian civil society actors in France, who are well connected and vividly 
defend tangible political projects, Central Africans in France are less organised and oftentimes lack a 
                                                     
401  Adding to this French companies do not anymore give preference to the francophone space but are more 
interested in economic power houses such as South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, or Angola.  
402  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author Paris, 18 February 2014.  
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concrete political vision for their country.403 It is thus no surprise that references to Central Africans 
living in France were entirely absent from the discourse on the problem solution in the CAR. There is 
no evidence that Central African civil society groups in France influenced the decision-making process 
at all. While the president and his ministers met on several occasions with representatives of the Malian 
expatriate community, this was not the case during the Central African crisis. Human proximity as an 
expression of immigration and shared experiences as had been framed during the Malian crisis, was now 
largely replaced by a more general compassion for suffering populations with whom France shares a 
long history and close friendship. This more generic narrative could have been applied to any of France’s 
former colonies. As we saw with regard to the other dimensions of proximity, the human and societal 
dimension referred more to Africa in general than to the CAR in particular. Having said this, the safety 
of French citizens living in the CAR caused constant worry among French decision-makers. In 
particular, at the beginning of the Central African crisis when it had not yet fully entered the French 
security agenda, the safety of French nationals living abroad constituted the first priority and principal 
justification of the gradual increase of France’s military presence in the country. In terms of cultural 
proximity, no essential differences between the two cases could be observed.    
 When integrating the Central African crisis on their national security agenda, French actors used the 
four different dimensions of proximity primarily to describe the special and close links between France 
and the African continent. Most of the frames used to securitise the crisis referred to the continent as a 
whole. In contrast to the Malian crisis, which from early on aroused the perception of being a direct 
threat to France, the nature of the Central African crisis primarily promoted an elevated degree of 
compassion. This compassion was embedded in the broader narrative of close French-African relations.
 Taken together, the factors discussed above, whilst allowing for the Central African crisis to be 
included on France’s national security agenda as a priority, also contributed to its solution being deferred 
during the French decision-making process. Accordingly, decision-makers began to expose the 
seriousness of the humanitarian crisis in the CAR and to advocate the need for support of an UN 
mandated peacekeeping operation no earlier than June 2013 (Araud 2013d). French actors did not ignore 
the crisis per se, but considered themselves unable to deal with it for the time being. Following the 
                                                     
403  Interview with researcher and specialist on the Central African Republic, Paris, 19 December 2014.  
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continuously deteriorating situation on the ground and the alarm call issued by several leading NGOs 
acting in the CAR, the veritable change in French actors’ perception occurred in August 2013. By 
September, the president, assisted by his minister of foreign affairs, and France’s permanent 
representative at the UN launched an awareness-raising campaign in favour of the CAR. By that time 
the situation in Mali had become more stable and Foreign Minister Fabius could be confident about the 
planned gradual retreat of French troops, Bozizé had been evicted from office, and deliberations with 
Chad had taken place. In particular, the gradual retreat of French troops from Mali and the apparent 
success of the military operation, allowed French decision-makers to shift their attention towards the 
CAR and advocate a more proactive approach to the humanitarian and security crisis (Fabius 2013a). 
Thanks to these changes in the operational environment, the CAR emerged as the ‘absolute priority’ on 
the French security agenda (Fabius 2013a; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2013e). 
 
5.2.2 Framing and Diffusion 
Despite the deferred inclusion of the issue on its national security agenda, the French government 
remained the first non-African actor to raise awareness for the humanitarian crisis in the CAR. On the 
occasion of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2013, President Hollande 
addressed the international community calling for a concerted response to the increasing violence in the 
CAR.  
I would like to sound an alarm, as I did last year on the subject of Mali. The alarm concerns the 
Central African Republic, a small country that has been ravaged for too many years by coups and 
conflicts. Today, chaos took hold [of the country]. Yet another time the civilian populations are the 
victims. We need to put an end to these acts of violence, which, by the way, are taking a confessional 
shape. This is why I wish that the Security Council would provide a mandate and the necessary 
logistical and financial means for an African force whose primary objective will be to re-establish 
stability in Central Africa.404 (Hollande 2013c)  
                                                     
404  ‘Je veux lancer maintenant un cri d'alerte, comme je l'avais fait l'année dernière sur le Mali. L'alerte concerne 
la Centrafrique, petit pays ravagé depuis trop d'années par des coups d'État et des conflits. Aujourd'hui, c'est le 
chaos qui s'est installé. Les populations civiles une fois encore en sont les victimes. Nous devons mettre un terme 
à ces exactions qui prennent d'ailleurs aussi une forme confessionnelle. C'est pourquoi je souhaite que le Conseil 
de sécurité donne mandat et accorde des moyens logistiques et financiers à une force africaine dont la première 
mission serait de rétablir la stabilité en Centrafrique’. 
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 Hollande’s speech marked the shift away from a phase during which the decision-making process 
was dominated by reluctance toward a second phase of mobilisation and action. From this moment 
onwards, the Hollande administration began an advocacy campaign in favour of the CAR (Hollande 
2013b). The explanation of this shift can be found in French actors’ self-identity, which is largely based 
upon the perception of their country’s specific role in the world and in particular in Africa. While the 
official French discourse at that point was still confined to promoting the transformation of the African-
led operation into an UN peacekeeping operation and no mention was made of direct French 
intervention, strategists and military planners in Paris were already pondering the details of a possible 
military operation. As one advisor confirmed during an interview in the aftermath of the intervention, 
‘indeed, we made the necessary arrangements to be able to intervene as soon as the resolution was 
passed; to face up to the urgencies. And there were immediately urgent situations’.405 By mid-October 
Fabius announced that French troops need ‘not only to continue their work, but when the time comes, 
have to be able to extend it’ and added that a second resolution would be presented to the UN Security 
Council by the end of November ‘which gives a mandate to the African and French forces to make 
further progress regarding the re-establishment of order’ (Fabius 2013m, emphasis added).406 These and 
other statements underline that the majority of actors in the French government were convinced that the 
African peace-building operation did not possess the necessary technical and human capacities to act as 
an effective intervention force. As one strategic advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it, ‘there 
is always the question [échelon] of the rapid intervention force, which remains unsolved. The African 
armies have reached a capacity level that allows them to do peacekeeping in medium intensity conflicts, 
but they are not yet able to handle situations like in Mali, the CAR, and Côte d’Ivoire’. Referring to the 
specific case of the CAR, he added, ‘the African force found it difficult to establish itself, and in any 
                                                     
405  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Effectivement nous avons pris 
les dispositions pour être en mesure d’intervenir dès que la résolution serait votée, pour faire face aux urgences. 
Et il y avait toute de suite des urgences’. This having said, military planning occurs on a permanent basis and 
considers a whole range of possible scenarios. The majority of these plans will never be realised. The actual 
planning for Operation Serval based on a UN mandate and conceived as a policing mission was realised only very 
late in the decision-making process (Interview with a researcher and specialist on the Central African Republic, 
Paris, 19 December 2014).   
406  ‘Il faut que les Français - et je salue les troupes françaises qui font un admirable travail, je leur rendrai 
d'ailleurs visite dans un moment - non seulement continuent leur travail mais puissent, le moment venu, l'étendre… 
Une deuxième résolution sera donc présentée à la fin du mois de novembre-début décembre qui, à la fois, précisera 
les points que je viens de développer et qui donnera mandat aux forces africaines et aux forces françaises pour 
aller plus loin en matière de rétablissement de l'ordre’. 
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case the African force was not capable of meeting the challenges’.407 Although French decision-makers 
believed in the necessity of a military operation led by France, they also knew that a unilateral move or 
high-profile intervention as in Mali was unthinkable given the specific context of the crisis and the 
discourse of a break with the past.         
 In October first official statements emerged that evoked the possibility of an extended mandate for 
Operation Boali, whose tasks up until then were strictly limited to the training of the Multinational Force 
in Central Africa (FOMAC), logistical support and intelligence and to securing the airport and protecting 
French citizens as well as French industrial sites and companies (Sénat 2007; Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangères 2013e).408 Since intervention per definition constitutes one or several ‘“discrete acts” of 
“coercive interference” in the “domestic affairs” of other states’ (Macmillan 2013, 1041), that is, ‘the 
transgression of a unit’s realm of jurisdiction, conducted by other units in an order, acting singly or 
collectively’ (Reus-Smit 2013, 1058), these calls for action were in conflict with previous claims of non-
interference in the CAR’s domestic affairs. On the one hand, its commitment to non-interference, which 
was more than a rhetoric device but an integral part of its understanding of a changed and renewed 
partnership between France and Africa, advised the Hollande administration to refrain from taking a 
more active position in the crisis solution. On the other, sentiments of responsibility and the obvious 
shortcomings of African security mechanisms increasingly pushed French actors to intervene once again 
in a region where they possessed both the capacity and the political will to provoke change. Resulting 
from these ideational struggles, earlier assurances that France had no intention to ‘interfere in the 
domestic affairs of the CAR’409 (Fabius 2013e) were increasingly eclipsed in favour of justifications that 
stressed the necessity for intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the former remained an argument 
in support of France’s announced rupture with the past and showcased France’s adherence to the 
principle of sovereignty in international affairs, the latter expressed the deep-seated belief that it is 
                                                     
407  Interview with a civil servant at the Foreign Ministry, Paris, 5 February 2014. ‘Il y a toujours cet échelon de 
la force de première intervention, qui reste problématique. Les armées africaines sont aujourd’hui sur le niveau 
de faire du maintien de la paix dans des crises de moyenne intensité mais pratiquement pas au niveau pour des 
situations types Mali, RCA, Côte d’Ivoire….Sur la RCA c’est un petit peu la même chose qui se passe. La force 
africaine a eu beaucoup de mal à se mettre en œuvre, et de toute façon elle ‘est pas à la hauteur des enjeux’. 
408  The mandate provided for French troops to support the FOMAC.  
409  ‘Non, pas du tout. François Hollande l’a dit fort bien, nous n’avons pas à nous mêler aux affaires intérieures 
de la Centrafrique. En revanche, nous devons protéger nos ressortissants. C’est ce que nous faisons’. 
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France’s duty and responsibility to intervene for the sake of other people, in particular if these happen 
to be citizens of a country within France’s former pré-carré.      
 As Finnemore (2003, 67) highlights ‘people who are confronted with the fact that they hold 
contradictory views will try to adjust their beliefs to alleviate dissonance between them’. In the present 
case the adjustment involved the gradual suppression of the non-intervention principle in favour of the 
increasingly dominant idea of the need for humanitarian intervention. In an attempt to produce a 
coherent discourse, French actors sought to gather the broadest legitimacy possible for their future 
actions by following a double strategy of blaming and shaming whilst simultaneously offering possible 
solutions. The international community was first accused of ignoring a genocide in the making and then 
reminded that it was not yet too late to avoid mistakes committed in the past. Understanding this 
discursive strategy provides a direct access to the French actors’ mental maps that influenced the 
decision-making process during the framing and diffusion phase.  
 
The Forgotten Orphan: Attention, Legitimacy, and Self-Affirmation 
When the Hollande administration eventually considered the crisis in the CAR as a priority on its 
national security agenda and began calling more actively for an international response, decision-makers 
in Paris saw themselves confronted with a general disinterest for the sufferings of the Central African 
people. The framing of the intervention as a multilateral action that would conform to the principle of 
Africanising Africa’s security required the international community’s blessing before any military 
action could be taken. Given the circumstances under which Michel Djotodia had come into power and 
in particular his role as the former leader of the Seleka, members of which were identified as the 
perpetrators of the majority of atrocities committed, the French government could not lean on the Central 
African authorities’ formal request for military assistance―as it did in Mali―but needed an explicit 
UN mandate to legitimise a future military operation.410        
 In search of a receptive audience for this responsibility narrative, the principal problem French actors 
                                                     
410  Following François Hollande’s decision, one finds a few referencesalthough no official proofto a request 
issued by the Djotodia administration (Assemblée Nationale 2013d; Fabius 2014a). In contrast to Mali, this request 
never figured as the principal justification of Operation Sangaris.  
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faced, as Gérard Araud argued in October 2013, was ‘that Central African Republic is on the front page 
of no newspaper in the world apart from in France and in Africa’. Therefore, the French government 
felt the need to make its proximity to the CAR and the perceived urgency of the crisis that of the 
international community. Araud correctly estimated the situation when he added, ‘we have a lot of work 
in mobilizing the international community’ (Araud 2013a). At the beginning of the framing process not 
even Britain, France’s most likely partner when it comes to military interventions on the African 
continent (Chafer and Cumming 2011b), showed a particular interest in the resolution of this crisis. As 
a general in the French Army remarked, ‘I spoke to Phil Hammond about the CAR and he told me: “This 
is brilliant but in Great Britain this is not an issue. If the British know anything about the CAR, it is that 
the country is located in Central Africa”’.411 This position reflects some sort of general disinterest in the 
fate of the CAR on the part of most Europeans. At the same time, it shows the shortcomings of France’s 
obtrusive discourse on African issues, which many Europeans disapprove. As events during EUFOR 
Chad/CAR 2007-2008, the intervention in Libya in 2011, or again in Mali in 2013 have shown, the 
French diplomatic apparatus is not amenable to advice coming from their European partners. French 
diplomats are all too often perceived as having a predefined and incontestable opinion on African issues, 
which they bring to the European agenda without providing for any serious debate.412   
 Laurent Fabius implicitly conveyed precisely this message when saying, ‘even if the CAR is a vast 
country, its population is not very large, let us be frank, the CAR until now has not been the international 
community’s focal point’ (Fabius 2013m).413 Four days later Fabius became more explicit when 
responding to a question in the Senate:  
The Central African Republic’s three initials are CAR, and the problem today is that the A means 
“Abandonment”. This abandonment is reflected by the fact that 10 per cent of the population today 
is displaced, that the infant mortality rate is higher than 10 per cent and that with exception of the 
                                                     
411  Didier Castres, vice chief of staff, interview by author, Paris, 18 February 2014. ‘J’ai parlé avec Phil Hammond 
sur la RCA et il me dit : C’est génial mais en Grande Bretagne ce n’est pas un sujet. Si les Anglais savent quelque 
chose de la RCA, c’est qu’elle se trouve au Centre d’Afrique’. 
412  Interview with a researcher and specialist on the CAR, 19 December 2014. EUFOR Chad/CAR was widely 
perceived as a French mission in European disguise. The air strikes in Libya were preceded by a Franco-British 
struggle over the conduct and the representation of the conflict. Finally, in the case of Mali the French government 
staged a quasi-unilateral intervention. Suspicious of multilateralism at the operational level the French military 
preferred a quasi-unilateral operation. The idea of French distinctiveness in military matters reinforces this 
individualistic approach even further.  
413  ‘Parce que, même si la Centrafrique est un vaste pays, sa population n'est pas très nombreuse et, dans l'océan 
des crises qui existent à travers le monde, disons les choses franchement, la Centrafrique n'a pas été jusqu'ici le 
point focal de l'attention internationale’. 
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capital Bangui, where security is more or less guaranteed thanks to the presence of French troops, 
the rest of the country is ravaged by armed groups. Nobody took an interest in this country, until it 
turned out that France―because it is its mission―decided to alert the international community to 
the situation in this country...414    
 Between September 2013 and the adoption of UN Resolution 2127 on 5 December 2013, the French 
government made it its principal task to draw their international partners’ attention to the situation in 
the CAR. France’s entire diplomatic apparatus was rallied, including the president and the foreign 
minister, to communicate this message. The priority of the French diplomatic apparatus was to establish 
legitimacy for a future operation.        
 ‘Legitimacy’, Inis Claude wrote in his seminal article on the legitimising function of the UN, ‘not 
only makes most rulers more comfortable but makes all rulers more effective; rulers seek legitimization 
not only to satisfy their consciences but also to buttress their positions’. Consequently, ‘among 
statesmen, the lovers of naked power are far less typical than those who aspire to clothe themselves in 
the mantle of legitimate authority’ (Claude 1966, 368). The United Nations remains, for better or for 
worse, the primary source of collective legitimacy in international relations. As of the 20th century, and 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian interventions to be considered such needed to 
be conducted within a multilateral framework. As a result of this normative shift, the principle of 
unilateral intervention has become too costly ‘not in material but in social and political terms’ 
(Finnemore 2003, 74–75). At the same time, multilateralism and humanitarian justifications have 
become inextricably intertwined. A UN resolution has the power to attest the rightfulness of a given 
policy and can support the view of that this policy is beyond the national interest of the executing state 
but satisfies the desires and needs of humanity. Notwithstanding the fact that the composition, 
discourses, and practices of the UN itself are outcomes of processes of domination and subordination it 
continues to be seen as an objective instance of global governance. Put differently, the UN’s legitimising 
power is principally rooted in the shared understanding of its presumed rational legal authority and 
depoliticised nature (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Since the organisation’s creation UN officials have 
                                                     
414  ‘La République centrafricaine : ses trois initiales sont RCA, et le problème est que le A, aujourd'hui, cela veut 
dire «Abandon». L'abandon se traduit par le fait que 10 % de la population est aujourd'hui déplacée, qu'il existe 
une mortalité infantile de plus de 10 % et qu'à l'exception de Bangui, sa capitale où la sécurité est plus ou moins 
assurée grâce aux troupes françaises, le reste du pays est ravagé par des bandes armées. Personne ne s'intéressait 
à ce sujet, et il se trouve que la France, parce que c'est sa mission, a décidé de lancer l'alarme sur ce pays qui, 
comme son nom l'indique, est au centre de l'Afrique’.  
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spent ‘considerable time and energy attempting to maintain the image that they are not the instrument 
of any great power and must be seen as representatives of the “international community” as embodied 
in the rules and resolutions of the UN’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 709). Therefore, it is no surprise 
that the Hollande administration spent three months seeking the UN’s approval before sending soldiers 
to the CAR. It is important to note that multilateral justification is different from multilateral action. 
While successive French governments have been keen advocates of a de jure multilateralism, the 
majority of actors in the French state question the effectiveness and even the feasibility of multilateral 
action, be it at the international or the European levels.       
 This, however, is not to say that French actors do not believe in the legitimising function of the UN. 
If France evoked the UN as some kind of higher authority it is also because such thinking constitutes an 
accepted practice. Although the expression ‘mantle of legitimate authority’ (Claude 1966, 368) puts the 
emphasis on the instrumental function of legitimisation, Claude considers the quest for legitimacy to be 
more than an instrument to enforce gain driven and pre-defined national interests. Political justification, 
for Claude, is only one of the two reasons why actors seek to legitimise their actions via the UN. To 
emphasise this point he argues that legitimacy consists of two components: law and morality (1966, 
368). Law helps to buttress a chosen policy by providing a veil of righteousness, while morality refers 
to the actors’ conscience and thus their very identity. By extension, references to the UN also serve as a 
guiding principle for policy-makers when they face difficult choices and have to overcome uncertainty. 
For instance, Elisabeth Guigou, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the French National 
Assembly, employed legitimacy in this latter sense, when introducing a hearing of the defence minister 
and the foreign minister ten days after the beginning of Operation Sangaris she argued, ‘The president 
of the Republic has deployed our troops to save lives, to avoid massacres and rapes, and to attempt to 
prevent chaos in Central Africa. This intervention possesses all necessary legitimacy, since it conforms 
to a resolution that was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on December 5 [2013]’ 
(Assemblée Nationale 2013e, 2).415       
                                                     
415 ‘Le Président de la République a engagé nos troupes pour sauver des vies, éviter des massacres et des viols, et 
tenter d’empêcher le chaos en Centrafrique. Cette intervention a toute la légitimité requise, puisqu’elle s’inscrit 





 Taking into account the site and context of this utterance, Guigou was arguably less interested in 
gaining international support than in providing a vindicatory explanation of France’s action and the 
president’s―her president’s―decision. Put differently, portraying France’s military intervention as 
legitimate gives meaning to the decision and helps justify both human and material costs emerging from 
foreign intervention. Legitimacy becomes the decision-makers’ means of justifying their decisions and 
actions in front of the different audiences, but also for themselves in absence of any objective criteria 
that would provide for either a clear approval or total rejection of a given choice. Most actors have some 
moral aspirations or sets of values to which they intend to live up. The righteousness of France’s 
intervention in the CAR was established by evoking the responsibility of the international community 
and France vis-à-vis this forgotten country at the heart of the African continent. References to Rwanda 
and a “genocide in the making” allowed for the deteriorating situation in the CAR to be qualified as a 
case that requires humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2002; Hehir 2013, see below). Even more than in 
Mali’s case, French actors framed the Central African crisis in terms of an obligation of the international 
community to become active.         
 By accusing the international community and Europe of ignoring the whole extent of the Central 
African crisis, the French government portrayed itself as the defender and voice of the African continent. 
The Hollande administration not only sought to legitimise its action through an approval by the UN but 
intended to emerge as the initiator of an international alliance in support of the Central African 
population. Presenting themselves as the representatives of the abandoned Central African population 
allowed French elites to add further credibility to the argument that France’s present and future policy 
in Africa would be conducted not against but for the respective African countries and only on request 
of the latter. France’s lobbying campaign in front of the international community put the country at the 
centre of the problem resolution and thus allowed the government to enact its role as a representative of 
the African continent and vanguard of international stability. As the director of the Africa Department 
at the Quai d’Orsay outlined, ‘France’s policy rests on its capacity to mobilise the international 
community, rather than acting alone’ (Assemblée Nationale 2013c)416 This capacity is at the heart of the 
                                                     




idea that French actors have of their country being a puissance d’influence. Permanent Representative 
Araud framed this understanding on the part of France’s elites in almost missionary terms by saying, 
‘the whole international community, which has heard the calls by the president of the Republic and 
Laurent Fabius, is mobilising itself around France’ (Araud 2014a).417     
 The French government’s ability to convince its international partners in such a short period of time 
of the necessity to deploy a peacekeeping operation to the CAR was not only due to the Hollande 
administration’s diplomatic skills, but was also helped by the visible deterioration of the situation on the 
ground. In light of the increasing number of reported killings, lootings, rapes, and other kinds of 
atrocities that afflicted the lives of the Central African populace, the Security Council did not want to 
appear to be a simple bystander. References to the genocide in Rwanda were arguably the most 
important narrative frame that both French actors as well as their international audience had in mind, 
when considering military action.  
 
The Lessons from Rwanda  
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was not only one of the most horrendous crimes against humanity the 
world has witnessed since the Holocaust and the massacres of millions of civilians at the hands of 
Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, but also revealed serious shortcomings in the applicability 
of the principle of humanitarian intervention. For France, the genocide in Rwanda became its most 
serious foreign policy debacle since the Algerian War. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide France 
was accused by both domestic and international actors at best of neglect and at worst of compliance with 
the génocidaires whose action left about 800,000 Rwandans dead (Wheeler 2002, 234). More generally, 
France’s role in Africa and the motives of its military presence on the continent were called into 
question.            
 By supporting President Habyarimana’s regime on the eve of the genocide, France, in the eyes of 
many observers, became guilty of backing a non-democratic and authoritarian regime that counted 
                                                     
417  ‘L'ensemble de la communauté internationale, qui a entendu les appels du président de la République et de 
Laurent Fabius, se mobilise autour de la France’. 
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among its ranks the architects and perpetuators of the subsequent genocide (Kroslak 2008, 105–7). When 
the French government―two months into the genocide―requested approval by the UN Security 
Council for Operation Turquoise, which it received from a rather paralysed international governing 
body, it was immediately accused of following a hidden agenda that would explain this intervention. 
Critics questioned France’s belated vocation to ‘save lives’ while it had done nothing to stop the most 
important massacres that occurred immediately after Habyarimana’s death.418 Several media outlets and 
NGOs concluded that the French government’s decision to intervene was entirely motivated by policy-
makers’ desire to prop up an old ally, to defend the francophone sphere of influence against anglophile 
rebels, and to demonstrate ‘to Africa and the rest of world that France was no paper tiger and that it 
could project power rapidly on the continent’ (Wheeler 2002, 232–33).     
 The international community as a whole had high―although diverging―expectations of France’s 
capacity to contribute to the problem’s solution. The failure to measure up to these expectations made 
France partly responsible for what had happened in the eyes of many international and some domestic 
observers. As Wheeler puts it: 
… [France] was the only realistic candidate for leading such an intervention. France had the 
capability in the form of its rapid reaction force based in the region quickly to deploy in support of 
UNAMIR. Moreover, since French military advisers had trained the Presidential Guard and the 
militias, who better to close down the radio station, confiscate the weapons, and police the streets of 
Kigali? This would have sent a clear signal to the architects of the genocide that their plan of mass 
extermination would not be tolerated by their former friends in the French Government and military. 
As it was, when French paratroopers deployed into Rwanda six days after the outbreak of the 
genocide, it was only to rescue their own and other foreign (that is, Western) nationals, key members 
of Habyarimana's clique, and the embassy dog. It was revealing of the French Government's attitude 
to the crisis that the paratroopers left to their fate the Tutsi employees in the French embassy. 
(Wheeler 2002, 218–19) 
 Daniela Kroslak (2008) exposes France’s responsibility during the Rwandan genocide by applying 
three criteria: knowledge, involvement (political and military), and the capability of intervention. By 
assessing these three factors, she comes to the conclusion that the ‘French government had a major 
portion of responsibility with respect to the prevention of the genocide in Rwanda.…Paris not only was 
well informed through its intense military and political involvement in Rwanda, but also had numerous 
                                                     
418  Habyarimana’s plane was shot down while approaching Kigali on 6 April 1994, leading to the deaths of the 
president of Rwanda, the president of Burundi and several high senior officials. The news of the president’s death 
was the final trigger that sparked the genocide. Within hours the first roadblocks had been set up and the killings 
of Tutsi and moderate Hutu had begun.  
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possibilities and opportunities at its disposal to halt the drive towards genocide’ (Kroslak 2008, 171).
 These expectations on the part of France’s international partners both inside and outside of Africa 
illustrate the burden placed on any French government as soon as a crisis erupts in francophone Africa. 
Jospin’s catch phrase neither interference nor indifference (Merchet 1998) did not come from nowhere. 
Whilst consecutive French governments refused to acknowledge their country’s responsibility and 
implication in the genocide (Fabius 2014i), the accusations against France nevertheless led to serious 
reflections among the French foreign policy elite and to a reorientation of France’s subsequent political 
and military involvement in Africa.419 This in turn led to situations in which French actors have 
repeatedly been put in awkward situations where they had to decide between making use of their 
capacity to intervene in conflicts in Africa, and by so doing change the situation on the ground, and their 
political commitment to abstain from intervention (Hugon 2010, 166).     
 With the trauma of the Rwandan genocide and the negative consequences for France’s standing in 
the international system and its role in Africa in mind, French policy-makers analysed, evaluated, and 
responded to the deteriorating situation in the CAR. As one of Hollande’s political advisors made clear,  
                                                     
419  Exemplary of this rethinking among the French political establishment are the following recommendations 
proposed by the Parliamentary Commission charged with the investigations on France’s involvement in the 
Rwandan genocide: ‘First, the rapporteurs tried to demonstrate why France’s two-folded strategy of indirect 
military support and support of democratisation and negotiation processes failed to stabilise Rwanda and to resolve 
the conflicts that had torn up the country. In addition to the causes that were intrinsic to the Rwandan situation, 
institutional dysfunctions and errors of assessment need to be added. We, thus, have to ask ourselves how to rectify 
these mistakes and malfunctions so that France’s security policy in the future, notably in Africa, proves to be more 
efficient and better adapted to its ends, that is the incitement of democratisation, the respect of human rights, the 
preservation of peace, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts…. Finally, we saw how France, Europe, the 
Organisation of African Unity, and the international community witnessed the symptoms of a genocide and the 
worsening of the Rwandan crisis―which could not have been stopped either by democratising the political 
landscape or by any negotiations between the belligerents without becoming fully aware of their seriousness. We 
therefore need to think about possible improvements of the methods and the instruments of these international 
organisations to allow them to become able to identify and break these causal chains that may lead to the outbreak 
of violence in any given crisis’ (Assemblée Nationale). (‘En premier lieu, vos rapporteurs ont tenté de montrer 
pour quelles raisons la double stratégie voulue par la France a échoué dans sa volonté de stabiliser le Rwanda 
grâce à un appui militaire indirect et de résoudre, par l’ouverture démocratique et la négociation, des conflits qui 
déchiraient ce pays. A des causes spécifiquement rwandaises se sont ajoutés des dysfonctionnements 
institutionnels et des erreurs d’appréciation. Nous devons donc d’abord nous demander comment remédier à ces 
erreurs et dysfonctionnements pour qu’à l’avenir la politique de sécurité de la France, tout particulièrement en 
Afrique, se révèle plus efficace et mieux adaptée à ses objectifs d’incitation à la démocratisation, de respect des 
droits de l’homme, de préservation de la paix et de résolution pacifique des conflits…..Enfin, nous avons vu 
comment la France, l’Europe, la communauté africaine et la communauté internationale ont assisté, sans prendre 
pleinement conscience de leur gravité, aux prodromes du génocide et à l’aggravation de la crise rwandaise, que 
ne parvenaient pas à enrayer, ni la démocratisation de la vie politique, ni les négociations entre les belligérants. 
Ce constat nous impose de nous interroger sur les améliorations à apporter aux méthodes et aux moyens des 
organisations internationales, pour leur permettre d’identifier et de rompre à temps les enchaînements qui 
risquent de conduire à l’explosion de la violence à l’occasion d’une crise donnée’.) 
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…the reference to Rwanda is relevant with regard to [our] support to the CAR. Rwanda remains a 
trauma. There are very pronounced opinions [on this subject], also very divergent depending on the 
[respective] person…well…on the whole this is something that does not pass…The CAR―twenty 
years after the genocide [in Rwanda]―is a way of [rectifying the past]…there [in the CAR] we 
[thought] a genocide [was] possible and we intervene[d] in an attempt to prevent it. This is a sort of 
counter Rwanda. We tr[ied] to make sure that what happened in Rwanda would not happen in the 
CAR.420  
 Explaining his decision to deploy an intervention force to halt the clashes first in Bangui and then in 
the rest of the country, Hollande argued that in ‘Central Africa we were worried about a major disaster. 
Several serious abuses and acts of violence, directed primarily against women, indicated that a risk of a 
genocide existed. Inevitably, I had in mind what had happened in Rwanda’ (Hollande 2014f).421 And 
Permanent Representative to the UN Gérard Araud called on his colleagues in New York to act rapidly, 
‘to avoid the worst, to avoid a catastrophe that, alas, had already happened twenty years ago at the centre 
of the continent…’ (Araud 2013f).422 The analogy with the Rwandan genocide is obvious. What’s more, 
Araud also insisted on the fact that this genocide happened at the centre of the African continent, the 
very same term French actors used to designate the CAR and to emphasise its place and role in Africa. 
The two major functions of the Rwanda analogy were thus to facilitate the decision-making process by 
providing an easily accessible mental shortcut and to legitimise France’s future action. As Reus-Smit 
(2013, 1058) argues, interventions ‘violate the established principle of differentiation, and their 
legitimacy requires a normative defence’. What better normative defence could have been brought 
forward than the preservation of human life? Besides this more instrumental function of the Rwanda 
analogy, the events in Rwanda had profoundly shaped the decision-makers’ collective memory, which 
made it possible for French actors to think the intervention in the Central African Republic as some sort 
of “anti-Rwanda”. By preventing another genocide from happening at the heart of the African continent, 
French decision-makers could prove to the world and to themselves that they are part of a value 
                                                     
420  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Justement, la référence au Ruanda est 
pertinente pour l’appui centrafricain. Le Ruanda en France est un traumatisme. Après, il y a des opinions très 
marquées, très divergentes des personnalités…bon…mais globalement c’est un truc qui ne passe pas… La RCA, 
c’est aussi une manière de dire, 20 ans après le génocide…là on pense qu’un génocide est possible donc on 
intervient et on essaie de l’empêcher. C’est un peu un contre-Ruanda, essayer de faire en sorte qu’il ne se passe 
pas la même chose en RCA, que ce qui s’est passe au Ruanda’.  
421  ‘En Centrafrique, une catastrophe de grande ampleur pouvait être redoutée. Déjà des exactions, des violences, 
dont souvent les femmes étaient les premières victimes, laissaient penser qu'il pouvait y avoir un risque 
génocidaire. J'avais à l'esprit forcément, ce qui s'était produit au Rwanda’. 
422  ‘Pour éviter le pire, et pour éviter un pire qui a déjà eu lieu, hélas, il y a vingt ans au centre de ce continent, 
nous devons agir et nous devons réagir très rapidement’. 
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promoting community that does not stop short of defending these values for the sake of other people, 
making room for a narrative of ‘heroic interventionism’ (Gregory 2010, 156). 
 
Preventing Genocide or Fighting Terrorism?  
The aspiration to prevent a possible genocide was not the only motivation that was articulated during 
the policy framing process. Less than a year into the counter-terrorism operation in Mali, the possibility 
of the CAR becoming a safe haven for terrorists appeared as a motive for intervention in the French 
discourse. The debate on whether the CAR could be framed along the lines of the GWoT narrative was 
furthered by the belief in a causal relationship between poverty and politically motivated violence. This 
second reason in favour of military action, however, conflicted with the overall narrative of humanitarian 
interventionism as disinterested form of interventionism and the desire to frame the conflict as a civil 
and not a religious war.          
 Since the early stages of the decision-making process the Hollande administration had considered 
the existence of a failed state at the heart of the African continent as a potential security threat to the 
international community.423 French policy-makers listed poverty as among the principal root causes of 
insecurity and conflict proneness. This way of reasoning—far from being a particularity of France’s 
foreign policy discourse—reflects the widely accepted understanding of an existing causal relationship 
between poverty and insecurity. State-fragility, a lack of good governance, and the poverty-security 
nexus are all part of the same conceptual family and are applied at the discretion of the intervening 
powers (mostly located in the global North) in order to justify both in strategic-instrumental and moral 
terms their surgical interventions in the global South, which are conducted in the name of humanity. As 
Gregory (2010, 166) points out, ‘the usual narrative of a ‘failed state’ may be read as an invitation to 
intervene, whereas the criminalisation of conflict almost always provides a compulsion to do so’. In the 
case of the CAR, French actors observed the gradual criminalisation of a crisis that was caused by 
                                                     
423  The journal Foreign Policy ranked the CAR in 2012 as the 10th most failed state. The country’s neighbours 
DRC, Sudan, and Chad ranked second, third, and fourth respectively. Interestingly, the French government, 
however, refrained from designating Chad a failed state, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive, accessed on 23 September 2014.  
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grievances and social tensions. By the time of intervention, the country had become a space where 
outlaws engaged in criminal activity and subhuman behaviour against their fellow citizens. Intervention 
in the Central African crisis was thus considered not a matter of choice but necessity. In contrast, post-
colonial scholars have pointed to the ideological character of the failed state discourse and claim that 
the narrative’s main function lies in legitimising intervention and discarded the notion as being 
inadequate to capture the actual dynamics that cause states to fail and ‘unable to explain the production 
of conditions of crisis except through tautology and caricature’ (Jones 2008, 182–84). This important—
although debated—critique shows once more the centrality of ideas in foreign policy-making and their 
impact on actual outcomes.         
 The perceived necessity of intervention was reinforced by the increasing link French actors drew 
between human insecurity, political instability, and the likelihood of terrorist activity. Despite being 
contested by some voices within the field of social science, theories that link terrorism to poor economic 
development continue to dominate the international security discourse (Piazza 2006). This dominant 
narrative among practitioners and academics, which builds on the idea that relative economic 
deprivation increases the likelihood of political violence (Gurr 1970), views failed states as ‘reservoirs 
and exporters of terror’ (Rotberg 2002). The vast majority of foreign policy-makers in Europe and the 
US while accepting that ‘poverty does not cause terrorism, [assume] that it fosters exclusion and 
alienation, which terrorist organizations can exploit to garner support, if not recruits’ (Duffield 2007, 
2). Soon after the deterioration of the CAR had been established, the grievance argument began to be 
supplemented by concerns for France’s national security. In his discourse President Hollande established 
a nexus between instability, poverty, religion, and terrorism by arguing that ‘chaos leads to terrorism. 
Because what in the beginning was a new convulsion, just another putsch, has become a religious 
confrontation’ (Hollande 2013d).424 Foreign Minister Fabius even considered the possibility of Seleka 
militias metamorphosing into terrorists when saying, ‘for the moment, we are dealing with highwaymen, 
but we fear that they turn into terrorist groups with a religious agenda’ (Assemblée Nationale 2013b). 
The intelligence collected during the intervention in Mali reinforced the conviction among French actors 
                                                     
424  ‘Parce que le chaos engendrera le terrorisme. Parce que ce qui était au départ une nouvelle convulsion, un 
nouveau coup d'État est devenu, d'un certain point de vue, une confrontation religieuse’. 
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of the existence of a serious threat emanating from of a well-connected transnational terror network that 
acts across an area from Mauritania in the West to Somalia in the East of Africa, with direct links to Al-
Qaeda in the Middle East, and that would miss no opportunity to install another rear base once it came 
into contact with a fragile or failed state.425 Over the course of the policy framing process, the belief that 
the CAR could emerge as a safe haven of international terrorism increasingly came to the forefront. A 
look at the following two statements by Foreign Minister Fabius in March and in November 2013 
illustrates this shift on France’s foreign policy agenda.  
March 2013: 
Q: Is there a risk of the CAR becoming a safe haven for jihadist terrorists, in particular since Sudan 
is right next to it and there are other countries…?   
A: No, luckily we have not reached that point yet. But we have to be very careful because what we 
see in Mali, in Nigeria, or elsewhere shows that terrorists groups are a little bit everywhere.426  
(Fabius 2013e) 
November 2013:  
 
Q: Is this [the CAR] a country that can also become a safe haven for terrorists?   
 
A: Unfortunately yes. Already there are many brigands and, taking into account the situation of 
Africa, if things are not put back in order there is a risk of dissemination starting from these terrorist 
hotbeds.427  
(Fabius 2013r)  
 One could argue that this discursive shift was a reaction to a changing situation on the ground that 
had become increasingly conducive to terrorist and criminal activity. While the situation in the CAR in 
November 2013 could be described as a perpetual state of instability and violence, there is no evidence 
that would corroborate the claim of an increased influx of terrorists or the Seleka’s or other militias’ 
proneness to engage in the same kind of religiously motivated fundamentalism as radical groups in 
Nigeria, Somalia, or Mali. Nevertheless, French decision-makers were extremely susceptible to analyse 
                                                     
425  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. Interestingly, this narrative 
closely resembles the ‘”banana theory” of terrorism’, which justifies US presence in the region and the 
establishment and subsequent reinforcement of AFRICOM (Keenan 2007, 43; Keenan 2013, 38). The 2008 White 
Book on Defence already defined the very same axis reaching from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Oman as an area 
where the greatest risks to France’s national security were expected to develop (Livre Blanc 2008, 72).  
426  ‘Q - Est-ce qu'il y a un risque que la Centrafrique devienne à son tour un repère de djihadistes terroristes, 
puisque le Soudan est à côté et qu'il y a des pays... ?  
R - Non, on n'en n'est pas là, heureusement. Mais il faut faire très attention parce que ce qu'on voit au Mali, au 
Nigeria ou ailleurs montre qu'il y a en fait des groupes terroristes un peu partout’. 
427  ‘Q - C'est un pays qui peut aussi devenir un sanctuaire terroriste ?  
R - Malheureusement oui. Il y a déjà beaucoup de brigands et, compte tenu de la situation de l'Afrique, si les 
choses ne sont pas remises en ordre, il y a un risque de dissémination à partir de foyers terroristes’. 
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the Central African crisis through the lenses of the GWoT framework and if possible to link it to the 
activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria, which had gained new prominence on the international security 
agenda. Confronted with the absence of a visible terrorist threat, French actors did not claim to fight 
terrorists per se but asserted to fight the potential of future terrorist activity in the CAR. This line of 
reasoning, as evoked by Foreign Minister Fabius, failed to clearly differentiate between rebels and 
terrorists and rested on the assumption of a possible transformation of “highwaymen” (or any individual 
for that matter) into terrorists. However, the transformation of looting armed groups into organised 
criminal groups with a religious-ideological agenda is far from being a self-evident truth (Horgan 2013).
 This mental frame may also explain why French decision-makers failed to recognise the emergence 
of the anti-balaka militia, which have been at the origin of much of the violence committed since the 
second half of 2013 and more particularly since the launch of Operation Serval.428 The question remains 
why French actors confidently advanced the emergence of a safe haven for terrorists among their 
primary reasons for intervention despite having known of the non-existence of organised extremist 
Islamist fighters. In absence of any tangible evidence and deeper understanding of the underlying 
motivations and strategic reasons behind the fighting in the CAR as well as in light of the pressing time 
constraints and limited resources, French actors relied on familiar conceptual maps to label and 
categorise the violent social dynamics that had a lock on the country. Some pundits refer to the 
influential Catholic networks in the French state, whose representatives were particularly inclined to 
perceive the conflict through the lenses of religious war and Islamist terrorism.429 When defining the 
CAR as a potential future safe haven for terrorist, French policy-makers did more than merely reproduce 
a widely accepted security narrative that assured a high receptivity of their discourse. What’s more, such 
a narrative helped French actors to give meaning to a highly complex and uncertain situation.  
 The ongoing fight in Mali and the extension of the French operation across the wider Sahel region, 
the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the notorious example of Somalia as the world’s most failed 
state with Al-Shabaab militias on its territory and pirates on its shores, served French decision-makers 
                                                     
428  Interview with a researcher and specialist on the CAR, 19 December 2014. The anti-balaka militia derived 
from a French discourse that identified the Seleka as the first culprits that the French troops had come to assist 
them in their fight against the Seleka, triggering a series of atrocities in the weeks following the launch of Operation 
Sangaris.   
429  Interview with a researcher and expert on the CAR, 19 December 2014. 
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as telling precedents on which they drew when analysing the crisis in the CAR. Thus Fabius’s remark 
on the potential metamorphosis of Seleka militias into Islamist terror cells tells us more about the 
worldview of French policy-makers than about the social dynamics and incentives that motivated 
militias on the ground. The GWoT narrative, rather than reflecting an observable situation, constituted 
a framework that allowed French actors to analyse and comprehend a new situation by relying on 
familiar and well-established cognitive maps. The following statement by Defence Minister Le Drian is 
particularly telling since it exposes the different maps that motivated the Hollande administration to 
launch Operation Sangaris. 
This is one of the world’s poorest countries. Honestly, our economic interests are extremely 
marginal. On the other hand, our interest is security, our security. There is a humanitarian chaos, 
which first of all produces emotion and compassion in relation to what one sees on television: the 
murders, the children who are dying etc., but there is also the fact that if there were a failed state at 
the heart of Africa where permanent disorder reigns, this would be the beginning of all kinds of 
terrorism. In the region you have Boko Haram: next to them you have the Congolese Warlords in 
the east of the Central African Republic who just wait to turn this state into a base camp for other 
adventures.430 (Le Drian 2013b, emphases added) 
 Poverty was advanced both as a reason of instability and ultimate evidence of France not pursuing 
any hidden economic agenda. Security not economic interests were at stake. While the empathy for a 
suffering population in Africa remained the principal driver of the French intervention, French actors 
never denied their conviction that a timely intervention would also contribute to France’s own security 
by preventing the emergence of new centres of organised political violence in the name of an Islamist 
ideology.           
 The framing of the CAR as part of the GWoT narrative could have promoted a coherent security 
discourse. French decision-makers were guided by the ‘assumption that not only is it the moral duty of 
effective states to protect and better the lives of people living within ineffective ones, but such help also 
strengthens international security’ (Duffield 2007, 2). Like the intervention in Mali, the attempts to 
frame the operation in the CAR as France’s contribution to the GWoT were likely to meet the support 
                                                     
430  ‘C'est un des pays les plus pauvres du monde. Honnêtement, nos intérêts économiques sont extrêmement 
marginaux. En revanche, notre intérêt, c'est la sécurité, notre sécurité. Il y a un chaos humanitaire, une émotion 
par rapport à ce que l'on voit dans les images à la télévision, les assassinats, les enfants qui meurent, etc., il y a 
cette compassion, mais il y a aussi le fait que s'il y avait au centre de l'Afrique un État failli, un désordre 
permanent, ce serait l'ouverture à tous les terrorismes possibles. Dans la région, vous avez Boko Haram, vous 
avez à côté des chefs de guerre congolais à l'Est de la République centrafricaine qui ne demandent qu'à faire de 
cet État une base de départ pour d'autres aventures’. 
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of France’s core partners. The major hurdle that prevented this argument from becoming the dominant 
narrative was thus not the reluctance of a specific audience but the absence of a clearly identifiable 
enemy. To justify an intervention in the name of the GWoT targets needed to be identified and the 
existing threat substantiated by hostile actions on the part of the declared enemy. However, no groups 
circulated on the CAR’s territory that claimed the creation of an Islamist state, propagated the imposition 
of Sharia law or declared France and the West as their arch-enemy.     
 To avoid the stigmatisation of the CAR’s Muslim population and France being portrayed as a 
Christian crusader on the African continent, French actors subsequently began to invalidate the GWoT 
narrative by announcing that neither religion nor terrorism had ever influenced the decision-making 
process. By denying the role of religious ideologies in the on-going crisis, French decision-makers 
produced an increasingly contradictory discourse. The double bind was perfect when the French 
government started to insist on the non-religious character of the conflict and then refuted the idea that 
the operation would be part of a larger counter terrorism strategy. Two days into the intervention 
Hollande argued: 
First of all, I want to be clear and precise. In the CAR we are not fighting terrorism. There is no 
terrorism as such. There is chaos, disorder, inter-religious violence, which at some point can become 
explosive not only for the CAR but also for the neighbouring countries. Therefore we, that is the 
Africans with the support of the French, do not intervene to fight terrorism, we intervene for 
humanitarian reasons. As a matter of fact, this is a humanitarian cause.431 (Hollande 2013n, 
emphases added) 
 Since the CAR had never known the phenomenon of sectarian conflict in the past, so the adjusted 
argument claimed, it simply could not be a matter of religion and ergo the accusations against France 
had to be unfounded. Instead religion had been instrumentalised for political purposes, which implies 
that a military solution to the conflict still remained an adequate and non-discriminatory response (Araud 
2014b). As for the question as to whether or not France’s activities in the CAR were part of a larger 
counter-terrorism strategy, Laurent Fabius who one month earlier had been warning the international 
                                                     
431  ‘Je veux d’abord être clair et précis. En Centrafrique il ne s’agit pas de lutter contre le terrorisme : il n’y a 
pas de terrorisme en tant que tel. Il y a le chaos, le désordre, il y a des violences interreligieuses, qui peuvent à 
un moment, devenir explosives, pas simplement pour la Centrafrique, mais aussi pour les pays voisins. Donc nous 
n’intervenons pas – là je parle des Africains comme des Français qui les soutiennent – pour lutter simplement 




community about a rising terrorist threat emanating from the CAR added that the French intervention 
was entirely motivated on humanitarian grounds two months into the intervention.  
The authorisation by the UN was provided on 5 December, and that very same day we witnessed 
the killing of thousands of people because the conflict started to take on a religious dimension 
between Christians and Muslims. We intervened on 6 December, not to fight against terrorism but 
to avoid the risk of genocide; at the moment one speaks a lot of Rwanda. From the moment the 
Muslims on the one side and the Christians on the other started to kill each other, you could have 
had tens of thousands of dead.432 (Fabius 2014a) 
 This shift from a humanitarian narrative to a terrorist narrative and back to a humanitarian narrative 
provoked inconsistency in the official discourse. Not only did different actors issue contradictory 
statements, but also there were actors who changed their descriptions of the underlying motivations 
guiding France’s intervention. The most plausible explanation of these incoherencies of an otherwise 
well attuned foreign policy discourse arguably lies in the fact that the meaning-giving and framing of 
the crisis occurred simultaneously. Several processes of perception, understanding, framing, and 
diffusion came together at the same time and confronted French actors with the picture of an extremely 
complex situation. As argued above, this complexity and the prevailing uncertainty partially explain the 
attractiveness the GWoT narrative enjoyed during the early phase of the framing process. In more 
strategic terms, a narrative had to be offered that appealed to the international community and France’s 
European partners. References to terrorism facilitated the justification of a possible military 
intervention. In addition, the GWoT was a ready available framework towards which policy-makers 
around the world and in particular in the West have developed a strong bias over the past decade. This 
is why the French government decided to initially frame the crisis in the CAR as a site of a potential 
safe haven for Islamist terrorists and criminal groups in the making. Moreover, the GWoT allowed 
French actors to point to the continuity between the operations in Mali and the CAR and to highlight the 
palpable threat the crisis posed.        
 Following this tricky exercise of framing the issue without getting involved in domestic political 
                                                     
432  ‘L'autorisation de l'ONU a été donnée le 5 décembre, et ce jour-là il y a eu mille personnes tuées parce que le 
conflit prenait une dimension religieuse entre les chrétiens et les musulmans. Nous sommes intervenus le 6 
décembre, non pas pour lutter contre le terrorisme mais pour éviter un risque de génocide, on parle en ce moment 
beaucoup du Rwanda. À partir du moment où, d'un côté les musulmans, de l'autre les chrétiens, étaient en train 




battles and being accused of religiously motivated favouritism, French actors evaluated their country’s 
capacities to promote sustainable change. After having recognised the severity of the crisis by June 2013 
and subsequently set out to actively campaign for an intervention, the accumulated knowledge of the 
situation was sufficient to justify the need for action. 
The Central African Republic has in the past faced some very serious situations. But the CAR has 
never faced such a tragic situation. All those involved on the ground say so. Today, an entire 
population is at risk. Today, an entire population lives in fear and is subject to grave and systematic 
human rights violations: widespread abuse, villages burned, assassinations, rape, forced marriages, 
with, in addition, an increasingly sectarian and religious dimension. The heads of state in the region 
are worried about it and are saying so. The fate of women in the CAR, as in the Kivus (in the DRC) 
and Darfur, is tragic. We have no right to ignore the CAR. We must respond, as we responded 
together when basic rights were violated in northern Mali, with the outcome you’re familiar with. 
We have the ability to make the difference in the CAR. The time has come to act. (Fabius 2013b) 
 Not only did Fabius provide a detailed description of the situation on the ground and thus testified 
the in-depth knowledge the Hollande administration had accumulated on the crisis in the CAR, he also 
referred to the ‘ability to make the difference in the CAR’. Intervention per definition, according to 
Reus-Smit, is always a transformative act. ‘Actors intervene to alter endogenous processes and to bring 
about outcomes that would otherwise not have occurred’ (Reus-Smit 2013, 1065). Fabius, in other 
words, acknowledged France’s capability of changing the situation on the ground and of halting a 
potential genocide. Consequently, the international community and France had also the obligation to 
intervene. As shall be seen below, this reasoning became the primary justification in the aftermath of 
the launch of Operation Sangaris. Taken together, the belief in the need for humanitarian action that at 
times was blurred by references to France’s commitment to the GWoT and the belief in France’s 
capacity to conduct an effective operation made the Hollande administration eventually postulate that 
‘France won’t let the CAR down’ (Fabius 2013l).433  
 
  
                                                     
433  ‘La France est décidée à ne pas laisser tomber la République centrafricaine’. 
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5.2.3 The Decision to Intervene  
At 7 pm on 5 December 2013, as the first African delegations arrived in Paris for the upcoming Élysée 
Summit on Peace and Security in Africa, François Hollande publicly announced his decision to deploy 
French troops to the CAR:  
The situation in the CAR has become alarming and even terrifying. At the moment I am speaking 
massacres continue, including massacres carried out in hospitals. Every day women and children are 
assaulted and thousands of displaced people are looking for shelter. In light of this general chaos, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that gives a mandate to an African force to 
bring about security, to re-establish stability and to protect the population in the CAR. France 
supports this mission. This is its duty: its duty to assist and to be solidary with a small country, the 
CAR, a country that is far from here, a friendly nation (pays ami), a country that is the world’s 
poorest country, a country that called us for help. Given the urgency, I decided to act immediately, 
that is, as of this evening in coordination with the Africans and supported by the European partners. 
There are already 600 French troops on site. This number will be doubled within the next days if not 
within the next hours.434 (Hollande 2013k) 
 Hollande’s appeal to empathise with the sufferings of the Central African population can be 
understood as a rhetoric move that aims at justifying his decision and gaining the support for the 
government’s actions. The influence that rhetoric can have on the perception of a policy issue is 
advanced for instance by Finnemore when she argues that by ‘manipulating empathy, agents can change 
the perceptions about what kind of situation exists and whether it requires military force’ (Finnemore 
2003, 158). While certainly true, discourse is more than a deliberate misrepresentation of social facts by 
calculating rational actors with a predefined agenda in mind. As Johnson (2004, 12) argues in his 
discussion on the impact of overconfidence on war, ‘positive illusions…can of course be deliberate as 
well as subconscious’. Although Johnson proposes to analytically differentiate between bluffs and 
beliefs, he admits that ‘in reality, the line between conscious and unconscious behavior may sometimes 
be blurred’ (Johnson 2004, 12). By extension, I argue that the use of empathy in the French discourse is 
not only instrumental but also constitutive. References evoking the notion of empathy were more than 
                                                     
434  ‘La situation en Centrafrique est devenue alarmante et même effrayante. Des massacres s'y perpétuent en ce 
moment même, y compris dans les hôpitaux. Chaque jour des femmes et des enfants sont violentés et des milliers 
de déplacés cherchent refuge. Face à ce chaos général, le Conseil de sécurité vient d'adopter une résolution à 
l'unanimité donnant mandat à une force africaine pour apporter la sécurité, rétablir la stabilité en Centrafrique 
et protéger la population. La France soutiendra cette opération. C'est son devoir : devoir d'assistance et de 
solidarité à l'égard d'un petit pays, la Centrafrique, bien loin d'ici, pays ami, pays le plus pauvre du monde, pays 
qui nous appelle au secours. Vu l'urgence, j'ai décidé d'agir immédiatement, c'est-à-dire dès ce soir, en 
coordination avec les Africains et le soutien des partenaires européens. Déjà 600 militaires français sont sur 
place. Cet effectif sera doublé d'ici quelques jours, pour ne pas dire quelques heures’. 
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a rhetorical device to convince a largely indifferent audience and justify the financial costs and human 
sacrifice the peacekeeping operation would involve but a means for decision-makers to give meaning to 
this operation and thus to their foreign policy-making. Eventually empathy functioned as a constituting 
element of the French policy-makers’ collective identity that eventually led to intervention in the CAR. 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on this argument with special reference to the perceived 
obligations deriving from France’s military capacities and the actors’ belief to have avoided a second 
Rwanda on the African continent.  
 
The Intervention that was None 
Before engaging with the underlying motivations and mental maps that explain the French decision to 
intervene, it is however necessary to briefly discuss the phenomenon of what I call ‘France’s alleged 
non-intervention’.435 Whilst advocating the need for a peacekeeping operation and a more active 
involvement of the international community, which was put into practice with the president’s decision 
on 5 December 2013, French actors refrained from labelling Operation Sangaris as what it was: a full-
fledged military intervention led by France and thus the antipode of the idea of an Africanised solution 
of the crisis with French troops merely playing a supportive role in the background. Even more so than 
in Mali, French actors were inclined to downplay the military’s role in the conflict resolution. A light 
footprint was essential to the framing of the military intervention. The operation’s code name Sangaris 
is particularly telling in this regard.436 Under no circumstances should the impression prevail that France 
acted as a guardian angel and kingmaker of any political fraction. The historical legacy and France’s 
past involvement in the CAR together with the pledge to renew its relationship with the African 
continent continued to constrain French action. Being aware of the potential risk that another military 
intervention could erode the French narrative of a normalisation of France’s security policy towards 
Africa, the official discourse suggested that Operation Sangaris did not contradict France’s general 
                                                     
435  This term is not to be mistaken for the actual non-intervention that marked the beginning of the year 2013 and 
eventually contributed to the ousting of the CAR’s former President François Bozizé.  




policy of capacity building in Africa and was in line with the envisioned long-term reduction of France’s 
military presence on the continent. Thus, the phenomenon of France’s alleged non-intervention is yet 
another instance where struggles between different sets of beliefs become visible. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that Operation Sangaris had a precise starting point, 5 December 2013, most 
speech acts insisted on the fact that the transition from the non-intervention phase to the intervention 
phase was smooth. In practice, France had been gradually reinforcing its military presence in the CAR 
since December 2012. Originally French troops in the country were only meant to ‘ensure the [safety of 
the] diplomatic compound and the protection of […] expatriates in close cooperation with the Central 
African authorities’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2012f) but soon took on an increasing range of 
responsibilities.437 As the number of troops on the ground increased, the accompanying political 
discourse outlining the French military’s mandate and justifying their actions evolved as well. 
Consequently when François Hollande announced the beginning of Sangaris the decision was perceived 
as a continuation of previous discourses and practices.       
 As of October 2013 Foreign Minister Fabius, referring to the proposed Resolution 2127, evoked a 
more active role for French forces in the peace building process (Fabius 2013m). In November 2013, he 
announced yet another troop reinforcement and by so doing implicitly declared the launch of Operation 
Sangaris a week before the official presidential declaration was issued. Defence Minister Le Drian 
reiterated this statement on 26 November when referring to the forthcoming vote of UN Resolution 
2127, which ‘will include the French support to the African security mission’ (Le Drian 2013a).438 In an 
interview Fabius gave on 5 December, a few hours before the vote of UN Resolution 2127 and the 
publication of the official presidential statement, the foreign minister confirmed that a French 
intervention would take place and would be launched between ‘the vote of the resolution, that is, this 
evening, and which is necessary to conform with the law, and a date the president will choose’ (Fabius 
2013q). These statementsin particular when considering the timing of the utterancesshow that the 
decision to intervene had already been taken before the UN adopted Resolution 2127 that provided 
                                                     
437 ‘…pour assurer la sécurité de l'enceinte diplomatique et la protection de nos ressortissants en lien avec les 
autorités centrafricaines’.  
438  ‘Dans quelques jours, une deuxième résolution va mandater la Mission international de soutien à la 
Centrafrique (MISCA) pour rétablir les conditions de sécurité en RCA ; Cette résolution intégra le soutien de la 
France à la mission sécuritaire de la force africaine’.   
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France with the necessary mandate to conduct a military operation in the CAR. Assuming that Fabius 
had not been acting behind the back of the president, which Hollande’s subsequent announcement 
confirmed, it can be argued that the minister’s foreign policy statements served the purpose of 
announcing the end of an internal debate that had occupied the decisional apparatus during the previous 
weeks (see also Kissinger 1966, 511).439 Such a premature announcement of a decision that officially 
had not yet been made would have been unthinkable in the secretive environment that surrounded the 
decision-making during the Malian crisis. In the context of the CAR, it was not necessary to frame the 
decision as an ad hoc reaction to a changing situation on the ground that surprised the Hollande 
administration and required an emergency solution (Fabius 2013o). The reason for this fundamental 
difference in France’s reaction can be explained with reference to the different ways of legitimising the 
respective interventions. While Operation Serval was justified by a request for military assistance and 
the urgency on the ground, in the case of the CAR, UN Resolution 2127 provided the primary source of 
legitimacy of the French intervention. In contrast to the Malian case, France would not, in all likelihood, 
have intervened without an explicit mandate by the UN Security Council authorising the deployment of 
French combat troops. 
Q: What could be France’s possible role? We heard the Central Africans requesting France to do the 
same thing it did in Mali. What can France give to the Central Africans?  
A: As you know, we already have 450 troops on the ground. A limited reinforcement of this force 
is foreseen. But the CAR is not Mali. The French policy in the CAR—what we also had envisaged 
in Mali—is to help the Africans to deal with African issues. In Mali we had to intervene urgently, 
following an attack by the terrorists. In the CAR our goal is to support our African friends and the 
African mission, named MISCA.440 (Araud 2013a) 
 To reiterate, the primary justification was not grounded in the urgency of the situation, although the 
argument explained the moment of the intervention, but was mainly based on France’s responsibility to 
act as a permanent member of the Security Council that had the political will, the expertise, and the 
                                                     
439  On the occasion of a parliamentary hearing on 4 December 2013, Fabius warned the assembled members of 
Parliament to not comment on a decision that ‘will be taken either Saturday (6 December 2013) or Sunday (7 
December 2013) (Assemblée Nationale 2013d). 
440  ‘Q - Quel pourrait être l'implication de la France ? On a entendu les Centrafricains appeler la France à faire 
la même chose qu'au Mali. Qu'est-ce que la France peut offrir aux Centrafricains ?  
R - Comme vous le savez, nous avons déjà 450 hommes sur le terrain. Un renforcement limité de cette force est 
envisagé. Mais la Centrafrique n'est pas le Mali. La politique française en Centrafrique est ce que nous avions 
envisagé au Mali : aider les Africains à traiter les affaires africaines. Au Mali, nous avons dû intervenir dans 
l'urgence à la suite d'une attaque des terroristes. En Centrafrique, notre objectif est très clairement le soutien à 
nos amis africains, à la force africaine qui s'appelle la MISCA’. 
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necessary capacities to help change the situation on the ground. Given the long preparatory work the 
adoption of a UN resolution necessitates and the active contribution of the French diplomatic apparatus, 
French actors were able to predict the likely outcome of the Council meeting on 5 December 2013, 
weeks ahead of the decision itself and thus could prepare the ideational ground at home for an 
intervention.           
 Besides the gradual reinforcement of French troops and the thorough and long-term preparatory work 
at the UN there was another factor that allowed for the operation to be framed as being in perfect 
continuity with previous policies. In his presidential statement announcing the launch of Operation 
Sangaris, François Hollande emphasised the role the African force had already played and would 
continue to play. As for the French forces, their task was said to be limited to supporting the African 
troops. The UN mandate, as the president evoked, was given first and foremost to the African forces 
and France was merely there to support them. From this perspective, neither the intervention in Mali nor 
the peacekeeping operation in the CAR contradicted the idea of Africanising the continent’s security. 
Defence Minister Le Drian emphasised this point when defending the decision against critical voices 
that challenged the French administration for their unilateralist leanings in the CAR: 
I do not see why one forgets them the African-led peacekeeping operations! We are not alone and 
not only because the African forces are there but also because we are mandated by the United 
Nations and by the international community. Together with the African forces this mandate is clear. 
We are commissioned by the United Nations, by the international community. We respect this 
mandate that applies to the African forces and to France.441 (Le Drian 2013b) 
 Foreign Minister Fabius specified, ‘to stand by the Africans and not to substitute them; this is our 
understanding of partnership with this continent of the future’ (Fabius 2014g).442 Repeated references 
to the mandate issued by the United Nations aimed at legitimising France’s action. Describing the 
operation and the role of French troops as auxiliary brought this intervention in line with the overall 
narrative, according to which the Hollande administration intended to downsize France’s military 
                                                     
441  ‘Je ne vois pas pourquoi on les oublierait ! Nous ne sommes pas seuls, non seulement parce qu'il y a les forces 
africaines, mais aussi parce que nous sommes mandatés par les Nations unies et par la communauté 
internationale. Avec les forces africaines, le mandat est clair. Nous sommes mandatés par les Nations unies, par 
la communauté internationale. Nous respectons ce mandat destiné aux forces africaines et à la France. Nous 
réagissons tout de suite’. 




involvement on the African continent and transfer the responsibility of Africa’s security to the African 
states themselves. Araud offered the following explanation of French reasoning: ‘we are also confronted 
with what I call “Africa to the Africans”. It is not up to the former colonial powers or to foreigners to 
resolve Africa’s problems. Since the African Union decided to take charge of the crisis management 
during the Central African crisis, it is normal that France and the United Nations, with France’s request, 
align themselves with the African Union’ (Araud 2013a).443      
 By drawing a link between the need for Africans to take on responsibility and the obligation of the 
international community and France to support these efforts, the French representative later could easily 
justify the mission by saying, ‘our mandate is to support the African force. These 4,000 troops must 
restore order in the country’ (Araud 2013e).444 For many actors preparing the intervention France’s 
discourse and practice appeared coherent, notably because the AU’s Peace and Security Council had 
taken first concrete measures in reaction to the March 2013 coup, African troops had already been 
deployed to the country before Operation Sangaris was formally decided upon (Welz 2014, 604–5).  
‘…at the time when no one spoke of the CAR, there were already African troops on the ground. 
These missions were called FOMAC or MICOPAX. There was already an African operation in 
place when Djotodia seized control of the state and ousted Bozizé from office…France was not 
involved in all this…Simply, as the situation on the ground with regard to the religious divisions 
and the hatred continued to deteriorate the African Union-led operation, without external 
assistance, would not have been able to gain the necessary strength in time’.445  
 This statement not only once again reflects the prevailing doubts among French actors regarding the 
African states’ capacity towards maintaining peace and security on the continent, it also framed France’s 
action as necessary. In other words French policy-makers were convinced that as long as Africa’s 
                                                     
443  ‘Nous sommes confrontés également à ce que j'appellerais «l'Afrique aux Africains». Ce n'est pas aux 
anciennes puissances coloniales, aux étrangers, de résoudre les problèmes africains. Comme l'Union africaine a 
décidé de prendre en main la gestion de la crise centrafricaine, il est normal que la France, il est normal que les 
Nations unies, à la demande de la France, se placent résolument derrière l'Union africaine’. 
444  ‘Notre mandat c'est soutenir la Force africaine. C'est 4,000 hommes qui doivent restaurer l'ordre dans les 
pays’. 
445  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Pour Sangaris on peut dire 
on intervient uniquement en soutien des Africains. Au moment où personne n’a parlé de la RCA, il y avait déjà des 
troupes africaines qui étaient sur le terrain. Ça s’appelait la FOMAC ou la MICOPAX. Il y avait une opération 
qui existait et au moment où Djotodia a pris le pouvoir et a fait partir Bozizé, les forces africaines étaient déjà là. 
Il a été décidé, compte tenu de la dégradation de la situation, il a été décidé par les Africains, les organisations 
sous-régionales et l’Union Africaine ont décidé que l’UA prend plus de responsabilité. Dans tout ça la France 
n’était pas impliqué. Il y avait une opération en cours. Simplement, à mesure que les choses continuent à se 
dégrader sur le plan sécuritaire, à mesure que les choses continuent à se dégrader sur le plan de la division 




primacy in the conflict resolution was respected, France’s support became legitimate and self-evident. 
The creation of a semblance of normality or ‘obviousness’ and by consequence the emergence of an 
intangible narrative allowed French actors to unite two contradictory policies within what would appear 
to be a coherent approach towards Africa’s security (Finnemore 2003, 4). More specifically, the 
approach chosen during the conflict resolution in the CAR was described as being in line with France’s 
continuous efforts to establish an African peacekeeping force through the framework of (EU)RECAMP. 
In both cases, France supported African troops on the ground by providing material resources and 
military personal. While (EU)RECAMP and the operation of ENVRs constitute the peacetime version 
of this approach, Operation Sangaris was framed as its adaptation to a crisis situation. However, not all 
actors in the French state shared this conviction. In particular, some of my interlocutors when asked off 
the record openly admitted that continuous military interventions risked to undermining their 
commitment to a renewed and normalised relationship with the African continent. On the one hand, 
French actors put forward the primacy of African forces, on the other hand by intervening with its own 
troops the French government suggested that these forces were unable to control the situation and thus 
undermined Africa’s agency (Fabius 2013q). Foreign Minister Fabius acknowledged, this undeniable 
contradiction when saying, 
By their own admission the majority of African states do not have the means to settle these crises 
on their own: this requires material resources and a chief of staff; in these countries this is not 
evident. One they calls call for France because it is effective and because one they loves love 
it. The only way to come out of this contradiction is to build an intra-African force as proposed by 
the African Union for 2015.446 (Fabius 2014h) 
 The struggle between the two diametrically opposed ideas, that is, the commitment to a renewal of 
France’s security policy towards Africa on the one hand and continuously perceived need for action on 
the other, produced an inconsistent discourse and prevented a dominant narrative from emerging during 
earlier stages of the decision-making process.  
                                                     
446  ‘De leur propre aveu, les pays africains n'ont pas, pour la plupart, les moyens de régler les crises eux-mêmes 
: cela suppose des moyens matériels et un état-major ; dans ces pays, cela n'est pas évident. On appelle la France 
parce qu'elle est efficace et qu'on l'aime. La seule manière de sortir de la contradiction est de bâtir une force 
interafricaine, comme le propose l'Union africaine pour 2015’. 
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Capacity Obliges: Honour, Standing, and their Impact on the Decision to Intervene 
Notwithstanding the framing of Sangaris as an alleged non-intervention, by December 2013 the military 
operation had become a reality. 1,600 troops were deployed within the first half of December 2013 and 
400 more followed in January 2014. Neither an indifferent to partially hostile public opinion, the 
foreseeable financial and human costs, nor the actors’ commitment to alter France’s security policy 
towards Africa and the thereof emerging contradictions prevented the Hollande administration from 
launching Operation Sangaris. Thus, the pressing question remains: Why did French decision-makers 
opt for a military option, despite having been aware of the potentially negative and definitely costly 
consequences of such a decision?        
 To address this question, one needs to engage with the normative justifications that were advanced 
in the aftermath of President Hollande’s decision. As seen above, by the time of the intervention 
humanitarian motivations dominated the discourse. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as 
‘coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes 
of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing human suffering’ (Welsh 2004, 3).447 
Framed in those terms, Operation Sangaris qualifies as humanitarian intervention, in particular when 
one considers that its principal declared objective was providing much needed support to the African 
peacekeeping force MISCA, which had been established by UN Resolution 2127 and was deployed on 
19 December 2013. Another characteristic of humanitarian intervention is the intervener’s intention to 
provoke change. As we shall see below, the conviction that France possessed the capabilities and the 
authority to change the situation on the ground extensively played a dominant role towards the final 
                                                     
447  Alternative definitions of humanitarian intervention exist. According to Hehir (2013, 25) humanitarian 
intervention is the ‘military action taken by a state, group of states or non-state actors, in the territory of another 
state, without that state’s consent, which is justified, to some significant extent, by a humanitarian concern for the 
citizens of the host state’ (emphasis added, see also Reus-Smit 2013, 1060). According to this definition, Operation 
Sangaris would not fall into the category of humanitarian intervention. The problem lies in the criterion of non-
consent. As French policy-makers pointed out, France was able to eventually secure Djotodia’s consent for this 
intervention. However, as Welsh (2004, 4) adds elsewhere, ‘”non-consent” is in practice very difficult to maintain 
– particularly when consent is ambiguous or coerced’. In the case of the CAR the question of consent was both 
ambiguous and most likely the result of regional and international pressure if not coercion. While this information 
cannot be confirmed, it still can be assumed that in the weeks before UN Resolution 2127 was passed the African 
Union, regional actors―in particular Chad’s Idriss Déby―and the Hollande administration had convinced 
Djotodia to give his consent for French intervention. Djotodia’s legitimacy and power at the time―after having 
lost almost all control over the remaining ex-rebel fighters―was severely constrained and it is questionable 
whether he still was in the position to assume the role of a head of state and thus to speak in the name of the CAR. 
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decision. The fact that Operation Sangaris qualified as humanitarian intervention, however, still leaves 
unanswered the question of “why” the French administration was willing to burden the national budget 
and risk the lives of French soldiers in order to save strangers in a faraway land (Wheeler 2002).448 
Humanitarian interventions by the West are usually explained with reference to the CNN effect and 
domestic pressures that convince governments of the need for compassion (Robinson 2002; Welsh 2004, 
5; Hehir 2013, 5–7). However, in the case of the CAR, French public opinion remained either 
unconcerned or was against an intervention; even in Parliament the government did not receive the same 
unanimous support of its actions as it had in the case of Operation Serval in Mali (Fabius 2013p). 
Therefore, other reasons may be considered as the principal driving forces behind the French decision. 
 During his first state visit to the CAR, Hollande affirmed that the need to intervene had become acute 
and the only motivation that guided him throughout the decision-making process was the desire to save 
‘as many human lives as possible and to prevent the carnages that were imminent’ (Hollande 2013l). In 
light of this objective the president considered it impossible to hesitate any longer or to calculate the 
opportunities that might accompany a military intervention in a resource rich but poorly governed state 
or even to question the length of such an intervention (Hollande 2013l; Hollande 2013a).449 While these 
statements surely aimed at convincing different audiences that France did not intervene to satisfy any 
economic interests, they also show that the French president and his administration are able to think of 
and defend military interventions primarily as moral necessities. In other words, the French decision-
makers’ habitus allows them to identify their country as a value promoting entity, which is willing to 
defend these values even if this implies the use of force and the cost of human (French) lives (Bourdieu 
1980, 88–89). Hence, France intervened in both Mali and the CAR because the determination to 
intervene in situations where there is a perceived need for French action and where the French Army 
possesses the necessary capacities to conduct a mission successfully is part of the political elites’ self-
identity. These two conditions are given in large parts of francophone Africa, which makes this region 
particularly prone to French military interventionism. Throughout their socialisation, starting with their 
                                                     
448  At the time of submission (January 2015), three French soldiers had lost their lives in the performance of their 
duties, and 120 were wounded.  
449  ‘Il n'était plus temps de tergiverser, plus temps de s'interroger sur l'opportunité ou même la durée de cette 
opération. Il fallait tout simplement - et j'en ai pris moi-même la décision - oui, tout simplement intervenir pour 
sauver autant de vies qu'il était possible et prévenir les carnages qui s'annonçaient’. 
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education and later on during their careers as civil servants, French elites acquire this very specific 
understanding of themselves and their state’s role in the international system (Bertin-Mourot and Bauer 
2000; Bellier 1992; Siroux 2011, 16).450        
 Given France’s status in the world and its Army’s capacities, intervention becomes an option that 
French decision-makers cannot easily exclude from their foreign policy toolbox. This role conception 
of French decision-makers defied even public opinion. As Fabius argued, ‘I understand that the French 
think this the CAR is far away, this the intervention will be costly, but when your friends are on the 
verge of being massacred, when the United Nations unanimously ask you to intervene, France has the 
responsibility to do it’ (Fabius 2013g).451 In their work on the history of interventions, Lawson and 
Tardelli turn this finding of a nexus between status/capabilities and action into a rule that applies to all 
Great Powers. They conclude that ‘if superior power capabilities make intervention something Great 
Powers can do, their concern for status makes intervention something Great Powers must do, even when 
this is at considerable cost to both their capabilities and reputation’ (Lawson and Tardelli 2013, 1243). 
According to the English School, the very definition of Great Power applies to a state that cannot be 
intervened against, but that at the same time holds certain rights and duties in the international society 
such as the management of crises, the preservation, or an interest in the preservation of the established 
system, and ‘the enforcement of the norms and rules of international society’ (Bull 2002, 207; 
Macmillan 2013, 1045). In other words, for the French state to be perceived as a great or exceptional 
power, it has to live up to self-imposed role expectations derived from a discourse placing France at the 
top of an assumed hierarchical international order. In other words, the French interventions in both Mali 
and the CAR can be largely explained with reference to the actors’ perception of themselves as 
representatives of a great or influential power.      
                                                     
450  For instance Bellier (1992, 104) in her study on the ENA (French elite school for future civil servants) argues 
that the school’s principal purpose is to teach how to ‘be and appear in a system of norms established by the old 
guard’. In other words, she finds a strong path dependency in what is considered the state and the role of the self. 
Moreover, the knowledge and acceptance of the established norms is considered to be the principal characteristic 
that makes ENA students appear conform and at times as a uniform group (1992, 121). Bourdieu (1981, 3) defines 
the preparatory classes that grant access to France’s elite universities as ‘institutions whose task it is to confer 
schooling and a consecration for those who are called upon to enter the dominant class where most of them come 
from (one sees the paradox)’.     
451  ‘Je comprends que les Français se disent que c’est loin, que cela peut coûter cher, mais quand vos amis sont 
sur le point d’être massacrés, quand l’Organisation des Nations unies, à l’unanimité, vous demande d’intervenir, 
la France a la responsabilité de le faire’. 
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 Against this backdrop, the decision was framed as having emerged from a situation that French actors 
had wished to avoid but which nevertheless was forced upon them and made a reaction necessary. As 
already suggested above, the perception of France’s capacity to promote significant change was 
understood as an inevitable obligation to act. This argument became the principal justification of 
France’s action since the beginning of Operation Sangaris. In the words of the president, ‘France 
considered that it was its duty because it had the capacity to act’ (Hollande 2014c).452 The capacity to 
intervene derived from France’s traditional strategic positioning on the African continent. With a 
platoon based at Bangui airport, permanent bases in Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal in addition to 
the intervention force in the Sahel, France possessed several strategic entry points that allowed French 
troops to quickly become operational: ‘France has had emplacements in Africa for a long 
time….Therefore we had troops, as they say, that were prepositioned next to the CAR. And the question 
France, as the only European country, had to answer was the following: Should we allow the massacres 
to happen and remain simple bystanders although we had the means to act?’ (Hollande 2014c, emphasis 
added) 453.  
 The importance French actors attribute to their military apparatus is also reflected in France’s annual 
defence budget, which despite continuous budget cuts amounted to $61.2 billion in 2013 and thus 
constituted the largest national defence budget among EU member states and the fifth largest in the 
world, surpassed only by the United States, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. But more than a mere 
comparison of numbers, it is the idea that French actors attribute to their armed forces and that 
establishes the nexus between capacities and the perceived need for action. For Hollande ‘there is no 
great nation in this world that is not endowed with a defence apparatus’ (Hollande 2014g).454 This 
statement expresses the importance French security culture attributes to the virtues of autonomous 
decision-making and independent defence capabilities (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, 22).  
                                                     
452  ‘Donc, la France a considéré que c'était son devoir et c'était aussi parce qu'elle en avait la capacité d'agir’. 
453  ‘Il se trouve que la France a depuis longtemps des positions en Afrique. Et qu'elle essaye de traduire avec une 
nouvelle démarche cette relation particulière liée à l'histoire. Nous avions donc des troupes qui étaient - comme 
on dit - pré-positionnées, près de la Centrafrique. Et la question qui s'est posée à la France et j'allais dire 
seulement à la France en tant que pays européen, c'était de savoir si nous laissions faire les massacres, si nous 
restions spectateurs alors même que nous avions des moyens d'agir ?’ 
454  ‘C'est cette conjugaison d'équipements de qualité, d'hommes et de femmes de haut niveau technique et 
également une stratégie et une doctrine, appuyées par les moyens budgétaires qui sont accordés à la Défense ; 
c'est toute cette conjugaison qui nous permet d'être un grand pays. Il n'y a pas de grand pays au monde qui ne soit 
doté d'un outil de défense’.  
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 This perceived need for action was further reinforced by the exceptionality French actors attribute to 
their nation’s military apparatus. According to Hollande, ‘France is one of the few countries in the world 
that possess the defence mechanisms capable of confronting all kinds of threats. And I do say one of the 
few countries in the world’ (Hollande 2014g).455 Elsewhere Hollande proclaimed, ‘it is this combination 
of high quality material, well trained troops, a strategy and military doctrine, and an important defence 
budget that allows us to be a great nation’. By elevating their country to the realms of exceptionality, 
French actors imposed a mode of conduct upon themselves that could respond to the expectations that 
derived from the status of an exceptional power. French actors were convinced that their country had to 
fulfil great deeds in order to still be considered as a great or influential power. De Gaulle’s fierce belief 
in the prominence of foreign policy and its constituting function of the state shine through the French 
reasoning up until present.          
 More generally, France’s recent interventions in Mali and the CAR are in line with the practices 
undertaken ‘by a sufficiently unified core which has frequently demonstrated its will to use force to 
reorder the periphery, whether in the fight against militant Islam, the transformation of fragile states, or 
in the name of populations that are suffering’ (Macmillan 2013, 1054). France, due to its capacity to 
project forces around the globe and its claim to be situated at the upper end of the international hierarchy, 
obliges its leaders to take action beyond the country’s own boundaries in order to preserve the current 
system and to diffuse the norm structures that are considered as righteous. While this conviction applies 
to France’s foreign policy behaviour in general, it is the perceived proximity to francophone Africa that 
make French actors concentrate the better part of their normative aspirations on that region of the world. 
The particularity of France’s interventionism remains the geographic focus on a very specific part of the 
periphery: francophone sub-Saharan Africa. It is this geographic preference for francophone Africa that 
let the president argue, ‘France took on its duty where it feels most involved, in Africa. We did it in 
Mali…and today we are in the CAR to prevent a massacresome even speak of genocidebecause we 
believe once again that this is our responsibility’ (Hollande 2014b).456 In other words, French actors 
                                                     
455  ‘La France est un des rares pays au monde à pouvoir disposer d'un outil de défense capable de nous permettre 
de faire face à toutes les menaces. Je dis bien un des rares pays au monde’.  
456  ‘La France fait son devoir, là où elle se sent la plus engagée, en Afrique. Nous l’avons fait au 
Mali….Aujourd’hui nous sommes en Centrafrique pour éviter un massacre – certains parlent même de génocide 
– parce que nous considérons, là encore, c’est notre responsabilité’.  
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continue to develop policies that take into account a division of the world into different spheres of 
influence, which in turn leads to a division of labour among those who are considered and who consider 
themselves to be great powers. This geographical division of the world is a product of state actors’ 
socialisation and can only be understood if historical and societal contexts are taken into consideration. 
In this context the notions of proximity and friendship come into play. Just as in the case of the 
intervention in Mali, French actors repeatedly referred to the idea that friendship obliges as well. Fabius 
summarised this understanding succinctly when saying ‘When friends are swallowed up, we cannot 
ignore them and say we do not mind’ (Fabius 2014d).457 Along with the concepts of geographical, 
societal, and cultural proximity, the notion of friendship governs France’s relationship with the African 
continent in general and francophone Africa in particular.      
 For analytical purposes, the impact of such thinking on French decision-making processes can be 
divided into intrinsic and extrinsic motivations or push factors. Intrinsic motivations emerge directly 
from the actors’ role perceptions and are self-referential constructs that are only marginally influenced 
by outside opinions. They impose modes of conduct that are coherent and in line with the very role 
actors attribute to their country and to themselves. Intrinsic motivations respond to the necessity of 
satisfying the actors’ self-esteem, which is a crucial component of self-identity. For Lebow (2008, 64) 
having self-esteem is the ultimate goal of the human spirit (Lebow 2008, 64). Self-esteem is dependent 
on the achievement of goals that a given individual considers as desirable, righteous, and just. Against 
this backdrop it can be argued that Prime Minster Ayrault’s (2013) defence of the French intervention, 
according to which France ‘did not intervene to defend its interest…but first of all to defend our [their] 
values’, comes closer to the truth than many critics of France’s policy towards Africa would be ready to 
acknowledge.458 The traditional rational or materialist mode of reasoning that posits that all 
interventions, even humanitarian interventions, are driven by some underlying geostrategic interest is 
embedded in the functional or utilitarian bias in political science. Instead of creating an insurmountable 
                                                     
457  ‘Quand des amis se noient, nous ne pouvons pas les ignorer en disant que cela nous est égal’. 
458  ‘Rétablir la sécurité et démanteler les milices, c'est la première des priorités. Et si la France est engagée, ce 
n'est pas pour défendre ses intérêts, comme je l'ai entendu tout à l'heure, quand M. Jacob me pressait de le 
reconnaître. C'est d'abord pour défendre nos valeurs que nous intervenons. En ce soixante-cinquième 
anniversaire, jour pour jour, de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, qui a été adoptée le 10 décembre 
1948, la France est fidèle à ses propres valeurs et aux valeurs universelles’. 
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schism between these two sets of arguments, more comprehensive explanations need to acknowledge 
that ‘perceptions of utility are tightly bound up in perception of legitimacy’ (Finnemore 2003, 16).   
Honour and standing, which are the ultimate means to achieving self-esteem in society (Lebow 2008, 
64), played a considerable role in the minds of the French elite when considering possible intervention. 
Repeatedly, French actors reminded their interlocutors that ‘all the French should be proud of what we 
are doing’ (Araud 2013e)459 and as Hollande and Fabius pointed out, ‘it is France’s responsibility and 
its honour to contribute to the resolution of this crisis’ (Assemblée Nationale 2013e).460 This 
understanding was also used to defy criticism addressing the burden this intervention meant for France’s 
state budget. Trivialising the mission’s potential costs, Fabius argued ‘there is not only the financial 
aspect. France needs to shine (rayonner) and honour its international obligations’ (Fabius 2013p).461  
 To gain self-esteem, however, more than the satisfaction of self-imposed goals is required. Since 
honour and standing—or status and rank—are reputational factors that emerge from processes of 
interaction and thus depend on the perception of others’ perceptions of one’s self extrinsic factors come 
into play. Discourses and practices need to provoke signals made by the respective “Other” that let the 
“Self” believe that its deeds are considered honourable. Put simply, policy-makers seek positive 
feedback for their actions. In the realm of foreign policy this feedback is delivered by both national and 
international audiences. As Holsti pointed out in his seminal discussion on national role conceptions, 
they are the actors’ ‘”image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the 
external environment’ (Holsti 1970, 245–46). These images do not emerge in a vacuum but develop 
through interactions between members of different communities. To sense what other actors may think 
of one’s own decisions and actions the only strategy actors have at their dispositionbefore knowing 
the reactions of others ex post facto through experienceis to conduct actions responsive to the 
perceived or assumed expectations of others. The means of conduct for such an a priori evaluation 
emanate from past experiences and continually adapted images one holds of others. One can see that 
French actors aspired to satisfy the “Other” and to provoke positive stimuli by their own actions by 
                                                     
459  ‘Nous y allons pour protéger une population. Je crois qu’aujourd’hui tous les Français doivent être fiers de 
ce que nous faisons’.  
460  ‘Comme l’a souligné le Président de la République, c’est la tâche et l’honneur de la France de contribuer au 
règlement de cette crise, même si nous n’avons pas vocation à rester durablement sur place’. 
461  ‘Il n’y a pas par ailleurs que l’aspect financier. La France doit rayonner et remplir ses devoirs internationaux’.  
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looking at the following rhetorical question the president posed in the aftermath of his decision: ‘What 
would one have said about France if it had done nothing despite having forces stationed in the region? 
What would one have said about the United Nations?’ (Hollande 2014f).462 And Fabius added, ‘we did 
not intervene with pleasure, but if there is a friendly state (pays ami) that asks you, together with the 
African Union and the UN, and if French troops are present in the various African countries where we 
have military bases, you cannot say this does not concern you’ (Fabius 2014a).463 Defence Minister Le 
Drian agreed when affirming in front of the French Parliament that repatriating or leaving the French 
soldiers in Bangui idly standing ‘would have been catastrophic for France’s image’ (Assemblée 
Nationale 2014b).464 Further pressure was put on the government by the French expatriate community 
living in the region. As MP Gérard Charasse complained vis-à-vis the foreign minister, ‘I receive letters 
from French citizens who live there and who tell me there distress and what they themselves or their 
neighbours endured. They are disappointed because they hope for a faster reaction’ (Assemblée 
Nationale 2013b, 10).465        
 External pressure and expectations vis-à-vis the French government undoubtedly existed 
independently of the French actors’ perceptions of them, but it was only thanks to the French actors’ 
willingness to perceive and respond to these pressures that intervention became an obligation. The 
operation, from this perspective, was the only means to respond to the perceived expectations and to 
achieve a situation in which the actors’ self-esteem could be preserved if not strengthened. More than 
merely a tool to justify France’s interventions, the achievement of self-esteem can be considered among 
the principal guiding factors—together with the perceived empathy, the obligations emerging from 
                                                     
462  ‘Qu'aurait-on dit de la France, alors même qu'elle avait des forces prédisposées dans la région, si elle n'avait 
rien fait ? Qu'aurait-on dit des Nations unies ?’  
463  ‘Nous ne sommes pas intervenus de gaieté de cœur, mais parce que quand vous voyez un pays ami - alors que 
les Français sont installés dans différents pays d'Afrique, où nous avons des bases - qui vous demande, avec l'ONU 
et l'Union africaine, d'intervenir, vous ne pouvez pas dire que cela ne vous regarde pas’. 
464  ‘Sans l’intervention française, je le répète, nous aurions assisté à des massacres épouvantables. Quelque 250 
militaires français étaient d’ailleurs présents à l’aéroport de Bangui M’Poko, dans le cadre de la mission Boali, 
engagée en 2003. Fallait-il les rapatrier ? Les laisser spectateurs des massacres ? Cela eût été catastrophique 
pour l’image de la France’. 
465  ‘En tant que président du groupe d’amitié France-Centrafrique, je reçois des lettres de ressortissants français 
vivant sur place, qui me disent leur détresse et me racontent ce qu’eux ou leurs voisins ont subi. Ils seront déçus, 
car ils espéraient une réaction plus rapide’. 
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France’s military and political capacities, the actors’ self-identification as representatives of a Great 
Power—of the French decision.  
 
The Prevented Genocide: On the Power of Counterfactuals  
While France’s push for intervention can be understood with reference to the decision-makers’ identity 
as representatives of an influential power another case-specific factor needs to be included into the 
explanation as for why the Hollande administration could overcome a series of doubts and uncertainties 
and eventually launched what was expected to become a long and difficult mission. Following the launch 
of Operation Sangaris an increasing number of speech acts affirmed that the intervention had prevented 
genocide in the CAR. Although the motivation to prevent a possible genocide had already figured in the 
French discourse during early stages of the decision-making process, the belief in the achievement of 
this goal at the moment of the decision and following the launch of Operation Sangaris took the narrative 
to yet another level. References to genocide, the risk of genocide, quasi-genocide, or genocide in the 
making had become more than merely historical analogies with the help of which French decision-
makers were trying to make sense of the crisis in the CAR. Following 5 December 2013, the term 
genocide became the starting point of a counterfactual thinking according to which France’s intervention 
had prevented what it intended to prevent. More precisely, a counterfactual was invented that provided 
a solid reason and motivation for intervention and was able to accommodate the different mental maps 
ranging from France’s responsibility, its capacity to act, to the experiences in Rwanda and France’s 
knowledge of the deteriorating situation in the CAR within one single narrative. That this narrative 
described a reality that actually never occurred did not matter. ‘The ability to imagine alternative 
scenarios’, according to Lebow, ‘is a ubiquitous, if not essential, part of human life....Counterfactuals 
are routinely used by ordinary people and policy-makers to work their way through problems, reach 
decisions, cope with anxiety, and make normative judgements’ (Lebow 2010, 29). As a means of 
persuasion and appeal counterfactuals take a central place in politics and social life (Lebow 2010, 47). 
Counterfactuals consist of vivid descriptions of an imaginable alternative world that merges with the 
existing world. In conjunction these two worlds lead to the establishment of a truth that is partially based 
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on the perception of observable facts their framing by the actors and partially on individual and 
collective imaginaries that serve as either supplement or antipode to the observable environment. The 
longer such a narrative of an assumed second reality (counterfactual reality) is in use the more difficult 












Alternative worlds / options 
+ 
Perception, framing, interpretation 
  
TRUTH 
Figure 11. Simplified illustration of how social reality and counterfactual reality establish truth 
Source: own elaboration  
 The need for a counterfactual in the case of the CAR was fostered by a highly complex operational 
environment that was not conducive to quick military victory. The operational goal of keeping peace 
and the absence of a clearly identifiable enemy demanded for a comprehensive long-term solution, 
which could not be solved by focusing only on the security dimension of the problem. But even when 
looking at the security dimension, French actors acknowledged the potential difficulty of this mission 
from the very beginning: ‘We have always been aware that it would be a difficult mission, especially 
because we want to disarm all the armed groups’ (Araud 2013g). The planners in the Hollande 
administration also knew about the limited impact a force of 1,600 troops could have on the potential 
conflict solution. Finally, the developments in the CAR following the French intervention did not give 
much reason to hope for a quick ending of the conflict. Still in April 2014, France’s permanent 
representative to the UN had to acknowledge that ‘despite the efforts of the Africans with support of the 
French forces, the situation in the CAR remains extremely unstable….[which will necessitate a 
continuous deployment] over the coming months’ (Araud 2014c).466     
 In order to give meaning to Operation Sangaris and to legitimise its costs it needed to be demonstrated 
                                                     
466  ‘Aujourd'hui, malgré les efforts des Africains soutenus par les forces françaises, la situation en Centrafrique 
reste extrêmement précaire. Les troupes de l'Union africaine - auxquelles il faut rendre hommage - et les troupes 
françaises sur le terrain font un travail considérable pour protéger les populations civiles. Et elles poursuivront 
ce travail dans les mois qui viennent’. 
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that the French mission had a positive impact on the situation. A narrative was required that was 
powerful enough to counterbalance the bad news of continuous excesses and acts of violence, which the 
French and African forces were not able to halt immediately. However, the Hollande administration was 
lacking the necessary encouraging developments and observable facts that would have allowed for the 
construction of a progressive success story similar to the one in Mali. Body counts and lists of destroyed 
targets were simply no option in the CAR. As long as violence prevailed, the weapons the French Army 
seized were the only visible element decision-makers could advance to illustrate the operation’s 
effectiveness. Yet, the seizing of weapons did not possess the same weight as above-mentioned martial 
achievements, in particular since they did not hinder the perpetuation of violence. In the weeks following 
the French intervention, the degree of violence in the CAR did not decrease. First signs of a slight 
amelioration of the situation and the impact of the French intervention did not appear before mid-January 
(Marchal 2014). Against this backdrop, to support the righteousness of their decision and to provide 
Operation Sangaris with a sense, French actors imagined a worse scenario the French intervention had 
prevented from occurring and which was able to accommodate the fragile situation in the CAR as a 
positive development.           
 In other words, counterfactuals were used to explain the military mission in general as well as the 
moment of intervention. They made up for the lack of immediate military successes and allowed for the 
construction of a positive and progressive storyline. Following François Hollande’s decision to 
intervene, French actors engaged in a discourse that repeatedly brought forward the same rhetorical 
question: ‘What would be the scale of the acts of violence and the massacres today if France had stood 
by idly?’ (Hollande 2014g).467 And the answer to this question always read, ‘we would have counted 
the dead, not in the tens, not in the hundreds, but in the thousands because the terrible threat, the terrible 
and insidious poison of the clash between religions had crept into [the Central African crisis] (Hollande 
2014f).468 Addressing the French troops during a state visit to the CAR Hollande was adamant that 
‘thousands of lives, and I mean thousands of lives have been saved thanks to you…, because if we had 
                                                     
467  ‘Quelle serait aujourd'hui la situation en Centrafrique si la France était restée indifférente à la dérive de ce 
pays ?’  
468  ‘On aurait compté les morts, non pas par dizaines, non pas par centaines, mais par milliers, parce que s'était 
introduite la terrible menace, le terrible poison insidieux de l'affrontement inter-religieux’. 
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not intervened, the violence would have worsened and the massacres which were already happening 
would have multiplied’ (Hollande 2014d).469 Laurent Fabius estimated with confidence on one occasion 
that a non-intervention would have cost the lives of 10,000 people instead of ‘the 394 [he had] 
mentioned’ (Fabius 2013n).470 Later the foreign minister even spoke of tens of thousands of potential 
victims (Fabius 2014c), a figure that reached its climax in January when Fabius stated that France’s 
action had potentially saved up to 100,000 people from dying (Fabius 2014b). As Hollande explained 
his decision, ‘on the eve of our intervention the massacres caused 1,000 fatalities in the capital alone. 
That was the reality at the time when I decided, together with the Africans and under a UN mandate, to 
conduct Operation Sangaris’ (Hollande 2014d).471 Not only was the operation as such justified by ways 
of counterfactual reasoning, but also its timing. As Hollande stated, ‘the UN Security Council had given 
us a mandate. We could have waited. Every day that passed, meant dozens of dead, even hundreds at 
times’ (Hollande 2014a).472 The urgency of the situation was reinforced by the conviction that a genocide 
was about to happened and France the only outside actor with the capacity to bring the escalating 
violence to a halt.          
 This reality, however, was based neither on hard nor reliable figures. Estimates of the death toll 
related to the conflict vary widely. The Red Cross provided a figure of 1,000 to 2,000 dead for the period 
between December 2013 and January 2014. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) battle-
related death dataset 1946-2013 indicates 102 battle-related deaths in the CAR as a low estimate for the 
year 2013 (see table 3). These figures support the view expressed by several observers such as MSF’s 
Operational Representative Yann Lelevrier according to which ‘nobody really knows the death toll in 
the CAR’ (Reuters 2014). What’s more, these varying figures qualify the alleged exceptionality of the 
conflict as well as the use of the term genocide and put the crisis in the CAR amidst other crises that 
infested the world during the same period.  
                                                     
469  ‘D'ores et déjà, des milliers de vies, je dis bien des milliers de vies, ont été sauvées grâce à vous….Car, si nous 
n'étions pas intervenus, c'est vrai que les violences auraient dégénéré et que ce sont des massacres, qui étaient 
déjà à l'œuvre, qui se seraient multipliés’. 
470  ‘Si nous n'étions pas intervenus, il y aurait peut-être 5.000 ou 10.000 morts au lieu des 394 que j'ai mentionnés. 
471  La veille même de notre intervention, les massacres avaient fait 1.000 morts, 1.000 morts dans la capitale. 
Voilà ce qu'était la réalité au moment où j'ai décidé, aux côtés des Africains, avec le mandat des Nations unies, 
de faire cette opération Sangaris’. 
472  ‘Le conseil de sécurité des Nations unies venait de nous donner mandat. Nous aurions pu attendre. Chaque 
jour qui passait, c'était des dizaines de morts, centaines même qui étaient hélas constatées’. 
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Table 3. Battle-related deaths in the world, low estimates 2013 
 Country Battle-related 
deaths 
 Country  Battle-related 
deaths 
1 Syria 22,752 14 Russia 281 
2 Afghanistan 7,612 15 Myanmar 238 
3 Pakistan 1,774 16 Thailand 187 
4 Iraq 1,719 17 Algeria 145 
5 Nigeria 1,460 18 Colombia 140 
6 DRC 1,448 19 CAR 102 
7 South Sudan 1,269 20 Uganda 100 
8 Mali 822 21 Ethiopia 73 
9 Somalia 746 22 Malaysia 68 
10 Yemen 581 23 US 35 
11 Philippines 514 24 Turkey 30 
12 Sudan  475 25 Mozambique 26 
13 India 380    
Source: own elaboration based on the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2014, 1989-2013, 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/, accessed on 5 November 2014 
 To reiterate, these allegedly neutral descriptions of reality, as one can see from the lack of agreement 
regarding the number of casualties, were pure projections or estimations of a situation that never 
occurred. This is not to negate the seriousness of the Central African crisis, but to demonstrate that the 
estimates were drawn by observing an existing situation and projecting this observation, ceteris paribus, 
onto the long-term. In other words, what matters most is not the observable situation itself—which as 
in the case of counterfactual arguments does not even exist on its own and outside the actors’ minds—
but the interpretation that is attributed to the different perceived stimuli. This conviction of having 
prevented a genocide for which indicators could indeed be found in the operational environment but 
which in the end had been thought into existence taken together with the firm belief of France’s 
responsibility to act explain why François Hollande gave the order to launch Operation Sangaris within 
hours of the adoption of UN Resolution 2127.   
 
5.3 Conclusion: Serval Bis Repetita473 
The crisis in the CAR constituted yet another instance of struggle between different ideas and belief 
systems that shape present-day French security policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst the shift from 
                                                     
473  See Bayart’s (1998)‘Bis repetita’.  
 259 
 
a non-interventionist policy to military intervention was less radical and less visible than in the case of 
Mali, the issue itself was not less contested. At the time the French president announced his decision to 
deploy a peacekeeping force to the CAR, the intervention was framed as the only possible alternative. 
This conclusion, however, was the outcome of a longer process during which several alternatives 
competed with each other to become part of the dominant narrative.     
 Thus, accepting this narrative without enquiring the processes that have led to its emergence bears 
two analytical fallacies, which I have tried to avoid in the present analysis. First, it perpetuates a highly 
uncritical stance that makes analysts like decision-makers ‘take a whole range of ideas, beliefs, and 
contexts for granted’ (Finnemore 2003, 4). At best such thinking produces tautological and hence overly 
simplified explanations, at worst it offers grave misinterpretations of reality. The obviousness that 
describes the present-day discourse on Western liberal interventionism should therefore not remain 
uncontested. As any concept, humanitarian interventionism is mutable and changes over times and 
contexts (Finnemore 2003). Rather than accepting something that is defined as normal as a given, 
descriptions of normality should lead to reflection. This is no mean feat, since any challenge of the 
dominant discourse provokes violent reactions on the part of actors, pundits, and scholars.474 However, 
only by taking on this challenge analysts will be able to unveil the struggles that have preceded the 
emergence of a coherent narrative and thus come closer to the unstructured and uncertain world that 
policy-makers encounter during their daily grind. Related to this is a second reason why one needs to 
engage with the processes that lead to the emergence of a dominant narrative and not only with its 
outcomes. Policy-makers do not possess an ultimate truth or immutable and predefined interests they 
merely ballyhoo like door-to-door salesmen the virtues of a vacuum cleaner. This criticism is directed 
against both narrowly defined rational choice approaches and works that take France’s neo-colonial 
attitude for granted. Analysts of either strand assume an underlying, oftentimes material agenda, which 
they advance as the ultimate explanation of French action. By so doing, they eclipse the processes during 
which foreign policy is made and which, as I hope to have shown, are the key to our understanding of 
specific decisions and foreign policy outcomes.        
                                                     
474  That dominant narratives are guarded jealously becomes understandable if one considers the difficulties these 
ideas had to overcome before establishing themselves as accepted norms.  
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 Even more than in the case of Mali, the CAR confronted the Hollande administration with a situation 
that risked undermining the narrative of France’s renewed policy towards Africa. The on-going 
operation in Mali and the blurred political situation on the ground made the French government hesitate 
until the motivation to intervene began to supersede the actors’ doubts. The site of the crisis reinforced 
both the perceived need for French intervention and the fear of provoking undesired consequences and 
thus amplified the ideational struggles between the different mental maps. At the heart of the African 
continent and on the territory of the Cinderella of France’s former colonial Empire (Brustier 1962) the 
crisis in the CAR gave rise to both unwanted notions of neo-colonialism and high degrees of 
compassion. In a first attempt to justify a more active security policy towards the CAR without creating 
the impression that France was prolonging its neo-colonial policy-making of yore, French actors framed 
the crisis in terms of the GWoT narrative. While this move was instrumental to some extent—insofar as 
it served as a discursive tool that would make the international community receptive to this crisis in a 
country that traditionally had remained on the margins of the international security agenda—it was as 
much an expression of a belief system that had become inherent in the minds of many Western elites 
when speaking of international security. Against the backdrop of the intervention in Mali, global Islamist 
terrorism became a frame that prompted French decision-makers to understand the crisis in the CAR as 
a potential cause and future safe haven of terrorist activities.      
 After it had become obvious that the GWoT narrative was of no use to consciously and/or sub-
consciously deal with the conflict in the CAR, the satisfaction of the principles of honour and standing 
remained the principal push factor for intervention. By evoking their nation’s greatness, rank, and glory 
French actors compensated for the lack of a direct threat to France’s national security and the lower 
degree of perceived proximity when evaluating the different options at their disposal (Cerny 1980; 
Vaïsse 1998; Krotz 2001). However, French actors continued to be torn between their reluctance to 
launch yet another intervention on the African continent and the need to satisfy their self-esteem until a 
very advanced stage of the decision-making process. In contrast to Operation Serval, the principal 
advocates of Operation Sangaris were to be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to some 
observers, Laurent Fabius considered a well-managed intervention in the CAR as a means to compensate 
for the perceived absence of his Ministry during the Malian crisis. However, once again during the 
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implementation process French diplomats were absent. While the military entered Bangui and the 
embassy’s defence attachés could rely on an ever denser network of supporting staff, the number of 
diplomatic staff remained unaltered.475         
 The genocide in Rwanda and the international community’s failure to prevent it emerged as the 
principal analogy with the help of which French actors argued in favour of a timely intervention. By 
summer 2013, French decision-makers found themselves in a situation that called forth painful 
references to the failed crisis management in Rwanda two decades earlier. In fact, the Socialist 
government had become witness of the CAR’s decent into violence. Reminded of the consequences of 
non-intervention during the Rwandan crisis, the French government concluded that it could not any 
longer stand by idly. References to the Rwandan genocide and demonstrations of empathy with the 
Central African population are in line with the broader shift in recent security debates away from state 
security to human security, which is ‘viewed as a sorely needed venue for highlighting the particular 
vulnerabilities of peoples who suffer from violence from representatives of the state, as well as other 
forms of violence and injustices’ (Stern and Öjendal 2010, 15). The increasing awareness that action 
was needed provoked another contradiction in the French discourse. By advancing the option of a French 
intervention, the Hollande administration regional actors incapable of solving the problem. Still a few 
months earlier the same regional actors were framed as the key of any solution to the Central African 
crisis. The actors’ belief in France being a puissance d’influence and their conviction of facing another 
genocide at the heart of the African continent promoted the sentiment of responsibility, which soon 
became the major driving force behind the French intervention. As Fabius summarised, ‘if you are a 
global power you cannot walk your way, look the other way, and leave a friendly nation destroy itself’ 
(Fabius 2014g).476 This sentiment of responsibility and the herewith related perceived need for action 
were further reinforced by the merging of individual and collective identities. Government officials and 
politicians identify with the state they represent, ‘since the prestige associated with the institutions 
strongly influences [their] personal prestige’ (Lindemann 2013, 153). Vice-versa, institutional failure 
                                                     
475  Interview with a researcher and specialist on the CAR, 19 December 2014. Besides the Consulate staff and the 
Department for Cooperation, only three political advisors were in charge of the French embassy in Bangui.  
476  ‘Quand on est une puissance globale, on ne peut pas passer son chemin, détourner le regard et laisser un pays 
ami s’autodétruire’.  
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becomes personal failure. The further one ascends the hierarchical ladder of the state the more one’s 
own identity merges with the state’s collective identity. Due to the extended powers French presidents 
enjoy in the realm of foreign policy it is no wonder that the blending of the group identity and his 
individual identity were particularly pronounced in François Hollande’s mental maps. As the president 
stated on one occasion, ‘I am responsible because I am the head of state of a country that has ties with 
Africa, because we are solidary with this continent….I have a particular responsibility and therefore I 
care for France being at the forefront’ (Hollande 2013b).477      
 In the end the perceived need for intervention won over the objections against it. Rooted in the French 
actors’ identity and being the expression of their strive for honour and standing in the international arena, 
the French decision-making process produced a positive evaluation of France’s capacities to provoke 
change and concluded that it was its responsibility to stand by the people of the CAR. This evaluation 
was spurred by the positive experience the Hollande administration had in Mali just before launching 
Operation Sangaris: ‘Those in the inner circles of the state who planned militarily and prepared 
politically the eventuality of intervention in the CAR [...] all had in mind how things had been prepared 
for Mali’.478 Not only was the intervention in the Sahel successful at the operational level, but it also 
received accolades from France’s African and international partners. In addition, there was an 
overwhelming support for Operation Serval. With this in mind, French actors could hope for the re-




                                                     
477  Mais j’ai de la responsabilité, parce que je suis à la tête d’un pays qui a un lien avec m’Afrique, parce que 
nous sommes solidaires de ce continent, parce qu’il y a des populations qui se sont mélangées par la mobilité, par 
les déplacements, j’ai une responsabilité particulière et donc je tiens à ce que la France soit à l’initiative.  
478  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Dans le cercle de l’état où on 
a planifié militairement et préparer politiquement les éventualités d’une intervention en RCA, on avait tous en tête 
la manière dont les choses se sont préparer pour le Mali. Dans les deux cas le système français institutionnelle 







Decisions are always a matter of choice. Understanding the choices that have led to France’s two latest 
military operations in sub-Saharan Africa has been the primary objective of this project. The research 
began with the paradox of a French political discourse that promoted military disengagement from 
Africa and African ownership in security matters while at the same time French troops intervened in 
two conflicts in the country’s former backyard. Starting with the observation that French security policy 
towards Africa oscillates between what might seem an attempt to roll back the wheels of history and a 
continuous adaptation to a changing international environment in which a globalised Africa acts and is 
acted upon in a globalised world, this work has sought to unravel the mysteries of French decision-
making. By dissecting decision-making processes and engaging with the mental frames that influence 
perceptions, create interest, and eventually result in observable policy outcomes, the study has sought 
to disenchant the sacred realm of French security policy under the Hollande administration. While this 
project focussed on French military interventions in Mali and the CAR, its implications reach beyond 
these two specific cases. This final chapter summarises the thesis’s principal findings with view of their 
case-specific empirical and broader theoretical implications.  
 
‘Cheese-eating Warriors’479  
France no doubt continues to be a vigorous security actor and peacekeeper in francophone Africa. As 
the most implicated Western country in Africa, France remains at the forefront of multilateral conflict 
resolutions and interventions. Traditional roles do not disappear easily. Accordingly, geostrategic and 
material considerations or neo-colonial ambitions continue to be the most used variables to explain 
French interventionism. While it is certainly true that ‘strong states intervene in weak ones when it 
serves their geostrategic and economic interests’ (Finnemore 2003, 5), the present work has shown that 
France’s decisions to intervene in Mali and the CAR were not simply transpositions of a pre-defined 
                                                     
479  See The Economist 2014.  
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national interest but resulted from a process of intensive ideational struggles between competing 
concepts and beliefs.          
 In both cases French actors were torn between mutually contradictory principles. On the one hand, 
French decision-makers subscribed to the doctrine of multilateralism and promoted an Africanisation of 
Africa’s security. Consequently, the French government was committed to limiting its implication in the 
two conflicts to some low-profile political, financial, and military support of an African-led intervention 
force—be it AFISMA in Mali or MISCA in the CAR. On the other hand, as representatives of an 
influential power (puissance d’influence), French decision-makers deemed it their responsibility to 
create stability in a region where their country possessed the military experience, expertise, and capacity 
as well as the necessary political clout to provoke change. Once French decision-makers began to judge 
a successful conflict resolution through an African-led multilateral intervention increasingly unlikely, 
they embarked on a course that challenged the established narrative of indirect support. In the case of 
Mali, the Hollande administration made a sudden U-turn from a strict non-interventionist discourse to 
one that framed France as the lead nation of an international coalition in the fight against global 
terrorism, a threat that was said to not only afflict the Sahel but also Europe and the international 
community in general. In the case of the CAR, this discursive shift occurred more gradually. The 
previous intervention in Mali had consolidated the idea in the socialist government that, if called upon, 
France would assume its duties and intervene in a friendly nation. Therefore, disaffirmations about a 
possible French participation in combat activities were less categorical than it had been the case on the 
eve of Operation Serval in Mali.       
 Competing principles prevailed and led to dissent among the different decision-units in the French 
state. We saw the Ministry of Defence emerging as a proponent of early intervention in Mali as opposed 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which rather believed in a diplomatic and multilateral solution until 
the very last minute. The complexity of the two situations provoked further inconsistencies within the 
discourses of various individual actors. This was the case of President Hollande, who was visibly torn 
between the different belief systems that had emerged during the decision-making processes. For a long 
time it was unclear if the president would abide by his non-interventionist discourse or comply with the 
self-imposed burden of wanting to be a responsible actor on the international scene. Role theory has 
 265 
 
distinguished two conditions of incompatibility between role expectations. First, the so-called role 
conflict, ‘exists where honoring one expectation leads to behaviour that violates another’. A second, 
labelled role competition, emerges when ‘actions taken to honor one expectation compete in time and 
resources with actions necessary to meet another expectation’ (Backman 1970, 315). Both conditions 
were present during the decision-making processes that led to the French interventions in Mali and the 
CAR and help understand not only the conflict between different decision-units but also within the same 
individuals. From an analytical point of view, only by allowing for interests to emerge and form during 
these processes can we make sense of the president’s volte-face, which risked undermining his 
credibility as well as challenging some of his core convictions and beliefs. Social psychologists 
describing decision-making dilemmas argue that individuals ‘faced with conflicting expectations A and 
B’ either conform to one option, ‘compromise by meeting both expectations in part…[or] avoid 
conforming to either’ (Backman 1970, 318). In both cases, the decision-making process was first marked 
by the desire for compromise but ended with a clear choice.     
 France’s longstanding relationship with the African continent constrained French actors in their 
decision-making and simultaneously pushed them towards ever-deeper involvement in the resolution of 
the respective crisis. References to historical, cultural, human/societal, and geographic proximity were 
used extensively when they were thought not to provoke accusations of neo-colonial greed and avoided 
if the contrary was the case. This selective use of history challenges the argument of France following 
a neo-colonial policy as the latter cannot account for such differentiation.   
 Empathy and affect are, according to Finnemore (2003, 144), the two major driving forces that make 
leaders more likely to intervene in situations of human rights violations. She demonstrates this point by 
showing how nineteenth century interventionism was guided by the idea of a transnational Christian 
community. Likewise for French decision-makers, empathy with the people in Mali and the CAR, or 
what was framed as empathy, constituted another influential factor inciting French actors to decide on 
intervention.           
 Empathy and responsibility for the “Other” were enabled and enhanced by the perceived proximity 
between France and the African continent. Myers writes, ‘the best single predictor of whether two people 
are friends is their sheer proximity’ (1996, 499 quoted in Finnemore 2003, 155). And Finnemore (2003, 
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155) adds, ‘proximity increases people’s exposure to one another, and mere exposure is enough to 
prompt positive affect’. This is also in line with Jervis’s finding that ‘perceptions are influenced by 
immediate concerns as well as by more deeply rooted expectations. A person will perceive and interpret 
stimuli in terms of what is at the front of his [her] mind….Familiarity with an object is not enough. The 
person must also expect it to be present’ (Jervis 1976, 145; 203). Perceived proximity played a crucial 
role in the emergence and the subsequent framing of the two crises in francophone Africa. French actors 
were concerned by the events in Mali and the CAR because of the aforementioned forms of proximity. 
In particular, since proximity is a relative and not an absolute concept, it was sufficient for French actors 
to feel closer to the crises in Mali and the CAR than the rest of Europe in order to believe they must 
fulfil a special role with special responsibilities. Proximity perceived across the four dimensions 
mentioned above made French actors agree that ‘Africa is not a continent like any other’.480 One advisor 
to the president argued that Mali constituted ‘a theatre of operations that the French know because it is 
enough to go to the next café where they can talk to a Malian who will tell them “yes, we need to do 
it”’.481 Thanks to these close ties, decision-makers in Paris find it easier to justify the need for 
intervention in francophone Africa than in other places in the world where responsibility does not meet 
proximity, as it is the case in Afghanistan or Syria.482       
 However, since ‘it is exposure that matters, geographic proximity may not be as important as 
“functional proximity” (Finnemore 2003, 155). This last point has been corroborated by the difference 
that could be drawn between real and perceived geographical proximity. French leaders were inclined 
to perceive the Malian crisis in particular as a crisis on ‘Europe’s doorstep’ rather than a conflict in the 
Sahel-Sahara and, in so doing, were ready to ignore the real distance that separates the two geographic 
entities. The functional dimension had merged with the geographic dimension of proximity and created 
a distorted or subjective understanding of distance. By highlighting the vicinity of the two continents 
this subjective understanding of distance brought about an increased threat perception. French decision-
                                                     
480  Interview with personal advisor to the foreign minister, Paris, 31 January 2014. ‘Pour la France l’Afrique n’est 
pas un continent comme les autres’. 
481  Interview with personal advisor to the president, Paris, 16 March 2014. ‘Troisièmement, un théâtre d’opération 
que les Français connaissent, parce qu’il suffit qu’ils aillent au café et il y a un Malien avec qui ils peuvent en 
parler, et le Malien va leur dire « oui, il faut le faire ». La diaspora malienne ici était pour cette opération. Il y 
avait un très fort consensus pour cette opération’.  
482  Interview with personal advisor to the minister of defence, Paris, 16 September 2013. 
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makers were convinced that a deterioration of the situations in Mali and the CAR would have serious 
implications for not only the concerned states and the region but also for Europe and France.  
 In comparison, the sentiment of perceived proximity was more developed in the Malian case than it 
was in the CAR. In contrast to the Malian case where the perception of a close connection between 
Africa and Europe was supported, the crisis in the CAR failed to provoke similar sentiments among 
French elites. While Mali reinforced the proximity narrative, the CAR was simply affected by it. At first 
glance, this seems surprising given the long-standing and close history France and the CAR share with 
each other and the continuous French military cooperation between the two countries that accounted for 
the presence of a French contingent in Bangui even before the launch of Operation Sangaris. As I have 
argued in Chapter Five, several factors have contributed to this difference in perception. First the conflict 
in the CAR was primarily described as part of larger regional instability. While framing of the CAR as 
the centrepiece of the African continent highlighted the importance of safeguarding the country’s 
integrity and thus provided a rationale for intervention, it also prevented the crisis in the CAR from 
emerging as an idiosyncratic issue on the French security agenda for a long time. Additionally, French 
decision-makers were more alert to avoid references to a common history, which would have been able 
to increase the degree of perceived proximity but also risked to provoke negative connotations given 
France’s infamous past involvement in what was once known as the Cinderella of the French Empire. 
Finally, the co-occurrence of the two crises and France’s implication in a war in the Sahel, the outcome 
of which remained uncertain and largely unpredictable until the second half of 2013, made French actors 
take a more reluctant stance vis-à-vis intervention in the CAR at first.       
 In the end, the Hollande administration’s decisions to intervene in both instances highlights the strong 
influence of the concept of responsibility. Notwithstanding the financial burden and the political and 
human risks the military operations entailed, Hollande and his administration still deemed it their 
responsibility to act.483 Although the two crises gave rise to different mental maps and analogies that 
dominated the French government’s thoughts at the moment of the respective decisions—terrorism in 
                                                     
483  To name but a few of the operations’ likely costs and risks: First, the interventions were costly and exceeded 
the yearly budget programmed for external operations. They also risked France being labelled an imperialist power 
or a crusader in a war against fundamentalist forces entailing further consequences for France’s national security. 
Lastly the chances were high that the French military would get embroiled in long-lasting counterinsurgency and 
peacekeeping operations.  
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the Sahel, the risk of genocide in the CAR—both appealed to the decision-makers’ sense of 
responsibility, which was able to trump all constraints. This sentiment of responsibility was further 
enhanced by the fact that, at the very moment of decision, state action became an individual cause of 
those who were in the position to decide in the name of France. A strong identification with a certain 
conception of the French state and its role in the world turned the once hesitating President Hollande 
into the decisive Commander Hollande (Notin 2014, 177–79). Collective action became a matter of 
personal prestige. (Lindemann 2013, 153). As Hollande stated in the context of the Central African 
crisis, ‘I am responsible because I am the head of state of a country that has close ties with Africa; 
because we are solidary with this continent….I have a particular responsibility and therefore I care that 
France is at the forefront’ (Hollande 2013b).484       
 This being said, the triumph of the responsibility narrative does not make the Hollande administration 
an entirely altruistic actor whose sole interest and purpose is that of ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler 2002). 
As Minter details in his foreword to Schmidt’s volume on foreign intervention in Africa, ‘The concept 
of a purely humanitarian intervention simply to aid innocent civilians, with no political or military 
implications, is an illusion’ (Minter in Schmidt 2013, 15).     
 As mentioned above, French actors perceive themselves as representatives of a puissance 
d’influence. To maintain this role conception, they seek external confirmation of the images they hold 
of the “Self” and the “Other”. In other words, the construction of a security narrative needed to find 
acceptance among different domestic and international audiences. Or as Mead (1962, 204) put it, a 
policy ‘must be recognized by others to have the very values, which we want to have belong to it’. 
Consequently the success or failure of any action is not only in the hands of the actors that initiate a 
given action, but also depends on the specific addressees as well as on a wider audience. Richard Ned 
Lebow acknowledges this last point when arguing that ‘social exchange and mutual constitution’ 
transform material capabilities in power and influence (Lebow 2007, 121).485    
                                                     
484  ‘Mais j’ai de la responsabilité, parce que je suis à la tête d’un pays qui a un lien avec l’Afrique, parce que 
nous sommes solidaires de ce continent, parce qu’il y a des populations qui se sont mélangées par la mobilité, par 
les déplacements, j’ai une responsabilité particulière et donc je tiens à ce que la France soit à l’initiative’.  
485  Power should not simply be understood as a state’s material capabilities or resources but as the ability to change 
other states’ behaviour so that it concurs with the own interests and preferences (Nye 2011, xiii). Joseph Nye’s 
concept of soft power makes room for such inclusive understanding of power by considering ‘intangible power 
resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions’ (Nye 1990, 166–67). 
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 The very identity of French actors and thus the French state to some extent depends on the acceptance 
of the narrative of France being an influential power in the world. To maintain this narrative a policy 
was wanted that would confirm the discourse and put the French role conception into practice. Thus, 
when intervening in Mali and the CAR, the Hollande administration was not only saving strangers and 
contributing to international stability, but was saving its very self-image, which it wishes others to 
accept. France exists in the international system as a security actor on the African continent, as a 
democracy promoter and human rights defender that does not shy away from using force when it can 
help defend the values and ideas to which the polity subscribes. In other words, France’s role in the 
international system is intertwined with Africa’s instability. ‘Because of the reciprocal character of role 
relations’ France can only be Africa’s regional protector as long as African states assume the role of the 
protectee (Backman 1970, 313). If, one day, African leaders no longer resort to France’s assistance in 
security matters, France’s national identity and purpose in the international system will be seriously 
challenged. At that moment, French actors will enter a time of crisis, as Rosati (2000, 67) postulates, 
during which a new identity will be forged. Hence, French interventionism in francophone Africa is 
neither simply a leap back into a colonial relationship of dependency nor is it a leap towards complete 
disengagement.          
 Lastly, France’s continuous interventionism is both part of and contributes to the prolongation of a 
long tradition that ‘involved the continual objectification of “Africa” as a place where horrendous things 
happened to benighted people, and where the West could display its full panoply of moral and material 
powers to positive ends’ (Reid 2014, 144). In fact, each French intervention undermines the discourse 
of the promotion of African-led or other multilateral approaches to Africa’s security architecture and 
thus prolongs a certain type of paternalism to which the majority of African states had been subjected 
to long after decolonisation.         
 By analysing the processes that led to the two military interventions in Mali and the CAR 
respectively, I hope to have qualified the notion of interest, drawn attention to the high degree of 
complexity behind these decision-making processes, and identified tangible motivations that informed 
decision-makers in the course of France’s latest military interventions in Africa. Given the interactionist 
nature of foreign policy-making, policy-makers and analysts must pay close attention to the reactions of 
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different audiences in order to judge the success of a given policy. While I acknowledge the importance 
of different audiences and particularly the role of regional actors in crisis resolution, future research 
could provide a more detailed analysis of how foreign policy-makers reacted to French actions, 
influenced French policy-making, and defined their own role in light of France’s interventions.  
 
‘It’s the Process Stupid!’…and Ideas486 
In theoretical terms, this project intended to show how a process-oriented analysis in combination with 
an actor-centred ideational approach to foreign policy analysis can contribute to our understanding of 
foreign policy-making. To understand foreign policy-making, it has been argued that it is necessary to 
decipher the actors’ psychological environment. A close examination of the process brings out the 
equifinality of decision-making, that is, the potential existence of several equally (un)likely solutions to 
the same problem (George and Bennett 2005, 206–7). Such a process-oriented approach emphasises the 
need to distinguish between policy-making and policy outcomes. By so doing, the study has responded 
to the quest to bring ‘mechanisms’487 back into the analysis of international relations and produced a set 
of explanations that are grounded in empirical reality (Checkel 2005, 14). What happens below the 
macro-theoretical level of grand theories is more than just noise or décor but instead the very gist of all 
politics and therefore deserves a more prominent place in policy analyses.   
 Throughout this work I have emphasised the importance of taking mental maps and heuristic 
shortcuts serious when analysing foreign policy behaviour. Studies in social psychology found that 
unlimited choice and opportunity may provoke disappointment and even suffering (Schwartz and Ward 
2004; Schwartz 2004). Unlimited choice not only turns individual freedom into an act of condemnation 
but also leads to paralysis. Only ‘self-determination within significant constraints—within “rules” of 
some sort—[…] leads to well-being, to optimal functioning’ (Schwartz and Ward 2004, 86). In order to 
achieve such optimal functioning (or at the very least some functionality), actors rely on heuristic 
shortcuts or mental maps, as we have seen throughout this work. Close scrutiny of the actors’ discourses 
                                                     
486  See Checkel 2005. 
487  Defined as links between inputs and outcomes that account for interactions between agents and structure 
(Checkel 2005, 4).  
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has corroborated the argument that human beings, as decision-makers, make sense of the operational 
environment and give meaning to social facts through selective recognition of the totality of available 
information. This makes humans ‘limited information processors” (Lau 2003, 29) whose rationality 
remains bounded at most (Simon 1985). In a world of affluent choice, ideas help decision-makers take 
action. Beliefs and motives, as Hermann showed, ‘provide political leaders with maps for charting their 
course, shaping the nature of the leaders’ goals and appropriate strategies for achieving the goals… 
[they] suggest what is important to the leader’ (Hermann 1987, 165). Walker and Schafer corroborate 
these findings when arguing ‘that the subjective beliefs held by a leader are the ones that are most likely 
to influence his/her choice of moves’ (Walker and Schafer 2006, 11). By definition, mental maps 
simplify reality and give meaning to a contested present and unknown future. As Lebow (2010, 14) 
states, ‘insight into the future is rooted in our understanding of the past, our socially constructed, 
psychologically motivated, and ideologically filtered reconstruction of past events and imputation of 
their “lessons”’. Mental maps can take various forms and formats and are closely related to the actors’ 
individual and collective experiences. We saw how analogies to Afghanistan increased perceptions of a 
terrorist threat in the Sahel and likewise how analogies to Rwanda augmented the actors’ willingness to 
deploy a peacekeeping operation to the CAR in order to halt a genocide. By resorting to counterfactual 
reasoning, French policy makers had established a truth claim according to which French intervention 
was imperative in preventing an otherwise inevitable genocide.     
 The ideational struggles that could be detected during the decision-making processes confirm the 
core assumptions of social cognition and schema theory. The theory ‘depicts individual belief systems 
as internally much more fragmented, with different beliefs or schemas being evoked under different 
situations for making sense of the environment, suggesting a greater likelihood that some beliefs may 
change over time’ (Rosati 2000, 57). To test this hypothesis, the phenomenon of non-intervention 
deserves our attention. By analysing processes of non-intervention, one can scrutinise the impact of the 
same mental maps in light of a fundamentally different outcome. This study briefly elaborated on the 
non-intervention in the CAR at the beginning of 2013. It would be interesting to apply the same 
methodology to the non-intervention in Mali in 2012 under the Sarkozy administration, as well as to the 
ongoing Syrian crisis to further engage in the study of ideational struggles and their potential impacts 
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on policies.           
 Cognition and schema theory not only put struggles between competing ideas and belief systems at 
the centre of their analyses, they also allow for inconsistency in the actors’ mind thus discarding the 
explanation of French security policy towards Africa in terms of a confusion paradigm (Bovcon 2013; 
Cumming 2013). From the perspective of cognition theory, ‘although the beliefs held by an individual 
may appear inconsistent and contradictory to an outside observer, the overall belief system may be 
functional within the mind of the individual, indicating a complex and messy cognitive process’ (Rosati 
2000, 57). While brute facts can exist independently of human actors, social reality cannot.  
 Taken together, the recognition that processes are open-ended and non-determinate and the finding 
that policy behaviour depends to a large extent on heuristic shortcuts and a specific set of ideas provide 
for an interpretation that places ideational struggles at the core of any analysis. In other words, human 
cognition matters in the making of foreign policy and world politics (Rosati 2000, 47). In this study I 
have shown how it impacts on decision-making processes in the context of French foreign and security 
policy. By examining French interventionism in Africa, I found that national interests are neither given 
nor immutable, but emerge from a process of interpretation, during which ‘natural kinds’ traverse actors’ 
ideational prisms to become ‘social kinds’488 (Houghton 2007, 29). Social reality and by consequence 
foreign policy is always an outcome of a struggle between competing ideas. By shedding light on these 
processes of competition a better understanding of the making of foreign policy has become possible.
 The picture that emerges from this project is that of a complex and multifaceted reality. While I am 
convinced that the present approach positively contributes to our understanding of French security 
policy in sub-Saharan Africa and can be applied to other instances of foreign policy-making, it is not a 
panacea to solve all puzzle of foreign policy-making. Clearly, there are limits as to how much we can 
say about actors’ intrinsic motivations by relying on official discourse and interview data. As stated 
above, we simply do not have a direct access to the actors’ minds. Substitute data may be flawed, 
erroneous, or willingly distorted. By means of triangulation I tried to distinguish between constitutive 
and instrumental beliefs and thus increase the validity of the interpretations offered in this text. Whilst 
allowing for a convincing account of the processes that led to the military operations in Mali and CAR, 
                                                     
488  For a discussion of the differences between natural and social kinds see (Wendt 1999, 68–71). 
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one may raise some doubts as to what extent the story told actually explains foreign policy decision-
making. Claims about causality and generalizations are difficult to achieve and are rejected by the 
epistemology that has been chosen for this project. Isolating the impact of mental maps and culture on 
foreign policy-making is extremely difficult—and at times even impossible to achieve. While the 
multidimensional character and complexity of the interpretation proposed here may limit the study’s 
explanatory reach, this deficiency also constitutes the approach’s theoretical richness and principal 
contribution (Stark Urrestarazu 2015, 133). If we acknowledge multidimensional explanations as 
necessary to understand the complexity of social reality and advance a minimal definition of causes as 
‘reasons for action and other constitutive “driving forces”’ (Stark Urrestarazu 2015, 142), the model 
advanced here seems a promising approach to illuminate the processes and motivations behind France’s 
latest military interventions on the African continent.     
 
‘Making War and Waging Peace’: On Terrorism and 
Humanitarianism489  
When the Hollande administration decided on two interventions in Africa, it was acting not in a vacuum 
but under the influence of and according to the norms and rules of the present-day international system. 
In Chapter Two, I illuminated the interaction between individual actors and socially constructed 
knowledge structures. This co-constitution of social reality can be observed by looking at the two 
leitmotifs that helped actors to justify the respective interventions in Mali and the CAR. In the case of 
Operation Serval the justification derived from France’s commitment to fight terrorism whilst in the 
case of Operation Sangaris the responsibility to protect prevailed. Adding to this, the discursive 
commitment to multilateral solutions being considered the only righteous belligerent action also derives 
from a collective knowledge structure, according to which supranational organisations enjoy a greater 
legitimacy than state actors (Claude 1966). In her volume on changing beliefs and their impact on 
                                                     
489  See Smock 1993.  
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foreign intervention, Finnemore provides a succinct list of elements required for an intervention to be 
defined as humanitarian, thus being considered legitimate in the current context of world politics:  
In addition to a shift in normative burdens to act, intervention norms now place strict requirements 
on the ways humanitarian intervention can be carried out. Humanitarian intervention must be 
multilateral when it occurs. It must be organized under multilateral, preferably UN, auspices or with 
explicit multilateral consent. Further, it must be implemented with a multilateral force if at all 
possible. Specifically the intervention force should contain troops from “disinterested” states, 
usually middle-level powers outside the region of conflict – another dimension of multilateralism 
not found in the nineteenth-century practice. (Finnemore 2003, 80) 
 In both cases, French actors abided by these rules during the agenda setting and early framing 
process. Multilateralism took precedence over unilateral intervention, with the AU or the UN heralded 
as leaders of possible intervention forces in both cases. During the decision-making processes leading 
up to interventions in Mali and the CAR, France spent considerable time and effort lobbying at the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly. Multilateral consent was considered as the necessary 
precondition of any action.          
 As the decision approached, actors had become much more lackadaisical about the golden principles 
that had dominated the discourse at the outset of the decision-making process. The reasons that explain 
the French government’s decision to deviate from their initial course have been demonstrated above. 
Two other points deserve our attention. First, the interventions’ early phases, which had been conducted 
under French leadership in collaboration with regional partners, were framed as a necessary deviation 
from the normal course. After French troops had acted as a rapid reaction force (force de première 
entrée) helping to bring the violence to a halt (initially with limited success in the case of the CAR), 
policy-makers endeavoured to recreate the image of an intervention that corresponded to the 
characteristics of justified multilateral action. This line of argumentation, buttressed by constructivist 
scholarship, clearly shows the strong influence of established norms on policy action rather than 
reflecting the situation on the ground.        
 Given that rapid interventions by French forces in Africa in the name of regime stability were 
accepted courses of action until the 1990s, one can point to the malleable nature of norms and their 
transformation over time. In a sense, the operation in Mali was more than an ephemeral and necessary 
outbreak from the norm. Small deviations from established rules and norms, as Barnett and Finnemore 
(1999, 721–22) have shown, can set a precedent and have considerable impact on future action. ‘Over 
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time, these exceptions can become the rule—they become normal, not exceptions at all: they can become 
institutionalized to the point where deviance is "normalized"’ (1999, 722). The French intervention in 
Mali has been celebrated as a successful and efficient operation against terrorist forces and has received 
the approval and plaudits of the vast majority of actors in the international system. Although such quasi-
unilateral intervention with neighbouring states implicated at the conflict’s frontline contradicts the 
principle of multilateral intervention as outlined above, the triumph of the former type of intervention 
could lead to a gradual institutionalisation of this practice, thus potentially emerging as a normal 
procedure in the future. Operations conducted by one actor or a small group of actors acting in the name 
of the larger international community—due to their superior efficiency—could be considered as 
legitimate practice of multilateral intervention. France’s attempts to deduct the costs of external military 
operations from the EU budget calculations are a first step in this direction. In the wake of the 
intervention in Mali, French actors publicly claimed to have acted in the name of the EU. They purported 
that not only should their action be considered as legitimate, but also that other member states should 
contribute to the operation’s costs. If and when such contracted interventionism actually will become a 
future norm remains to be seen.         
 Global security agendas and international norms co-determine what becomes a threat and what does 
not. Similar to issue-specific mental maps, these macro-maps or norms emerge from ideational struggles 
between competing ideas and actors in the international system. Generally speaking, they are long-term 
procedures and therefore enjoy a highly developed level of social capital, that is, acceptance among the 
different actors. Consequently, they are rarely questioned. As Bigo argues, even after a process of 
institutionalisation these norms remain inherently political: ‘Labels like terrorism, human trafficking, 
economic refugee, and national security, even when sanctified by social sciences and transformed by 
lawyers into judicial categories, are not scholarly concepts or thinking tools but instruments of a politics 
of (in)security (Bigo and Hermant 1986)’ (Bigo 2011, 230–31). Once institutionalised, they prove 
particularly resilient and influence the way actors think about the operational environment that surrounds 
them. Long before the establishment of international relations as a discipline and emergence of 
constructivism as one of the dominating schools of thought, Neapolitan philosopher, historian, and jurist 
Giambattista Vico ([1710]1982, 55) drew his readers’ attention to the fact that ‘the criterion and rule of 
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the true is to have made it’. To critically scrutinize truth constructions by those social agents endowed 
with the necessary capital to create and shape collective narratives has always been and should always 



















Primary Sources According to Document Type 
 
 CAR Mali 
Official declarations 24 68 
Press conferences 143 83 
Speeches 99 73 
Official Interviews 56 51 
Parliamentary Hearings 39 17 
Parliamentary Reports 0 1 
Op-eds 4 1 
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Military operations in the CAR with French troop involvement 
 
Date Name Objectives 




Deposition of Emperor Bokassa I and re-installation of David 
Dacko, protection of French expatriates, stopping Libyan troops 
from occupying Bouar  






Pre-positioned French forces (forces pré-positionnées) in support 
of the FACA (Forces armées centrafricaines), permanent military  
presence also used as starting point for numerous interventions 
across the region, such as in Chad, Zaire, Gabon, Congo 
Brazzaville, or Rwanda 
April 1996 Furet/Almandin I Repeated mutinies on the part of some elements of the FACA 
against the government between 1996 and 1998 trigger military 
operations Almandin I – III. The missions supported the EFAO 
and involved up to 2.300 troops. The support to President Ange-
Félix Patassé, the protection of French expatriates and the 
securitisation of strategic points (such as the airport, or main 
roads) are among the principal tasks of the French troops. After an 
intensification of the violence and the death of two French 
soldiers in January 1997, Almandin III was launched, involving 
armoured vehicles and air support. 











790 African troops with logistical and financial support by France 
were mandated to restore peace and security by monitoring the 
implementation of the Bangui Agreements (peace agreement 
between the forces loyal to President Patassé and the rebels).  
During occasional peaks of violence French troops intervened 
directly (Mission Bubale, and with troops from Operation 
Almandin).    




de maintien de la 
paix des Nations 
Unies en RCA) 
In light of the financial and logistical constraints of the MISAB 
and France’s decision to retreat from the CAR by reducing its 
troops in the country to 300, UN Resolution 1159 (1998) 
established the MINURCA. French troops supported the UN 
mission until they were replaced by Egyptian forces in February 
1999.  
Oct. 1997 – 
April 1998 
Cigogne Support the retreat of EFAO troops.  
2000 Operation Murène 33 troops to protect the French embassy  
March 2003 - 
present 
Boali After an agreement between François Bozizé and Jacques Chirac, 
the French government launches Operation Boali to support 
FACA and FOMUC troops. Boali has comprised between 200 and 
500 troops and has been part of RECAMP. French troops 
intervene against UFDR rebels in 2006 and 2007, leading to 
another peace agreement between the CAR government and the 
rebel.  




EU mission to protect civilians (refugees), facilitate aid deliveries, 
and ensure the security of UN staff. The operation was 
coordinated from the headquarters in France, which with 2,500 
out of 3,700 troops was the largest contributor.     
December 2013 
– present  
Operation 
Sangaris  
Peacekeeping operation to inhibit violent clashes between former 
Seleka elements and anti-balaka fighters, protect French 
expatriates and the Central African population, prevent a civil war 
and allow for the UN peacekeeping operation to restore order and 
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